

**Power, Participation and Relationships: An Evaluation of Decentralization in the  
Planning and Management of Quetico Provincial Park**

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**ABSTRACT**

There has been a global trend towards the decentralization of protected area planning and management. This study used a decentralization framework to determine if the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park has been decentralized since its inception in 1909. The study found that public participation in the planning and management decision-making process has increased, but that decentralization has not occurred. However, it was found that even though actors such as local communities, ENGOs, and tourism outfitters do not have the power to make planning and management decisions, they are able to influence the decision-makers through participating in the process and developing relationships with all actors including the government representatives.

*Keywords:* governance, decentralization, public participation, power, social capital, participation, relationships, protected area planning, Quetico Provincial Park.

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## CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

### BACKGROUND

In 1909, the area now known as Quetico Provincial Park was designated as a Forest Reserve, with the purpose to protect moose and other game animals from over harvesting by local mining and forestry work camps (Peruniak, 2000). At that time in Canada, it was unusual to protect an area for ecological purposes (Malcolm, 2009). From the 1800s to the 1960s, areas were protected at the behest of the public for more utilitarian purposes, such as commercial recreation and tourism. Ecological protection did not become the norm until the environmental movement of the 1960s when the public became concerned about pollution and rapid industrial and commercial development within parks. At the same time, due to public and environmental non-governmental organization pressure, commercial and industrial development was superseded by a greater emphasis on ecological integrity and recreation (Killan, 1993; McNamee, 2009).

The first parks in Ontario under the 1913 *Provincial Parks Act* were designated and managed by government experts with the aim to satisfy the will of the public for the protection of recreational values (Malcolm, 2009). Then in 1971, through public pressure of the environmental movement, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR) changed its policies so that there was a requirement for public participation in the development and review of all park management plans (Killan, 1997). As a result, when the Quetico Provincial Park Master Plan (the first in Ontario) was developed the public, for the first time, was able to provide planning input to an advisory committee

consisting of provincial leaders through public meetings and written submissions. Later in 1993, minimum levels of public participation were legislated in the *Environmental Bill of Rights* guaranteeing public opportunities for input prior to the Government of Ontario making environmentally significant decisions for policies, Acts, regulations. The requirement for public participation in park planning was legislated in the 2006 *Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act*.

The change to public involvement in park planning and management in Ontario followed the global trend towards greater public participation in protected area management. Public participation in park planning and management has been found to improve conservation efforts and bring social and economic benefits to local communities and other stakeholders such as tourism operators, resource extraction industries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), and ministry staff among others (Buteau-Duitschaever, 2009; Eagles, McCool, and Haynes, 2002; Jeanrenaud, 1999; Porter, 2001). Other benefits of public participation in natural resource decision-making include the incorporation of public values, improved quality of decisions, greater cost effectiveness, increased capacity of stakeholders, increased trust in government, and enhancement of public environmental problem knowledge through education (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Colfer and Wadley, 1996; Cote and Bouthillier, 2002; Reed, 2008).

There are also potential negative consequences to public participation. Existing power structures can be negatively affected through the empowerment of peripheral groups, or can become more entrenched minimizing the impact that peripheral groups have (Reed, 2008). Stakeholders can suffer from consultation fatigue if processes are

mismanaged, or if there is a perceived lack of power over decisions (Reed, 2008).

Stakeholders can also feel powerless if there are actors that have non-negotiable positions or veto powers. This can result in low participation rates and negatively influence the significance of participation. The value of participation can also be questioned due to a lack of capacity to meaningfully engage in often highly technical debates. While information may be shared, if it is done in such a manner that some of the actors do not understand that information, it can negatively affect their ability to participate in decision-making (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Reed, 2008; Robson et al., 2010).

An increase in public participation can range from a minimum of allowing communities to advise agency personnel of their wishes all the way up to communities being able to negotiate or having the majority of decision-making power (Arnstein, 1969). The act of giving up the power and responsibility for the management and planning of resources by a government agency to stakeholders is called decentralization (Ribot, 2004). There has been a global trend towards decentralization of authority and responsibility for conservation management (Davey, 1998).

Numerous functions of government agencies can be decentralized. They include planning, finances, information, service delivery, and human and other resources. It is rare for all government functions to be decentralized concurrently, and some may not be decentralized at all. The extent of decentralization is differentiated by a few key initiatives that are introduced in stages. Each function can range from being fully centralized to being fully decentralized, with most systems falling somewhere in between (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Hutchcroft, 2001; Hutton, 2002; Ribot, 2004).

One of the positive aspects of decentralization is that as citizen participation increases, the decision-making actors within government become more responsive to citizens' needs, resulting in greater equity amongst all actors and more efficiently delivered services (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). These benefits are realized because the actors who control the resources in a decentralized system are downwardly accountable to constituents (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999).

Decentralization also has some negative characteristics. They include political obfuscation, corruption, lack of resources and capacity, and unwillingness to cede power by authorities (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Capistrano and Colfer, 2005). One cause of these negative aspects can be the lack of the necessary support (i.e. funding, technical skill, supporting policy, etc.) to a community when the responsibility for a natural resource is downloaded.

## **THE TREND TOWARDS DECENTRALIZED PROTECTED AREA MANAGEMENT**

There has been a trend towards decentralization of the planning and management of protected areas in Ontario such as Quetico Provincial Park. There have been three phases of park establishment. The first phase (~1893–1960s) consisted of public pressure being placed on government to protect specific areas for generally utilitarian purposes (forestry, tourism, hunting and angling). It was at this stage that Quetico was designated as the Quetico Forest Reserve in 1909, and then became the first park under the 1913 *Provincial Parks Act*. The next phase (~1960s–1970s) was the establishment of parks to meet recreation and ecological goals that are based on representation of

ecoregions or ecodistricts (Killan, 1993). At this stage parks such as Quetico were managed by ministry experts that were mandated to care for the ecological integrity of the park over all other objectives. The third and current phase (1970s–present) has increased inclusiveness by mandating that the rights of or impacts on local communities (especially Aboriginal people) are considered when making planning or management decisions (Dearden and Langdon, 2009; Department of Justice, 2000, 2002; OMNR, 1992; OMNR, 2009c; Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act, 2006). At this stage public participation was included for the first time in the first provincial park management plan in Ontario, though ecological integrity remains the primary objective of all park management and planning decisions.

During the first two phases, planning and management were highly centralized, because once land was under the purview of the park agency, it was assumed that agency staff had planning and management education and skills not available to the general public. Over time, however, agency staff capabilities have become less respected. One factor contributing to this is that, contrary to legislative mandates, the state of many parks' ecological integrity has deteriorated, particularly high profile parks such as Banff, Riding Mountain, and Waterton Lakes National Parks (Nevitte, 1996; McNamee, 2009). Park agencies have also likely lost some of their lustre through the forced removal of communities when developing parks, such as Kouchibouguac National Park and Ipperwash Provincial Park (Linden, 2007; McNamee, 2009).

Criticism of the centralized approach to park planning and management in the Canadian and Ontarian protected area systems began to escalate. These criticisms were based on the discontent and obstruction of cooperation between the public and planning

authorities that a centralized authority causes, because a centralized authority is prone to doing what it feels is right rather than what others think is right (Brown & Harris, 2005). It was not until the 1980s that public participation in park planning and management became more acceptable to conservationists and park superintendents. The first two events that led to this shift in attitude by conservationists and park superintendents were the 1980 World Conservation Strategy and the 1982 World Congress on National Parks in Bali (Wells, Brandon and Hannah, 1992).

The 1980 World Conservation Strategy is significant because it emphasized the value of connecting parks and the economic activities of communities rather than separating the two. The significance of the 1982 World Congress on National Parks was that conservationists and park superintendents supported the inclusion of local people in the planning and management of parks, which was also contrary to previous ideology. Congress participants also established the requirement for increased support of local participation in decision-making, greater access to resources, and appropriate development near parks for the benefit of nearby communities. In short, both the World Conservation Strategy and the World Congress on National Parks recognized that for long-term successful management of parks, there must be cooperation and support from local communities or the parks and their ecological integrity were at risk (Wells et al. 1992). An example in Canada of a protected area that fulfills the mandates of the World Conservation Strategy and the World Congress on National Parks is Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve. The creation of the National Park Reserve involved multiple levels of government, and stakeholder groups such as ENGOs and the tourism industry (Parks Canada, 2010; Wright and Rollins, 2009).

In concert with the increased pressure for greater public involvement in park planning and management was the emergence, in the 1970s, of a new approach to resource management called ecosystem-based management (EBM). According to Slocombe and Dearden (2009) there are various definitions for EBM, but most share concepts around management that is collaborative and participatory, based on biophysical and not administrative boundaries, where management goals are concerned with ecological integrity, sustainability, and biodiversity maintenance. While the focus of EBM is largely ecological integrity, some other elements that have contributed to its success are the cooperation between stakeholders and government agencies who each have different objectives and constituencies, and viewing social, political, and environmental issues holistically and not individually (Slocombe and Dearden, 2009).

Ecosystem-based management began to be used in Canada during the 1980s; however, the Canadian version of EBM has been focused more on the scientific and ecological integrity component than on the participatory or process component which has developed in other areas of the world (Slocombe & Dearden, 2009). Parks Canada officially recognized EBM in 1994 through the Parks Canada Policy and in the 2002 National Marine Conservation Areas Act, both of which have a strong focus on public participation in the planning and management of parks (Slocombe and Dearden, 2009). No similar policy exists specifically for Ontario Parks (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 1992; OMNR, 2009b; Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act, 2006). However, Ontario's 1993 *Environmental Bill of Rights* has a strong focus on environmental integrity, and requires public input for park management plans.

## **DECENTRALIZATION FRAMEWORK**

In 1999, Agrawal and Ribot developed the only analytical framework found that evaluates decentralization in natural resource management. The framework provides a foundation that limits and guides the analysis to three discrete components the authors identified that underlie all acts of decentralization: actors, powers, and accountability (see Table 1). Agrawal and Ribot found that by limiting the analysis to these three components the analysis is organized, but explanations of the outcomes or behaviours are neither provided nor predicted. They also found that if the powers of the actors, the spheres of influence in which they exercise those powers, and to whom and how they are held accountable are not understood, it is not possible to determine the extent to which meaningful decentralization has occurred.

**Table 1.** The three most significant components of Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) decentralization framework with important aspects and examples.

Components of the framework	Important aspects of the components	Examples
Actors	<p>Can be controversial to determine</p> <p>Process to identify should not exclude on a de facto basis</p> <p>Different types of influence for each actor</p> <p>Each is accountable to others</p>	<p>Elected and appointed officials</p> <p>Powerful and influential individuals</p> <p>Corporate bodies (i.e. communities and industrial interests)</p> <p>Committees</p> <p>Cooperatives</p> <p>Non-governmental organizations</p> <p>First Nations leaders</p> <p>General public</p>
Powers	<p>Affected by laws, policy and legislation</p> <p>Can be dependent on wealth, heredity, electoral clout, etc.</p>	<p>The power to create or modify rules</p> <p>The power to make decisions about the use of resources</p> <p>The power to implement and enforce compliance of the new or altered rules</p> <p>The power to adjudicate disputes that occur during the creation and enforcement of compliance of new or altered rules</p>
Accountability	<p>Measure of responsibility to those represented by an actor</p> <p>Decentralization only effective when actors are downwardly accountable</p> <p>Accountability prevents arbitrary decisions or actions by an actor</p> <p>Downward accountability can increase participation</p>	<p>Electoral Process</p> <p>Horizontal and vertical ties between government departments</p> <p>Relationship between the administrative superiors and customary authorities</p> <p>Procedures for recall</p> <p>Third party monitoring by media, NGOs, or independently elected controllers</p> <p>Auditing and evaluation</p> <p>Political pressure and lobbying</p>

Note: The powers listed are the four powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999).

The framework can be used to examine whether or not the policies, legislation and actions on the ground by the controlling actors constitutes decentralization. To do so the researcher conducts document reviews and interviews the actors involved to determine who the actors are, which of them hold power, and how they are held accountable. The framework also traces changes in actors, powers, and accountability, and identifies political obfuscation or deficiencies such as design flaws in the action of decentralising. The results of identifying any shortcomings can allow advocates of decentralization and agency personnel to move reforms beyond dialogue to on-the-ground action. The framework is able to do this because it is applied to a single sector, and therefore determines any agency shortcomings that may be lost in otherwise well-designed initiatives or legislation.

### **STUDY OBJECTIVES AND SIGNIFICANCE**

Today, because of the requirements for public participation during management planning, the park planning system has become less centralized. As well, the literature indicates that a system of resource control that is fully decentralized will be more likely to realize the benefits of decentralization than is one that is partially decentralized (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). Therefore, the aim of the study is to utilize Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) framework of actors, powers and accountability to assess the extent of decentralization that has occurred over the history of the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park, and measure the present day extent of decentralization that exists in the management of the park.

The framework has been used to determine the degree of decentralization in natural resource management in developing nations including Mongolian pasture-land management (Mearns, 2004), African forestry projects (German et al, 2010; Muhereza, 2005), and other natural resource community-driven developments in developing nations around the world (Ribot and Mearns, 2005). It has not been applied to gauging decentralization in protected area management, nor in a highly developed country context. Therefore, the study will also test the framework and contribute to theory regarding decentralization of management of natural resources, specifically parks, in a developed country context.

Quetico Provincial Park was chosen as the study area because it is a large (i.e. 4,758 km<sup>2</sup>), highly protected area, and has a history that encompasses all of the global and provincial phases of park planning and management. Quetico's large size makes it a Wilderness Class Provincial Park. Ontario Parks (2009) defines a wilderness class park as an area greater than 100,000 hectares that visitors may travel through using non-mechanized means such as hiking and canoeing "while engaging in low-impact recreation to experience solitude, challenge and integration with nature". The equivalent International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) classification would be a category II (national park), because the area protects large-scale ecological processes and is compatible with cultural, spiritual, scientific, education, recreation and other tourism opportunities (Dearden and Rollins, 2009; IUCN, 2009). It is hoped that by tracing the history and determining the degree of decentralization of planning and management in Quetico Provincial Park, the study will provide agency staff with information that can increase the management success of the park. Given that Agrawal

and Ribot's (1999) decentralization framework has been applied to natural resource settings only in a developing country context, this study will also test the framework and contribute to theory regarding decentralization of management of natural resources, specifically parks, in a developed country context.

The study has the following research objectives:

1. To trace how and why acts of decentralization in the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park have occurred from the inception of the park to the present day.
2. To determine the stakeholders involved, the powers they wield, to whom and how they are held accountable, and if their participation has increased or decreased in the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park since inception.
3. To determine which aspects of decentralization are most significant to stakeholder success.

To meet these objectives, a document review and informant interviews were conducted. The documents reviewed consisted of newspaper articles, historical accounts and government documents, including background reports, management plans, policies and legislation. There were 12 individuals interviewed from groups such as the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS), local community representatives, commercial tourism operators, and park users.

It is hoped that by tracing the history and determining the degree of decentralization of planning and management in Quetico Provincial Park, the study will provide agency staff with information that can increase the management success of the park. As well, it is anticipated that testing the framework will determine the viability of the framework to measure the degree of decentralization of the planning and management of protected areas in Ontario and other developed country contexts.

## **DEFINITIONS**

The following is a list of terms and definitions that will be used throughout the thesis.

Aboriginal people: “is a collective name for the original peoples of North America and their descendants. The Canadian constitution recognizes three groups of Aboriginal people: Indians (commonly referred to as First Nations), Métis and Inuit. These are three distinct peoples with unique histories, languages, cultural practices and spiritual beliefs.” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2010a).

Deconcentration: The transfer of powers to lower level actors who are upwardly accountable. Also known as administrative decentralization (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999).

Ecodistrict: An ecodistrict is a subdivision of an ecoregion that is based on relatively homogeneous biophysical and climatic conditions and are appropriate for strategic planning at the sub-regional level (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2008; OMNR, 2005).

Ecoregion: An ecoregion is an ecological division based on climate, soil type, landform, species and ecological processes (Racey Wiltshire & Archibald, 1999).

Environmental Registry: A repository of public notices about environmental matters covered by the Environmental Bill of Rights that ministries of the government of Ontario must use to communicate and receive comment from the public.

Legislation: For the purposes of this study, legislation refers to an act that has been passed into law by Parliament. An example would be the 2006 *Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act*. Legislation sets out the objectives, principles and rules that are required of those affected by it. Failure to comply can result in fines or other penalties.

Policy: OMNR defines policy “as a statement of intended direction developed to guide present and future actions and decisions” (OMNR, 2012). Policies are designed by ministry staff such as the park superintendent or others and are not debated by parliament, but are subject to final approval by senior ministry staff or the Minister in charge. An example of an Ontario Parks policy would be the Quetico Provincial Park Management Plan. Policies can become laws, and to do so would require Parliamentary debate. An example of a policy that became law is the policy requiring public participation during park planning that became law under the 2006 *Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act*.

Stakeholder: A stakeholder is all the individuals or groups of any size or social status who affect or are affected by the decisions, actions, and policies of the park (Grimble & Chan, 1995; Nelson & Wright, 1995). McCool (2009) found that a wide variety of stakeholders expected to be included in park planning and management. Examples would include park users, the local communities, politicians, businesses, trappers, and both ENGOs and NGOs.

## STUDY LIMITATIONS

The majority of the study limitations are a result of the sample size of 12. Below is a list of the limitations, the steps if any to mitigate their affect, and potential implications.

The first two limitations are that it was not possible to interview anyone from the major actors representing the provincially elected officials or Lac La Croix First Nation. Approximately 40 attempts were made through phone calls, faxes, emails, and on site visits to meet with and interview someone from the First Nation. Information on this actor group was obtained through the document review and obtaining information from informants that had knowledge regarding Lac La Croix based on personal and professional interactions with members of the community.

The third limitation is that no one from the United States was interviewed for this study. The reason that this is significant is that U.S. citizens represent 80-95% of park users. Unfortunately, it was not possible to contact anyone from the United States to be an informant. An attempt was made to use internet based chat forums that cater to Quetico and Boundary Waters Canoe Area users to contact potential informants. However, there were no responses from any members of the American public.

Fourth, it must be remembered that this study is based on 12 interviews, of which the majority of informants provided environmental advocacy responses. The result of this is that saturation may have been achieved prematurely because of a lack of sample variance. For some of the actors I am very confident in my findings. However,

for others, particularly the General Public group, it would have been preferable to interview more individuals as this group is not homogeneous. Unfortunately, it was very difficult to identify and interview the two that I was able to contact. For the General Public group it would have been particularly helpful to interview a number of different individuals. First would have been those who have participated in the past, but had stopped doing so. Second, would be representatives from Thunder Bay, Fort Frances, northwestern Ontario, and southern Ontario. The reason for this is that the General Public actor group encompasses all of the members of the Ontario public including Thunder Bay, Fort Frances, northwestern Ontario, and southern Ontario. In the past all of these groups have individually been major actors, but as noted earlier it was very difficult to identify and contact individuals from the General Public actor group.

It may be that some members of the general public are represented by interest groups such as the ENGO and NGO groups from which individuals were interviewed. However, there may be a segment of the population that does not participate and is not represented by any interest group or political party. For example, Petry and Mendelsohn (2004) found in Canada that the consistency of public policy meeting with majority opinion dropped 20% over 16 years from 69% for the period 1985-1993 to 49% for the period 1994-2001. They also found that policy was more likely to match public opinion for high profile issues than it was for low profile issues, and that the public was less likely to be aware of the low profile issues. Therefore, the results from the General Public perspective are unlikely to be representative of the entire actor group.

The final limitation of the study is that the findings cannot be generalized to other park management agencies in Canada, or elsewhere, but is limited to Ontario Parks' planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park.

### **DELIMITATIONS**

The study will be delimited to the history and present level of decentralization in the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park. The examination of the history and present level of decentralization in all wilderness class parks in Ontario is beyond the reach of the researcher given the limited time and money for conducting the study.

## CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter contains the literature review. It is divided into five sections: 1) governance, 2) public participation, 3) social capital, 4) political capital, and 5) Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) decentralization framework.

### GOVERNANCE

This section will provide a definition of governance, explain the different types of governance, and describe the five categories of governance as outlined by Eagles (2009). These categories are based on the ten principles of governance as outlined by Graham et al. (2003).

Governance is “the interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say” (Graham et al., 2003, p. 1). The significant aspects of governance are power, relationships and accountability, specifically who has influence, who decides, and how are influential individuals held accountable (Graham et al., 2003). There are three spheres of governance—political, administrative and economic—involving many entities including government, corporations, NGOs, and individual citizens. Political governance refers to decisions regarding policy, while administrative governance is the implementation of law and policy. The process of economic decision-making is known as economic governance (Eagles, 2009).

Graham et al. (2003) categorized ten principles of governance, which Eagles (2009) combined into five categories: legitimacy and voice, strategic vision,

performance, accountability, and fairness. The first category, legitimacy and voice, consists of public participation and consensus orientation. Public participation refers to all people having either a direct or indirect voice in decision-making. Consensus orientation concerns attaining the best decision for the population through mediation resulting in a consensus.

The second category, strategic vision, involves constructively looking towards the future while considering the historical, cultural, and social intricacies of all situations. The third category, performance, consists of three principles. First is responsiveness to stakeholders, which pertains to proactively serving stakeholder by dealing with their complaints and criticisms through institutions and processes. The second principle in this category is effectiveness, which involves having the capacity to attain objectives, while the third principle, efficiency, involves making the best use of those resources.

The fourth category, accountability, consists of two principles. First is accountability, which is the requirement of government officials, such as agency staff and political leaders, to answer to stakeholders regarding their responsibility for any failures (including incompetence and fraud), dispose of their duties and powers, and respond to criticisms or any obligations they have. The second principle in this category is transparency, which concerns acting openly and sharing information. The last category, fairness, consists of two principles: equity, the just and fair treatment of similar cases, and rule of law, the fair and impartial enforcement of legal frameworks.

## **PUBLIC PARTICIPATION**

This section discusses public participation including: a discussion of the levels of public participation in natural resource management identified by Berkes, George, and Preston (1991); mechanisms of participation used by stakeholders; stakeholder motivations to participate; barriers to participation; and the positive and negative aspects of public participation.


### **Levels of public participation**

As seen in the previous section, governance requires public participation in decision-making. Public participation is a vague label that can include an individual or group taking part in a cooperative action or being an active participant with other community members (Ingles, Musch, and Qwist-Hoffman, 1999). There are a number of levels of participation ranging from complete government agency control over decision-making to low power level stakeholders making decisions. The most often cited literature discussing the different levels of public participation is Arnstein's (1969) Ladder of Participation.

Berkes et al. (1991) modified Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation for the co-management of natural resources (see Figure 1). Their model has seven levels with each step up the ladder increasing the influence of non-governmental actors on the management of the resource. At the lowest stage, the non-governmental actor is simply informed about decisions after the governmental actor has made them. At the next stage, consultation, the non-governmental actor has some face-to-face contact with

governmental actors, but their input may not be utilized. The third stage, co-operation, is when non-governmental actors begin to have input into management of the resource by providing services such as knowledge and data gathering. The fourth stage, communication, is the start of a two-way information exchange when non-governmental actor concerns begin to be addressed in management plans. At the fifth stage, advisory committees, actors become partners in decision-making, and governmental and non-governmental actors jointly act towards common objectives. The sixth stage, management boards, is when non-governmental actors are given opportunities to take part in developing and implementing management plans. The last stage, partnership/community control, is when all actors are considered to be equal partners, decisions are made jointly, and where possible the non-governmental actors assume responsibility for all decision-making (Berkes, 1994).

**Figure 1.** Levels of Co-management



Source: Berkes et al., 1991.

### **Mechanisms of participation**

There are a wide range of public participation mechanisms used by stakeholders to influence decision-makers (Ingles et al., 1999). They include: lobbying, written submissions, voting, elections, referenda, litigation, advisory committees, participation through ENGOs and NGOs, public and individual face-to-face meetings, public protest, questionnaires, round tables, interviews, field trips, and publicity (Cleaver, 1999; Cote and Bouthillier, 2002; Ingles et al., 1999; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004; Nelson and Wright, 1995; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000c). However, it should be noted that not all of these mechanisms are accepted throughout the literature (Beierle and Cayford, 2002).

For example, violence, while listed as a mechanism by some (Ingles et al., 1999), is not considered an acceptable form of participation by others (Beierle and Cayford, 2002). As well, there is some argument about the validity of some traditional participation mechanisms such as lobbying, voting, referenda and litigation, because they are too individualistic or rooted in power politics to be considered participatory mechanisms (Beierle and Cayford, 2002). It should be noted that the effectiveness of participation mechanisms can be limited by personal agendas, personalities, and social capital (Cote and Bouthillier, 2002).

### **Motivations for public participation**

According to Cleaver (1999) and Aguilar, Garcia, Alvarez, and Garcia-Hidalgo (2012), the two motivations for stakeholder participation are economic incentive and social norms. Of the two, economic incentive is the main driver for stakeholder

participation according to Cleaver (1999). Economic incentive is also directly linked to the level of participation, as the greater the economic incentive, the more likely a stakeholder is to participate, while the lower the economic impact to the stakeholder, the less likely they are to participate. Social norms such as the need for recognition, respect, purpose, community service, and responsibility can be strong motivators for stakeholders to participate. However, they are usually seen to eventually serve the aims of economic development (Cleaver, 1999).

DeCaro and Stokes (2008) found that those stakeholders that participate based on economic incentives are less motivated to participate fully, or over the long term, while those who participate for non-economic reasons are more likely to participate longer, fully commit to participation, and attain their goals.

### **Barriers to public participation**

Barriers to participation are any impediment to the ability of a stakeholder to participate in a planning or management processes. According to Diduck and Sinclair (2002), there has been little study of barriers, even with the increased emphasis on public participation in natural resource management. Below is a list of the public participation barriers identified in the literature.

- Inadequate information – This includes inaccessible information, information that is excessively technical, and incomplete information (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Robson et al., 2010). Robson et al. (2010) found that these barriers can also be an issue for highly educated individuals.

- Capacity – The capacity barrier includes a lack of financial resources, knowledge about the topic, policy, or planning processes, and expertise working with policy or participating in a planning process (Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Robson et al., 2010; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b). It was found that those stakeholders who had previously engaged in at least one full planning process were less likely to have knowledge or expertise capacity issues (Robson et al, 2010).
- Lack of power – Included in this barrier is the inability to influence decisions due to a process that lacks openness, decisions being forgone conclusions, and insufficient opportunities to make meaningful suggestions that are evaluated through a systematic process (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002).
- Personality traits – Included in this barrier is a lack of motivation, interest, time or acceptance of the status quo. Many stakeholders believe that they are adequately represented by others, individuals are too busy due to life issues such as work and family commitments, or they feel that as long as there is no or little change, there is no need to participate (Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002).
- Structure of the process – This barrier is caused by policies, legislation, and procedures that limit a stakeholder’s ability to participate effectively. Included are the lack of opportunity to participate due to policies and legislation that limit the number of times a stakeholder can participate, the length of time allowed for comments to be submitted, or inconvenient meeting times or locations (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002). Also included in this category is government

administration resistance, whereby agency staff are so resistant to public participating that stakeholders do not feel comfortable being involved (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b).

- Extreme partisan behaviour – Included in this barrier are extreme positions being claimed by stakeholders that intimidate other individuals from participating (Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b).
- Not knowing process was occurring – Often this barrier is due to poor communication by the controlling entity, or policies limiting notification to certain geographic locations (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b).
- Potential for conflict – Some stakeholders choose not to participate because they know that their stance on an issue will result in conflict between them and other individuals or groups. Therefore, they choose to avoid participating and not cause issues with other stakeholders such as neighbours, colleagues, family, or friends (Coburn, 2011; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b).
- A lack of trust – Trust can involve the belief in the process, decision-makers, or other stakeholders (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b).

### **Positive and negative aspects of public participation**

There are many benefits of public participation in natural resource management decision-making. They include the empowerment of peripheral decision-making citizens, and, if the process is transparent and uses a diversity of opinions, it can increase the

public trust between stakeholders and government agencies and planning processes (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Cote and Bouthillier, 2002; Reed, 2008).

Trust is “a belief that another will faithfully act upon promises made” (McCool, 2009, p. 143). Trust between parties is easily lost and difficult to develop and maintain, and a lack of trust is one of the greatest barriers to implementing protected area management plans (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; McCool, 2009; Reed, 2008). There are two types of trust: interpersonal and organizational. Interpersonal trust includes reciprocity, understanding, and honesty. Organizational trust is people being treated fairly through rules and institutions that ensure fairness of plan development (McCool, 2009). Two other aspects of trust are competence (the ability of the agency to do what is right) and fiduciary duty (that the government will do what is right). Stakeholders that trust government agencies feel that the agency is able, willing, and obliged to do what is in the public interest (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Reed, 2008).

Another benefit of public participation is capacity. Capacity can increase through the “co-generation of knowledge”, the results of which are higher quality decisions based on a broader body of knowledge (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Colfer and Wadley, 1996; Reed, 2008). Public participation can provide a sense of ownership over the management plan, and empowerment of low power groups or individuals (Colfer and Wadley, 1996). Additionally, public participation can result in government accountability (Knack, 2002), greater cost effectiveness, the reframing of issues (Beierle and Cayford, 2002) (e.g. environmental clean-up can be made into economic development plans), and the resolution or mitigation of conflicts (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Colfer and Wadley, 1996; Cote and Bouthillier, 2002). Conflict, if resolved through negotiations,

communication, and mediation, can result in positive relationships in which formerly antagonistic parties can become allies (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000a). Also, when actors do not agree, they often find that they do have some things in common. They can work together to accomplish those goals and agree to disagree on those where they are not able to find common ground (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000a, b) or by avoiding the issue (Beierle and Cayford, 2002). Participation can also increase conflict, though there can be positive outcomes such as increased sustainability (Colfer and Wadley, 1996), greater creativity in solutions, and increased awareness of knowledge, needs and goals of other participants (Lawrence, 2007).

However, participation does not always live up to claims. There can be negative consequences to existing power structures from the empowerment of peripheral groups, or those power structures can become more entrenched minimizing the impact that peripheral groups have (Reed, 2008). Stakeholders can suffer from consultation fatigue if the processes are mismanaged, or if there is a perceived lack of power over decisions (Reed, 2008). Stakeholders can also feel powerless if there are actors that have non-negotiable positions or veto powers. This can result in low participation rates and negatively influence the significance of participation. The value of participation can also be questioned due to a lack of capacity to meaningfully engage in often highly technical debates. While information may be shared, if it is done in such a manner that some of the actors do not understand that information, it can negatively affect their ability to participate in decision-making (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Reed, 2008; Robson et al., 2010).

Participation in planning and management can provide a degree of power to actors (Nelson and Wright, 1995), and that is why individuals decide to participate in planning processes (Cote and Bouthillier, 2002). However, agency institutions can limit the amount or types of power of actors, and often do because they are reluctant to relinquish their power over resources (Cleaver, 1999; Cote and Bouthillier, 2002; Nelson and Wright, 1995). One of the issues of empowerment through participation is who is being empowered: the individual, the community, or categories of people based on socio-economic class, gender, social standing (Cleaver, 1999). The degree of influence achieved by marginalized stakeholders can impact public participation processes. If, for example, previous low power stakeholders gain equal or greater power than the traditionally powerful, it can upset social norms (Cote and Bouthillier, 2002). However, there is little evidence that participation results in empowerment of the disadvantaged (Cleaver, 1999; Lawrence, 2007), while there is evidence that the socially, economically and educationally advantaged experience greater benefit from processes that utilize public participation (Lawrence, 2005).

Social learning occurs when stakeholders and the wider society they live in learn from each other, and can result in deepening existing relationships, developing new relationships and transforming adversarial relationships into cooperative ones (Reed, 2008). The development of these relationships occurs through the discovery of trustworthiness, common ground, and the legitimacy of other viewpoints (Cleaver, 1999; Reed, 2008). Other positive aspects of public participation include higher quality environmental decisions because information and creativity from more sources is used (Reed, 2008; Huitema et al., 2009). As well, those decisions are more resilient, and better

adapted to local environmental and socio-cultural circumstances. As such, the decisions are more likely to be accepted and adopted locally (Reed, 2008).

## **SOCIAL CAPITAL**

The trust developed through public participation is essential for the development of social capital (Berkes, 2007). Social capital is the organized facilitation of cooperation within or amongst groups using trust, formal and informal social networks, shared social norms, values and understanding (Jones et al., 2012; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007; Putnam, 1993). It has been found that public participation processes that have higher levels of social capital result in more positive management of natural resources, to the degree that it is considered to be essential for successful implementation of environmental management and policy (Jones et al., 2012; Pretty, 2003).

There are three stages of social capital. In the first stage, each actor type has social capital with similar actors and other types of actors. The second stage is reached when those actors' interactions result in connections such as bonding and bridging, which occur and are affected by previous experiences. The third stage occurs after a critical amount of social capital accumulates, and at this time actors are willing to work together for common goals (Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007).

There are also three types of connections that result in social capital. First is bonding, which refers to the relationships between family, close friends, and members of a specific subgroup. The second connection, bridging, refers to the relationships that an actor has with those of a greater social distance than those in the bonding category. They include distant friends, colleagues, and associates in other subgroups. An example of the

latter would be a member of an ENGO developing a relationship with a member of a hunting and angling organization. Lastly are linkages, which are the vertical relationships with those such as politicians, senior bureaucrats, and others who have greater influence, and using those relationships to obtain information, resources, and ideas (Woolcock, 2001).

Through social capital, actors are able to obtain both positive and negative benefits through social networks and other social structures (Portes, 1998). These benefits include positive relationships, such as group support and trust, and political capital (Portes, 1998; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000a). Some of the negative consequences of social capital include the exclusion of outsiders from social groups or networks, limitations on individual freedoms that constrain independent thought or action, excessive claims for use of resources by group or network members, and downward leveling norms which restrict the ability of group members to advance themselves (Portes, 1998).

### **POLITICAL CAPITAL**

As stated earlier, one of the benefits of social capital is political capital (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000a). Political capital is “the resources used by an actor to influence policy formation processes and realize outcomes that serve the actor’s perceived interests” (Birner and Wittmer, 2003, p. 298). Political capital can be created from social capital in different ways. Social networks can facilitate lobbying by creating opportunities for access to political and administrative decision-makers (Birner and Wittmer, 2003). As well, political capital can be exercised through petitions, public protests, electoral leverage of large groups, and the use of public pressure using scientific

knowledge or ideology (i.e. environmentalism versus industrial use versus commercial use of parks) (Birner and Wittmer, 2003).

Once created, political capital must be maintained by investing resources such as time, effort, and money. Political capital must also be used wisely, as political and administrative decision-makers will be limited in their ability to assist a certain group or individual (Birner and Wittmer, 2003). There is a risk in investing in political capital with specific individuals, particularly politicians, who may not be re-elected; therefore, actors may diversify their political capital by spreading it around multiple individuals or parties. Political capital can also be subverted by opponents, or lost if an interest group is unable to deliver promised benefits of supporting the group (i.e. electoral support) (Birner and Wittmer, 2003).

Through political capital, it is possible for a stakeholder to gain power to influence decisions (Birner and Wittmer, 2003). Power “is the ability to influence people to behave in ways that may not be in their own immediate self-interest” (McCool, 2009, p. 143). By moving up Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation, actors are empowered both collectively and individually. Empowerment during the planning process can lead to inclusion of diverse sets of knowledge, a greater chance for consensus and ownership of the management plan (McCool, 2009). However, political power is unevenly and arbitrarily distributed throughout society with some groups having what McCool (2009) calls “virtual veto authority” (p. 144).

## **DECENTRALIZATION FRAMEWORK**

As decentralization involves the devolution of power by central government to low power actors it is a form of governance (Graham et al., 2003, p. 1; Ribot, 2004). As well, to have the greatest influence on decision-makers stakeholders must participate in the decision-making process, and use their social and political capital to influence the decisions made and to hold decision-makers accountable (Birner and Wittmer, 2000; Blair, 2000; Graham et al., 2003; Knack, 2002). The Decentralization Framework allows the researcher to determine the actors involved, how they influence the decision-making process, and how they hold decision-makers accountable.

Below is a description of the three discrete components of Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) decentralization framework mentioned in the introduction. Those components are the actors, powers, and accountability. Each component is described in detail to provide the reader with greater understanding of factors that Agrawal and Ribot (1999) identified as being significant to all acts of decentralization.

### **Actors**

According to Agrawal and Ribot (1999), actors in a decentralization context are those individuals or organizations that control public resources. They include elected and appointed officials, powerful and influential individuals, corporate bodies such as communities and industrial interests (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal), committees and cooperatives, NGOs and First Nation leaders. However, Buchy and Hoverman (2000) argue that determining who is an actor in a planning process can be controversial, and

that a process that identifies actors should not de facto exclude any group. In support of this, others such as Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003) and Eagles et al., (2002) have identified the general public as an actor in protected area planning in addition to those identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999).

The literature identified a number of actors that are involved in the planning and management of Ontario Parks. They include Ontario Parks' staff, First Nations communities, non-governmental organizations, including environmental NGOs, park visitors, tourism operators, local communities, and resource extraction companies (Buteau-Duitschaever, 2009; Eagles et al., 2002; Porter, 2001). McIntyre, Yuan, Payne, and Moore. (2004) also identified four stakeholders that recreate on Crown lands near the Quetico region: U.S. citizens, northwest of Ontario residents, Thunder Bay residents, and the rest of Canada.

Each of these actors has certain types of influence and is usually accountable to an individual, agency or constituency (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Buchy and Hoverman, 2000; Lockwood, 2010). To whom these actors are accountable is dependent on the political, social and historical influence of each actor (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Blair, 2000). The basis of each actor's power can include wealth, heredity, ideology, election, electoral clout, or appointment (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Blair, 2000). Actors can also be distinguished from one another by the internal structure of their organization, including the financial and membership sources of the organization, the laws, policies and legislation that control their actions, and their beliefs and objectives (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999).

As decentralization is about shifting control from higher to lower levels of authority, the actors involved are positioned at different levels of social action (Buchy and Hoverman, 2000; Schlager, 1999). As each actor has different personal or organizational interests, it is likely that if similar powers are devolved to different actors, this will lead to different outcomes. Therefore, the characteristics of decentralization are dependent on the actor to whom power is devolved and this, in turn, is dependent on how or whether the actor is held accountable (Buchy and Hoverman, 2000; Schlager, 1999).

### **Powers**

Actors have four broad types of powers of decision-making that are critical to understanding decentralization (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). They are: 1) the power to create or modify rules, 2) the power to make decisions about the use of resources, 3) the power to implement and enforce compliance of the new or altered rules, and 4) the power to adjudicate disputes that occur during the creation and enforcement of compliance of new or altered rules (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Jones, 2009; Kapoor, 2001; Nagendra, Karmacharya, and Karna, 2005; Virtanen, 2003). Increasing the decision-making powers of lower level actors to any of the four types of powers listed above constitutes some form of decentralization (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Decentralization does not eliminate the issues of checks and balances and separation of powers to which more centralized forms of governing are subject.

The power to create or modify rules allows actors to legislate principles that coordinate decisions and actions that determine who, how, and to what extent benefits

are realized from a resource. If a government is attempting to decentralize this power, it is usually in relation to a particular group of actors. An example of this type of power would be community-based forestry, where the community controls who, where, when and how timber and non-timber forest products are harvested (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Kapoor, 2001; Nagendra et al., 2005; Virtanen, 2003).

The power to make decisions about the use of resources can increase the autonomy of the actor who gains this power and influences others who do not have the power. The greater these powers, the greater the discretionary authority of local bodies and the more direct their effect on the use of the resource. The power to make decisions does not have to affect the behaviour of others by mandating what they must, must not, or may do. An example would be shifting the ability to make budgetary decisions to a lower level of government. If that level of government has the power to decide how to spend a budget and raise revenue, then a degree of decentralization has been achieved, even if the power to mandate what others must, must not, or may do has not also been transferred (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Jones, 2009; Nagendra et al., 2005; Virtanen, 2003).

The power to implement and enforce compliance of new or altered rules entails the power to execute, and to gauge and monitor whether actors are performing their prescribed roles. Also included is the power to impose and enforce sanctions on actors who do not perform as required. For example, if a particular group or individual is not supposed to harvest game in a specific area and fails to comply, rule makers may then impose sanctions on that group or individual. The power to enforce compliance also includes the ability to ensure that those who break the rules follow the imposed

sanctions. It should be noted that the power to make decisions and rules without the power to enforce those rules could result in the powers being meaningless, because decision-making and enforcement of powers are complementary. Additionally, these powers also require administrative and fiscal resources to carry out any necessary monitoring and sanctions (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Nagendra et al., 2005).

The power of enforcement can be transferred to local administrative branches of government (e.g. OMNR) rather than to a representative local government at the same level (e.g. a local municipality). Whether or not the transfer of the power to implement and enforce will lead to effective decentralization depends on the nature of the accountability relations, the mix of powers that a given actor holds and the horizontal relations among actors at the same level. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) suggest effective decentralization can be achieved even if the powers of rule making and enforcement are divided, so long as the actors who have the power of enforcement are either controlled by or accessible to those who make the decisions and rules (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Nagendra et al., 2005).

The power of adjudication is important when rules are created or the type of decisions a particular actor can make is changed or modified. When these changes occur, there are often disputes and negotiations that will need to be adjudicated. The two important aspects of adjudication are accessibility and independence. For local people who are affected by the devolution of powers to be fairly treated, they require the ability to access channels of adjudication for appeal. Additionally, the channels of adjudication should be organized in a manner that does not have links to sectoral interests. The rules,

decisions, their implementation, and enforcement should be challengeable by constituents, and the outcome of those challenges should not be biased in favour of power holders. The most critical aspect of the powers of adjudication is that they are exercised in a non-biased, systematic and accessible manner (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2003; Virtanen, 2003).

### **Accountability**

Accountability is a measure of how actors are held responsible by those they represent, and has been found to improve management effectiveness (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Dearden, Bennett, and Johnston, 2005). Accountability of decision-makers to the public is an important aspect of governing a protected areas as it ensures that funding is properly spent and tasks and objectives are completed and finished within specified timelines.

According to Dearden et al. (2005), there is a lack of literature on accountability mechanisms. However, in their study these authors found that the mechanisms that are used in park planning and management include state of the park and annual department reports, external audits, advisory committees, parliamentary debates, stakeholder roundtables, internal audits, and the use of a public “watch dog”. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) found that other methods of accountability include: procedures for electoral recall; third party monitoring by media, NGOs, or independently elected controllers; auditing and evaluation; and political pressure and lobbying by associations and associative movements. These and many other approaches to accountability are necessary as the electoral process is generally not sufficient to guarantee accountability

to constituents, given that elected officials are often more accountable to their political party or other individuals or organizations (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999).

However, some of these mechanisms are not always very effective. For example, Ontario and many other Canadian provinces do not have procedures for electoral recall. Electoral recall occurs when registered voters petition a body that is responsible for administering the electoral process for the removal of their elected representative between elections (Elections BC, n.d.). As well, there is some concern regarding the effectiveness of media monitoring as politicians can obfuscate transparency by manipulating the media that converts political and legal issues into mass entertainment (Balkin, 1998).

Greater public involvement has been identified as a reason for greater accountability, because it increases stakeholder communication and input. Dearden et al. (2005) found that park management was better as a result of increased accountability. As well, legally mandated management plans were also found to provide greater accountability as park superintendents must follow the management plan. However, Eagles (2009) found that management by a government agency could result in weak accountability and poor transparency, because they are rarely subjected to independent audits. It was found in Denmark that, due to the complexity of a park planning process, science could be politicized by excluding non-experts and, because of this, experts might disguise their political interests as objective science to further personal agendas. By doing so, experts risk legitimacy, scientists can lose credibility, and the public may be unable to hold decision-makers accountable for the decisions they make (Lund, Boon, and Nathan, 2009).

Eagles (2009) found that private entities such as NGOs and ENGOs have moderate levels of accountability, and as such are not accountable to society as a whole. In Canada, however, these organizations are considered to be quite transparent because they must provide governments with statements of operation which identify major activities and the names of directors, and include audited financial statements.

Decentralizing powers to actors that are not accountable to a constituency, or are only accountable to superior authorities within a government structure, is unlikely to achieve the stated goals of the decentralization actions taken and is termed deconcentration (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Lockwood, 2010). Decentralization can be effective only when the actors are downwardly accountable and the actor's constituents are able to exercise accountability as a counterbalancing power (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Lockwood, 2010). Accountability is relational and about the mechanisms to implement countervailing powers by those who are subject to the actors with decentralized power. A system that is accountable can prevent arbitrary decisions or actions by actors (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Therefore, downward accountability can increase the participation of those who are subject to actors that hold decentralized power (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Dearden et al., 2005).

Downward accountability of actors is enforceable through various methods (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Dearden et al., 2005). The most common form of accountability for elected representatives is the electoral process (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Lockwood, 2010). Horizontal and vertical ties between government departments can also influence accountability between local government actors and their constituents. Furthermore, the relationship between the administrative superiors and

customary authorities can affect the downward accountability of those authorities. As downward accountability can broaden the participation of local populations and enhance the responsiveness of empowered actors, it is a primary element of decentralization if those who receive powers from the central state on behalf of a constituency are downwardly accountable. The reason for this is that the many acclaimed benefits of decentralization are achieved through greater participation of local populations and the responsiveness of empowered actors (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999).

Some of the other methods of accountability include: procedures for recall; third party monitoring by media, NGOs, or independently elected controllers; auditing and evaluation; and political pressure and lobbying by associations and associative movements (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Dearden et al., 2005). These and many other approaches to accountability are necessary as the electoral process is generally not sufficient to guarantee accountability to constituents, given that elected officials are often more accountable to their political party or other individuals or organizations (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Dearden et al. (2005) found that highly developed countries like Canada were less likely to use accountability mechanisms such as external audits and parliamentary debate than were less developed countries. However, highly developed countries are more likely to use accountability mechanisms such as internal audits and monitoring by external groups such as ENGOs and the media.

Lockwood (2010) states that a governing body should also be upwardly accountable to higher level authorities such as parliament, external audits, and instruments such as the 2006 *Provincial Park and Conservation Reserves Act* (PPCRA). There is also some concern that as protected area management is decentralized

accountability may become weakened, because accountability structures such as the electoral process for non-parliamentary actors are not well developed. The lack of accountability can also be weakened when responsibility has been widely spread and poorly defined, so that actors do not have control over growing problems (Lockwood, 2010).

## **CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY**

### **INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter, I will situate myself as a researcher and describe the methodology for the study. Situating myself will allow the reader to understand any personal or intellectual biases that I have in my approach to the study (Dupuis, 1999; Mays and Pope, 2000). The description of the methodology includes justification for the use of a grounded theory approach and an outline of why I chose a multiple methods qualitative data analysis approach to trace if, how, and why decentralization occurred over the last 100 years of administration of Quetico Provincial Park. It also includes measuring the extent to which decentralization has taken place, the concepts of theoretical sensitivity, theoretical sampling, theoretical saturation, and constant comparison to theoretical categories. I then describe what a case study is and how Quetico was chosen as the case study for this project. After that, I provide an overview of how the framework was used to guide the study and then explain how the data was collected using a document review and semi-structured interviews, both of which are also described. In the final section, I describe the ethical dimensions of the study.

## **SITUATING MYSELF**

My goal for this research is not to prove that Ontario Parks has or has not centralized or decentralized the planning and management of Quetico over the last 100 years. My goal is to explore whether decentralization has occurred and, if so, to identify how, to what extent and why it has taken place and gain insight that will help all affected by the planning and management of parks in a positive manner.

I grew up on a farm in southern Alberta, where there was only one right method or way of approaching an issue. After travelling internationally, working in the tourism industry for over 15 years, living in two provincial parks for a total of 10 years, obtaining a degree in Ecotourism and Outdoor Leadership from Mount Royal College in Calgary, Alberta, and beginning my Masters of Environmental Studies in Nature-Based Recreation and Tourism, I learned that there are many valid points of view and methods of dealing with any issue.

I believe that in many cases, but not all, local placed-based communities should have more influence than distant communities on the decisions about the natural resources that surround them. Crown lands in Ontario are managed to benefit all Ontarians, the majority of whom live very far from the Quetico region. In my opinion, if distant communities want to have greater input, then they should be willing to provide support that offsets any sacrifice made by local communities in regards to potential gains from those resources. For example, I am a supporter of community-conserved areas or IUCN Category VI protected areas. These areas, also known as Managed Resource Protected Areas, are managed largely by the local community(ies) for the long

term protection and maintenance of biological diversity, while also providing a sustainable flow of natural resources and services to meet the community's needs (Dearden, 2009).

I am a strong advocate of greater community control of natural resources through concepts such as co-management, community-based forestry, and decentralization, with the knowledge that these management regimes do not work for all communities or situations. Therefore, while I will attempt to be neutral about the decentralization that has occurred within Quetico Park, I am strongly biased towards local communities having more power, benefits and responsibility for the natural resources that they use in their daily lives, and therefore, my interpretations may tend towards supporting the decentralized form. My bias has also led me to read material on co-management, adaptive management, adaptive co-management and governance.

## **METHODOLOGY**

There has been little research on the decentralization of protected areas in a developed country context, especially Canada and Ontario. As such, a qualitative approach is the preferred method to investigate the related phenomena (Cresswell, 2009). I chose to use the grounded theory method, because it is a flexible emergent method that will allow me to build a broad knowledge about the decentralization of park management and planning, and then focus on those aspects that I find to be most critical. Being an emergent method, it is inductive, indeterminate, open ended, and is compatible with the study of dynamic, contingent, or unknown phenomenon (Charmaz, 2006, 2008). An example of this would be evaluating the decentralization of parks in a

developed country context using Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) framework, which has only been tested in developing countries. One implication of this may be that, while they found accountability to be the most significant factor, the same may not be true in this context. Grounded theory is also useful for generating, mining and making sense of data. These qualities make it especially useful when researching new or poorly understood phenomena, such as decentralization of the planning and management of parks in a developed country context, as it allows for new properties of the phenomenon to develop that identify new conditions and consequences to study (Charmaz, 2006, 2008).

Glaser and Strauss developed the grounded theory method in the 1960s (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). Changes to how it is applied over the last 40 years have resulted in a less positivistic and more emergent qualitative method (Charmaz, 2006, 2008). The emergent qualities of grounded theory involve four essential properties: theoretical sensitivity, theoretical sampling, theoretical saturation, and the constant comparison of data to theoretical categories (Charmaz, 2006; Hood, 2007; Kelle, 2007).

### **Theoretical Sensitivity**

Theoretical sensitivity occurs when the researcher has theoretical insight into the area of research, and combines it with the ability to develop their own insights (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This means that the researcher uses the analysis of data to determine which theories apply best in a given context instead of using theories to impose pre-existing categories on the data prior to data analysis. Consequently, Glaser and Strauss (1967) have advocated that the literature review should be left until the analysis is

completed. By doing so, they argue, the researcher is less likely to see the data through the lens of other ideas. Similarly, Charmaz is not insistent that a complete literature review needs to be conducted prior to the data analysis.

Kelle (2007) asserts that it is very difficult for a novice researcher to develop theoretical categories with little to no knowledge of a topic; however, to aid in the process of coding and developing categories, Holton (2007) recommends that the researcher read widely in other disciplines to enhance their theoretical sensitivity. I feel that the reading on decentralization and protected area management I did to prepare the proposal for this project, in addition to previous literature reviews on the related topics of governance, co-management, adaptive management, and adaptive co-management, provided me with a strong knowledge foundation that allowed successful development of theoretical categories. By doing so, reflexivity was easier, and I was able to see the world through the interview participants' experiences rather than forcing the data into pre-existing categories that are based on a literature review (Charmaz, 2006, 2008). As I followed Charmaz's (2006) method, I did not conduct a thorough literature review prior to conducting either the document review or the personal interviews. The method requires that the researcher conduct the literature review after the analysis has been completed, whereupon, I was able to determine if my understanding of the analysis coincided with, contradicts, or reveals a new or existing theory. After the analysis was conducted I then turned to the literature to determine if my understanding of the analysis coincides with, contradicts, or reveals a new or existing theory.

### **Theoretical Sampling**

Grounded theory does not prescribe where the data will take the researcher. Therefore, theoretical sampling is tentative and changes as the data is gathered and analyzed. Theoretical sampling seeks out relevant comparative data to identify, elaborate on and refine hidden properties of a category and by doing so develops an emerging theory (Charmaz, 2006; Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). To accomplish this, participants were deliberately sought who were able to provide responses about their experiences regarding the planning and management of Quetico. These responses were obtained by asking targeted questions with the aim of verifying and linking information gathered during the document review and previous interviews (Morse, 2007). As well, participants were sought who held particular concepts or ideas that appeared to be significant (Morse, 2007). These ideas included their thoughts on participating in the public participation process, how it has changed, who the power holders are, areas for improvement, success of their group under the process at attaining goals, limitations and barriers, issues of adjudication and accountability, and who they felt should benefit from the park and how that should occur. Theoretical sampling was conducted by selecting participants to develop the properties of the identified and emerging categories until theoretical saturation was achieved (Charmaz, 2006).

I interviewed individuals from a variety of backgrounds that had been involved in, or had extensive knowledge of, the planning and management of Quetico Park. These respondents included members of the local community, Thunder Bay, and southern Ontario. The respondents are knowledgeable about public participation in park

management and planning from one of many perspectives and were willing to discuss decentralization of park planning and management. Their perspectives address how and why decentralization has occurred from the inception of Quetico to the present day and the level of decentralization that presently exists. Being knowledgeable does not necessarily mean that an interviewee was directly involved in planning and management decisions for Quetico Park. It also meant that the interviewee had participated in a planning process by indicating their opposition or support for the management options provided by the planning team. The most important criterion being that they represent a particular viewpoint about the planning and management of Quetico.

As mentioned earlier a number of potential Ontario Parks' stakeholders were identified in the literature (Duteau-Duitschaeffer, 2009; Eagles et al., 2002; McIntyre et al. (2004); Porter, 2001). The actors identified through this process included Lac La Croix First Nation, provincially elected officials, MNR bureaucracy staff, the tourism industry; ENGOS, NGOs, the forestry and mining industries, the community of Atikokan, the general public, and U.S. citizens. The initial informants were identified through a small document review that was conducted during preparation for the project. These included ENGOS, community leaders, and agency staff. Additional informants who have special knowledge or distinctive qualifications (Johnson, 1990) were also identified through a snowball sampling process, approached and, if willing, interviewed. In addition, internet chat forums were used to identify members of the general public.

It should be noted that U.S. citizens were included as an actor, because they constitute the majority of Quetico users. According to informants, the greater use of

Quetico by U.S. citizens provides them with a great deal of influence over day-to-day management decisions, such as portage and campsite conditions. However, the amount of influence that U.S. citizens have during management planning exercises was not as well known. In addition, there was a lack of agreement amongst informants as to how much influence any group or individual from outside of Canada or Ontario should have during the management planning process. So while U.S citizens constitute the majority of park users it was felt by the majority of informants that control of the park should belong to those who own the resource (i.e. Ontarians) rather than those who use it.

As well, other than the local communities of Atikokan and Lac La Croix there was no evidence during the document review that other communities or residents of northwestern Ontario, including Thunder Bay, could be listed as specific stakeholders today. Historically other northwestern Ontario communities, such as Thunder Bay and Fort Frances, were affected by Quetico Park management decisions, because the lumber processing mills were located in communities such as Atikokan, Fort Frances, and Thunder Bay, and any decision that affected the harvest of timber could have economic impacts to those communities (Thunder Bay Chamber of Commerce, 1971). The 1977 abolition of logging within the park meant that future management decisions would no longer directly affect those communities other than Atikokan, to the same degree again.

Another reason that in the past the list of actors included northwestern Ontario and Thunder Bay residents is that Quetico is the largest park in the area, and according to OMNR (2007) and Whiting and Mulrooney (1998) provincial parks in Ontario provide both economic and non-economic benefits to local communities. The 2007

*Quetico Background Information Report* claims that Quetico only provides economic benefits to the communities of Atikokan and Lac La Croix. These benefits are largely limited to person years of employment (18 in Atikokan and 2 in Lac La Croix). However, logic indicates that the proximity of Thunder Bay and Fort Frances to Quetico must result in some degree of economic impact as some U.S. citizens travelling to northern entry points must pass through these two communities and are likely to purchase goods and services or eat meals while there.

The other benefits attributed to parks include protection of ecological functions, health effects, worker productivity, educational and scientific benefits, fulfillment of international responsibilities, business location decisions, and community cohesion (OMNR, 2007; Whiting and Mulrooney, 1998). These latter benefits are likely to be experienced by the northwestern Ontario and Thunder Bay residents either through their use of the park or through the knowledge that the park exists. However, these benefits are unlikely to be negatively affected by management planning decision-making because the *2006 PPCRA* provincial parks objectives prevent that from occurring. The *2006 PPCRA* provincial park objectives mandate that all park management decisions must protect the ecological integrity of the area, provide opportunities for outdoor recreation, provide opportunities to increase knowledge and appreciation of the natural and cultural heritage of the park, and the facilitation of scientific research.

Another historically significant actor was the population living in the southern Ontario region known as the Greater Golden Horseshoe (i.e. Toronto, Hamilton, Oshawa, Peterborough, etc.) The region is home to two-thirds of Ontario's population

(Statistics Canada, 2009), and because of its large population it was thought that the residents of this region could still be considered to be an actor on its own. However, this population was not identified as an actor during the current planning process, because there was no evidence of significant participation by this group during the document review and informant interviews.

It should be noted that during the literature review other Ontario Park's governance research did not identify other semi-local communities (e.g. Thunder Bay, Fort Frances, and northwestern Ontario) or southern Ontario as specific actors. It was felt that the interests of these groups (i.e. the Ontario public) were represented through actors representing park users, ENGOs, and local communities (Buteau-Duitschaever, 2009; Eagles et al., 2002; Porter, 2001). As the researcher was unable to contact a significant number of individuals from the General Public actor group it was not possible to represent the interests of all actors through individual groups (i.e. Thunder Bay, Fort Frances, northwestern Ontario, and southern Ontario). Therefore, to represent the interests of all Ontarians this study uses the actors ENGOs, NGOs, and General Public. For future researchers to have stronger studies it will be necessary to identify and interview members of these various groups.

To approach all of the potential informants, both a telephone script and letter (or email) was crafted with the Lakehead University logo that outlined the goals of the project, what was expected of the interviewee, and indicating their right to anonymity was used to satisfy the Lakehead University Ethics Review Board (Appendix 1 and Appendix 2).

### **Theoretical Saturation**

Theoretical saturation occurs when gathering more data fails to provide additional theoretical insights, and does not reveal further properties of the core theoretical categories (Charmaz, 2006). Some researchers argue that saturation of the theoretical categories supersedes sample size and that samples can be very small (Charmaz, 2006).

Saturation is strongly linked to sampling and constant comparison, because interviewing knowledgeable respondents and constantly comparing the data they provide can cause saturation to occur quickly. Identifying when saturation takes place is important because it allows the researcher to avoid wasting time collecting, transcribing and analyzing redundant information and focus on those categories that require further examination (Holton, 2007). Saturation was reached when informant responses began to be similar if not exactly the same. For questions such as “Who has control over how funds are spent for the park?” saturation was reached very quickly. Other questions such as “Have you or your group been able to achieve the goals that you set out to get in past or current planning and management decision-making?” were asked of all non-bureaucratic staff as each informant’s group had a different experience in its ability to achieve its goals.

### **Constant Comparison to Theoretical Categories**

Theoretical categories emerge from the data and/or codes that are the most significant and/or frequent. The categories also make the most analytic sense for the

complete and insightful categorization of the data. Theoretical categories explain ideas, events and processes in the data, and may subsume common patterns and themes of several significant codes. By constantly comparing data, codes and theoretical categories, conceptual understanding becomes more sophisticated because the defined analytical properties of the categories can be treated with more rigorous scrutiny. From this scrutiny the analysis becomes more theoretically explicit by fitting the data into specific theoretical categories and by examining how the categories and fundamental aspects of human existence are related (Charmaz, 2006).

By using the three essential properties of theoretical sampling, theoretical saturation and the constant comparison method, the interviews yielded rich (detailed, focused and full) data in which respondents' views, feelings, intentions and actions, plus the contexts and order of their lives, were revealed. To obtain rich data, it was necessary to seek thick descriptions by writing extensive field notes of observations and accumulating detailed narratives (Charmaz, 2006). When addressing these three essential properties, I took care to be reflexive when designing the study and collecting, analysing, and describing the data, because the researcher is a part of the study; this is the reason I situated myself at the beginning of the chapter (Charmaz, 2006; Mruck and Mey, 2007).

This study used a constructivist grounded theory approach that places priority on the phenomena of the study and views the data and analysis as being created from the shared experiences of the researcher and the participants and the relationship between them. A tenet of constructive theory is that multiple realities exist, that data reflect the researcher's and participants' mutual constraints and that the researcher, to some extent,

enters and is affected by the participant's world. This approach provides an interpreted portrayal of the world, not an exact picture. The researcher wants to learn the participants' implicit meanings of their experiences to build a conceptual analysis of those experiences. A constructivist approach takes implicit meanings, experiential views and the grounded theory analysis as constructions of reality with the data being contextually situated. This approach also stresses the respondent's definitions of terms, situations, and events (Charmaz, 2006).

### **CASE STUDY**

A case study research approach is used to conduct an in depth study of one or a few instances of a phenomenon. A case study approach is better suited for trace social constructivist theories that stress the importance of an individual's perceptions or the predominant discussions regarding social processes (Blatter, 2008). Case studies have a major strength when attempting to produce a detailed complex historical account through a thick description (Blatter, 2008; Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001). There is some debate about what a case study is. Some feel that a case study should be spatially and temporally varied, while others state that a case study should range from 10 to 60 cases, thus being able to bridge the qualitative–quantitative gap (Blatter, 2008). Generally though, the strength of a case study approach is the in-depth examination of fewer instances (Blatter, 2008; Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001).

Some of the positive aspects of case studies are that they are better able to represent real lived experiences than are other forms of research such as structured questionnaires (Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001). A case study can also explore lived

unusual or unexpected experiences that other forms of research cannot. By identifying the unusual, multiple case studies are able to also compare and contrast the idiosyncratic rather than just the common or shared experience. As well, a case study can identify the reasons behind a causal relationship that a large  $-N$  study has identified as being statistically significant. Case studies can facilitate the development of new theories, because existing theories are often confronted with the complex realities of real lived experiences that can be unexpected and idiosyncratic (Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001).

Some of the limitations of case studies identified by Hodkinson and Hodkinson (2001) are that there is often more data than a researcher is able to analyze, resulting in the omission of some information. The cost of a case study can be related to the scale of the project with small scale studies being more affordable than large scale due to the time required to collect and analyse data. Another limitation is that once the data has been analysed, it can be difficult to represent the complexity found in a simple manner, because while writing the findings is generally linear, the story that the research has uncovered can be non-linear. As well, while some case study work can be numerically represented, much of it cannot, because the complexity of the findings do not fit neatly into theories, models, or frameworks (Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001). Case studies are often not able to be generalized, because they usually have small sample sizes that can be idiosyncratic. Case studies are also quite dependent on researcher expertise, knowledge, and intuition, but these aspects often raise concerns about the objectivity of the study.

It is possible to make theoretical generalizations using a constructivist case study approach. However, the quality of the study is not dependent on the researcher to provide detailed evidence at each step of the causal chain. Instead, the quality of the study depends on how skilfully the researcher uses empirical evidence to make their argument within a scholarly discussion that includes both complementary and competing theories. For a constructivist approach, the case should be documented using a comparative structure, rather than chronological or linear-analytic structures (Baltter, 2008).

### **Selection of Case Study**

Originally the goal of this project was to study and compare three wilderness class parks. However, it was realized early on that it would not be possible to conduct, transcribe and analyse the required number of interviews within the time available, and there were also financial constraints with accessing all three parks. Therefore it was decided to limit the study to Quetico Provincial Park, because it is the park with the longest history, and financially it was easier to access Quetico than the other parks

Therefore, the study area is limited to Quetico Provincial Park and nearby surrounding area, including Atikokan and Lac La Croix. The reason for this limitation is that the primary sphere of influence of park management decisions is limited to the area within the boundary of the park by the 2006 *Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act* and the 2007 *Quetico Background Information Report* claims that the park only provides economic benefits to Atikokan and Lac La Croix. However, the study does include actors that do not reside within this boundary, because they have a

significant affect on management decisions. Examples include the Minister of Natural Resources who is ultimately responsible for the decisions that are made, ENGOs that are based in southern Ontario, members of the general public who may live locally or in other areas of Ontario or Canada, and citizens of the United States.

There are three reasons for the selection of Quetico. First, Ontario Parks classifies it as a wilderness class park, which is the equivalent of an IUCN category II or national park (Dearden and Rollins, 2009; IUCN, 2009). Wilderness class parks are a minimum of 100,000 ha in size, the largest provincial parks in Ontario, where the forces of nature are allowed to freely exist, and have the second highest level of protection next to nature reserve class parks (OMNR, 2008, 2009c). Protection means that protecting the ecological integrity is the most important aspect of the park. The park is mainly a recreation area, with the limitation that visitors may participate only in human-powered low impact activities such as canoeing and hiking. All motorized forms of recreation (i.e. ATV and snowmobile use) are prohibited, and industrial activity is not allowed within the park boundary (OMNR, 2007).

The second reason is that the large size also means that wilderness class parks are more likely to overlap with traditional and industrial users (i.e. trapping, tourism, forestry and mining) than is the case in smaller parks in other park classes. In addition, the high level of protection means that wilderness class parks are also more likely to have affected, and therefore been pressured to involve, traditional and industrial users in decision-making than parks in other less restrictive park classes. Therefore, examining a wilderness class park offers the best means to measure the extent to which decentralization in planning and management within Ontario Parks has taken place. As

this class of park is highly protected, there will be more rules limiting the activities allowed within their boundaries and there is less likelihood that control would be given up to local interests that could come into conflict with those rules.

The third reason Quetico Park was chosen is that the date of its establishment—1913—means that it was one of the first provincial parks established in Ontario. The extensive history of the park will allowed the researcher to trace the administrative past of Ontario’s provincial parks from the establishment of the first Ontario-wide provincial park legislation to the present, including the wide range of types of public involvement that occurred within the Ontario Parks system. For example, Quetico Provincial Park involves the earliest days of provincial parks when there was no public involvement in planning or management of Ontario’s parks.

### **AGRAWAL AND RIBOT’S (1999) FRAMEWORK**

The purpose of Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) framework is to provide a foundation that limits and guides the analysis of the actors, their powers, and how they are held accountable. The aim of studying these three components is to determine if and how decentralization of Quetico Park planning and management has occurred.

The framework was used to identify the actors involved, the powers they possessed (i.e. 1) the power to create or modify rules, 2) the power to make decisions about the use of resources, 3) the power to implement and enforce compliance of the new or altered rules, and 4) the power to adjudicate disputes that occur during the creation and enforcement of compliance of new or altered rules), and how the decision-

makers are held accountable. This was accomplished through the document review and informant interviews.

During the analysis of the data it was discovered that Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) definition of actor was limited in that it did not allow for the inclusion of those groups or individuals that do not have any of the four powers identified in the framework, but are still able to influence planning and management decisions. For the purposes of this study, an actor is defined as any group that has either direct influence through the four identified powers, or indirect influence through other means of public participation (i.e. lobbying, attending openhouses, providing written submissions, etc.).

From the document review an initial list of actor groups was identified, and informants from these groups were contacted. Then through the informant interviews a snowball method was used by asking respondents to identify other actors involved in the current Quetico Management Plan Review (QMPR) and confirm the findings of the document review.

Once the actors had been identified, informants were contacted about an interview. During the interview informants were asked if their group possessed any of the four powers, or if they knew of other actors that possessed them. They were also asked to comment on the accountability of those groups or individuals that do have some or all of the four powers. The information gathered was then used to determine if the planning and management of Quetico is decentralized.

## **DATA COLLECTION METHODS**

As grounded theory is an emergent method, two techniques of collecting this type of data are document reviews and semi-structured active interviews (Altheide, 1996; Holstein & Gubrium, 1995), both of which are outlined below.

### **Document Review**

The document review provided a greater understanding of the current and historical planning and management context, offered insight that assisted with gaining richer data from the interview participants, and supplied a method of triangulation for information discovered during the interview process (Altheide, 1996). To obtain the richest and most useful data, the researcher must have extensive background knowledge about the topic, through either research or personal experience. The document review enabled the researcher to ascertain the actors involved, how decisions are made, and to attempt to discover accountability. By conducting a document review, familiarity with the contextual, cultural, interpretive and material circumstances of the respondents' behaviour, orientation and the vocabulary that the respondents used was gained. This knowledge allowed the researcher to understand what was being said and the respondents' perspectives and interpretations, and was a way to develop shared understanding and experiences that provide a reference base for interviews. Background knowledge also allowed the researcher to move from the hypothetical to the concrete by asking relevant questions of the respondents' experiences during the semi-structured

active interviews. This in turn provided rich descriptions of the respondents' lived experiences (Altheide, 1996).

To obtain the necessary background knowledge, I reviewed newspaper articles, historical accounts and government documents, including background reports, management plans, policies and legislation. Examples include legislation such as the 1993 Environmental Bill of Rights and the 2006 Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act; policies including the 1977 Quetico Provincial Park Master Plan and the Draft version of the 2009 Ontario Protected Areas Planning Manual; and webpages for ENGOs involved in park planning. Information gathered at this stage, in conjunction with historical readings (i.e. newspapers, historical accounts) and informant responses during previous interviews, made it possible for each questionnaire to be specifically targeted towards the informant's group affiliation. For example, respondents from ENGOs and NGOs were asked how they determined their position on an issue. In contrast, MNR staff were asked the differences in influence on the decision-making of large organizations such as ENGOs and NGOs versus individuals or smaller organizations. As an informant's responses often required clarification, or opened new avenues of inquiry interviews, questions were not limited to those developed prior to the semi-structured active interviews (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995).

### **Semi-structured Active Interviews**

Active interviews are appropriate when there is an interest in subjective views or interpretations and sampling flexibility is required (Charmaz, 2002; Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). Like grounded theory, the sample is not determined in advance when

using active interviews, because, as new information is gathered through constant comparison, previously unknown perspectives may be needed (Charmaz, 2002 & 2006; Holstein and Gubrium, 1995).

Qualitative interviews in general are used when trying to identify common patterns or themes between respondents (Warren, 2002). Semi-structured active interviews encourage the respondent to direct the conversation towards the area of the researcher's interests through a flexible approach that allows the respondent to provide fresh insights to community issues. The result is that discussions are more like a one-on-one conversation than a formal interview about community issues and problems (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). Situating the interview as a conversation builds a level of trust and confidence between the researcher and the interviewee, resulting in rich detailed information. As well, non-verbal forms of communication can and were observed and provided additional insights by recording them in field notes and connecting those notes to the transcripts for analysis (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).

Prior to starting the project there was concern that agency respondents would not be as accepting of this form of interview technique as non-agency respondents. To compensate for this, a more structured questionnaire was developed for agency staff. However, during the interviews with agency staff, it was found that this concern was not warranted. That may be because informants were provided with the questionnaire prior to the interview when possible so that they would be able to provide more in-depth responses.

By using open-ended, semi-structured interviews, respondents were able to use their own voice to situate themselves. Due to the flexibility of this method, interviews were guided towards the research agenda by using probing questions about areas that needed to be further explained. To direct the conversation, the questionnaire was prepared in such a way to incite responses that addressed the project's research needs and engaged the respondent, but the interview was not set in stone. To ease the process, the initial context was provided to the respondent at the time of the interview request to inform the respondent about how it was perceived the respondent could help with the research (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995).

One of the assumptions of the active interview technique is the multiple perspectives of respondents (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). Multiple perspectives are an individual's reflections from many viewpoints. Respondents for this project represented different occupations, environmental ethics, recreation types, regions of residence (i.e. urban southern Ontario versus rural northern Ontario), levels of education, political connections, and locations in which they were born and raised. It was found that all respondents provided a sometimes surprising number of multiple perspectives, which resulted in a reduced number of interviews (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995).

In addition to these assumptions, the active interview technique encourages respondents to switch narrative positions (i.e. from occupation to environmental ethic) and discuss the topic from multiple points of view. This often yielded contradictions and complexities, because the meaning of an experience is dynamic and dependent on the context and circumstances of the narrative. For example, one respondent stated that logging should be allowed to resume in the park and then a few minutes later said that

the park must be protected from all environmental impacts. These contradictions, and the fact that a respondent may provide perspectives that do not necessarily reflect the point of view of all group members, are seen as a limitation of the technique (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). To avoid extreme viewpoints skewing the data, a minimum of two people from each actor group were interviewed. For example, there were two outfitters, four ENGO members, and three agency staff interviewed for each of those perspectives.

In active interviews, the respondent's positional shifts, relationships and perspectives of meaning take precedence over the implied relationships and perspectives inherent in the prepared questions. The interviewer can interject himself into the interview in many ways to provoke the respondent's narrative through conversational give-and-take or drawing on mutually familiar events, experiences or outlooks to secure rapport, fix the conversation in a particular direction of meaning and encourage respondent elaboration (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995).

Interviews were recorded in a variety of locales ranging from a restaurant, to offices, to interviews conducted over the phone. Those interviews conducted face-to-face were done using two digital recorders to avoid loss of data through equipment failure or other accidents. The Multimedia Services Unit of the Technology Services Centre at Lakehead University recorded all phone interviews.

After each interview, notes were made and the recordings were reviewed and analysed to determine if there were any common themes with previous interviews, or the document review. As well, subsequent interview questionnaires were adjusted to exclude themes that had been saturated, or to further explore new areas of inquiry (Charmaz, 2006; Holton, 2007; Lepp and Holland, 2006).

There were twelve interviews transcribed by the researcher. It should be noted that the sample size is small and there was some homogeneity in regards to the environmental advocacy statements among the informants. Transcription of the interviews by the researcher allowed greater familiarity and understanding of the data (Park and Zeanah, 2005; Tilley, 2003). Such immersion in the data is one of the methods to develop additional theoretical sensitivity during the analysis process (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The transcripts were then coded sentence by sentence using the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti v6 software program (Pope, Ziebland, & Mays, 2000). The software allows basic coding and complex analysis of the transcripts. Data can be kept in its whole form or segmented for ease of analysis. The software also allows the researcher to create models that demonstrate relationships between codes and respondents (Atlas.ti, 2009; Pope et al., 2000).

The initial coding resulted in approximately 3000 codes. Through merger of similar codes these were then consolidated to approximately 500 codes. An example would be the merging of the two codes PARK USER and PARK VISITOR or COOPERATION and PARTNERSHIP. From the remaining codes five families—Accountability, Actors, Participation, Power, and Relationships—were developed a posteriori. These families were then analysed to determine the relationships between them, and diagrams of these descriptions were created.

### **Ethics**

For this study, great care was used to maintain the safety of all interview respondents who volunteered to participate in this study. Each of the individual

interviews respondents, whose ages ranged from mid-thirties to early seventies, were required to provide free and informed consent using the form in Appendix 3 Informed consent letter. before they could participate. All interview data was collected by and available to only the primary researcher, and were transcribed and analysed on a secure computer, with the original audio being stored at the School of Outdoor Recreation, Parks and Tourism at Lakehead University for five years. The primary researcher completed the Tri-Council training on research with human subjects (certificate as Appendix 4), and ethical approval was obtained from Lakehead University before any interviews occurred (Research Ethics Board, 2007).

## CHAPTER 4 – RESULTS

This chapter will present the background on the case study of Quetico Park and an analysis of the documents reviewed and interviews conducted. The analysis of the document review and interviews provided insight into the current and historical management and planning mechanisms for the park. The document review provided an understanding of the issues that were present from the 1960s until today. Many of these issues have been constant sources of conflict between parties that have a relationship with Quetico. Examples include motorized access, lack of economic benefit to local communities, majority use by U.S. recreationists and outfitters, and development of new access zones. While the aim of the study was to document the entire 100-year management and planning history of Quetico, this was not possible as there were neither documents nor firsthand individual accounts available for the entire period. However, some of the respondents did have knowledge of decisions making in the past and provided as much information as possible.

The document review for this project consisted of examining both government documents and studying historical accounts, newspapers, and other documents from the early 1950s through to present times. The documents analysed include community-based land use planning documents, historical and current legislation, previous Quetico Park master plans, planning manuals used by Ontario Parks' staff, and documents relevant to the management plan review that was underway during this project. Other sources included historical books, newspaper articles, a tabloid produced by Lac La Croix First Nation, and webpages hosted by ENGOs.

## BACKGROUND OF QUETICO PARK

This section provides: a description of Quetico Park and nearby communities; a planning history; a cultural history; details the commercial aspects of the park; the management planning history; and finally the stages of a management plan review. The information gathered at this stage through a document review provided direction for the interview stage and questionnaire development.

Below is a timeline of significant policy and management events that have affected the planning and management of Quetico.

**Figure 2.** Chronology of Significant Policy and Management Events in Planning and Management of Quetico Park.

1873	Treaty #3 signed between the Government of Canada and local First Nations including Lac La Croix enshrining Aboriginal and Treaty Rights
1909	Quetico designated as a Forest and Game Reserve
1913	First Provincial Parks Act enacted and Quetico becomes a provincial park
1939	Prospecting and mining in the park approved as an emergency measure for World War II
1949	Lac La Croix First Nation members allowed to trap in park
1954	Ontario Provincial Parks Act passed
1956	Mining and prospecting ban reinstated
1959	Wilderness Areas Act passed
1967	Quetico classified as a Natural Environment park to be managed under a multiple-use policy
1970	Quetico Advisory Committee appointed to examine the conflict over logging in the park
1971	Logging banned in Quetico by Premier to appease conservationists, and public consultation becomes entrenched in the park management planning process
1973	First management plan begins to be developed and Quetico designated as a Primitive Class Park
1977	Quetico Park's first Master Plan approved resulting in the banning of logging, mining, hunting, and motorized access
1978	Quetico designated as a Wilderness Class park
1982	First review of the Quetico Master Plan completed and released
1989	Second review of the Quetico Master Plan completed and released
1992	Agreement of Co-existence signed between Lac La Croix First Nation and the Ontario Government, and Ontario Provincial Parks: Planning and Management Policies updated resulting in the Blue Book
1993	Environmental Bill of Rights, enshrining public participation in development of provincial government policies, enacted
1995	Revised Park Policy 1995 released
1997	First Quetico Provincial Park Fire Management Plan approved
1999	Class Environmental Assessment for Provincial Parks begins
2004	Class Environmental Assessment for Provincial Parks completed
2006	Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act enacted, and initiation of the current Quetico

	Provincial Park management plan review process
2009	Updated Quetico Provincial Park Fire Management Plan approved, and the 2009 Ontario Protected Areas Planning Manual replaces the 1992 Blue Book

**Quetico Provincial Park area**

The following is the description of the case study area based on the planning history, cultural history, and commercial aspects of Quetico Park. Quetico Provincial Park is Ontario’s third largest wilderness park encompassing 4,758 km<sup>2</sup>, and is located approximately 160 kilometres west of Thunder Bay (Figure 3). The two nearest communities are Atikokan to the north and Lac La Croix First Nation on the western boundary. Quetico has over 1,400 km of canoe routes with 612 portages on approximately 542 lakes. In addition to canoe routes, Quetico also has six hiking trails, 2,146 interior campsites, 107 car campsites, as well as two yurts (The Quetico Foundation, n.d.; OMNR, 2006).

**Figure 3.** Map showing Quetico Provincial Park in relation to Thunder Bay, Superior National Forest and the Boundary Waters Canoe Area.



Source: Adapted from OMNR, 2009d.

### **Planning History**

Quetico was designated as a Forest and Game Reserve in April 1909, after President Theodore Roosevelt created the Superior National Forest in Minnesota in February 1909 (see Figure 3). The two main purposes for designating the area as a forest reserve were to establish a reserve of timber and to protect wildlife values. Protection of wildlife was important because the logging and mining camps in the area were using local fish and game to feed the men in their camps resulting in extreme pressure on fish and wildlife populations. The purpose of the park also changed over this time from being utilitarian to being preservation-based, so the park was re-classified as a wilderness class park in 1978 (Littlejohn, 1965; OMNR, 2005, 2006 & 2007; Peruniak, 2000).

When the area was designated a Forest Reserve in 1909, rangers were directed to evict any First Nation people to further the conservation goals of the area by reducing the pressure on fish and game. However, such actions did not halt the poaching of wildlife by work camp harvesters, likely because there were only ten rangers hired for five months of the year to patrol the area, and they did not venture from major waterways. To increase the efficiency of enforcement, regular ranger patrols were instituted, permanent ranger stations were built and a warden was appointed to oversee the Forest Reserve. In 1913, rangers were given the powers of peace officers under the new *Provincial Parks Act*. The Act also permitted the Minister of Lands, Forests and Mines to issue timber licences in parks (Peruniak, 2000).

Quetico became the first provincial park gazetted under the new *Provincial Parks Act*. Under the control of the first superintendent, park rangers were required to work year-round under all conditions patrolling for illegal trapping and hunting. The superintendent also directed the rangers to maintain good relations with Canadian First Nation people, but warned them not to trust the United States (U.S.) First Peoples as he felt they were poaching and illegally trapping in the region. While relations between the rangers and Canadian First Nation people may have been positive on a personal level, the Federal and Provincial governments de-listed a small reserve that was surrounded by the park. This area is now subject to a land claim by the Lac La Croix First Nation (Peruniak, 2000).

Management of logging and timber licences was often an issue in Quetico. In 1919 there was a political scandal regarding logging in the park when the Minister of Lands and Forests sold timber licenses to a fellow Member of Provincial Parliament's (MPP) timber company for less than half of the going rate. This same business, the James A. Mathieu Lumber Company, was also often accused of ignoring regulations but did not suffer any penalties. That changed in 1941 when Quetico's superintendent, Walter Cain, who considered logging second in importance to tourism, enforced regulations (Killan, 1993; Peruniak, 2000).

As early as 1920, Quetico staff had been recommending that tourists be encouraged to enter from the Canadian side of the park to help develop a Canadian tourism outfitter trade. To make the Canadian side of the park more attractive to recreationists, portages were made easier to find and use (Peruniak, 2000).

Poaching and illegal trapping regulations were enforced more stringently to maintain or grow wildlife populations. However, contrary regulations were often instituted towards the same end. For example, there had been a request to allow gill netting on one of the lakes that was denied, but ring-necked pheasant, an exotic species, were introduced for beautification purposes. As well, in 1949 the governments of Ontario and Canada were able to come to an agreement that allowed the Lac La Croix First Nation to develop trap lines in the park to provide the community with a small income (Peruniak, 2000).

During the 50s and 60s, there was a recreation boom in Ontario's parks with a great number of pressures being placed on parks by people looking to recreate. One of those pressures in Quetico was the use of airplanes to access the remote lakes. Eventually an air space restriction had to be instituted (Killan, 1993; Peruniak, 2000).

Later in the 60s and 70s, the purpose of a park was debated between preservationists and utilitarians (Killan, 1993; Peruniak, 2000). During this debate, a classification system was developed in 1967 that provided five classes of parks. These classifications ranged from parks with the primary objectives of ecological integrity based on scientific knowledge through to multiple use parks in which industrial activities such as logging would continue (Killan, 1993). With the change to a focus on a scientifically-based classification system, greater emphasis was placed on systematically representing and protecting biodiversity, as well as designating areas for other human uses (Killan, 1993; Wright & Rollins, 2009). Preservationists prevailed in the utilitarian-preservationist debates and Quetico was designated as a Primitive Class Park in 1973, resulting in a ban on logging, mining and hunting. To further the goals of

preservation, the boundaries of the park were adjusted, a buffer zone was created and garbage reduction rules were implemented. To help further tourism goals, more access points were created in the northern part of the park and a daily quota system for southern entry points was implemented. As well, motors were prohibited except for members of the Lac La Croix First Nations Guide Association, and these were limited to a maximum of 10 horsepower (Peruniak, 2000).

Planning and management became more long-term oriented, and in 1973 park superintendents, with assistance from the Quetico Park Advisory Committee, began developing a Master Plan for the park that was brought into force in 1977. The core of this plan was a determination to co-exist with the Lac La Croix First Nation people. All waters of Lac La Croix were de-gazetted from the park to allow access to the Lac La Croix First Nation by boat (OMNR Provincial Parks Council, 1983; OMNR, 2006; Peruniak, 2000). To keep the plan current and relevant and to address specific issues, the 1977 plan was reviewed in 1982 and in 1989 (OMNR Provincial Parks Council, 1983; OMNR, 2006). Then in 1992, Lac La Croix First Nation proposed a major amendment that provided employment opportunities and economic diversification that resulted in the Lac La Croix Agreement of Co-existence and the Revised Park Policy in 1995 (OMNR, 2006; Spielmann and Unger, 2000).

One last management issue is that of fire suppression, which was carried out, likely for economic reasons, from sometime prior to 1909 until the 1990s. However, in the period when the first Master Plan was being developed, research demonstrated that fire might be an essential ecological process fundamental to ecosystem health and sustainability. Since that time, this finding has been accepted as fact with the result

being that there is a fire management plan that allows 63% of Quetico to burn naturally (Peruniak, 2000; OMNR, 2008).

### **Cultural History**

There is a strong cultural heritage in the region for both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. Aboriginal people have continually occupied the area since the Paleo-Indian Period (10,000 to 7,000 BP). Other significant cultures that inhabited the area include the Middle Shield (7,000 to 1500 BP), Laurel (3,000 to 1500 BP) and Blackduck (1500 BP to contact) who are the ancestors of today's Cree and Ojibwa cultures. Evidence of occupation by these cultures is in the form of artefacts such as arrowheads found in archaeological sites and pictographs (OMNR, 2007).

Today Quetico lies entirely within the Treaty 3 area (Figure 4). The purpose of Treaty 3 from the European perspective was to exploit the lumber and mineral resources of the area. Treaty 3 stipulates that in return for surrendering 14,245,000 hectares, the Saulteaux tribe of Ojibway First Nation and all its descendants “shall have right to pursue their avocations of hunting and fishing throughout the tract” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2010b). The closest First Nation community to the park is Lac La Croix First Nation reserve, which abuts the southwest corner of the park. Much of the traditional lands<sup>1</sup> of the Lac La Croix First Nation are within Quetico Provincial Park. The Lac des Mille Lac and Seine River First Nations have also traditionally used the area. When Quetico was first established as a Forest Reserve in 1909, hunting and fishing were banned (contrary to their Aboriginal and treaty rights).


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<sup>1</sup> Lands historically occupied and used by the First Nation.

Aboriginal people who lived in the area were relocated to residential reserves outside of the Quetico boundary (OMNR, 2007).

Aboriginal and treaty rights include hunting, fishing, trapping and harvesting of other non-timber forest products such as berries, rice and, medicinal plants within the treaty areas in which they live. Treaties such as Treaty 3 also acknowledge that the designated reserve lands are for the use of the Aboriginal people from those communities (Daugherty, 1986).

**Figure 4.** Map of Treaty #3 area.



Source: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2002).

Non-Aboriginal heritage in the area started with traders and explorers such as Jacques de Noyon, David Thompson and the voyageurs who utilised the two major water/trade routes that pass through the area (INAC, 2009; OMNR, 2006). The first route, used from 1731 to 1798, went from Grand Portage to Rainy Lake, now forming the international boundary. From 1798 to 1821 the Kaministiquia route, which later became the Dawson Route, went from Fort William up the Kaministiquia River to Rainy Lake. The Dawson Route was completed in 1870 by troops sent to arrest Louis Riel in Manitoba during the Red River Rebellion, and then abandoned after 1885 when the Canadian Pacific Railway provided a direct route from eastern Canada to the prairies. Passage to the park and through the area did not become easy until 1956 with the development of Highway 11 (Litteljohn, 1965a; Quetico Provincial Park Advisory Committee, 1972).

The three major non-Aboriginal communities in the area, Fort Frances, Kenora and Atikokan, were founded in the 1800s (1817, 1836 and 1899 respectively). The region was settled and developed to capitalize on the fur trade and the mining and forestry industries (100<sup>th</sup> Birthday Committee, 1999; Lund, 1976).

### **Commercial Aspects of the Park**

When the Quetico Forest Reserve was originally designated, the area was closed to prospecting, hunting and trapping, and mining, but remained open to logging, with the later two industrial activities starting in the 1880s (KBM Forestry Consultants Inc., 2005; Quetico Provincial Park Advisory Committee, 1972). At the beginning of World War II, as part of an emergency measure, prospecting and mining were again permitted

in the park from 1939 until the ban was reinstated in 1956 (Quetico Provincial Park Advisory Committee, 1972). There were no mines developed, and many of the claims staked in the permitted period were later purchased back by the government (Peruniak, 2000). Commercial fishing licences were established in the 1920s but the practice was discontinued after 1970 (OMNR, 2007).

A reinstatement of trapping occurred in 1949, at the request of the Federal Department of Indian and Northern Affairs to provide economic opportunities for the Lac La Croix First Nation (OMNR, 2007; Quetico Centre, 1987). Later in 1971, after a prolonged debate, logging was banned to appease conservationists (Thunder Bay Chamber of Commerce, 1971; Hakala, 1971). One of the results of the debate was the formation in 1970 of the Quetico Park Advisory Council (QPAC). The nine member Advisory Council was appointed by the Minister of Lands and Forests and charged to advise the provincial government about the public will, and provide an avenue for public participation regarding the debate surrounding logging within the park (OMNR Provincial Parks, 1983; Quetico Provincial Park Advisory Committee, n.d.).

Today, the main form of commercial enterprise in Quetico is recreation and tourism. Since the early 1900s, there have been complaints that the majority of park users are non-residents of Ontario. The majority of non-resident visitors are U.S. citizens who enter the area from the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA) in Minnesota. The non-resident use of the park has varied from as high as 500 U.S. Citizens to each Canadian in 1954 to approximately 75% today (Schrag, 1954; OMNR, 2007). The main concern about the high rate of non-resident use and access from the BWCA is that the majority of the economic gain realized from the park goes to U.S.

outfitters in Ely, Minnesota. Overall the number of park users is controlled by a quota system, though that does not limit entrance by residency as has been requested in the past by the Community of Atikokan and local tourism businesses (OMNR, 2007; OMNR Provincial Parks Council, 1983).

### **Management Planning History**

Planning for parks involves two overlapping and sometimes competing goals of provision of access and protection of both natural and cultural heritage. The development and reviewing of management plans is an attempt to resolve the incompatibilities between the two goals while protecting park values and providing economic opportunities for local residents and businesses. Doing so often requires compromising one of the goals to achieve the other (McCool, 2009).

In 1977, Quetico was the first provincial park in Ontario to develop a master plan. Prior to that, the 1954 Provincial Parks Act, the 1959 Wilderness Areas Act, and other provincial policies regulated all parks in Ontario. With the advent of the environmental ethic in the 1960s, protection of ecological values and public participation in resource management became highly contested issues. The conflict surrounding these issues was particularly significant in Quetico between utilitarian and preservationist worldviews. At this time, there was also significant pressure for public involvement in planning and management of provincial parks, and consultation became a mandated part of park management planning in 1971 (Killan, 1997). As a result, the government of the day established the Quetico Park Advisory Committee.

The members of the committee were provincial leaders and included representatives from industry, environmentalists, local municipal officials, Members of Provincial Parliament, Lakehead University, and the Chief of Lac La Croix First Nation. The Advisory Committee held 23 public meetings in Quetico Park, Atikokan, Fort Frances, Lac La Croix First Nation, Thunder Bay, and Toronto in April 1971. It also received 263 written briefs and ~4500 letters. From this process there were 26 recommendations based on input from the general public that were then used to develop the 1977 Quetico Park Master Plan (Quetico Provincial Park Advisory Committee, n.d.; Quetico Provincial Park Advisory Committee, 1972).

After the creation of the original 1977 Master Plan, there were subsequent reviews to address specific issues and ensure relevancy in 1982 and 1989. Then in 1995, the Lac La Croix Agreement of Coexistence was signed and resulted in the Revised Park Policy in 1995. The purpose of the Agreement of Coexistence was to provide business and employment opportunities to Lac La Croix First Nation.

The Agreement of Coexistence is a statement of political relationship that recognizes that Lac La Croix First Nation has an inherent right to self-government and that the relationship between Ontario and Lac La Croix First Nation must be based upon respect for that right. The agreement is an attempt to right the many injustices that occurred as a result of the creation of Quetico Park on Lac La Croix First Nation's traditional lands. It states that Lac La Croix must be an active and full participant in future planning and development of the Quetico area, share in the resource management (i.e. fisheries and trapping), develop employment and economic benefits for the community, and that a portion on the western periphery is to be co-managed by Lac La

Croix and Park staff. As well, the community is to have access by air and powerboat for economic, cultural, and spiritual purposes (Spielmann and Unger, 2000).

### **Stages of the Management Planning Process**

Currently Ontario Parks has two management plan reviewing processes; both will be discussed below. The first was developed under the auspices of the 1954 *Ontario Parks Act*, with policies and procedures being developed and used until the creation of the current process developed in 2009 based on the 2006 *Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act*. The greatest difference between the two processes related to this study is that public participation is required for the review process under the 2006 PPCRA, but not for the 1954 Ontario Parks Act. As well, there are differences in how the two processes occur as will be seen below. The current Quetico Park management plan review process uses the 1992 Blue Book management plan review process because planning began prior to the development of the new *2009 Ontario Protected Areas Planning Manual*.

Quetico Park has undergone three management plan reviews since the implementation of the 1977 Quetico Park Master Plan and a fourth is currently underway. There are three guiding tools utilized to complete these reviews. They are the *Ontario Provincial Parks Act, 1954*, the *Ontario Provincial Parks Policy Statement*, and the *Ontario Provincial Parks Planning and Management Policies* (OMNR 1992). The Master Plan was developed in 1977, under the auspices of the 1954 *Ontario Provincial Parks Act*. This legislation was enacted with the purpose of guiding the management and development of the park system, and remained largely unchanged until the passing

of the 2006 PPCRA. The development of the second tool, the *Ontario Provincial Parks Policy Statement*, was guided by nine principles: 1) permanence, 2) distinctiveness, 3) representation, 4) variety, 5) accessibility, 6) co-ordination, 7) system, 8) classification, and 9) zoning. The policy statement also identified the provincial park system's four objectives of protection, heritage appreciation, recreation, and tourism and the goal of protecting the provincial parks system's natural, cultural and recreational environments while providing outdoor recreation opportunities (OMNR, 1992). The third tool used by park planning teams was the *Ontario Provincial Parks Planning and Management Policies*, also known as the Blue Book because of its blue vinyl cover. The document contained a combination of program targets, management policies, systems rationale, and park philosophy in sections associated with each park classification. These were accomplished through six park classes, four objectives, internal zoning, and natural heritage features protection targets. In 2009, the *Protected Areas Planning Manual* replaced the Blue Book to meet the planning requirements of the 2006 PPCRA.

Unlike the older planning process, the new 2009 planning manual also incorporates the assessment requirements and consultation procedures that Ontario Parks must follow as outlined in the 2005 *Class Environmental Assessment for Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves* (Class EA). The Class EA covers such topics as general operations, managing natural resources, construction of facilities, matters pertaining to park and conservation reserve boundaries, and acquisition of land for new or existing protected areas (OMNR, 2005).

The new 2009 process also provides more options for planning teams than the former process; however, there is a potential for fewer opportunities for public

engagement using the 2009 process if a planning process is deemed to need only a Management Statement (see Appendix 1). The current Quetico Park management plan review is being conducted under the auspices of the older Blue Book planning regime that has five stages: Terms of Reference, Background Information Report, Management Options, and Preliminary Management Plan, Final Management Plan.

The Terms of Reference stage outlines the roles and responsibilities of the people involved, the tasks to be accomplished, and a tentative schedule for completion. For the QMPR, the Terms of Reference identified the seven members of the planning team, two of which are not MNR staff. As well, because it is a high profile park, the QMPR required an advisory committee of ten individuals. They represent Lac La Croix First Nation and a variety of stakeholders including Atikokan, ENGOs, Lakehead University, the forestry and mining industries, and the Resource Management Advisory Committee—a local committee that advises OMNR during forest management planning.

The second stage, the Background Information Report, provides information regarding recreational activities, demographic data on park users and a market analysis to be used by the reader to provide informed input to the planning team. As well, it also provides issues identified by the planning team that they feel need to be addressed. The planning team for the current QMPR identified 39 management issues that they thought should be considered. Topics covered included policy and development, ecology, culture, recreation, and visitor regulation.

The third stage of the process, the Management Options Document, outlines and presents the management options available for each issue. In the Quetico Management Options document, there are nine management topics with an average of three to four

options identified. As well, another seven management topics were identified that require further discussion. Furthermore, the planning team has indicated that if an issue has been missed, then this is the stage at which it should be brought forth. All of the issues and their options listed were identified by the planning team and through input from the public, stakeholders, and other interests at the Background Information stage.

The fourth stage of the process is the Preliminary Management Plan. The document presents the policies that will be developed based on the selected options for the issues identified in the previous stages. The Preliminary Management Plan stage has not been completed at the time of writing. However, unless a glaring omission or error is identified through the public participation phase of this stage, the policies proposed will form the fifth stage, the Final Management Plan.

The Final Management Plan is the guiding document used by the park superintendent and senior bureaucratic staff to inform all decisions about the park. While each park management plan is unique, the issues discussed can include: relevant legislation, vision, and objectives, values and pressures, zoning, permitted uses, resource management activities (i.e. fire, vegetation, wildlife, and fisheries management), operational and development activities, implementation priorities, and monitoring activities (OMNR, 2009c).

There are opportunities for stakeholders to participate after each of the first four stages (see Appendix 6). At each of these four stages, any stakeholder who wants to participate has 45 days to respond, after which all comments are collated and sorted by the planning team. The information gathered from these comments is then used to

identify the degree of support or opposition for any issues or options presented, and determine if there were any topics missed that need to be included.

Under the new 2009 process, the number of opportunities for public participation available is dependent on the complexity of the planning process. The new process has a minimum of one opportunity for public participation for non-complex reviews and up to three for very complex processes (see Appendix 5). For either of these management plan review processes, planning staff are required to inform the public when a management plan process has begun and when and how they are able to participate.

Under the 2009 process, communication about a management plan review is handled through a variety of methods. First is the mandatory contact list, which includes all the ENGOs and NGOs with provincial interests, local municipalities and citizens, other government ministries, and affected First Nations. Those on this list receive all planning documents and public notices associated with the planning process. Second is the use of media such as newspaper ads, postings in key community locations, mailouts to those not served by local papers, local, regional, and provincial press releases, and, in the case of Quetico, the park tabloid. Third are electronic forms of communication such as the Ontario Parks website and the mandatory posting on the EBR Registry mandated under the *Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993*. Fourth is the use of open houses in area communities during the Management Options and the Preliminary Management Plan stages. It is hoped that by using these methods of information distribution a broader audience will be reached.

The 2009 Management Planning Manual process has many similarities to the older Blue Book process. However, there are also some significant changes. Under the

2009 process, it is possible for a planning team to consolidate a number of protected areas under one Management Plan. The reason for this is to reduce the number of Management Plans required and to allow Ontario Parks to meet its Management Plan responsibilities. The stages under this process differ from the former in a number of ways. First, the former planning process had only one management direction in the Final Management Plan; however, there are now two forms of management direction. Under the 2009 planning process there is now also an option for either a Final Management Plan or a Management Statement. Management Plans are used for complex protected areas, while a Management Statement is used for areas of limited complexity. The type of management direction is based on the complexity of the park, public profile of the park, classification, resource management values, proposed issues, and infrastructure development.

The second difference is the number of opportunities for public input. A process that results in a management statement requires only one public input opportunity, while those resulting in a management plan will require either two or three depending on the complexity (See Appendix 5).

Third is that the new process has a values and pressure analysis at the background information stage. This analysis helps to determine the complexity of the process and needs for zoning, identifies specific objectives and any necessary management actions that are required, and is used during the monitoring and assessment phase. The latter is also a fourth difference between the two processes, as the former process did not include a monitoring and assessment stage.

The final major difference between the two processes is that the new process utilizes an adaptive management approach. Adaptive management according to Ontario Parks (2009c) is the constant improvement of management policies and practices by studying the results of their implementation.

### **The Current Quetico Park Management Plan Review**

The intent of the current management plan review is to incorporate the many sub plans developed since the previous management plan review. As well, the review is going to consider matters of zoning, natural resources management (fire, wildlife, vegetation, and fisheries), cultural resources management (First Nation values and historic sites), operations (e.g. Atikokan–Quetico tourism recommendations, outfitting issues, and research), and development for Atikokan and Lac La Croix First Nation (e.g. roads, recreational activities, and economic development) (OMNR, 2006).

The current QMPR is being conducted under the policies of the former planning regime known as the Blue Book, and began on July 4, 2006 when the Terms of Reference was released to the public. The timeline for the process indicated that the Background Information and Management Options stage would begin in the fall of 2006 and end in the spring of 2007. The Preliminary Management Plan was to be completed by the fall of 2007, and the Final Management Plan approved in the summer of (OMNR, 2006). In reality, the Background Information and Management Options stages ended in the fall of 2010 and at the time of writing (August, 2012), the Preliminary Management Plan has yet to be approved. The most common response to a question about what informants would change about the process was to shorten the time that it takes to

conduct the planning process. The reason for this was the development of the new *2009 Ontario Protected Areas Planning Manual*. According to Ontario Parks' staff, the development and vetting of the document consumed a great deal of planning staff resources. After the Background Information stage was completed in August of 2010, the Management Options document was released. The opportunity for comments at this stage closed October 15, 2010. As of August 2012, the process has not yet advanced to the Preliminary Management Plan stage.

### **ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS USING ACTORS, POWERS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

This section analyzes the results of interviews conducted with twelve key informants, using the Agrawal and Ribot (1999) framework that focuses on actors, their powers, and their degree of accountability. It was found that there are two types of actors—high power and low power. High power actors each utilize some of Agrawal and Ribot's four powers (discussed later), while low power actors do not utilize any of those powers. High power actors are also the only actors that are accountable for park planning and management decisions.

#### **Description of Informants**

In total 13 individuals were interviewed; however, the first informant had not participated in a planning or management decision processes, so that interview was not transcribed or analyzed. Three of the interviews were conducted as recorded telephone conversations, two of which were with the ENGO respondents living in southern

Ontario. The other phone interview was with a person who was interviewed from the general public perspective, and they live in southern Ontario as well. The remaining nine interviews were conducted face-to-face with respondents in a variety of settings ranging from restaurants, to offices, meeting rooms, and personal homes. Participants provided multiple perspectives (see Table 2).

The informants ranged in age from mid-thirties to early seventies, and two were female. Seven of the informants were local to the region, and the five non-locals were from communities ranging from Thunder Bay to Ottawa. All informants were Ontario residents, and one had dual Canadian-U.S. citizenship. Nine informants, four of which were local people, expressed environmental/wilderness protectionist views, and of the local informants who did not express those views, two advocated for a return of industrial logging in the park, and one for creating mainstream commercial tourism within the park.

**Table 2.** Perspectives of informants during interviews.

Informant	Informant perspective											
	Environmental advocate	Industrial advocate	Business advocate	Local community	NGO	Tourism outfitting	MNR Bureaucracy	General public	Local	Non-local	Park user	Non-park user
1	X						X	X	X		X	
2	X									X	X	
3	X		X	X			X	X	X		X	
4	X		X			X				X		X
5			X	X					X			X
6	X							X		X	X	
7	X		X			X			X		X	
8		X			X				X			X
9	X									X	X	
10		X	X	X					X			X
11	X						X			X	X	
12	X						X		X		X	

Note. The perspective of an informant was not necessarily limited to the actor group they represented. While only an individual from a local community could provide that perspective, other viewpoints such as Environmental Advocate, Industrial Advocate, or Business advocate were not limited to membership.

The majority of respondents were very willing to answer all questions, though some had concerns that their responses could cause difficulties for their organizational relationships with other actors. For this reason organizational names have been avoided where possible. Most respondents were very supportive of the project, though one felt that governance issues were far less important than those of climate change and the effect it will have on the ecological integrity of the park. The responses of this individual to other questions seemed to be somewhat guarded; however, their responses did support the majority of findings from other interviews.

As stated earlier, the questionnaires were developed by using the information gathered during the document review and informant responses during previous interviews. The questions were structured around Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) framework to determine if there were any unidentified actors, the powers actors may have, and how decision-makers are held accountable. Earlier interviews asked questions regarding adjudication, but saturation on this subject was achieved early in the interviewing process.

Each questionnaire was specifically targeted towards the informant's group affiliation (see Appendix 7, Appendix 8, and Appendix 9). It should be noted that if there was more than one informant from a representative group, their questionnaires were not necessarily identical, because either saturation occurred on a topic or new avenues of enquiry were discovered.

All of the questionnaires began with inquiries about the individual's historical and personal connections with the park. For example, they would be asked if they had grown up in the area, if they lived locally, or how long they had been visiting the region

if they were not local residents. The purpose of these questions was to develop a rapport with the informant, allow them to become comfortable with the process, and forget that they were being recorded. Informants were also asked about their use of the park, and any thoughts they had about how the park was managed during their first Quetico experiences. The questions then shifted towards their involvement in planning or management decision-making processes, whether they felt the process was positive or negative, and how they participated (i.e. written submission, attend meeting, donate money to ENGO, etc.). The questions then targeted who the power holders were, and who the informant felt was the ultimate authority on decisions. All the questionnaires ended with two questions about the ecological state of the park and if the existence of the park had affected how that individual recreates on or uses the land.

### **ACTOR GROUPS**

This section describes the actors involved in the current QMPR. In all, there are ten actor groups involved in management planning and decision-making in Quetico Park. They are Lac La Croix First Nation, Tourism Industry, Provincially Elected Officials, Industry, MNR Bureaucracy, General Public, Environmental Non-governmental Organizations, U.S. Citizens, Community of Atikokan, and Non-governmental organizations. These actor groups were developed through information gathered during the document review stage, combined with information gathered during the informant interviews. All actors exert varying degrees of control over planning and management decisions. The nature of each actor's influence on management decisions varies from the ability to enact laws to influencing decision-makers through public

participation methods such as letter writing and attending open houses. While Agrawal and Ribot (1999) determined that all actors are accountable to differing individuals, agencies and constituencies, two actors were found in the study that are not accountable to any of these. Lastly, the actors discussed below have a variety of organizational structures ranging from none (i.e. the group General Public) to formal and highly structured (i.e. the group MNR Bureaucracy).

### ***Lac La Croix First Nation***

Lac La Croix is the small First Nation community located at the southwest corner of Quetico Provincial Park. Lac La Croix is located on the Indian Reserve # 127 Nenguaguon Indian Reserve, which abuts the southwest boundary of Quetico Provincial Park and has a population of 402, with 278 living on reserve and 113 off reserve (INAC, 2009).

Lac La Croix First Nation has a long history with the park including a spiritual connection to the land, as well as hunting, trapping, and gathering in the area. The creation of the Forest and Game Reserve in 1909 was the first significant impact on their way of life because community members were prohibited from hunting or trapping within the boundaries of the reserve. These regulations were contrary to Treaty #3 that made the commitment to allow the First Nation signatories to continue hunting and fishing on their traditional lands. Another impact was the forced removal in 1910 of some members from a reserve on Kawa Bay on Lake Kawnipi. In 1949, in an effort to alleviate poverty in the community the Government of Canada negotiated with the Ontario Government to allow community members to trap within the park boundary.

In 1977, the creation of the Quetico Park Master Plan resulted in the phasing out of motorized access. In 1995, Lac La Croix First Nation and the Government of Ontario signed the Agreement of Coexistence, a 15-year accord to improve the First Nation's economic conditions and facilitate the community's social and cultural ties to the area within the park. The agreement also allows community members to provide motorized guiding to anglers within the park and other employment opportunities in the park. Through the agreement, the community also provides some management of the fishery in the area designated for their motorized access, and road access was provided to the community in the late 1990s, previously accessible by only boat or plane. While the agreement has exceeded its timeline, it has been rolled over and Lac La Croix is still able to exercise any benefits that it provides. While the Agreement of Coexistence has technically expired, informants stated that it continues to be in effect as if it was still current.

The community has participated in previous management plan reviews, but is not actively participating in the current management planning review process. Even without participating in the process, the community can have a significant impact on decisions made about the park due to treaty rights. One implication of Lac La Croix First Nation not participating in the planning process is that after the current planning process is completed, the community could reject the management plan forcing the process to begin all over again.

### ***Provincially Elected Officials***

This group of actors includes the Ontario MPP for the Thunder Bay–Atikokan riding, the Minister of Natural Resources, and the Premier of Ontario. During the time of the current QMPR, there have been four Ministers of Natural Resources.

The Minister of Natural Resources can have a significant impact on the influence of the bureaucratic staff, because the Minister decides how centralized decision-making will be. Some ministers have let senior bureaucrats approve policy changes such as management plans, while others insist that any decisions that have any potential for controversy be approved by the minister.

The other members of this group also have some influence on decision-making as often stakeholders will approach them when the stakeholder is unhappy with a decision that park management has made. As all the members of this actor group are elected, they are often more sensitive to the will of stakeholders than they are to the policies and science that bureaucrats use to make decisions.

### ***MNR Bureaucracy***

The bureaucratic staff of the MNR discussed by informants ranged from the park superintendent through to the Director of Ontario Parks. The superintendent oversees daily operations of the park and is the chief writer of the management plan, while the Director of Parks is responsible for the administration, planning, management, and operation of all parks in Ontario.

The park superintendent lives in Atikokan and manages the park from an office in that community. The superintendent's supervisor is the Zone Manager, located in

Thunder Bay at the regional office, which is also where the park planner for this management plan review is located. The park planner assists the Superintendent to develop the plan. All other superiors are located at the OMNR head office in Peterborough, which is located approximately 1400 km from Thunder Bay in southern Ontario. All potentially controversial decisions are sent to staff in Peterborough for either confirmation of the action suggested by the Superintendent, or for further direction that is accompanied by any relevant information.

If the Superintendent makes a decision that a stakeholder does not agree with, the stakeholder would start by contacting the Superintendent, and if they were not satisfied with the response, they work their way up through the chain of command until they contacted the Director. If they still were not satisfied they would then contact the Minister and their MPP. The reason for this latter tactic is that bureaucratic staff are subordinate to the Minister, and can have pressure applied to them from other MPPs.

There were two active members and one retired member of this group interviewed for this project. The non-active member was very forthcoming about their planning and management experiences. The two active members were not as forthcoming, though one was more so than the other. The individual who was not as forthcoming was far more guarded in their responses to the extent that it seemed that there was a small piece missing from many of their answers. The other active member was actually interviewed twice, as they felt that the project had been misrepresented. After reviewing the thesis proposal they agreed to be re-interviewed. All of the questions in the second interview were derived from the first, and they provided the

same responses, with possibly more detail for some of the questions about the structure of the two planning processes.

### *ENGOS*

The ENGO actor group consists of two ENGOs. One is a large national organization that has multiple chapters across the country, two of which are in Ontario. Support for its mandate comes from the public, private foundations, and corporations. The chapter of this organization that participates in the QMPRs has a paid staff, and positions on issues are based on the organization's mission and vision statements. Both of these statements advocate the protection of ecological integrity, with local community and First Nations issues falling a distant second to these ecological integrity mandates.

The other ENGO interviewed is quite small, but each member, all of whom have significant political and bureaucratic connections, is invited to participate by other members. Where the former ENGO participates in a majority of management plan reviews in the province, this second group participates in a very limited number. Positions on issues are determined through consensus, and the group works to assist both the local communities and First Nations to realize greater economic and social benefits from the park. While the organization does not have a definitive mission statement, they do advocate for the protection of wilderness, though occasionally they support programs that may negatively impact the wilderness if it means greater benefit to the protected area in question. This latter group is directly involved in the

development of policy including the management plan review while the other participates through the public participation process.

Two other ENGOs were mentioned during interviews; however, according to the informants, neither of the organizations is significantly involved in the current management plan review. According to an informant and former board member of one of the organizations, the group does not participate itself, but does request members to become involved. According to a staff person at the other ENGO mentioned, although they are often involved in provincial park management plan reviews, their organization has not been participating in the current QMPR because of a lack of capacity.

There were two individuals from this actor group interviewed, both of whom live in southern Ontario. One of these individuals was concerned that their responses to some questions would have negative repercussions for the organization they represent and other actors. For this reason the ENGO organizations are not being named. However, the answers to the questions that they were most concerned about were similar if not identical to other informants. In spite of these concerns both informants were very forthcoming in their responses. The difference in their attitudes towards the planning and decision-making processes and local communities realizing economic benefits from the park were quite different. One group is quite supportive of Atikokan, and especially Lac La Croix First Nation, realizing economic benefits from utilizing the park, while the other feels that the park should be protected at all costs, with the exception of allowing canoeists to utilize the park. Where one group has a positive relationship with local, regional, and provincial Ontario Park's staff, the other seems to have the opposite with every interaction being a conflict. Much of this conflict seemed

to be based on the legislation and policy that guide and constrain all decisions, but the conflict seems to be directed towards the decision-makers.

### *Community of Atikokan*

The actor group Community of Atikokan is located 50km from the park with a population of 3,293 (OMNR, 2006; Statistics Canada, 2006). The group consists of local leaders of organizations such as the Town Council, Chamber of Commerce, and Economic Development Corporation (EDC). All have a similar goal of increasing Atikokan's economic benefit from Quetico Park. The most effective member of this group would be the Town Council as they have the most capacity (something the Chamber of Commerce is lacking) and a reasonable relationship with the park superintendent (something the EDC seems to lack).

Another group in the community of Atikokan actor group is The Atikokan Committee. It is an extension of the Atikokan Town Council used to develop and implement plans for realizing an economic benefit from the park. The major focus of this group seems to be exploiting the tourism potential, and its subsequent economic impact, of the corridor between Quetico Park and Highway 11 that parallels the northern border of the park. The Committee does not participate directly in the management plan review, but they do negotiate with the park superintendent and other members of the actor group MNR Bureaucracy to develop greater economic links between the town and Quetico Park.

The community has a varied relationship with the park. One informant stated that when the economy is strong and employment is high, then the community tends to

ignore the park. However, when the economy suffers a downturn and unemployment is high, then the town looks to the area of the park as a source of economic return either through tourism or resource extraction. While there is some debate about whether residents would be in favour of opening the park up to logging or mining again, it seems that those who do favour such action are of an older generation, while the younger people are not interested. The reason for this demographic difference may be that since 1964 all local high school students have had an opportunity to experience the park through a multi-day canoe trip in the park.

Some local residents still have negative feelings towards the park. Some members of the community are still upset about the loss of motorized access that occurred in the 1970s. Others are upset by the lack of positive economic impact that the town realizes from the park. The reasoning behind these feelings are based on the majority of park users being Americans who enter from the south end of the park resulting in Atikokan not being able to realise any economic gain from these visitors. One older local respondent stated that some residents feel that the Canada / U.S. border begins at the northern boundary of the park, rather than at its southern edge.

Two individuals from this actor group were interviewed. One is a member of the town council and the other is with an organization involved in economic development. The individual from the town council was far more positive about the park, and what it could mean for the community, but was somewhat sceptical about how much economic impact the park could have or how soon it would occur. The other individual was quite negative about how the community was affected by the proximity to the park and park

management, as they felt the park policies and legislation were very restrictive and limited the community's ability to obtain economic gain from the park.

### ***Tourism Industry***

The Tourism Industry actor group has two types of members. The first and most significant participants are the outfitters that use Quetico Park, while the second and less influential are the other tourism businesses. The outfitters, both Canadian and U.S., have an annual meeting in April hosted by park management to discuss issues such as access, entry fees, and maintenance. Park management has requested that local outfitters revive the defunct Canadian Outfitters Association, but the suggestion has not been followed up.

According to an informant, seven local outfitters utilize Quetico for economic benefit, providing services such as trip logistics, canoe rental, guiding, air services, and provision of food packages. Not all of these outfitters live locally, though a local family owns and operates the largest outfitting company, Canoe Canada, in Atikokan. There are 15–20 American outfitters similar to Canoe Canada, with another 25–30 providing other services such as towing and youth camp trips. The Canadian outfitters are seasonal operations and supply services only during the canoeing season. Some American outfitters utilize the park year-round as they provide both canoeing and dog sledding outfitting services.

Tourism outfitters can have significant influence on decisions because they use the park more than any other stakeholder. Their use of the park provides the park with economic benefits through the purchase of park trip permits that all park users must

purchase. As well, the largest local outfitter has political connections with either those who have significant decision-making power, or who can influence decision-makers. As the majority of park visitors are Americans, many of whom use American outfitters, it was felt by some informants that American outfitters may also have a considerable amount of influence on park planning and management decisions.

There were two individuals interviewed from this group, both of whom are Canadian outfitters. The first tourism informant has a very large and successful family business, is very active in Ontario Parks, and as a result of that and family connections has a great deal of influence with higher power actors. The second tourism industry informant had been unaware until just before the interview was conducted in late 2009 that the management plan review was occurring, even though the process began in 2006 and outfitters are on a must-contact list. Both of these individuals were open and willing to answer all the questions presented to them, and were quite environmentally and socially aware. Their responses were similar, though not exactly so, but the first informant was far more savvy to the planning and decision-making processes and how to navigate them. The first informant grew up in the region and his family has had commercial interests in the park for many years. The second informant is not local; they purchased their business from a family friend and they have a primary residence in Thunder Bay so are only in the area during the outfitting season.

### ***Industry***

The Industry actor group consists of representatives from the mining and forestry sectors. Both have seats on the Advisory Committee, but they do not participate. The

reason for this is that they are not allowed to exploit resources within the borders of the park, and the park management decisions do not affect industrial operations outside of the park boundary. However, the forestry companies are sensitive to the effect that their operations have on visitors inside the park, and they will often time operations to have a minimal impact on visitor experiences.

The members of this actor group provide employment to local communities, and when park policies, such as the banning of logging within park boundaries in 1977, negatively affect industry members of the Community of Atikokan and other local actor groups, they often respond negatively towards the park. The park administration has attempted to work with industry through scientific studies by providing baseline forest information to researchers, but industry has not accepted these overtures.

While there are no informants from this actor group, a member of the forestry industry did respond to an email and stated that they do not participate in the management plan review because the decisions made do not affect their operations, but they do arrange with the park administrator to take precautions to avoid affecting park users. There was no response from any members of the mining sector who were contacted.

### ***General Public***

The general public consists of all those individuals that participate on their own rather than through other actor groups. The main demographic in this group would be park users who have a strong emotional attachment to the park. They may also be members of one of the other actor groups, but choose to participate individually in

addition to participating through the actor group. For example, an individual may be a supporter of an ENGO, but also provides individual input during management plan reviews through the EBR website. This group was the most difficult to identify and contact, as there are no organizations that could be contacted to request an interview.

Others that are part of this actor group, but were not interviewed, are those individuals who make submissions, but do not have computer access. This latter group was mentioned by two of the informants in regards to concerns that they may be experiencing participation barriers that others are not.

Other members of the general public include residents of Atikokan and other local communities that participate individually rather than through local organizations such as town councils and economic development organizations. As stated by informants, Atikokan residents are not homogenous in their attitudes towards the park and the effects that it has on the community. Informants also stated that while there may be many local individuals who would prefer to harvest all of the resources within the park, there are also many who would prefer to protect the area for future local and non-local generations.

There were two individuals interviewed from this actor group. Both were born non-locally, but one has been in the region since 1987 and the other lives in southern Ontario. The non-local informant was contacted through a posting on an internet chat forum. Both are or have been members of ENGOs, have had long relationships with the park as park visitors, and have participated in previous park planning exercises. Neither were pleased with Lac La Croix's use of motors in the park, but understood and supported the community retaining that right. Both are environmental advocates, but

also support local communities being able to realize an economic benefit from the park, as long as the environmental impacts are minimal. Of the two, the local informant was the one who was least supportive of local commercial use of the park.

It should be noted that with the study sample size of 12 there were only two individuals interviewed from this actor group. As this is not a homogeneous group all results from the General Public perspective must not be viewed as being representative of the entire general public. As well, while Thunder Bay is the nearest large population centre, it no longer has any direct affect on the decision-making for Quetico.

Historically, when forestry occurred within the park boundaries Thunder Bay attempted to influence decisions. For example, the Thunder Bay Chamber of Commerce gave a written submission to the Quetico Advisory Committee during the debates concerning banning logging in the park. However, after the logging ban in 1977 Thunder Bay no longer had an interest in the management decisions of the park.

### *U.S. citizens*

The actor group U.S. citizens was discussed with all informants in regards to the influence that they have on decision-making and management planning, though no members of this actor group were interviewed. The group is included because 80–90% of park users are U.S. citizens, and there are strong feelings about the amount of influence that this group has. Their influence comes in the forms of written submissions, and support to Canadian NGOs and ENGOs through both individual and private foundation donations. There were also informants who stated that some U.S.-based ENGOs such as the Heart of the Continent Partnership, an organization that seeks to

improve or maintain the economic and ecological health of the Ontario/Minnesota border region, can also have a great deal of influence over park planning and management.

It was found that this actor group does have significant influence on day-to-day management decisions (i.e. toilet cleanliness, portage conditions, etc.). However, U.S. citizens have far less direct influence on management planning. There is potential for there to be some influence as one MNR Bureaucracy member stated that if a good idea was presented to them they would consider it no matter what the source was. Also, there is potential that this group could have influence through the Tourism Industry group as this group will want to keep the U.S. park users happy, because they represent the majority of tourism business in the park.

### *NGOs*

There was one individual interviewed from this actor group, which includes two NGOs. The first is the locally-based hunting and angling advocacy group. It has approximately 80 to 90 members, the majority of which are local residents. The group runs a walleye fish hatchery used to stock local lakes, and is working on a project to raise sturgeon fry.

The second group is a provincial hunting and angling advocacy group. This NGO has over 100,000 members, and advocates for angler and hunter rights and traditions. The organization also has interests in invasive species, fisheries habitat and wildlife restoration, and anti-poaching.

Both of these closely aligned NGOs have advocated for access to hunting within Quetico Park. The local club is a supporter of changing the rules governing motorized access within the park. They and other local actor groups have proposed allowing small gas motors or electric motor access to the fringe lakes of Quetico Park.

The individual from this actor group is a long-time local resident who supports reopening the park to logging and motorized access. As well, they would like to have the park opened up for guided hunting as well. Their organization does not have a positive relationship with local park management as they blame the superintendent for their lack of success in achieving goals such as hunting and motorized access in the park. Coupled with this is a severe lack of knowledge about existing legislation or policy, and their affect on the decision-making process. Often responses from this individual were contradictory. For example, they want to reopen the park to logging, but also to protect the area for all to enjoy in perpetuity.

## **POWERS**

Below is a discussion of the powers used by actors. The study found that three of the actors are able to use three of the four broad powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999): 1) the power to create or modify rules, 2) the power to make decisions about the use of resources, and 3) the power to implement and enforce compliance of the new or altered rules. The fourth power, adjudication, is not directly wielded by any actors because of legislative limitations, but can be influenced by those three actors. However, the remaining seven actors are able to influence decision-making through two additional new powers identified in the study. These powers have been termed Participation and

Relationships. As the actors who have the four powers make the planning and management decisions, they have been labelled as high power actors, while the remaining actors that use the Participation and Relationship powers are called low power actors. Low power actors do not have direct control over decisions, but are able to influence the high power actors through the Participation and Relationships powers.

The following section is broken into five main segments. The first segment discusses why the four powers are restricted to the three high power actors. As well, there is a table that shows the powers that each actor has. The second segment discusses the three high power actors and how they use their powers. The third and fourth segments discuss the Participation and Relationship powers respectively, and the final segment describes how the two new powers interact by bridging through communication between actors.

### **Why the four powers are restricted to three actors**

The process under which the QMPR is occurring is a largely centralized process. The basis for this statement is that decision-making powers are designated to the actor groups MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials by both legislation and policy. The 1990 *Provincial Parks Act* and the 2006 *Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act* both state that provincial parks are under the control of the Minister of Natural Resources who is able to designate a superintendent to have charge of each park (R.S.O. 1990, c. P.34, s. 7(1); 2006, c. 12, s. 12(1)). Under the 2006 PPCRA, there must be a minimum of one public participation opportunity. Prior to 2006, the requirements

for public participation were based on guidelines stipulated in policy statements and not legislation, with a requirement of four opportunities for public participation.

Also within the 1990 and 2006 legislation, the Minister has control and responsibility for preparing management directions, because the Minister is responsible, through the division of powers for provincial governments, under *The Constitution Act* s. 92A (1867), for the management and conservation of forestry resources. As well, the more controversial or significant a decision is, the higher up in the MNR Bureaucracy a decision will be made, with the most important being decided by the Minister or cabinet of the government of the day. All of this indicates that power is centralized with the main instrument of power being legislation backed by regulations and guidelines.

Through the legislation described above, Treaty Rights, legal agreements, and Supreme Court of Canada land claim rulings, there are three actors that have the four broad powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). These three actors are Provincially Elected Officials, MNR Bureaucracy, and Lac La Croix First Nation. The Provincially Elected Officials and MNR Bureaucracy actors obtained their four powers through *The Constitution Act* s. 92A (1867), 1990 *Provincial Parks Act*, and the 2006 PPCRA. Lac La Croix has the four broad powers due to Treaty Rights, legal agreements, and Supreme Court of Canada land claim rulings. The remaining eight actors do not have any of the four powers, with the result that there are two power levels of actors—high and low. The high power actors are Provincially Elected Officials, MNR Bureaucracy, and Lac La Croix First Nation, while the eight remaining actors are low power level actors (see Table 3).

**Table 3.** Actors and the powers they use to make or influence management planning decision-making.

Actors	Powers					
	High Power Actor Powers				Low Power Actor Powers	
	Create or modify rules	Make decision about resources	Implement and enforce compliance of rules	Adjudication	Participation	Relationships
Provincially Elected Officials	X	X	X	X		
MNR Bureaucracy	X	X	X			
Lac La Croix ENGOS	X	X	X	X		X
Community of Atikokan Industry Tourism					X	X
Industry General Public					X	X
U.S. Citizens NGOs					X	X

Note: The actor industry does not have any powers indicated, because it does not have any of the four powers, nor does it utilize the Participation power in planning decisions through its position on the Advisory Committee. The reason for this is that park planning and management decisions do not affect the operations of Industry outside of the park.

The following sections will discuss the powers used by each high level actor, describe the Participation and Relationship powers and how they are used by low power level actors to influence decision-making.

### **Use of the four powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999)**

The actors Lac La Croix First Nation, Provincially Elected Officials, and MNR Bureaucracy are all high power actors that each utilizes at least some of the four powers (see Table 3) identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). These three actors and how they use the powers are discussed in the section below.

### ***Lac La Croix First Nation***

Lac La Croix First Nation is one of the two most powerful actors because it is able to utilize the four powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) as well as the Relationship power. Lac La Croix has the four powers through Treaty Rights, legal agreements including the Agreement of Coexistence and their seat on the planning team for the Management Planning Review, and Supreme Court land claim rulings (see *Keewatin v. Minister of Natural Resources*, 2011, *Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage)*, 2005, and *R. v. Sparrow*, 1990). Access to these powers is a significant change from the influence the community was able to exert in 1910 when it was forced from the Sturgeon Lake Reserve 24C (McNab, 1991). According to a former MNR Bureaucracy member during the Quetico Provincial Park Advisory Committee hearings in the early 1970s, Lac La Croix's "...ability to exert their positions was a little bit limited." A more recent statement by an MNR Bureaucracy member illustrates how much has changed: "I think that the power exists for First Nations to slow down or even stop a planning process so that it can accommodate their interests and their needs, but they have to make that happen." Other respondents from the ENGOS, MNR Bureaucracy, General Public, and Community of Atikokan actor groups also agreed that the First Nation has a great deal of power to stop, slow, restart, or influence the process. However, there was a statement by one interviewee that, even though Lac La Croix First Nation has a great deal of direct power through Treaty rights, they can also be considered to be powerless, because their power is derived from the courts, and to wield that power Lac La Croix requires both human and monetary resources.

The OMNR State of Ontario's Protected Areas Report (2011b) states that the Crown has a duty to consult an Aboriginal community if any decision or action affects established or asserted Aboriginal and treaty rights, and any planning is to consider the interests and rights of affected First Nation communities. However, the 2006 *Provincial Park and Conservation Reserves Act* does not address First Nation's Aboriginal and Treaty Rights that are protected by s.35 of the *Constitution Act, 1982*, and have been upheld in subsequent litigation (see *Keewatin v. Minister of Natural Resources*, 2011 and *R. v. Sparrow*, 1990).

It is through such legislation and litigation, plus the Agreement of Coexistence that Lac La Croix obtains its powers. The power that these afford Lac La Croix First Nation results in their ability to create or modify rules, and the power to make decisions about resources in the western periphery of the park. They also have some influence to implement and enforce compliance of new or altered rules. However, government and legislation, such as the *Endangered Species Act* (2007), can supersede that power. Through the Agreement of Coexistence, Lac La Croix also has some influence on the adjudication of disputes about rules, but it is limited to their Aboriginal and Treaty rights.

Lac La Croix also has some influence through the power of relationships. For example, when the 1992 Agreement of Coexistence was being debated, they invited a member of the ENGOs actor group to conduct relationship building and gain the support of that group in their bid to conduct motorized guiding in the park.

### *Provincially Elected Officials*

Provincially Elected Officials are the other most powerful actor group. They have three of the four powers—the power to create or modify rules, the power to make decisions about the use of resources and the power to implement and enforce compliance of the new or altered rules—identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999), and can strongly influence the fourth, the power to adjudicate disputes that occur during the creation and enforcement of compliance of new or altered rules. While the actor group MNR Bureaucracy creates or modifies the rules, policy, and legislation, the Minister gives final approval for any policies that are developed such as management plans and management plan reviews. However, if the Minister approves a policy or piece of legislation that is considered by large or influential groups, such as ENGOs, to be incompatible with the park objectives or planning and management principles, those groups may lobby the Premier, or use a publicity campaign to apply public pressure on these individuals that would cause the decision to be changed. An example of a publicity campaign that occurred in Quetico is the banning of logging and motor use in the park as a result of the environmental movement of the 1960s and 70s. Environmental groups such as the Wildlands League, through public protests and publicity campaigns that forced the Ontario Government to act, influenced the banning of logging in 1971 and development of the 1977 Master Plan that also phased out motorized access in the park.

In addition to changing policies and legislation, the Provincially Elected Officials actor group can also overrule policies. These abilities can have a significant effect on decisions about the use of resources and the enforcement of compliance on new or altered rules. While Provincially Elected Officials do not adjudicate disputes

regarding new or altered rules, they can strongly influence the decision to enforce them. As well, the decisions of Provincially Elected Officials can be strongly influenced through the relationship and participation powers by the Industry, ENGO, and General Public actors through lobbying. While these groups can influence the Provincially Elected Officials, the decisions are made based on the information given to them by the MNR Bureaucracy, existing legislation, and the political landscape.

### ***MNR Bureaucracy***

The MNR Bureaucracy group is also quite influential, because it actually creates and modifies the rules that are put into policy and legislation, and provides the information that the Provincially Elected Officials use to make decisions. The MNR Bureaucracy group also has the power to make decisions about the use of resources in Quetico. However, through the Agreement of Coexistence, the MNR Bureaucracy group shares that power with Lac La Croix First Nation for the western periphery of the park. As well, the MNR Bureaucracy implements and enforces all of the rules, including those that are new or altered. This group does not have the power to adjudicate disputes. However, for minor infractions they often prefer to use education to obtain compliance rather than sanctions. In addition, if a new or altered rule had unintended consequences, this group would be able to draft an amendment to the park management plan that would need to be approved by Provincially Elected Officials.

Most respondents felt that the park superintendent was second in power only to the Minister, because the superintendent makes all of the day-to-day decisions, is the chief author of the management plan, and makes recommendations to the Director of

Parks about major decisions. While the superintendent does use tools such as the management plan, legislation, park policy, and input from superiors to make decisions, the reality is that those devices also limit the superintendent's power. The members of the Politically Elected Officials actor group, legislation, and park policy all stipulate the rules that the superintendent must follow. While major policy decisions of superiors, such as the Director of Parks and their staff, are largely based on the information provided to them by the superintendent, they also face constraints based on the political landscape and political will of the Minister.


### **THE PARTICIPATION AND RELATIONSHIP POWERS**

Below is a description of the two low power level actor powers Participation and Relationships. First, each power is explained, and then a full description of how the low power level actors use each power is provided.

#### **Participation power**

Participation is the act of an individual or group providing input or having influence on a decision-making process. While the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials actors make final decisions, they do respond to public pressure. Participation can therefore provide a low power level actor a degree of influence on planning and management decisions. Actors are not guaranteed success by participating, but by providing suggestions to the planning team that do not contravene either the legislation or policy that decisions are based on, they are far more likely to be successful than those who do not participate. A diagram (see Figure 5) demonstrates the relations

between the themes of participation, power, policy, legislation, communication, knowledge, and decision-making.



From Figure 5, we can see that policy is derived from legislation. An example of this would be that under the 1990 *Parks Act*, public participation requirements came from policy rather than legislation. Also from Figure 5 we can see that legislation and policy cause decision-making, because all decisions must meet the requirements in policy and legislation. Decision-making is also a part of power because only the two higher power level actors have the power to enact any decisions made. The power to

make those decisions also derives from policy and legislation because the Minister has control of all provincial parks.

Participation is the cause of actors having some degree of influence during the decision-making process. However, participation is associated only with decision-making, because there is no guarantee that the decision will be made in a lower power level actor's favour. Technically, all comments submitted are weighted equally, whether or not they come from an individual or a group. However, in reality the superintendent has stated that he will spend more time trying to understand what it is that a group wants than he does for individuals. For groups with disparate opinions, the superintendent also stated that he would give more weight to comments coming from an expert group than he would from one that is not. For example, when dealing with quotas and permits, he would put more weight on those comments coming from members of the actor Tourism Industry than he would on those coming from another actor.

Participation is also associated with knowledge, because the act of participating does not assure that the participant has any knowledge about the process. However, those that do have knowledge about the process and the limitations that legislation and policy place on planning staff, have a much greater chance of affecting change. This latter aspect is why knowledge is also a part of power.

Communication refers to any form of dialogue between participants. It is a part of participation, because to participate in a planning process actors must engage with one another and the public through a variety of methods including written submissions, face-to-face meetings, and openhouses. It is associated with power in Figure 5, because the MNR Bureaucracy actor group controls the information provided to the public, and

by communicating with members and the public at large other actors are able to influence decisions. Examples of the latter are the use of websites, mass emails to supporters, and advertising campaigns through public service announcements and other media. As will be seen later, communication and decision-making are both associated with the participation and relationships powers. Communication is a part of relationships, and the forms of communication used range from the personal, such as letters, face-to-face meetings, or phone calls, to the less personal planning documents, written submissions, or public service announcements.

### *Participation mechanisms*

Lower power level actor groups use 13 identified participation techniques to influence decision-makers. These techniques are: 1) paying attention; 2) being proactive; 3) providing input; 4) being an advisor; 5) being on an advisory panel; 6) electronic participation; 7) writing a letter to the editor; 8) lobbying; 9) attending or requesting a meeting; 10) being on a mail/notification list; 11) attending an open house; 12) participating through an ENGO; and 13) providing a written submission. No actor group or informant uses all 13 techniques, but all utilized at least one. For some actor groups one member of the group may use a technique, but that does not mean that other members of that group will.

In Table 4 it can be seen which mechanisms of participation actors use. Please note that the actor NGO was not included as the group interviewed does not participate in any management or planning exercises. The Industry group also does not participate and was not included. As well, while these findings suggest that a group does not use a

mechanism, the data is limited to the responses of the informants. Others in the same actor group who were not interviewed or from actor groups that were not interviewed (i.e. Lac La Croix, General Public, and U.S. Citizens) may use mechanisms that the informants do not. The methods of participation for U.S. Citizens was obtained from interviews with members of the MNR Bureaucracy group.

**Table 4.** Mechanisms of participation that actors use.

Mechanisms of participation	Actors					
	Lac La Croix	Community of Atikokan	ENGO	Tourism	General Public	U.S. Citizens
Pay attention			X		X	
Being proactive						X
Provide input		X	X	X	X	X
Be an advisor		X	X	X		
Be on an advisory panel	X		X	X		
Electronic participation			X		X	
Letter to the editor			X		X	
Lobbying		X	X	X		
Attend or request meeting		X	X	X	X	
Be on mail/notification list	X	X	X	X	X	
Attend an open house				X	X	X
Participate through ENGO					X	X
Written submission		X	X	X	X	X

Note: The actors Industry and NGO are not included because they are not participating in the current planning process.

The form of participation titled “pay attention” is the act of a group or individual monitoring a variety of methods that planning staff utilize to inform the public about the management plan review process. Included would be monitoring newspapers and the EBR for notifications, and ensuring that the individual or group are on any relevant mailing lists. In interviews three respondents mentioned that this was a good method of ensuring participation.

Being proactive refers to actor groups approaching Ontario Parks’ staff well in advance of a management plan review exercise to propose a new or altered activity or

policy. An example for the current management plan would be U.S. outfitters approaching park management about allowing commercial guided dog sledding in the park. This group proposed the activity well in advance so that park staff had an opportunity to conduct compatibility tests and would then be able to make a recommendation when the management plan review began. Being proactive was identified as a very successful tactic by an informant from the MNR Bureaucracy.

Often when new activities or policies are proposed Ontario Parks staff will request advice from certain groups or individuals. Advice can range from what a group's response will be to a proposed policy or technical assistance on developing the policy.

Being an advisor is different than being on the Advisory Panel. The Quetico Advisory Panel is a formal group that the planning team establishes for management plan reviews of high profile parks such as Quetico. The panel provides advice based on local, regional, and provincial knowledge to the planning team. For the QMPR, the Advisory Panel represents environmental interests, Atikokan, Lac La Croix First Nation, Lakehead University, the forestry and mining industries, and the Resource Management Advisory Committee. Interestingly, while members of the panel are invited to participate by park management and senior levels of the bureaucracy, outfitters who use the park the most do not have a position on the current Quetico Advisory Panel.

The next form of participation is that of Electronic participation. Included in this form of participation is the use of the EBR and Ontario Parks websites and internet chat forums. There is a trend towards use of technology during the management plan review process. Some of the positive aspects mentioned are reduced costs, as hard copies of

documents at each stage are no longer sent out, as they are now available online. As well, it is felt by some respondents that geographic participation barriers are reduced through these media for some participants.

While the shift from a hard copy base to an electronic base does have its proponents, who feel that participation has been made easier through electronic participation, there was some concern by two informants that certain demographics may be being missed. Examples given were older individuals who do not have computer skills, and individuals who live in areas with no or poor internet connections. To address these barriers, Ontario Parks still offers hard copies of all documents, but they must be requested. This mitigation strategy does not, however, satisfy notification through the EBR website, or an inability to use website chat forums. To keep informed about planning activities these individuals must watch local newspapers for notifications about planning processes. According to one informant, older participants are used to this method and still use it with success.

One participation method that has carried over from before the electronic age is that of Letters to the Editor. While the effectiveness of these is not known, it is one method of voicing opinions and applying pressure on planning staff and elected officials. There were no letters to the editor found regarding the current planning exercise.

Letters to the Editor can be combined with the next form of participation, Lobbying. Lobbying is the act of a group or individual attempting to influence the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials actor groups. Local forestry and mining industry, multinational recreational equipment manufacturers, ENGOs, NGOs, local

communities, and tourism outfitters conduct lobbying. However, through political connections, financial influence, and large memberships, some organizations and individuals have greater success than others do.

Another form of participation is Attending or Requesting a Meeting with a member of the planning team or other Ontario Parks' official. Often these meetings are used to reach a compromise with groups or individuals who bring forward concerns late in the planning process. If the concern does not conflict with policy or legislation and Ontario Parks' staff agree that the concern has merit and needs to be addressed, they will often use meetings to reach a compromise rather than restarting the entire process.

Members of the Tourism Industry, which consists of both U.S. and Canadian outfitters, participate largely through an annual outfitters meeting hosted by local park management. The meeting is a forum for discussing concerns and any new rules or regulations that have come into affect. Examples of the latter include new fishing regulations and changes to permit fees.

Being on the Mail/Notification List ensures that participants are kept informed when management plan review processes begin, as each stage is reached/completed, and when planning events will occur. Some planners have taken to using email lists for this, as they are then able to keep participants informed sooner and for less money. There are two mailing lists used. The first one is the must-contact list. It includes large organizations such as ENGOs and NGOs, local communities, industry, and First Nations. Under the new planning manual, there is now a requirement to do pre-consultation with some of these groups, particularly First Nations. The second mailing

list is developed as individuals and organizations identify that they would like to be on the mailing list for a particular project, such as the QMPR.

One of the planning events that participants can learn about through a notification list is an open house. By attending an open house, participants are able to see what issues are being discussed and, depending on the stage of the management plan review, the proposed or chosen options for each (see Figure 6). If attendees have any questions, concerns, or suggestions, planning staff are available to speak with and record any comments.

**Figure 6.** Example of a Management option presented at Quetico Park Openhouse in Thunder Bay.

**TOPIC 3. Threshold Wilderness Zone (W3) Boundary and Associated Activities**

**Management direction is required to delineate the threshold wilderness zone boundary and to determine appropriate activities and any associated development to facilitate new/expanded activities in this wilderness zone. See Figure 5 for threshold wilderness zone size options.**

**OPTION 1:** The zone will encompass the shoreline of French Lake and the waters of French Lake (excluding the Dawson Trail campground and French Lake access zone) to a distance of 60m from the shore, extending east to the north bank of the French River, extending west to the Pines on Pickerel Lake from Baptism Creek, and south from the Pines to Sawmill Lake on a southeasterly bearing of 63° as shown in Figure 5. The size of the zone will be set at 1993 hectares. This represents less than 1% (**0.40%**) of the total area of the park. This is the preferred option.

**OPTION 2:** The zone will encompass the shoreline of French Lake and the waters of French Lake (excluding the Dawson Trail campground and French Lake access zone) to the northern park boundary, and extending east along this boundary to the north bank of the French River, and south to the intersection of the French River and Baptism Creek, and west to the outlet of the Pickerel River into Pickerel Lake, as shown in Figure 5. The size of the W3 zone will be set at 2011 hectares. This represents less than 1% (**0.40%**) of the total area of the park.

**OPTION 3:** The zone will encompass the shoreline of French Lake and the waters of French Lake (excluding the Dawson Trail campground and French Lake access zone) to a distance of 60m from the shore and extending east to the north bank of the French River, and south to the east bank of Baptism Creek, as shown in Figure 5. The size of the zone will be set at 920 hectares. This represents less than 1% (**0.18%**) of the total area of the park.

In addition to speaking with planning staff at open houses, participants are able to provide a Written Submission. Written submissions, which include letters, comment forms, emails, faxes, and petitions, were the most common form of participation identified. To make collating comments and responses easier, park staff has provided a

comment form that lists each issue, the options for each, and a space for comment (see Appendix 10), and that can be emailed to the planning team. The actor group that was most likely to participate through written submissions were ENGOs, particularly those that do not have local representation. Additionally, because of the ease of electronic communication, ENGOs are now able to contact members and supporters to request that they send in their own written submissions or use form letters that are hosted on the ENGOs website. Use of ENGO form letters is also a form of participation through an ENGO, which is the last form of identified public participation.

Participating through an ENGO consists of providing monetary support, signing petitions, submitting form letters hosted on the ENGOs website, or contacting the ENGO to inform them about issues they feel need addressing. As such, this form of participation can also be a type of accountability, because if the ENGO supporter feels that the organization is not fulfilling its mandate they can withdraw their support. In addition, the more supporters that an organization has, the more influence that organization can have on decision-makers, because those decision-makers are less likely to do something a large number of people oppose, as may be the case of an ENGO with public support which is monitoring their actions.

### ***Participation barriers***

While it is common for participants to use more than one form of participation, none use all 13 because there are barriers associated with many. For example, an individual living in Ottawa would have great difficulty attending any of the Quetico openhouses or requesting a face-to-face meeting. In total there were 43 participation

barriers identified. These barriers are relevant to all but the two actor groups—MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials. These two groups do not experience barriers to participation because they control the process. Of these barriers, eight were found to be the most common. These barriers—capacity, communication, confusion, geography, knowledge of jargon, lack of interest, lack of power, and structure of the process—are shown in Table 5 listed with the actors that each barrier affects.

Issues such as a lack of funding and other resources can limit the capacity of an actor group to participate. The actor groups for which this barrier were identified as being an issue were Lac La Croix, ENGOs, Community of Atikokan, General Public, and NGOs.

Communication is a barrier for the General Public, Lac La Croix, and the Tourism Industry actor groups. The basis of this barrier is either difficult or poor communication by MNR with those groups. The General Public actor group had the greatest incidents of communication barriers being identified.

**Table 5.** Eight most common participation barriers and the actors they affect.

Barriers	Actors						
	Lac La Croix	Community of Atikokan	ENGOs	NGOs	Tourism Industry	General Public	U.S. Citizens
Capacity	X	X	X	X		X	
Communication	X				X	X	
Confusion		X	X		X	X	
Geography			X			X	X
Knowledge of Jargon			X		X	X	
Lack of interest	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Lack of power	X	X	X	X		X	
Structure of the process		X	X			X	

Confusion is a barrier when participants do not know when, how, or if they should participate. One common complaint about the QMPR was that at the Background Information Report stage, the notice to participate was at the back of the document, and the notice referring to participation was unclear as to how many times one should submit input to fully participate. Confusion is a barrier for the General Public, Tourism Industry, ENGO, and the Community of Atikokan. Confusion is not as big of a barrier for those actor groups such as ENGOs that participate regularly, as they are very familiar with the stages of the process. However, it was identified as an issue for ENGO individuals when they were new to the process.

Geography is a barrier mostly because it limits who can attend open houses or have face-to-face meetings with planning team staff. The actor groups for which geography was identified as a barrier were ENGOs, General Public, and US Citizen. From the point of view of local groups, this barrier provides them with greater influence on the process because they are able to develop relationships with planning team members.

Knowledge of jargon is a barrier because groups do not understand the meaning of terms used by MNR. It was identified as an issue for the actor groups General Public, Tourism Industry, and ENGOs. Similar to the confusion barrier, the ENGO actor group identified jargon as an issue when an individual first participated in the process. Other actor groups may also experience jargon as a barrier, particularly when an individual from that group is new to the process, but this issue was not identified during interviews.

The barrier Lack of Interest occurs for a number of reasons. First, is the duration of the process, because the process can be very drawn out and people can move, or

change interests. Second, is a sense that Ontario Parks is on the right track and there is nothing to worry about. Third, is the lack of contentious issues brought forward in the management plan review process. With nothing to get people really stirred up, they are unlikely to participate because it was noted by an MNR Bureaucracy member that the public is reactionary rather than proactive about issues. Fourth, people lead busy lives and do not have time to participate. Fifth, there is a sense that it takes too much effort and time to make changes that actors would rather just live with it. Six, is a lack of trust.

Lack of interest was identified as a barrier for the actor groups Lac La Croix First Nation, ENGOS, Community of Atikokan, NGOs, General Public, and Tourism Industry. One informant felt that Lac La Croix First Nation might not have interest because of a lack of trust due to historical treatment of First Nations by government bodies. Lack of interest could be surprising for ENGOS, but in this instance, it refers to changing priorities of members, particularly when the process takes so long. For the Community of Atikokan the lack of interest is not pervasive, but is limited to those groups or individuals who have been unable to make desired changes through a lack of power. The NGO actor group also has a lack of interest for the same reasons, and they feel that the effort to make change is not worth it. The General Public actor group's lack of interest was thought by informants to be based on the lack of contentious issues, being too busy, and the duration of the process and resulting change of interests. Informants from the Tourism Industry actor group did not all have a lack of interest as a barrier, but those that did said they were busy doing other things. In addition, members of this actor group may not participate during the stages of the process, because they have meetings and regular communications with park management.

When actor groups experience the barrier Lack of Power, participants can seem as if they have lost interest, but it is distinctly different. The causes behind the lack of power barrier are: feeling as if they do not have the same voice as others, or that the final management plan is a forgone conclusion with the planning team just going through the motions to satisfy participation requirements. The actor groups that experience lack of power are Lac La Croix First Nation, who, even though they have a significant amount of influence through Treaty rights, are not always able to exercise those rights due to a lack of capacity. Additionally, some ENGOs experience this barrier, while others do not. This lack of power will be further discussed in the relationship section to follow. Some segments of the Community of Atikokan group also experience the lack of power barrier. They and NGOs feel they have a complete lack of power, but it is often not because they do not have any influence, but due to a lack of knowledge about what is allowed under legislation and existing policy. An example of this would be wanting hunting in the park. As hunting is illegal in Quetico Park, Ontario Parks' staff will not include it in management plan reviews, because it would never be allowed to happen. The other actor group that experiences a lack of power is the General Public. Often this group also desires activities that are illegal under current legislation. However, they also experience this barrier because they are not an organized group that can apply pressure to politicians and bureaucrats.

The last major barrier to participation is the Structure of the Process. The term structure of the process refers to the policies and procedures of the management plan review process that creates barriers for some actor groups. There are eight causes of the structure barrier: 1) limited opportunities to participate, 2) limited length of comment

periods, 3) change from public meetings to “open houses”, 4) lack of clarity about when and how to participate, 5) lack of clarity about need for participation at multiple stages, 6) switch from hard copies to electronic input, 7) limited location for open houses, and 8) the length of time required for input.

First, is the limited number of times available to participate, which are more limited for management plan reviews that require management statements under the new planning process. Second, is the limited length of comment periods. While 45 days is long enough to respond, the difficulty occurs when the 45-day period includes a holiday period such as Christmas. Third is the change from public meetings, where the public was able to make and listen to presentations, to open houses where the public views displays and interacts with Ontario Parks staff only. Fourth is the lack of clarity about when and how to participate in the management plan review. Fifth is the lack of clarity about the need for participation at multiple stages of the management plan review. Sixth is a change from hard copy documents such as the Background Information Report being mailed out to electronic versions being posted on the EBR website. Seventh, there are a limited number of locations where open houses are held. Finally, is the time it takes to complete the entire management plan review.

There are three actor groups that experience the structure of the process as a barrier. The General Public actor group was the most impacted by this barrier with only the limited number of times to participate not being indicated as an issue. The General Public can have difficulty with the length of the comment periods around holidays and during the summer when many of them are using the park. As well, some preferred the former public meetings to the current open house system, and the lack of clarity about

how, when and the need to participate at multiple stages was also a problem. The change from hard copy to electronic of documents was a concern for this actor group because of a potential for poor internet service and computer skills of older participants. The location of open houses was a concern for this group if they did not live in a community that hosted one, and the time to complete the process was considered to be too long for the public to maintain interest.

Some in the ENGOs actor group felt that the limited number of opportunities to participate, the length of comment periods, and the time to complete the process were the structural barriers that affected them the most. The actor group Community of Atikokan experienced the structural barrier through the limited number of opportunities to participate and the time to complete the process.

For a lower power level actor group to have any influence, they need to overcome some, but not all, of the participation barriers that they are experiencing. For example, if a group is experiencing geographic barriers, they can provide written submissions or request phone rather than face-to-face meetings. By participating in some fashion, interviewees felt that participants greatly increased their influence. Additionally, a member of the MNR Bureaucracy actor group stated that there is a greater chance for success if participation starts well before a management plan review begins. As well, advocating to all levels of the MNR Bureaucracy and to Provincially Elected Officials, particularly with a strong petition, greatly improves the chances of success.


Participation by actor groups in a management plan review or other decision-making process can develop relationships between those participants, but is not

guaranteed to do so. Those participants who have the greatest success in achieving their goals have also developed positive relationships with other actors.

### **Relationships Power**

Relationships are the connections that exist between individuals, organizations, and/or actors. Through these connections, actors are able to influence the planning process, have disputes adjudicated, and hold decision-makers accountable (see Figure 7). There were four elements of relationships identified: communication, conflict, consultation, and cooperation. By using these elements, lower power level actors are able to build relationships and influence decision-makers.

Positive relationships with higher power level actors can provide lower power level influence during the decision-making process. For example, when a bridge to a major Quetico access point used by park outfitters washed out, the outfitters asked park management to replace it. Unfortunately, the budget would not allow park management to comply, so individuals from the actors Tourism Industry and Community of Atikokan contacted members of the Provincially Elected Officials actor group for assistance. The result was that the Minister ordered Ontario Parks to find the money so that park management would be able to replace the bridge.



### *Elements of relationships*

Below is a description of the four elements—communication, conflict, consultation, and cooperation—of relationships that were identified in the study.

*Communication.* The first element of relationships is communication, and it refers to any form of dialogue between participants (see Figure 7). There were two forms of communication found: personal and impersonal. Personal forms of communication consisted of letters, face-to-face meetings, phone calls, and emails. Impersonal forms of communication were represented by planning documents, written submissions, websites, public service announcements, the EBR registry, and surveys.

Some participants, such as the Atikokan Town Council and park management, communicate or interact personally on a regular basis. An analysis of the interviews suggests that those participants who communicate using personal methods have either greater goal achievement or more positive relationships with other participants.

As seen in Figure 7, communication is also associated with power, because by communicating with any of the MNR Bureaucracy actor group, a participant can have a significant influence. For example, a member of the ENGOs actor group stated that, if the park superintendent made a significant decision that they strongly disagreed with, “[w]e would say that’s absolutely the wrong decision and we would tell him why ... and we’d go at him a third time.” The interviewee then stated that if they felt the issue was important enough, they would use political connections within the MNR Bureaucracy or Provincially Elected Officials actor groups to have a decision changed.

*Conflict.* The second element of relationships, conflict, consists of both the positive and negative relationships between participants. Positive relationships in this study are based on either no conflict (i.e. agreement about issues) or conflict avoidance. The bases for negative relationships in this study are the actual or perceived positions of other participants’ issues. Participant relationships can also be both positive and negative, as they may cooperate on some goals while being adversarial on others. As well, some members of an actor group may collaborate with that of another actor group, while others do not. For example, member A of the ENGOs actor group is working with the Atikokan Town Council to help the community realize greater financial gain from the park, while ENGO member B does not. As such, member A has a more positive

relationship with the Town Council and may enjoy some influence with the community while member B does not.

In addition to being part of relationships, conflict is also associated with power (see Figure 7). It was found that those participants who have positive relationships with higher power level groups, such as the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials, are more likely to achieve or partially achieve their goals than those who have negative relationships.

*Consultation.* The next aspect of relationships, consultation, is the seeking of advice or input from an actor or participant by the MNR Bureaucracy. The actor MNR Bureaucracy often consults with others. In particular, park management often consults with one of the members of the actor ENGOs about a new or changing policy or decision. While ENGOs do not have veto power over a decision, they can create a great deal of grief for not only the park superintendent, but also senior Ontario Parks' staff and the Minister. As an inactive member of the MNR Bureaucracy groups stated: "I would sooner have all those groups for me than against me." However, an active member of the MNR Bureaucracy group stated that conflict could be helpful because it may increase participation and interest in the planning process and, by doing so, generate creative compromises. However, all MNR Bureaucracy informants also mentioned that senior management and politicians tend to avoid conflict at all costs and that all communications from the planning group are sanitized to avoid conflict. One method used by the MNR Bureaucracy to reduce conflict is to consult a group or actor about a proposed decision to determine what the response would be.

*Cooperation.* The final aspect of relationships, cooperation, occurs when two or more organizations or actors work together to achieve a goal. Relationships such as these allow the participants to pool their respective influences on the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials actor groups. Examples include one of the members of the actor ENGOs cooperating with the Community of Atikokan in trying to develop a strong municipal economy that helps the community to see Quetico Park as a valuable asset rather than an impediment to economic sustainability.

*Accountability.* Also associated with the relationships theme is accountability (see Figure 7). As accountability is one of the three main components of Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) framework, it will be discussed in the accountability section following the discussion about powers.

*Adjudication.* The second aspect associated with relationships is adjudication, which is the act of hearing and settling a dispute about new or altered rules. It is associated with relationships because the analysis indicates that a party that does not have the adjudication power identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) to have a dispute settled needs either relationships with a high power actor or the ability to create political pressure. The relationship needed would be either with a senior member of the MNR Bureaucracy or in the Provincially Elected Officials group. Otherwise, the group or individual seeking adjudication must be able and willing to complain long and loud enough that individuals with the power would rather settle the dispute than deal with the repercussions of not settling. However, while there are methods to have a dispute adjudicated, it is often difficult if not impossible to do so because rules are based in legislation and policy and are therefore non-negotiable. However, if an offence is not

too severe the park superintendent may deal with it, but major issues require the attention of very senior Ontario Parks' management or members of the Provincially Elected Officials. The best time to dispute rules is when they are being developed, because after they become either policy or legislation there is little that can be done. If, for example, immediately after the 1973 Management Plan was completed a park user carried glass bottles into the park unaware that it was no longer legal, the park superintendent or park warden would likely let the individual off with a warning. However, if someone was to cut down trees for their campsite, they would likely face stiff penalties.

### **Actor relationships**

The relationships between actors, particularly between low level and high level actors was found to be a significant factor in low power level actors achieving park planning and management goals. Below is a discussion of the relationships of the actor groups Lac La Croix, ENGOs, Community of Atikokan, Industry, Tourism Industry, General Public, U.S. Citizens, and NGOs that were identified in the study.

#### ***Lac La Croix First Nation***

While Lac La Croix First Nation does have the ability to utilize the four powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999), they also have some influence through the power of relationships. For example, when the 1992 Agreement of Coexistence was being debated, they invited a member of the ENGOs actor group to conduct relationship building and gain the support of that group in their bid to conduct motorized guiding in the park. In addition to the positive relationships with other actors, there are also

negative relationships. For example, there is some resentment about Lac La Croix's unique ability to use motorboats in the park, but the majority of those who take issue with this understand the economic reasons for the community to have that access.

### *ENGOS*

There were two ENGO organizations interviewed for this study. Both use the relationship power, though not in the same way or with the same degree of success in attaining planning and management goals. According to non-ENGO informants, ENGOS have two methods of achieving their goals. The first is conflict-based in which a group takes an extreme stance based on environmental goals and fights long and hard to protect that position. Goal achievement is attained when there is a compromise somewhere in the middle between the poles of the conflict. By taking these types of extreme stances, one member of the MNR Bureaucracy group felt that other individuals, particularly members of the General Public actor group, may experience a barrier to participation because they feel they do not have the capacity to compete. Another more collaborative approach consists of seeing the area of concern as part of a larger landscape where all actors are willing to work together towards a consensus.

There was no evidence that either of the two ENGOS currently participating in the QMPR are using extreme stances. However, there was a great deal of evidence that one of the ENGOS is cooperative and supports the economic viability of local communities, while the other is focused on environmental protection regardless of the cost to local communities. Interestingly, the group that practices cooperation is far more

successful at attaining its environmental protection planning and management goals for the park.

To accomplish its goals the cooperative group uses a direct approach to participating in planning and management decision-making, including performing an advisory role to park management, giving written submissions, being on mailing/notification lists, taking part in face-to-face meetings with park management, and lobbying senior Ontario Parks' bureaucrats and members of the Provincially Elected Officials. The group also participates in a limited number of management plan reviews and other decision-making processes for parks, as its mandate is limited to wilderness class parks rather than participating in park planning across the entire province or nation.

All informants, with the exception of one MNR Bureaucracy member, felt that the cooperative ENGO has a great deal of influence on decisions about Quetico Park based on the relationships that it has with local and non-local MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials. Even the informant from this ENGO stated: "It's highly unlikely that ... [the park superintendent] would make a significant decision on the park that would affect the protection of wilderness without letting us know in advance." The positive relationship that the group has with these two actors, as well as the Community of Atikokan, local outfitters who are part of the Tourism Industry group, and Lac La Croix First Nation is due to the positive consensus-based approach the group uses when dealing with issues both internally and with other actors.

Other methods of developing positive relationships with Lac La Croix First Nation and the Community of Atikokan that the cooperative group uses are the

programs such as multi-day canoe trips within the park for local students, summer job opportunities, and local student educational bursaries that the group provides. As well, while this ENGO has a mandate to protect wilderness within the park, that mandate does not always supersede the social and economic needs of the communities.

The second ENGO is a large nation-wide organization that participates in planning exercises across the province regardless of the park classification. The group's mandate is also to protect the park wilderness and values, though it is not as concerned with the economic welfare of local communities. This group has fewer positive relationships with other actors, including both of the higher power actors and other low power actors. As a result, the relationships that this larger ENGO has with decision-makers came across as being more confrontational than the cooperative ENGO, with the majority of the organization's complaints being about the restrictions of policy and legislation.

Another difference between the two organisations in this group is that while both are based in southern Ontario, the smaller, more cooperative organisation has one local active member, while the larger organization does not have an active member on the board or a local member of the chapter that participates in the planning process. There may be local supporters of the larger organization (i.e. donors), but those individuals are not part of the chapter that makes the submissions.

While only two ENGOs were interviewed for the study, there have been other similar organisations that participated in the past, but are not involved in the current planning process due to a lack of capacity. An example would be Ontario Nature, which

does not have the capacity to address all of the environmental concerns in its area, so has decided to forego participating in park management planning in Quetico altogether.

### *Community of Atikokan*

Two of the members of the Community of Atikokan actor group utilize the relationship power. Park management works with the Town Council and a committee created to enhance Atikokan's economic benefit from the park. It also has relationships with members of the Provincially Elected Officials and senior members of the MNR Bureaucracy. When it has specific goals that it wants to achieve, it will lobby these individuals or cooperate with the ENGOs and Tourism Industry actor groups.

Interviewees from this actor group indicated that the community does not have the influence that they feel it should. Informants from this actor group felt that the community should be able to create or modify existing park rules and have greater influence about how park resources are used. For example, a Community of Atikokan informant stated:

Yeah, I think the local people should have more of a say in that. Well, they're the ones that live there. We're the ones that ... know the issues, and know about what the local history is ... . And we're the ones who are being affected by the economy.

Informants felt the community would have that ability if they were members of the planning team in addition to being on the Advisory Committee.

A degree of conflict may exist between some members of the Community of Atikokan and non-local interests such as ENGOs and U.S. citizens and outfitters. The cause of the conflict is due to the levels of influence on the decision-making process that the Community of Atikokan informants perceive the other actors to have. However,

Atikokan has an informal cooperative relationship with one of the non-local ENGOs to realize greater economic benefits from the park. The MNR Bureaucracy, as one of the actor group's members stated, also supports the community in this endeavour:

... certainly the park wants to have a positive impact on a local economy  
... . In that case, we would probably be more thoughtful of how our  
decisions are affecting a place like Atikokan than we would be thinking  
about how they affect Toronto.

The community also supports local outfitters when they lobby Provincially Elected Officials and MNR Bureaucracy for changes to park management decisions or policies. However, they cooperate with Lac La Croix First Nation only on issues involving the development of mining in the region exterior to the park, and not in regards to park management issues. While the majority of groups and individuals within the Community of Atikokan actor group have positive relationships with the MNR Bureaucracy group, there are a few that do not. The main cause for any negative relationships with the MNR Bureaucracy seems to be the lack of Community of Atikokan members' knowledge or appreciation for the limitations imposed on park management through legislation, policy, and the political considerations of Provincially Elected Officials.

The other members of this actor group, the Chamber of Commerce and Economic Development Corporation, do not participate in the management planning process. The reasons for this are likely based on the fact that the Chamber of Commerce does not have any capacity, neither funding nor manpower, and the EDC is not interested because park planning is not a focus of the organization. As well, the EDC feels that if it did participate, it is completely powerless to make change, and the EDC

has a very poor relation with local park management. The EDC's relationships with other organisations within the Community of Atikokan actor group are positive, but the state of its relationships with other low power level actors is unknown.

### ***Industry***

With seats on the Advisory Committee, both the mining and forestry industries could have a significant impact on management planning. However, as neither industry is allowed to exploit resources within the park boundaries, they participate only enough to ensure that their operations outside of the park are not negatively affected. The forestry companies that have the Sustainable Forest Licenses bordering the park attempt to reduce any conflicts by timing their operations to minimize any impacts to park users' experiences by not harvesting near the park boundary during canoeing season.

The forestry members of this actor group seem to have a positive relationship with the local park administration as they work together to ensure that logging operations do not affect park visitors, and the administration allows the forestry companies to use park lands in scientific studies.

### ***Tourism Industry***

The two outfitters from the Tourism Industry interviewed were quite dissimilar, in that one has a great number of political and bureaucratic connections and advises Ontario Parks about management of the provincial park system, while the other does not have the same political connections and did not know a management planning process was occurring until well after it began.

The relationships with the park management of both group members that were interviewed seemed to be positive. The group has positive relationships with the cooperative ENGO, the Community of Atikokan, MNR Bureaucracy, and Provincially Elected Officials.

Members of this actor group have relationships with the General Public and U.S. Citizens groups. However, from the interviews it was found that their relationships with these two groups are limited to communication about arranging trips in the park and the state of park facilities (i.e. toilets, campgrounds, portages, etc.). There was no indication that outfitters and members of the General Public or U.S. Citizens cooperate or consult. While it is possible that members of General Public or U.S. Citizens could try to influence management decisions through the Tourism industry by using conflict (i.e. boycotts), there was no indication of this occurring.

The majority of actors felt that U.S. outfitters, who greatly outnumber the Canadian outfitters, have a significant amount of influence on the planning process. Those who disputed this were members of the actor MNR Bureaucracy with one of those informants stating that when the informant was involved in park planning and management, the U.S. outfitters were willing to go along with any rules so long as they are allowed into the park.

### ***General Public***

The actor General Public is the largest and one of the least influential actors participating. The members of the General Public group seem to have significant influence on the day-to-day running of the operation through comments made to

outfitters and parks staff about signage, portage and campsite conditions, etc. However, while all comments made during a management planning exercise are supposed to carry equal weight, whether they come from an individual or a large national organization, this is not always the case. A member of the MNR Bureaucracy stated that when they receive comments during a management planning exercise: "...[W]e record them all as equally weighted, but I think I would be more likely to go back and reread a couple of times anything coming from a larger organization just to make sure I got the gist of it."

The most significant weakness of the General Public actor group when attempting to influence decision-making is that they are not an official influence group with political connections, nor do they have any of the other benefits of being an influence group such as the ability to organize protests or funding to conduct a media campaign.

Some members of this group do try to influence decision-making through the actors ENGOs and Tourism Industry. However, any degree of influence that is gained by their relationships with these actors are peripheral as their concerns must fall within the mandates of the ENGOs and have an impact on the bottom line of the Tourism Industry.

A subset of this actor group that was identified by an informant is the poor and disenfranchised. While this subset has an interest in parks because they are citizens of the province, they do not participate, nor are they likely to have relationships with influential actors.

### *U.S. Citizens*

Similar to the General Public actor, U.S. Citizens can influence the day-to-day operational decisions by making comments to park staff and outfitters about facility conditions. There is, however, debate about the degree of influence that this actor has on management planning decision-making. The majority of non-MNR Bureaucracy informants felt that U.S. citizens have significant influence on decision-making. However, two members of the actor MNR Bureaucracy stated that even though U.S. citizens represent 80-90% of park visitors and an open house was held in Ely, Minnesota for the current management plan review, their influence is negligible. The two MNR Bureaucracy respondents were in complete disagreement about the value of U.S. input. The first felt that it was essentially discarded, while the second stated that they would use any good idea no matter from where or whom it came.

Similar to the General Public, members of this actor group may have influence through ENGOS and Tourism Industry actors, but again the degree of influence gained through these relationships is likely to be minimal, because their concerns must fall within the mandates of the ENGOS and NGOs, and have an impact on the bottom line of the Tourism Industry.

### *NGOs*


There are two NGOs in the region, and the locally-based NGO has a negative relationship with local park management and feels that they should be invited to participate. Much of the basis for the negative relationship between the NGO member interviewed and local park management is the NGO executive's lack of knowledge

about the constraints placed on decision-makers by policy, legislation, and the political landscape.

### **Bridging between Participation and Relationships**

The following section describes how the Participation and Relationships powers connect to one another through the communication element (see Figure 8).

The Relationships and Participation powers are connected through the shared elements of communication and decision-making (see Figure 8). The reason for this is that communication is a part of both powers. Communication is the bridge between these two powers and is an integral part of both. Without communication, the development of relationships and ability to participate would not be possible. Communication enables lower power level actors to influence decision-makers, to participate in decision-making processes, and to keep their constituents informed. Communication is associated with power because on its own it does not give an actor power. For decision-makers the power is through the legislation and policy that gives them the four powers (i.e. : 1) the power to create or modify rules, 2) the power to make decisions about the use of resources, 3) the power to implement and enforce compliance of the new or altered rules, and 4) the power to adjudicate disputes that occur during the creation and enforcement of compliance of new or altered rules.) identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999), and low power level actors derive their power through participation and their relationships with each other and with high power level actors.



As seen in Figure 8, decision-making is also connected to relationships and participation because these two powers are able to influence decisions. Participation is associated with decision-making because the act of participation itself does not confer power, but not participating guarantees no influence. Relationships are a part of decision-making because the relationships between low power level actors and high power actors can influence the decisions made.

## **ACCOUNTABILITY**

The following section defines accountability, discusses which actors are accountable for park planning and management decisions, how they are held accountable, and to whom they are accountable.

### **Accountability of actors**

Accountability is a measure of responsibility by which actors can be held responsible by those they represent, and who an actor represents can heavily influence what they will be held accountable for, so long as all of the defining constraints such as legislation are followed. For example one segment of the population may try to hold a Provincially Elected Official accountable for the lack of access to hunting inside Quetico. However, should the Provincially Elected Official group try to allow hunting within park boundaries, it would find that legislation prevents that from occurring. Should they try to change the legislation to allow hunting in the park, then they would likely be confronted with other constituents that do not want hunting allowed in the park. In this way a system that is accountable can prevent arbitrary decisions or actions by actors.

Provincially Elected Officials and MNR Bureaucracy members are far more accountable regarding park planning and management than they were historically. According to a MNR Bureaucracy informant, in the early days of the park, the park superintendent would receive guiding instructions about how to manage the park, and would then have near autonomy as to how the park was managed. As well,

superintendents in the past allowed a logging company to ignore regulations but not suffer any penalties. Today park managers are constrained by policy, legislation, and must seek approval from superiors for all but the most basic day-to-day decisions. This upward accountability means that that decision-makers such as park management are not accountable to those affected by the decisions such as the members of the actors Tourism Industry or the Community of Atikokan, but are accountable to senior members of the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials.

When non-MNR Bureaucracy informants were asked how decision-makers were held accountable, some felt that decision-makers are not accountable, while others stated that they felt that to hold decision-makers accountable was quite challenging because the system of accountability can be difficult to navigate for the uninitiated.

### **How decision-makers are held accountable**

The methods used by informants to hold decision-makers accountable are accountability through superiors, media and ENGO monitoring, political pressure, and lobbying.

Below is a discussion of the accountability of the higher power level actors Provincially Elected Officials and MNR Bureaucracy. The methods by which they are held accountable by the other actors can be seen in Table 6. For the two higher power level actors, MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials, accountability is generally through superiors; however, the members of Provincially Elected Officials are also directly responsible to the public of Ontario through elections, though no instances of this method being used in regards specifically to Quetico were found.

**Table 6.** Methods used by actors to hold Provincially Elected Officials and MNR Bureaucracy actors accountable for Quetico planning and management decisions.

Accountability methods	Actors					
	ENGO	NGO	Tourism Industry	Industry	Lac La Croix	General Public
Through superiors	X	X	X	X	X	X
Monitoring	X	X	X	X	X	X
Political pressure	X	X	X	X	X	
Lobbying	X	X	X	X		
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights					X	

Note 1: This table is limited to only those actors that were found to use one of the identified methods to hold decision-makers accountable.

Note 2: Use of a method does not denote success.

Note 3: Only those methods that an informant stated were used are listed

### *Accountability of Provincially Elected Officials*

The local MPP and the Minister of Natural Resources are both upwardly accountable to the Premier, and all three are downwardly accountable to the actors General Public, ENGOs, NGOs, and Community of Atikokan. The members of this actor group are held accountable through political pressure, lobbying, and monitoring by media and ENGO/NGOs. According to MNR employee informants, elected officials are highly sensitive to controversy and conflict, and it is the duty of the MNR Bureaucracy group members to ensure that neither occurs. By avoiding controversy and conflict, Provincially Elected Officials are able to avoid being held accountable for a controversial decision. However, while Provincially Elected Officials can be held accountable, informants felt that the members of this actor group were more likely to hold the MNR Bureaucracy accountable. Accountability in this instance can include reprimands, but it is more likely that an MNR Bureaucracy decision will be altered or reversed.

### *Accountability of MNR Bureaucracy*

Officially, the members of the actor MNR Bureaucracy are accountable to superiors within their group and the members of the Provincially Elected Officials group. However, other actors can also hold the MNR Bureaucracy members accountable through lobbying of senior members of the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials, through monitoring by ENGO/NGO and the media, and political pressure. The actors who can seek accountability of MNR Bureaucracy members in this way are ENGOs, NGOs, Tourism Industry, Lac La Croix First Nation, and the General Public.

According to informants, there is a limitation of the accountability through superiors of the park superintendent, because the superintendent's direct superior, the Northwest Zone Manager, is unlikely to challenge his decisions. The result is that three informants perceived that the park superintendent is unaccountable, because a complainant must contact senior staff, an MPP, or the Minister to achieve accountability. Other informants that have experience dealing with the bureaucratic system stated that, when a low power level actor wants a decision changed or a park superintendent held accountable, there is a system to work through (see Figure 9). The system consists of starting by asking the park superintendent to change a decision and then, if they are unable to obtain satisfaction, begin contacting superiors in order, starting at the lowest level, until they reach the Premier. The process is quite lengthy at each stage, and the individual or group seeking accountability should note that any decisions that could be even slightly controversial are made with the full knowledge of MNR Bureaucracy superiors and the Minister.

**Figure 9.** OMNR organisational chart for holding decision-makers accountable.



Source: OMNR, 2011a and Service Ontario, 2011.

Some actors try to circumvent the system if they feel that the issue is time sensitive. For example, the actor Community of Atikokan will request a meeting with the park superintendent to have a decision explained. The press is usually in attendance at these meetings, thus providing another avenue of accountability. As well, ENGO organizations that are unsatisfied with a decision will contact their membership and request that they write members of the Provincially Elected Officials to achieve satisfaction, while members of the Tourism Industry will use political contacts with senior MNR Bureaucracy members and Politically Elected Officials to achieve their goals.

Lac La Croix First Nation can theoretically secure accountability of the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials through its Treaty rights. However, to do so requires human and financial resources that many First Nations do not have. The other actor that finds it difficult to achieve accountability of the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials is the actor General Public. This group does not have the organization or often the knowledge of how to hold a public servant or elected official accountable in between elections. As well, with the lack of organization the wishes of the public can be lost amongst those of larger organizations such as ENGOS, NGOs, industry, and local communities.

## **CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION**

This chapter will discuss and compare the findings to the three objectives of the study. Results are compared to those found in the literature review that was conducted after the analysis of the data had been completed. First, will be a short description of how public participation in park planning and management has changed since the inception of Quetico in 1909. Then there will be discussion as to why decentralization is a form of governance, and a description of other forms of governance. Fourth, is the section describing the outcomes of answering the three study objectives with explanations for each of the findings. Lastly, are the recommendations to improve public participation in park planning and management for Quetico Park.

### **PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND QUETICO PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT**

There have been significant developments in the ability of the public to participate in planning and management processes. From the beginnings of the park in 1909 until the 1970s, government experts managed parks, with the thought that the public was unable to understand the complexities of managing a natural landscape. That ended when the environmental movement, in conjunction with protests about the management of parks such as Quetico, influenced the abolishment of activities that did not conform to the objectives of protecting parks for future generations, including industrial activities like logging and mining. Public participation became policy in 1971 through the use of Advisory Committees and forums for public participation that included written submissions, the Environmental Registry (EBR), face-to-face meetings with park and planning personnel, lobbying of decision-makers, and many more.

Public participation in park management planning then became enshrined in legislation in the 2006 *Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act*, though the number of opportunities for participation changed from four opportunities, no matter the complexity of the project, to a minimum of one and maximum of four depending on the project complexity (see Appendix 6 and Appendix 5). The change to the system of public participation opportunities being variable has caused some concern, particularly in the ENGO community, about the potential for the planning process to become less participatory. One informant from the MNR Bureaucracy group stated that they were not sure what the affect would be, though they did indicate that currently there is little participation occurring during planning reviews, so the changes should not have any negative effect on public participation.

## **GOVERNANCE AND DECENTRALIZATION**

Decentralization is a form of governance because it involves the devolution of power by central government to low power actors (Ribot, 2004). Governance is the determination of how decisions are made, actors have their say, and power and responsibilities are exercised (Graham et al., 2003). Another form of governance is public participation by non-governmental actors such as park recreationists, ENGOs, commercial users, First Nations, and others that provide input for the management and planning of natural resources (Ingles et al., 1999).

### **Decentralization and the study objectives**

The objectives of this study are to trace how and why acts of decentralization in the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park have occurred from the inception of the park to the present day; 2) to determine the stakeholders involved, the powers they wield, to whom and how they are held accountable, and if their participation has increased or decreased in the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park since inception; and 3) to determine which aspects of decentralization are most significant to stakeholder success.

#### ***Determining if the process is decentralized***

The first objective was to trace how and why acts of decentralization in the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park have occurred from the inception of the park to the present day. It was not possible to trace how and why decentralization has occurred, because the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park is not decentralized. Decentralization has not occurred because has not formally yielded any “powers to actors and institutions at lower power levels in a political, administrative and territorial hierarchy” (Ribot, 2004, p. 8). The current legislation allows only the actors MNR Bureaucracy and Politically Elected Officials the ability to utilize the four powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). As well, the legislation creates a supersubordinate system, because the approval of and responsibility for all planning and management decisions rest ultimately with the Minister of Natural Resources. A Supersubordinate system is one in which: authority relationships are hierarchical; organizational tasks are guided by administrative rules; technical rules exist for

decision-making procedures; maintenance of files and records is the basis of administrative behaviour; and where impersonality of interpersonal relationships is the norm as the private lives of agency officials are considered to be separate from the office (Diamond, 1984). An example of how the Quetico management planning system is supersubordinate would be when the park superintendent makes a decision recommendation based on onsite information, but final approval for that decision would be passed upwardly through a hierarchical system to the superintendent's superiors up to and including the Minister. Diamond's (1984) definition also includes the characteristics of maintenance of files and records as the basis of administrative behaviour where impersonality of interpersonal relationships is the norm because the private lives of agency officials are considered separate from the office. However, the characteristics of impersonality of interpersonal relationships and limited public input do not represent Quetico planning and management system because members of the MNR Bureaucracy have personal relationships with members of other actors such as ENGOs and Community of Atikokan and legislation requires public input. One last reason that the planning and management of Quetico cannot be considered decentralized is that the effective accountability of decision-makers to lower power actors is very complex.

### ***Role of Actors in Decision-making***

The second objective was to determine the stakeholders involved, the powers they wield, to whom and how they are held accountable, and if their participation has increased or decreased in the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park

since its inception. The study identified 10 actors, three of whom exercise some of the powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). The study found that the decision-makers are, for the most part, upwardly accountable with the exception that through elections lower power actors can hold the Provincially Elected Officials members accountable. Participation of low power non-governmental actors has increased, because of the requirement for public consultation in policy in 1971 and legislation in 2006. The participation of the Lac La Croix First Nation has also likely increased due to the enforcement of Aboriginal and Treaty rights in landmark litigation and the implementation of the Agreement of Coexistence.

The 10 actors identified were—General Public, U.S. Citizens, Industry, Tourism Industry, ENGOs, NGOs, Community of Atikokan, Lac La Croix, MNR Bureaucracy, and Politically Elected Officials. Further evidence that the planning and management processes are not decentralized is the inability of the non-governmental actors to wield the four powers on rule-making and decision-making. The actors found to have these powers were the Provincially Elected Officials and the MNR Bureaucracy, with the Lac La Croix First Nation being limited to using these powers only in relation to their own use of the park.

While the ten actor groups identified and the forms of accountability afforded them were as expected, the powers and how they were obtained were a surprise. While Agrawal and Ribot (1999) did not identify participation or relationships as significant to the Power category, this study seems to suggest that, in the context of public participation in park planning and management in a developed country context, those two sub-themes of power were very significant. While it seems obvious that power is

achieved only through participation, this is not always so as will be seen later. As well, it was found that relationships, particularly cooperation and conflict, between interested parties have a significant effect on goal achievement. Subsequently, with this knowledge it was also surprising which groups or organizations did or did not cooperate, thus having an effect on goal achievement.

To whom and how decision-makers are held accountable is complex. The reason for the complexity is that the decision-makers are in a supersubordinate system in which the members of the MNR Bureaucracy group are upwardly accountable both within their group and to members of the Provincially Elected Official group. The members of the Provincially Elected Officials group are then ultimately accountable to the electorate that is comprised of the members of low power actors. Low power actors such as ENGOs and NGOs capitalize on the Provincially Elected Officials' accountability to the electorate by applying political pressure through organizing their large memberships to contact and voice the opinions of the group. These groups also communicate with the actor General Public to attempt to have that group also pressure the Politically Elected Officials via the power of the electoral process. Willetts (2002) who states that interest groups such as ENGOs and NGOs are able to influence social and political outcomes through political pressure supports these findings. Clark (1995) also states that these organizations are able to influence decision-makers through public support of their cause. In the literature, however, it was stated that the electoral process is not an effective method of holding decision-makers accountable, because elected officials are often more accountable to their political party or other individuals or organizations (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999), and ENGOs and NGOs can also be influenced by

government through government funding regimes (Willetts, 2002). As well, there has been a trend towards public policy not fulfilling public opinion (Petry and Mendelsohn, 2004). However, there are other methods of holding decision-makers accountable or to have a decision changed (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Dearden et al, 2005). Two methods identified in this study are through the two powers Participation and Relationships.

Support for these findings can be found in the literature. The power Participation is supported by Blair (2000) and Knack (2002) who found that participation by stakeholders can lead to the accountability of decision-makers. As well, Dearden et al. (2009) found that accountability increased because of greater stakeholder communication and input. However, Eagles (2009) found that management of a protected area by a government agency could result in weak accountability and poor transparency if there is a lack of independent audits. The Relationship power is supported in the social capital literature, as social capital is the most important method used to influence government performance, because government accountability is broadened to citizens at large (Knack, 2002). As a result politicians must be responsive to the public's desires.

### **Decentralization Aspects Most Significant to Stakeholder Success**

The third objective was to determine which aspects of decentralization are most significant to stakeholder success. While it was established that decentralization has not occurred, it was found that the aspects of decentralization that are most significant to low power actors in this context are the ability of those actors to influence the planning and management decision-making processes through the two powers identified in the

study: Participation and Relationships. While these powers were not a part of the Agrawal and Ribot (1999) framework, it was found that in a more centralized process such as that found in Quetico that low power level actors were found to have influence over the process through the two powers identified in the study. It was found that by participating in the process and through the relationships, or social capital, they form through that participation, actors are able to influence decision-makers, thus making a planning or management decision-making process less centralized.

### *Participation*

Public participation occurs when an individual or group takes part in a cooperative action or being an active participant with other community members (Ingles et al., 1999). From the informant interviews there were 13 mechanisms of participation used by actors. Five of these were identified in the literature review (i.e. advisory committees, lobbying, request or attend meeting, participation through ENGOS and NGOs, and written submissions).

Two motivations for public participation were identified in the literature review. According to Cleaver (1999), the economic incentive is the main driver for stakeholder participation. The groups in this study that have the greatest economic incentive are the actors Community of Atikokan, Tourism Industry, and Industry. The Community of Atikokan group is somewhat reliant on the park for economic benefits through local employment, and tourism. The community would like to have the park make an even greater economic impact, but is hampered by park policies and legislation. The Tourism Industry is even more economically linked to the park than is the community, and is also

somewhat constrained by park policies and legislation. However, these restrictions do not have the same degree of negative impact on the tourism outfitters as they do on the Community of Atikokan group. The industry actor does not participate in any planning or management processes including the Quetico Advisory Committee on which it has a seat. When contacted a forest industry respondent stated that they are only affected by the park temporally as they adjust when they harvest timber along the border to avoid negatively affecting park users. As a result, these findings would support those of Cleaver (1999).

The other motivation identified by Cleaver (1999) and Aguilar et al. (2012) is social norms such as the need for recognition, respect, purpose, community service, and responsibility. These would be the incentives for the other actors U.S. Citizens, General Public, and ENGO. From the interviews it was found that these actors are more concerned about the protecting the environment and other park values. For example, both of the ENGOs have mandates to that effect. The members of the Tourism Industry would also have social norms as an incentive as both of the informants from this group indicated that they want the ecological state of the park to be protected. It is possible that their environmental advocacy is a part of the marketing aspect of their businesses, but both described themselves as being strongly connected to the land.

As the actors NGOs and Lac La Croix First Nation did not participate, they were not included in this motivational index. Without the opportunity to interview a member of the Lac La Croix group, it is difficult to say what their motivations would be. Spielmann and Unger (200) state that the reason for the development of the Agreement of Coexistence was to reverse the social degradation of the community (i.e. substance abuse, unemployment, cultural loss, etc.) that was occurring. Therefore, those motivations may

remain as there would certainly be an economic and employment incentive to continue providing motorized guided fishing of tourists. As well, the community's spiritual connection to the land may assist in regaining some of the culture that was lost.

The NGO group does not participate as it has little incentive. Hunting has been banned within the park boundary since it became a Forest and Game Reserve in 1909. The NGO informant would like to have the park opened up for hunting, and while the park area is very large, it is surrounded by a larger landscape of Crown land on which hunting is allowed. There is, therefore, little incentive to wage a long, potentially expensive, and likely unsuccessful campaign to have the park opened to hunting.

The reason that the NGOs would be unsuccessful is because the legislation, a structure of the process barrier, states that hunting is not allowed in a Wilderness Class Park. While there are exceptions to this (i.e. Woodland Caribou and Wabakimi), it is because those parks were established in areas where there were existing hunting tourism operations. To avoid conflict during the establishment of the parks, exceptions were made that maintained the hunting areas for these businesses.

According to Diduck and Sinclair (2002) there has been little study of the barriers to public participation in natural resource management. The participation barriers identified in this study were capacity, communication, confusion, geography, knowledge of jargon, lack of interest, lack of power, and the structure of the process. Those found in the literature review were inadequate information, capacity, inability to influence decisions, personality traits, process, extreme partisan behaviour, not knowing the process was occurring, potential for conflict, and a lack of trust. For the most part these two lists are very similar and the comparison can be seen in Table 7.

**Table 7.** Comparison of eight most common barriers found in study and literature.

Study barriers	Literature barriers	Sources
Capacity	Capacity	(Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Robson et al., 2010; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b)
Communication	Not knowing the process was occurring	(Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b)
Confusion Geography	Capacity	(Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Robson et al., 2010; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b)
Knowledge of jargon	Inadequate information	(Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Robson et al., 2010)
Lack of interest	Personality traits	(Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002)
Lack of power	Lack of power	(Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002)
Structure of the process	Structure of the process	(Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002)
	Extreme partisan behavior	(Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b)
	Potential for conflict	(Coburn, 2011; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b)
Lack of interest	Lack of trust	(Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b)

Note 1. The repetition of the barriers in the left column is to illustrate which of the barriers identified in the literature are comparable to those found in the study.

Note 2. No corresponding barrier was found in the literature for the geography barrier.

Capacity as defined through the study was the lack of funding or other resources.

In the literature review, it also includes the knowledge about the planning process such as how or when to participate (Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Robson et al., 2010; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b). In the study not knowing how, when, or if a stakeholder should participate was listed as Confusion. In the literature, Robson et al. (2010) found that those stakeholders who had previously engaged in at least one full planning process were less likely to have knowledge or expertise capacity issues. One of the ENGO informants, a highly educated professional, stated that during their first planning process they had a great deal of difficulty understanding what was happening, but that subsequent planning processes were much easier.

The Communication barrier found in the study resulted from poor communication by the QMPR planning team. The result was that individuals were unable to participate because they did not know what the process or stage of the process was occurring. In the literature, the barrier Not Knowing Process was Occurring was listed, often due to poor communication by the controlling entity, or policies limiting notification to certain geographic locations (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b).

The Geography barrier identified in the study was because it limits who can attend open houses or have face-to-face meetings with planning team staff. While the limitation can be overcome with money that allows for travel, it was identified as a barrier for the actors ENGOs, General Public, and US Citizens. No similar barrier was identified in the literature, though due to the ability to overcome the barrier through travel, it may be linked to the capacity barrier found in the literature.

The Knowledge of Jargon barrier identified in the study is very similar to the Inadequate Information barrier found in the literature identified by Coburn (2011), Diduck and Sinclair (2002), and Robson et al. (2010). Similarly to Robson et al. (2010), this barrier in the study was found to be more significant during an individual's first exposure to the planning process even for the educated informants.

The next barrier identified in the study, Lack of Interest, is similar to the Personality Traits barrier identified by Cleaver (1999), Coburn (2011), and Diduck and Sinclair (2002). In the study it was found to have six aspects associated with it. First is the duration of the process. Second is a sense that Ontario Parks is on the right track and there is nothing to worry about. Third is the lack of contentious issues brought forward in the

management plan review process. Fourth, people lead busy lives and do not have time to participate. Fifth is a sense that it takes too much effort and time to make changes so potential participants would rather just live with it. Sixth is a lack of trust. In the literature, Personality Traits is described as a lack of motivation, interest, time or acceptance of the status quo. As well, many stakeholders believe that they are adequately represented by others, individuals are too busy due to life issues such as work and family commitments, or they feel that, as long as there is no or little change resulting from their participation, there is no need to participate (Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002).

The sixth aspect of the barrier Lack of Interest, is the same as that identified in the literature review, called Lack of Trust (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b). For the purposes of the study it was linked to the Lack of Interest barrier because those who experience this barrier appear not to be interested in participating. The actor that is most likely to experience this barrier is the Lac La Croix First Nation because of the many historical incidents such as the eviction of Reserve members in 1910, and the many promises that have been broken historically by governments or their agencies.

The next barrier identified in the study, Lack of Power, was also identified in the literature. In the literature, the Lack of Power barrier is the inability to influence decisions due to a process that lacks openness, decisions being forgone conclusions, and insufficient opportunities to make meaningful suggestions that are evaluated through a systematic process (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002). Informants who experienced this barrier also felt that management planning was not open, that plans were forgone conclusions from the time the Terms of Reference were released, that there

needed to more opportunities to participate, and that their suggestions were dismissed out of hand. Actors that experience this barrier do not all do so in the same manner. It was stated by some informants that Lac La Croix First Nation would experience this barrier because they were unable to exercise their Aboriginal and Treaty rights due to a lack of capacity. ENGOs that experienced the barrier felt that they did not have enough opportunities to participate, or that comment periods conflicted with inconvenient times such as holidays. The ENGO informant that identified this as a barrier was a member of a group that did not practice being proactive. Had they done so and had a more positive relationship with the MNR Bureaucracy members, they may not have experienced this barrier.

The Lack of Power barrier is also experienced by the NGOs and Community of Atikokan actors. The NGO group feels that they have a complete lack of power, which is likely due to the lack of knowledge about what is allowed under legislation and existing policy. During the interview with the informant from this group, they blamed the park superintendent for not changing the rules to allow hunting and motorized access. It is not possible for the park superintendent to change these rules because it is legislation that can only be changed by the Provincially Elected Officials actor group. Some members of the group Community of Atikokan have similar expectations of the superintendent or other MNR Bureaucracy members.

The other actor that experiences the Lack of Power barrier is the General Public. Similar to the NGO group, the General Public also often desire activities that are not allowed under current legislation. However, the barrier is also experienced by this actor because the General Public is not an organized group that can apply pressure to Politically

Elected Officials or MNR Bureaucracy members to the same degree that the ENGO actor with its large membership and lobbying abilities can.

The last major participation barrier identified in the study is Structure of the Process. The term structure of the process refers to the policies and procedures of the management plan review process that creates barriers to some actor groups. There are eight causes of the structure barrier. They are: 1) limited opportunities to participate, 2) limited length of comment periods, 3) change from public meetings to “open houses”, 4) lack of clarity about when and how to participate, 5) lack of clarity about need for participation at multiple stages, 6) switch from hard copies to electronic input, 7) limited location for open houses, and 8) the length of time required for input.

In the literature, this barrier is caused by policies and procedures that limit a stakeholder’s ability to participate effectively. Included are the lack of opportunity to participate due to policies that limit the number of times a stakeholder can participate, the length of time allowed for comments to be submitted, or inconvenient meeting times or locations (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002). Also included in this category is government administration resistance, whereby agency staff are so resistant to the public participating that stakeholders do not feel comfortable being involved (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b). There were two informants that indicated that they experienced administrative resistance, but upon further examination it was found that the park superintendent was not being so much resistant as constrained by policy and legislation. There were also three actors who indicated they had experienced the Structure of the Process barrier.

The General Public group is the most impacted by the Structure of the Process barrier. The limited number of participation opportunities was not found to be an issue for the group, but it did experience the barrier through the inconvenient comment periods, having a preference for public meetings which were replaced by open houses, and they also found difficulties with a lack of clarity concerning when, how and the need to participate at multiple stages. Also, there was some concern for members of the General Public regarding the change from a system that is based on information in hard copy form versus the new electronic-based system. The concerns for this revolved around the required computer skills and access to the internet that is needed to participate that many older or those living in remote areas may not have. Lastly, there were concerns about the length of the process with comments that indicated that members of this (and other) actor groups did not know if the process had been completed. Not knowing what stage the process was at would make it difficult to participate.

The second actor to experience the Structure of the Process barrier was ENGOs. The barrier was experienced by ENGOs through the limited number of opportunities to participate, the length of the comment periods, and the time to complete the process. What is interesting about how one of the ENGO informants discussed these issues is that they felt that there should be more comment periods in the new 2009 planning regime for the non-complex park planning process. They also stated that the comment periods should be longer, and that the entire process should take less time. While the current Quetico process has taken far longer than was initially planned, the informant

did not seem to think that having more comment periods that were longer should impede planners from completing a management plan review faster.

The other actor group that experienced the Structure of the Process barrier was the Community of Atikokan. The community informants felt that there should be more opportunities for them to participate. They essentially would like to have a far greater influence on decisions made about the planning and management of the park. They also felt that the time to complete the process was far too long. In that regard, all but one informant, a member of the MNR Bureaucracy, felt that the process was extremely protracted and had affected participation to some degree.

There were two other barriers identified in the literature. The first, Extremist Partisan Behaviour, was found by Diduck and Sinclair (2002) and Wondolleck and Yaffee (2006) to exist when extreme positions are claimed by stakeholders that intimidate or prevent other individuals from participating. A local informant who is a non-active MNR Bureaucracy member made a similar statement:

The public consultation system is the inclination for the extremists to show up, be very well organized, be very loud, vocal, be connected—politically connected—and ... I think it sways the whole thing. And it jades some of the guys down the street there that would like to see this or that as the case may be for perfectly valid reasons from his perspective. Of participating cause he ... says, well shit, ... I'm up against these guys anglers and hunters or the miners association or the Sierra Club or whatever and who's ... gonna listen to me? And he may be right ... there is that element whether we like it or not.

Other local informants from the Community of Atikokan group agreed with this statement, though they felt that the only extreme behaviour was from environmental organizations or park visitors being fanatical about maintaining an undisturbed wilderness experience. As well, an MNR Bureaucracy informant also stated that some environmental

groups would take an extreme position with the aim of negotiating closer to where they really want to be.

The last barrier mentioned in the literature was that of the Potential for Conflict. In the literature this barrier is described as stakeholders choosing not to participate because they know that their stance on an issue will result in conflict between them and other individuals or groups. Therefore, they avoid participating and not cause issues with other stakeholders such as neighbours, colleagues, family, or friends (Coburn, 2011; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b). While none of the informants indicated that Potential for Conflict would be a barrier to participating, one informant did state that their group refrained from taking a stance on certain issues to avoid developing conflict with another actor that they had an otherwise positive relationship with. Positive relationships are one of the beneficial aspects of public participation and will be discussed in the following section.

In the literature review it was found that some positive aspects of participation are empowerment, increased capacity, trust, greater cost effectiveness, and resolving or mitigating conflicts (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Reed, 2008; McCool, 2009). This study found that the actors who participated in the process the most have far greater influence than those who do not participate or participated minimally. Examples include the ENGO actors compared to the NGO actors. The ENGO actors were far more likely to achieve their goals during planning and decision-making largely because the NGO group does not participate.

Those low power actors who do participate have found that they become empowered to a degree. They do not have the power to force the MNR Bureaucracy to

allow non-conforming activities, but they are able to have activities that have not been conducted in the park become the subject of trials early enough that the activity is addressed in the management plan review. An example would be that U.S. outfitters requested that they be allowed to provide guided dog sledding trips for their customers. The park superintendent obtained permission from his superiors to allow trial trips that were monitored by park staff. After determining that the activity did not have any obvious conflicts with park policy or legislation, commercial dog sledding in the park was put forward as a management option. By being proactive and interacting with the park superintendent, the low power actor has likely been able to have a new commercial activity allowed in the park.

The last benefit of participation, Greater Cost Effectiveness, was not mentioned directly. However, the park superintendent stated in response to a question regarding how much influence the U.S. Citizens actor group has that he would use any good idea no matter where or from whom it came. Therefore, there is likely to be some degree of improved efficiency or effectiveness that occurs with a greater variety or number of participants.

### ***Relationships***

In the study, relationships were found to be the connections that exist between individuals, organizations, or actors. Through these connections, actors are able to influence the planning process, have disputes adjudicated, and hold decision-makers accountable. The study identified four characteristics of relationships: communication, conflict, consultation, and cooperation. By using these four characteristics, it was found

that lower power level actors are able to build relationships and influence decision-makers.

During the literature review, it was found that the Relationships power is very similar to that of the concept of social capital. Social capital involves cooperation, trust, formal and informal social networks, shared social norms, values and understanding (Jones et al., 2012; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007; Putnam, 1993). Through communication, conflict, consultation and cooperation, an actor can develop three types of connections: bonds, bridges, and linkages (Woolcock, 2001). For example, a group such as the cooperative ENGO, which has been quite successful in achieving its planning and management goals, has strong bonds within the group, and has bridges with other actors largely because of the consensus-based approach that it uses. Those linkages, plus the political and administrative connections that individual members of the organization have, provide vertical relationships with politicians and senior bureaucrats. These linkages are also known as political capital. Political capital allows the more cooperative ENGO and other actors such as Tourism Industry and Industry to influence members of the high power actors MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials (Birner and Wittmer, 2003).

Further evidence that the power Relationships is similar to social capital is that the ENGO that participated the most had the strongest relationships or greatest amount of social capital with the park superintendent, other MNR Bureaucracy members, and other actors. Those relationships were based on trust. The group shares the four aspects of trust (i.e. interpersonal, organizational, competence, and fiduciary duty) with other actors or actor members that were identified by Beierle and Cayford (2002), McCool

(2009), and Reed (2008) . From interviews with many of the informants, it seemed that the cooperative ENGO has the greatest amount of trust with the park superintendent. There was interpersonal and competence trust with the park superintendent, and organizational and fiduciary trust with the MNR Bureaucracy. The statement that highlights this is when the informant from the cooperative ENGO stated: "It's highly unlikely that ... [the park superintendent] would make a significant decision on the park that would affect the protection of wilderness without letting us know in advance." The group's organizational trust is also based on the numerous powerful connections that its members have within the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials groups.

One of the benefits of social capital identified in the literature is the resolution or mitigation of conflict by developing social trust (Jones et al, 2012; Sanginga, Kamugisha, and Martin, 2007). The cooperative ENGO member described how their organization and Lac La Croix First Nation have developed methods to cooperate on issues around which they share interests and avoid conflicts on those they do not. On issues where they have common ground, the two groups work together to allow the First Nation community to benefit economically from the park, and on issues where they do not agree, they have found that the conflict can be avoided by not discussing the issue.

Another indication that the Relationship power is similar to social capital is the shared social norms that the majority of those informants who participate hold. The most obvious shared social norm was that of environmental advocacy (see Table 2). There were nine of the 12 informants who expressed an environmental advocacy perspective during their interviews. Of the three informants who did not have that perspective, two did not participate in any park planning or management processes.

Neither of those individuals had a positive relationship with the park superintendent, while those who do participate either did have a very positive relationship with the superintendent, or they at least respected how he managed the park. It was relationships like those, or with other members of MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials, that provided low power actors such as Tourism Industry, ENGO, and Community of Atikokan to experience success in achieving at least some of their goals during planning and management processes. The two General Public informants also expressed an environmental advocacy perspective, and largely felt that they were able to have their voices heard regarding planning and management decisions.

## CONCLUSIONS

The following are the conclusions and recommendations of the study. It must be noted that the existing study limitations may influence the findings. However, I am very confident that the findings are sound. To remind the reader the limitations were: 1) a lack of representation from representatives of Lac La Croix First Nation, 2) the limited number of interviews (12) 3) the propensity of respondents to be environmental advocates, 4) the limited number of interviewees from the actor General Public, 5) there were no interviews with political officials or U.S. citizens, 6) the finding being limited to the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park.

The first objective of the study was to trace how and why acts of decentralization in the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park have occurred from park inception to the present day. The study found that the park planning and management decision-making process changed from a non-participatory expert based system to one that now requires minimum levels of public participation. The public participation requirements are enshrined in legislation such as the 1993 *EBR*, and 2006 *PPCRA*. However, even though public participation is currently required in all park management planning processes, the QMPR was found to not be decentralized, because the decision-making process is still a hierarchal system with the Minister of Natural Resources having ultimate authority and decision-making power.

It is not known if a decentralized management planning process would be successful or desirable for Quetico. The study found that there are polarized opinions between the preservationists and utilitarian actors about what is good for the park and

local communities. Members of each of the preservation and utilitarian groups felt that the other should not have more influence than they currently do because it could have a negative effect on the park or other actor's ability to utilize the park in their preferred manner. If the process were decentralized, my fear would be that an actor with an extreme perspective would gain enough power to destroy the current balance between the utilitarian and preservationist viewpoints that is maintained by Ontario Parks and OMNR Ministerial staff. Similar instances were described by Reed (2008) who found that during decentralization peripheral groups could gain power and significantly shift the management of a protected area to fit their ideal rather than that of all actors. According to one of the MNR Bureaucracy interviewees planning staff consider a management plan as successful if all the stakeholders are dissatisfied with the results of a management plan, because they have probably done their job properly.

Knowing that the process was not decentralized however did not prevent the study from meeting the second study objective of determining the actors involved, the powers they wield, to whom and how they are held accountable, and if their participation has increased or decreased in the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park since inception. The actors identified were representative of those found in other studies including governance studies of other Ontario Provincial Parks (i.e. Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Buteau-Duitschaever, 2009; Eagles et al., 2002 and 2003; Graham et al., 2003; and McIntyre et al., 2004; Porter, 2001).

However, as the system is not decentralized the actors identified were found to be either high power actors or low power actors. The high power actors are able to utilize at least three of the powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) and strongly

influence the fourth power. The remaining seven actors were determined to be low power level actors and they did not utilize any of Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) identified powers.

Nevertheless, the low power level actors were found to be able to influence the decisions of the high power level actors by participating in the process and developing relationships with both the high and other low power actors. It was also found that these two powers must be used together, as those groups that relied solely on using participation as a method of achieving planning and management goals were not as successful as those that developed relationships with other actors. These findings are also supported by the social capital literature (i.e. Berkes, 2007; Jones et al., 2012; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007; Portes, 1998; Pretty, 2003; Putnam, 1993; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000a; and Woolcock, 2001). While the social capital literature supports the findings, there were no other examples found of actors using social capital (i.e. participation and relationships) to influence park management planning of a protected area in other developed countries.

It was found that the actor accountability is complex, because the decision-makers (i.e. high power level actors) are in a supersubordinate system that is ultimately accountable to the electorate which is made up of the low power level actors. During the change from a purely expert based management system to one that involves public participation it was found the low power level actors such as ENGOs were able to influence the high power level actor Provincially Elected Officials through political pressure and monitoring by ENGOs and the media. The study found that there is some accountability of high power level actors through ENGO monitoring, but there has not

been any recent examples of monitoring by the media. The literature indicated that monitoring by the media has become less effective because politicians are often more beholden to their party than their constituents and are adept at manipulating the media (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Balkin, 1998).

The study revealed that actors who have positive relationships within the high power level actor groups MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials are able to obtain a degree of influence over decisions and some accountability of decision-makers. The large less cooperative ENGO and other actors that are more likely to use aggressive and negative methods such as political and public pressure against high power level actors were found to be less successful at attaining desired park management goals than were those actors who used positive relationships.

Participation seems to have decreased since inception of public participation in park planning and management in the 1970s. During the first Quetico management planning exercise the planning committee received 4500 letters, 263 written briefs, and listened to 144 oral presentations at a total of 25 public meetings. Today some actors that have seats on the planning committee no longer participate due to a lack of interest or capacity, and openhouses are poorly attended.

There may be many reasons for the reduction in participation. First, management decisions have no real effect on either the forestry or mining sectors. The reason for this is that the 1954 *Parks Act* and 2006 *PPCRA* limits the effect of management decisions to the area within the park boundary. As a result, neither of those industries have any incentive to participate.

The general public does not participate in any significant manner. The reasons for this may have to do with participation barriers such as jargon, structure of the process, and a lack of knowledge about their ability to participate. One other reason may be a general lack of interest based on the fact they feel that they have a lack of power over decisions, or that there are no burning issues that make the process more important than the challenges of everyday life.

It was found that ENGOs would participate more if they had greater capacity or there were greater controversy surrounding the process. There were two ENGO representatives spoken with who indicated that if their organizations had more financial or human resources or there were more controversial issues making it necessary to designate greater resources to the process they would be likely to participate significantly.

The NGO respondent stated that they do not participate because they do not feel their input is valued. However, the reason that their input is not considered more seriously is that past and current legislation prevents the higher power actors from allowing the non-conforming activities that the NGO interviewee desires (i.e. hunting and motorized access within the park).

The lack of participation by the tourism industry was surprising. All the outfitters attend an annual spring meeting hosted by the park administration. Other interactions with park management happen on an individual basis. It was assumed that because they have a financial incentive to participate in the planning process that they would be more involved as a group through an association, but that is not the case. Possibly the reason for this is the competitive nature of the tourism business. However,

the study results seem to show that an organized group with positive relationships that participates is more likely to achieve management planning goals than are individual companies doing the same.

The final objective was to determine which aspects of decentralization are most significant to stakeholder success. For the high power level government actors the key to their success is that they have the ability to utilize the at least three of the four powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). Lac La Croix is able to influence the process somewhat through use of three of the four powers, but has greater influence by exercising their Aboriginal and Treaty Rights. Those rights are also supported by key court decisions such as (*Keewatin v. Minister of Natural Resources*, 2011, *Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage)*, 2005, and *R. v. Sparrow*, 1990).

The participation and relationships powers identified in this study were found to be effective methods for low power actors to influence the process. For an actor to be successful, they must use both powers in combination as those groups that relied solely on using participation as a method of achieving planning and management goals were not as successful as those that also developed relationships with other actors. However, to develop the relationships an actor must also participate.

Overall it was found that while the current system has its challenges it is preferable to a decentralized system that has been taken over by one viewpoint or extremist view. That said the following are a few recommendations to improve the system.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are recommendations for the QMPR process based on study findings. The first recommendation is in regards to use of Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) framework in analysing a protected area's governance regime in a developed country context. The second recommendation is in regards to the regional economic impact of the park. The remainder are recommendations for Ontario Parks' staff to increase the public participation during management plan reviews.

### **Agrawal and Ribot's decentralization framework**

As the process was found to not be decentralized there may be some thought as to the applicability of the Decentralization Framework in this context. The results of this study demonstrate that the framework is still applicable, because it allowed the researcher to identify the actors involved, the powers they wield, and to whom and how decision-makers are held accountable. The only differences being that the study identified that in this context there are two levels of power and that low power level actors are able to utilize two additional to influence the decision-making process.

From the results of this study, I would recommend that anyone using the Agrawal and Ribot (1999) framework in a developed country context when examining a centralized park management planning decision-making process add the participation and relationship powers identified in this study. Doing so will allow the researcher to identify indirect methods of influencing the process utilized by low power level actors.

### **Regional economic impact assessment**

Ontario Parks should conduct a regional economic impact assessment to determine the regional economic benefits—personal, business, and societal—that Quetico provides to the region. A study of this nature was conducted by Whiting and Mulrooney (1998), but it does not provide the data regarding how those impacts are felt by individual communities and the *Quetico Background Information Report* only lists Atikokan and Lac La Croix as communities that are economically affected. If a regional economic impact assessment was conducted that determined the economic impact at a community level, it may be found that the park has an impact on other communities in addition to Atikokan and Lac La Croix. Doing so may increase participation as communities such as Thunder Bay and Fort Frances may learn that Quetico does have a greater economic impact on them than the economic impact section of the *Quetico Background Information Report* suggests. These and other communities and actors may begin to participate in planning processes, thus generating input from a greater number and variety of stakeholders. As was seen in the literature, input from a wider variety of stakeholders can result in better management of natural resources.

### **Recommendations to improve public participation**

I have five recommendations that I feel would increase public participation in the planning process. Currently participation by the public and some actors is minimal at best. While attending the Management Options openhouse in Thunder Bay for two hours I saw two other attendees. The planning staff who hosted the event stated that

openhouses are generally poorly attended, and respondents from the MNR Bureaucracy actor group also stated that usually there is little public participation in management plan reviews unless there are contentious issues that need to be resolved. An established park such as Quetico rarely has any contentious issues according to those informants.

1. Reduce jargon in documentation.

Respondents that do not participate regularly in planning processes often find the process confusing. From the interviews the confusion is largely due to the jargon used in the planning documents such as the *Background Information Report*. In addition to respondent complaints about the level of jargon used, the literature has also identified it as a barrier to participation. It may not be possible or feasible to remove the jargon or “dumb down” the text, but a comprehensive glossary ideally within the documents or available separately (i.e. online or a separate document) should reduce the negative affect that jargon has on participation levels.

2. Clarify when the public can and should participate.

Similar to the issues around jargon some respondents indicated that there was a lack of clarity about when the public is able to provide input. As well, there was also some concern about the number of times that the public can participate (i.e. after the release of the Terms of Reference, Background Information Report, Management Options, and Preliminary Management Plan). Ideally a fully engaged person or group will participate at each of the four stages. However, one respondent indicated that they knew of members of the General Public actor group who thought they were only meant or allowed to participate once.

3. Make openhouses more accessible.

The second most common complaint was the accessibility of open houses. Currently they are stand-alone events held during mid-week evenings in a limited number of communities, and attendance is generally very low unless there is a contentious issue to discuss. One suggestion made by an informant was that the open houses should be held in conjunction with other community events. The example given was to have a booth at the community's annual fishing derby because there would be a large portion of the community there and the public would not have to make a special effort to attend.

Another method of including other communities that would help to reduce the costs of openhouses and allow greater public participation would be to host openhouse video conferences at other Ontario Parks or OMNR regional offices. Park staff would remain in Atikokan or Thunder Bay, thus greatly reducing travel and venue costs. The public could attend the meetings by travelling to the closest regional venues to them where information could be displayed. Then if there were any questions, the public could ask the planning team via video conference link. There may be some trepidation by certain individuals to participate via a video conference, but by hosting them in regional offices the openhouses would be available to a greater number of Ontario residents.

4. Have a clear, limited, and well-defined period for the planning process.

The most common complaint by informants was the length of time that the QMPR process has taken. There was concern from some interviewees that people had lost faith in the system or interest in the QMPR because the process has taken so long.

Originally, the process was planned to take approximately two years beginning in the summer of 2006 and resulting in a completed management plan in the fall of 2008. Even taking into account that the new 2009 legislation and Ontario Protected Areas Planning Manual delayed the approval system, one wonders why the Preliminary Management Plan has not been released yet in the summer of 2012 when it was scheduled to be released in the fall of 2007. It may not be prudent to place a maximum time limit on a management plan review, as that could lead to other issues. However, having guidelines and more importantly a need to justify why a process is exceeding anticipated dates of completion would likely solve the majority of public participation issues.

5. Stop sanitizing conflict from planning processes.

Interviewees from the MNR Bureaucracy actor group indicated that one of the reasons that the process was taking so long is that all management plan review documentation had potentially volatile statements removed or watered down to avoid conflict with influential groups or individuals. The literature does state that conflict during natural resource management can have negative consequences, however, there are also positive aspects to conflict. The most significant positive aspect is that conflict can encourage dialogue between parties and that dialogue can result in creative solutions (and Wadley, 1996; Lawrence, 2007). As well, one of the MNR Bureaucracy members felt that by sterilizing all conflict from the planning process public participation was being negatively affected as actors and the public could not see any proposed changes that necessitated participation either for support or opposition. I don't advocate creating conflict or introducing topics that are too polarizing, just allowing some minor things to be floated by for public input. By doing so participation may increase and those

participating will likely also make suggestions on all aspects of the management plan thus resulting in greater creativity in the process.

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**APPENDICES**

**Appendix 1.** Telephone interview request transcript.

Hello,

My name is Troy Davis and I am a graduate student at Lakehead University researching the extent of public participation (decentralization) in the planning and management of Ontario's Provincial Parks has changed over the past 100 years. I was speaking with \_\_\_\_\_ who informed me [I learned through \_\_\_\_\_ (document name)] that you were involved in the planning or management of Quetico/Woodland Caribou/Wabakimi Provincial Park.

My hope is that by tracing the history and determining the amount of public participation (decentralization) of the planning and management in Quetico/Wabakimi/Woodland Caribou Provincial Park, I will be able provide Ontario Parks' staff with information that increases the management success of each park as well as the planning and management success of protected areas being developed under the Far North Planning Initiative.

Would you be willing to help me with my project by participating in a 1 ½ to 2 hour interview?

Your participation is completely voluntary and you are free to refrain from answering any questions or to withdraw from the interview at any time. All questionnaires will be kept confidential and all data will be analyzed in a form that assures your anonymity.

**Appendix 2.** Email request for interview

Hello,

My name is Troy Davis and I am a graduate student at Lakehead University researching how public participation in the planning and management of Ontario's Provincial Parks has changed over the past 100 years. My hope is that by tracing the history and determining the amount of public participation in the planning and management occurring in Quetico Provincial Park, I will be able provide Ontario Parks' staff with information that increases the management success of parks in Ontario including the protected areas being developed under the Far North Planning Initiative.

To date it has been easy to identify and interview people from organizations that have participated during one or many of the Quetico Provincial Park management planning processes that have occurred. However, I am having difficulty finding someone who has done so as an individual.

For my thesis to be as strong as possible I need to interview at least one person who has participated by writing letters/emails and/or attended public meetings or open houses in a Quetico management plan processes.

To help me will involve an approximately 1 ½ hour interview either in person or by telephone. If you would be willing to help me, know someone who would, or have any questions please contact me by email ([tdavis@lakeheadu.ca](mailto:tdavis@lakeheadu.ca)) or phone (807-343-8876). Please note that your participation is completely voluntary and you are free to refrain from answering any questions or to withdraw from the interview at any time. All questionnaires will be kept confidential and all data will be analyzed in a manner that assures your anonymity.

Best regards,

Troy Davis

Researcher

Troy Davis

MES in Nature Based Recreation and Tourism Candidate

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Lakehead University Office of Research  
Phone: (807) 776-7289  
Fax (807) 346-7749

**Appendix 3** Informed consent letter.School of Outdoor Recreation, Parks & Tourism

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Informed Consent for the *Evaluating Decentralization in the Planning and Management of Ontario's Provincial Parks: A case study of Quetico, Wabakimi and Woodland Caribou Provincial Parks* research project.

Before agreeing to participate in this research study, it is important that you read the following explanation of this study. This statement describes the purpose, procedures, benefits, risks, discomforts, and precautions of the research. Also described are the alternative procedures available to you, as well as your right to withdraw from the study at any time.

Troy Davis, a graduate student in the Masters of Environmental Studies in Nature-Based Recreation and Tourism program in the School of Outdoor Recreation Parks and Tourism at Lakehead University, is conducting this study to trace the history and determine the amount of public involvement in the planning and management of Quetico, Wabakimi, and Woodland Caribou Provincial Parks that has occurred. Participation in the study involves participating in a 1 ½ to 2 hour interview, carried out in a location and setting that is mutually agreeable to the participant and the researcher. The interviews will be audio recorded by the researcher and later transcribed for the purpose of data analysis.

There are no foreseeable physical risks, harms, or inconveniences anticipated from your participation in the study. The anticipated benefits to the community for participating in the study are that the researcher will be able provide Ontario Parks' staff and community representatives with information that helps to increase the management effectiveness of each park. The researcher also hopes to provide information that will increase the management effectiveness of Dedicated Protected Areas under the Far North Planning Initiative.

The information gathered during this study will remain confidential on a secure computer or in a locked office during this project. Only the researcher, their supervisor and Lakehead University Office of Research will have access to the study data and information. There will not be any identifying names written on the audio recordings, and participant's names will not be available to any-one other than the researcher or their supervisor. After completion of the study the recordings will be stored on recordable DVDs in the School of Outdoor Recreation, Parks, and Tourism at Lakehead University for a period of five years, whereupon they will be destroyed. The results of the research will be published in the form of papers that will be reviewed by the thesis committee and may be published in a peer reviewed professional journal or presented at professional conferences. Any presentation or publication of the data will be in aggregate form so individual participants will not be identified unless they have provided their explicit consent.

Participation in this study is voluntary; refusal to participate will involve no penalty. The participant is free to withdraw consent and discontinue participation in this project at any time. If requested, the researcher will provide a summary of the research results.

Should participants have any questions concerning the research they may call Mark Robson (faculty advisor for this project) at 807-343-8057. Questions regarding rights as a person in this research project should be directed to the Lakehead University Institutional Review Board at Phone: (807) 766-7289 or Fax: (807) 346-7749.

This agreement states that you have received a copy of this informed consent. Your signature below indicates that you agree to participate in this study.

Signature of Participant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Participant name (printed) \_\_\_\_\_

Signature of Researcher \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Researcher  
Troy Davis  
MES in Nature Based Recreation and  
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Email: [tdavis@lakeheadu.ca](mailto:tdavis@lakeheadu.ca)  
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Phone: (807) 343-8057  
Fax: (807) 346-7836


Lakehead University Office of Research

Phone: (807) 776-7289  
Fax (807) 346-7749

**Appendix 4.** Researcher introductory tutorial for the tri-council policy statement: ethical conduct for research involving humans certificate.




Appendix 5. 2009 Management Plan flow chart.



Appendix 5 Source: OMNR, 2009c, pp 15. 45 days = Minimum notice/external involvement period, including EBR posting.

**Appendix 6.** Stages of planning process prior to 2009.



**Appendix 7.** Semi-structured interview guide example questionsIntro questions

1. How long have you been in the area? Did you grow up in the area/community?  
What was that like?
2. Did you spend much time using the park when you were younger? What activities did you do then?
3. Do you use it much now? How?
4. What are your thoughts about the park and how it was managed, when you were younger?
5. Have your thought changed about that over time?

Other Questions

1. Have you ever been involved in a park planning or management decision-making process for either a FMP or the park? Can you describe that for me?  
(How, when, individually/in a group)
2. What was/is the best part of the process?
3. What was/is the worst part?
4. When did you become involved in the planning and management decision-making for QPP? Can you describe that for me?
5. Can you describe the methods that Atikokan uses to participate in planning and management decision-making?
6. Can you describe how your group decided what their stance on issues would be?  
(Did you question the membership, vote on it, was it an executive decision, or

was there another process? If group members did not agree was there a method for them to voice that or was it indicated in anyway? )(With prejudiced).

7. Has Atikokan been able to achieve the goals that it set out to achieve in past or current planning and management decision-making processes? Can you please describe that?
8. Do you feel that Atikokan is limited in how it is able to participate in planning and management decision-making? If yes how?
9. Is there any confusion as to how or when Atikokan is able to participate? Why?
10. Do you feel that Atikokan's ability to participate in planning and management decision-making has increased, stayed the same or decreased? Can you explain why you feel this way?
11. Do you feel that the planning and management decision-making process takes too long, is too short, or about the right length? Why?
12. When decisions about the park were made did you feel that Atikokan's concerns were honestly considered or did it seem that the decisions were made without considering other view points?
13. Would you say that planning and management decisions for Quetico are based on local citizen concerns, non-citizen concerns, made by local park staff, made by non-local park or ministerial staff, or made by the Minister of NR? Was it always this way or has it changed over time? Would you say it has always been this way or has there been a change?
14. In your opinion to what degree are local communities/groups/organizations actively participating in the future planning, development and management of

the park? Do you feel that they could participate more? Are they restricted in anyway from participating? Do they participate too much?

15. In your opinion how much influence do local communities have on the future planning, development and management of the park? Do you feel that they should have more influence?
16. In your opinion are non-governmental organizations such as the Quetico Foundation, Friends of Quetico, CPAWS/Wildlands League actively participating in the future planning, development and management of the park? Do you feel that they could participate more? Are they restricted in anyway from participating? Do they participate too much?
17. What about their influence? Do they have enough, too much? Do they represent local interests?
18. Do you think that a complete range of interests are involved in the planning and management decisions that are being made, especially around this current management plan? How so? Is industry well represented? Tourism? Park users? Environmental concerns? Your community/industry? Are there any groups that you feel have been excluded?
19. Do you think the ecological state of the park has gotten worse, improved or stayed the same in the time that you have been associated with it?
20. Has Quetico affected how you recreate or use the land?
21. Do you think others in Atikokan feel the same, or are there individuals that may have a different perspectives on anything we have discussed here today?

**Appendix 8** Semi-structured interview guide questions that were later added.

1. How many Canadian outfitters are there that utilise QPP?
2. Is Canoe Canada the largest Canadian outfitter in Quetico?
3. How old is the company?
4. When did you become president of the company?
5. Are you involved with the park in any other capacity?
6. How long have you been in the area? Did you grow up in the area/community? What was that like?
7. Did you spend much time using the park when you were younger? What activities did you do then?
8. Do you use the park now? How and why?
9. What are your thoughts about the park and how it was managed, when you were younger?
10. Have your thought changed about that over time?
11. Have you ever been involved in a park management planning or decision-making process? Can you describe that for me? (How, when, individually/in a group)
12. What was/is the best part of the process?
13. What was/is the worst part?
14. When did you become involved in the planning and management decision-making for QPP? Can you describe that for me?
15. Can you describe the methods that Canoe Canada uses to participate in planning and management decision-making?
16. Has Canoe Canada been able to achieve the goals that it set out to achieve in past or current planning and management decision-making processes? Can you please describe that? Other outfitters?
17. Do you feel that Canoe Canada is limited in how it is able to participate in planning and management decision-making? If yes how?

18. Is there any confusion as to how or when Canoe Canada is able to participate? Why?
19. Do you feel that Canoe Canada's ability to participate in planning and management decision-making has increased, stayed the same or decreased? Can you explain why you feel this way?
20. Do you feel that the planning and management decision-making process takes too long, is too short, or about the right length? Why?
21. When decisions about the park were made did you feel that the concerns of outfitters have been honestly considered or did it seem that the decisions were made without considering other view points?
22. In your opinion who makes the decisions about the park? Why do you say that?
23. Who are they responsible to and how can they be held accountable?
24. Would you say that planning and management decisions for Quetico are based on local citizen concerns, non-citizen concerns, made by local park staff, made by non-local park or ministerial staff, or made by the Minister of NR? Was it always this way or has it changed over time? Would you say it has always been this way or has there been a change?
25. Do you think local people such as MNR staff or other elected officials should have more influence over decisions that are made about the park? Why?
26. In your opinion to what degree are other local communities/groups/organizations actively participating in the future planning, development and management of the park? Why? Do you feel that they could participate more? Are they restricted in anyway from participating? Do they participate too much?
27. In your opinion how much influence do local communities and organizations have on the future planning, development and management of the park? Do you feel that they should have more influence?
28. In your opinion are non-governmental organizations such as the Quetico Foundation, Friends of Quetico, CPAWS/Wildlands League actively participating in the future planning, development and management of the park? Do you feel that they could participate more? Are they restricted in anyway from participating? Do they participate too much?
29. What about their influence? Do they have enough, too much? Do they represent local interests?
30. How much influence do you think that US citizens or outfitters have on planning and management decisions?

31. Do you think that a complete range of interests are involved in the planning and management decisions that are being made, especially around this current management plan? How so? Is industry well represented? Tourism? Park users? Environmental concerns? Your industry? Are there any groups that you feel have been excluded?
32. How much influence do you feel Atikokan or other groups have on deciding how the resources of the park will be used, by who, and in determining who would be able to use those?
33. If Robin was to make a decision about something that affects your group, and your group disagrees with it who would you go to for assistance? Would you have to go to his superior's?
34. In your opinion who has the final say when decisions about the park are made?
35. How are decision-makers held accountable for the decisions they make? For example, are they accountable to superiors, or are they accountable to local citizens?
36. Do you partner with other groups such as the QF or the Town of Atikokan to influence decisions?
37. Do you think the ecological state of the park has gotten worse, improved or stayed the same in the time that you have been associated with it?
38. Has Quetico affected how you recreate or use the land?
39. Who do you think should benefit from the park? How and why?
40. Do you think other outfitters feel the same, or are there individuals that may have a different perspectives on anything we have discussed here today?

**Appendix 9.** MNR staff semi-structured interview guide.

1. What are the steps of a management plan process and what must be done to complete each step? As this is in transition could you please note the differences between the two processes.
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the new system as you see it from a public participation point of view?
3. How effective do you feel the public participation process that is used today is compared to previous ones? Do you feel the same stakeholders are being engaged? Why?
4. Are all park management planning processes the same (cookie cutter) or can they be different? If different how so?
5. Can parks of the same class have different regulations?
6. Are advisory groups always used? Why? Are they useful?
7. Has OP tried to speed up this process, and if so how? Has that made the process more or less responsive to individual situations?
8. Is there a different level of engagement based on location? i.e. Toronto vs Atikokan vs Ely vs Lac La Croix
9. What do you think of the time it takes to go through the process? How would you improve the system?
10. Some have accused OP of having a predetermined outcome for management plans what is your response to this?
11. Are release dates of documents generally timed so as to allow the public the greatest or least opportunity to access and comment on them?
12. How is the public made aware of a management planning process? Is OP doing anything to make sure that all stakeholders or concerned individual are included?
13. How do you ensure greater participation? Do you think the system could it be improved?
14. How much influence does the public have on the planning and management decisions that are being made? Is it the same for small groups or individuals and larger organizations such as CPAWS or OFAH?

15. How do you determine which issues are dealt with or how issues are dealt with during the planning process?
16. Is the concept of the Greater Park Ecosystem considered at all in park management planning? Can you describe that?
17. Can decisions that are contrary to park interests be affected by factors external to parks that are also planned by MNR such as forestry, hydro, or renewable energy during a park management planning process?
18. Are there aspects of the plan or planning process that are not negotiable with interest groups (Atikokan, LLCFN, QF, F of Q, etc.)? Can you describe them?
19. Are there aspects that are completely open to negotiation and can parks of the same class have different regulations? Describe this please.
20. How does the decision-making process work? How are the decisions made and who makes them?
21. What types of decisions can the superintendent make?
22. Can policy be overruled and if so who has the authority to do so? Do you have any examples of that?
23. What is the highest level of decisions that the park superintendent can make?
24. Who has the final say on the approval of management plans, and has it always been this way?
25. Is there active management to allow greater benefits for local communities and people? How?
26. In general would you say that when decisions are made that local community interests are given more or less weight than are those of policy or non-local interests such as ENGOs or more populated regions?
27. How are the interest's of groups worked into a management plan, especially differing views? Eg. Motor boats on lakes in Quetico or hunting in parks.
28. How much influence do US citizens have versus a Canadian citizen?
29. How much does political pressure from interest groups influence the outcome of planning and management decisions versus individuals? Eg. Interest group in the southern part of the province. Spring bear hunt.

30. Can you tell me if and how park users and local industry & tourism are represented during the management plan process? Could more be done to facilitate that? Are there restrictions that would affect how they can participate?
31. How much influence do non-local or provincial industrial lobbyist have on park policy?
32. In your opinion do local communities and organizations have much influence on the planning, development and management of the park? Can you please explain that? Do you feel that they should have more or less influence? Could they participate more or less? Do you know why local people participate in the levels that they do?
33. How much influence do First Nations have on the planning process? How do they effect the outcome?
34. Are the views and concerns of non-governmental organizations such as the Quetico Foundation, Friends of Quetico, CPAWS/Wildlands League being represented well enough in the future planning, development and management of the park? Are they restricted in anyway from participating? Do they participate too much?
35. Do these groups have much influence in the process? Should they have more or less?
36. Do these groups represent local interests?
37. Do you think that a complete range of interests are being represented in general? How about the current management plan process? How so?
38. Are there any groups that you feel have been excluded either intentionally or unintentionally?
39. In your opinion are people as engaged with the Quetico park management planning process as they could be or have been in the past? Why?
40. Do you think this may be due to satisfaction with policy and confidence that Ontario Parks employees and others involved are doing a good job? Why?
41. Who are the individuals or groups that are on the advisory group for the current QPP management plan process?
42. As I understand it the planning review for QPP, which started 4 years ago, has been stalled with a planning document at the main Ontario Parks office since June of 2008. Do you know why this is?

43. Do you think that the fact that the current QPP planning process has been stalled may cause those involved in the process to become frustrated and feel that their voices are not being heard?
44. Do you feel that overall the planning and management process is centralized or decentralized? Why?
45. How has the level at which management decisions are made within MNR/OP changed over the years? Would you say it is more or less centralized?
46. Do you think that the final planning and management decisions are made to meet policy, address concerns of citizens or to be politically comfortable?
47. What do groups or individuals need to do to ensure that their goals were achieved?
48. Are OP and MNR staff as accessible to the public as they could be or have been? Why?
49. Do you think the ecological state of the park has gotten worse, improved or stayed the same in the time that you have been associated with it?
50. Has Quetico affected how you recreate or use the land?

**Appendix 10. Quetico Park Management Options Comment Sheet**

Quetico Park Management Options Comment Sheet

**TOPIC 9. Pickerel Lake Dam**

**There is a need to review current management direction to determine appropriate policy for maintaining the Pickerel Lake dam.**

- Option 1:** Quetico staff will continue to work with the Northwest Region MNR to monitor the condition of the Pickerel Lake dam and to undertake remedial actions (such as repair or stoplog replacement) to prevent dam failure and to maintain the present water levels. Subject to available resources should extensive repair or replacement of the existing structure be required, the creation of a spillway or weir type dam will be considered. This is the status quo option.
  
- Option 2:** Quetico Provincial Park will continue to work with the Northwest Region MNR to monitor the condition of the Pickerel Lake dam. Though the actual impacts of the dam's deterioration are somewhat speculative, we should be able to safely predict the outcome of the lake system's eventual return to historic levels. Currently, a study is being undertaken that will provide a more precise idea as to the effects on the lake that a change in water levels will have. As water levels drop, implications for day-use beaches and ease of canoe travel will be assessed; if necessary remedial restoration will be done to maintain/restore a minimum water level, subject to available resources. This is the preferred option.

Comments:

[Empty comment box]

*Thank you for providing your comments!*

*Please provide any additional comments for our consideration below:*

[Empty comment box]

Quetico Park Management Options Comment Sheet**TOPIC 1. East Side Access to the Park**

Management direction is required to provide and control public access on the east side of the park. See Figure 4 for access options.

- OPTION 1:** No new access is created on the eastern boundary of the park. Aircraft may continue to land on Clay Lake, or Mack Lake during periods of low water as permitted by the park superintendent. This is the status quo option.
- OPTION 2:** No new access is created on the eastern boundary of the park. The Mack Lake entry location will be changed to Cullen Lake via the portage from Ross Lake (most recently maintained in 2008). Aircraft will not be permitted to land on Mack Lake but will land instead outside of the park on Ross Lake. Mack Lake aircraft landing will be removed from regulation.
- OPTION 3:** New access is created on the eastern boundary of the park. The Mack Lake entry location will be changed to the Wawaig River. New road access will be created at the Wawaig River from existing logging roads (upon agreement with the Sustainable Forest License holder regarding road liability/maintenance). Based upon preliminary discussion with the Sustainable Forest License holder use and access to the road should not pose a problem. The access point will include a parking lot and a portage located outside of the park. Mack Lake aircraft landing will be removed from regulation. The remote access designation would not be changed. This is the preferred option.

Comments:

**TOPIC 2. Aircraft Landing**

Management direction is required to control aircraft landing access to the park and determine on which lakes aircraft would be allowed. Seasonal restrictions may be warranted.

- OPTION 1:** Commercial aircraft may land by permit for recreation purposes only on the following bodies of water (open or frozen): Beaverhouse Lake, Basswood Lake (King Point), and Mack Lake. Commercial aircraft carrying Canadian residents holding a Canadian resident permit only may land by permit for recreation purposes only on Saganaga Lake (Cache Bay). Private or commercial aircraft may also land by permit for access only to private properties and tenured land on lakes not included in the preceding list. This would formalize the fly-in trial periods on Cache Bay and King Point. This is the status quo option.
- OPTION 2:** Commercial aircraft landing on Beaverhouse Lake will no longer be permitted. The other commercial aircraft landings as described above in option 1 (Basswood Lake, Mack Lake and



### Quetico Park Management Options Comment Sheet

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- OPTION 2:** Commercial aircraft landing on Beaverhouse Lake will no longer be permitted. The other commercial aircraft landings as described above in option 1 (Basswood Lake, Mack Lake and Saganaga Lake (Cache Bay) will continue to be permitted. Aircraft may land on lakes (open or frozen) by permit for access to private properties and tenured land only.

Quetico Park Management Options Comment Sheet

Comments:

**TOPIC 4. Dawson Trail Campground Vision**

Management direction is needed in defining the long term vision and associated development for Dawson Trail campground. Some of the impacts to be considered are carrying capacity of the site, noise levels, fire restrictions, and damage to vegetation (soil compaction, cutting of trees).

- OPTION 1:** The Dawson Trail campground area will be managed in keeping with the character of Quetico, which may include non-mechanized recreation such as natural heritage education, hiking, cross-country skiing, skijoring (skiing while pulled by a dog), mountain biking (in designated areas), as well as providing staging for day trips and short overnight trips into the interior. A limited number of sites may have electrical hook-ups added up to a maximum 40% of sites, or be enlarged or merged to accommodate larger (over 32') recreational camping units (RVs) and the associated spur/back-in/pull-through areas, as demand warrants. This is the status quo option.
- OPTION 2:** The Dawson Trail campground area will be managed in keeping with the character of Quetico, which may include non-mechanized recreation such as natural heritage education, hiking, cross-country skiing, skijoring (skiing while pulled by a dog), mountain biking (in designated areas), as well as providing staging for day trips and short overnight trips into the interior. The existing 107 camp sites within the Dawson Trail campground will be maintained. No additional campsites will be created, enlarged or electrified. Dawson Trail Campground will continue to be managed as described above in option 1. Dawson Trail campground will not emphasize development to accommodate the very large recreational camping units (RVs).
- OPTION 3:** The Dawson Trail campground area will be managed in keeping with the character of Quetico, which may include non-mechanized recreation such as natural heritage education, hiking, cross-country skiing, skijoring (skiing while pulled by a dog), mountain biking (in designated areas), as well as providing staging for day trips and short overnight trips into the interior. The number of campsites within the Dawson Trail campground may be increased by a maximum of 20 sites (to a maximum of 127 sites) as need/demand warrants; some of these new campsites may be created for walk-in camp sites, canvas tents, or yurts. A limited number of these new sites may be created to accommodate larger (over 32') recreational camping units (RVs) and the associated spur/back-in/pull-through areas, as demand warrants. A limited number of sites may have electrical hook-ups added up to a maximum 40% of sites, as need/demand warrants. Dawson Trail Campground will continue to be managed as described above in option 1. A group campsite may be developed as demand warrants. This is the preferred option.

Quetico Park Management Options Comment Sheet

Comments:

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- OPTION 2:** The Dawson Trail campground area will be managed in keeping with the character of Quetico, which may include non-mechanized recreation such as natural heritage education, hiking, cross-country skiing, skijoring (skiing while pulled by a dog), mountain biking (in designated areas), as well as providing staging for day trips and short overnight trips into the interior. The existing 107 camp sites within the Dawson Trail campground will be maintained. No additional campsites will be created, enlarged or electrified. Dawson Trail Campground will continue to be managed as described above in option 1. Dawson Trail campground will not emphasize development to accommodate the very large recreational camping units (RVs).
  
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Quetico Park Management Options Comment Sheet

Comments:

**TOPIC 5. Mechanized Ski Trail Grooming**

Management direction for mechanized grooming of single-track trails for front-country classic style skiing in the proposed threshold wilderness zone in and around French Lake needs to be determined.

- OPTION 1** Mechanized trail grooming (dragging and track-setting) will occur within the present footprint of cross-country ski trails as presented previously in **Topic 3, Option 1**. This would include the trails within the Dawson Trail campground as well as The Pines, Sawmill Lake and French River Trails. This is the preferred option.
- OPTION 2:** Mechanized trail grooming (dragging and track-setting) is limited to existing cross-country ski trails within the access zone as presented previously in **Topic 3, Option 3**. This would follow the trails within the Dawson Trail campground and would include the French River Trail.
- OPTION 3:** Mechanized trail grooming (dragging and track-setting) is limited to the campground roads.

Comments:

### Quetico Park Management Options Comment Sheet

#### TOPIC 6. Long-distance Backcountry Trail Development

Management direction is needed to determine if development of long-distance trails (e.g. for back-country hiking and skiing) is consistent with Quetico's objectives (see Figure 6).

- OPTION 1:** No long distance trail development is permitted.
- OPTION 2:** Long distance trail development (maximum tread width 1.5 – 2 meters) is only permitted on the network of abandoned logging roads (many of which have grown in) suited to hiking in the NE corner of the park (those previously used as hiking trails).
- OPTION 3:** New long distance trail development (maximum tread width 1.5 – 2 meters) is permitted anywhere in park where it is appropriate and does not conflict with other park uses, but the focus will be on trail development in the NE corner of the park on elevated terrain. This is the status quo and preferred option.


Comments:

#### TOPIC 7. Commercial Dog sledding

Management direction is required to determine if commercial dog sledding is an appropriate activity for Quetico.


- OPTION 1:** Commercial dog sledding will not be permitted anywhere in the park. No private large dog team (i.e. more than 1-2 dogs) will be permitted in the park.
- OPTION 2:** Commercially outfitted dog sledding will be permitted in the French Lake access zone only **after** a five-year trial period to assess the impacts to the park's resource base and benefits to the local economy. \*\*
- OPTION 3:** Commercially outfitted dog sledding may be permitted in the French Lake access and adjacent threshold wilderness zone **after** a five-year trial period to assess the impacts to the park's resource base and benefits to the local economy.\*\* If permitted, a quota for this activity would be implemented. This is the preferred option.

\*\*Dog sled owners/operators/mushers will be required to dispose of dog feces at least 60m from any water source while at campsites and would be required to provide proof of annual vaccination, including vaccination for parvovirus.

Quetico Park Management Options Comment SheetComments:  
**TOPIC 8. Designated travel routes and campsites**

Management direction is required in order to guide changes to the visitor regulation program respecting traveling on designated routes and camping on designated campsites. Considerations include visitor choice to select locations, impacts of uncontrolled camping and hiking, and ability to locate visitors in emergency situations.

- OPTION 1:** No changes to travel or campsites will be made. Although encouraged to use sites designated by the presence of a primitive stone fireplace, interior visitors may continue to camp in any suitable area/site, in consideration of the prohibition on damage to trees and vegetation. Visitors may continue to travel anywhere in the park that is not closed to travel, (in other words go anywhere and camp anywhere). This is the status quo option.
- OPTION 2:** Interior visitors must camp on a designated campsite, identified by the presence of a primitive stone fireplace and eventually by the site's inclusion of the Quetico Park canoeing map. Quetico Park is not considering the use of signage to designate sites.
- OPTION 2A:** Visitors may continue to travel anywhere in the park that is not closed to travel, (in other words camp on a designated site but day trip only off of established travel routes). This is the preferred option.
- OPTION 2B:** Visitors may only travel and camp on established travel routes, identified by existing park-maintained portages and trails and campsites designated as described above (in other words camp only on designated sites and travel only on established travel routes).

Comments:  


Quetico Park Management Options Comment Sheet**TOPIC 9. Pickerel Lake Dam**

There is a need to review current management direction to determine appropriate policy for maintaining the Pickerel Lake dam.

- Option 1:** Quetico staff will continue to work with the Northwest Region MNR to monitor the condition of the Pickerel Lake dam and to undertake remedial actions (such as repair or stoplog replacement) to prevent dam failure and to maintain the present water levels. Subject to available resources should extensive repair or replacement of the existing structure be required, the creation of a spillway or weir type dam will be considered. This is the status quo option.
  
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Comments:

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