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Lakehead University

"From Moribund to Mobilized"

The Lake Superior Regiment 1920-1940

**A Thesis Submitted to
the Faculty of Arts and Sciences
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Master of Arts**

Department of History

by James Ellard ©

**Thunder Bay, Ontario
November 1999**



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Dedication:

**This work is dedicated to the memory of
Lieutenant Colonel Edmond Joseph Oscar Gravelle
1919-1999**

**and to all members, past and present, of
the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment
and the units it perpetuates**

"INTER PERICULA INTREPIDI"

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A Note on Terminology:

In this work, several acronyms and short forms are used. Most of these are either common usage from the period being discussed or correct current forms. For purposes of succinctness, I have shortened certain titles without using the standard form of the time.

For example, "Director of Military Operations and Intelligence" has become **DMOI** rather than the *DMO and I* (the form used in correspondence), which to me seems rather unwieldy.

I have attempted to use a single standard short form for military rank within the text of this work. I have not, however, altered the format used in primary source documents. The format I have used for indicating rank within the text is as follows:

Private	Pte.	Lance-Corporal	LCpl.
Corporal	Cpl.	Sergeant	Sgt.
Warrant Officer, 2nd Class	WO2 /	Company Sergeant Major	CSM
Warrant Officer, First Class	WO1 /	Regimental Sergeant Major	RSM
Second Lieutenant	2lt.	Lieutenant	Lt.
Captain	Capt.	Major	Maj.
Lieutenant Colonel	Lt. Col.	Colonel	Col.
Brigadier	Brig.	Major General	Maj. Gen.
Lieutenant General	Lt. Gen.	General	Gen.

I have also observed several military conventions:

- Though an infantry regiment generally consists of more than one battalion, in this work, the terms "regiment" and "battalion" will be used interchangeably in reference to the Lake Superior Regiment, which was effectively a single-battalion unit during the interwar period.

- An officer holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Canadian Army may be referred to as "Colonel".

-Subalterns of the rank of Lieutenant and Second Lieutenant may both be referred to as "Lieutenant".

-Although the term "Warrant Officer, 1st Class" (WO1) refers to the rank of the Non-Commissioned Officer and "Regimental Sergeant Major" refers to their appointment as the senior NCO of a battalion, these two may be used synonymously, providing that the NCO holds both the rank and the appointment. The same applies for the rank of WO2 and the appointment of CSM.

Introduction

I

The intent of this work is to determine to what extent the Lake Superior Regiment of the Non-Permanent Active Militia¹ fulfilled both its military and civic role in the Lakehead cities of Fort William and Port Arthur, Ontario during the twenty-year period from 1920 to 1940. It is not intended that this work provide an analysis of the social makeup of the militia or of Canadian defence policy during the interwar period, nor is it intended to provide a profile of the Canadian Army or the Non Permanent Active Militia as a whole. It is important, however, to examine the evolution of the Canadian military in general and the militia in particular in order to understand the environment in which the Lake Superior Regiment operated during the period in question.

It is likewise important to realize that the militia cannot be seen simply as an adjunct to the nation's regular army, but must be viewed as a separate and distinct tradition within the state which predates the modern standing army. In undertaking the study of any modern military organization, understanding the military structures of both the country and the period being studied is of paramount importance. This requires a thorough familiarity with the subject of military history itself:² One

¹ During the period to be dealt with in this work, Canada's military forces were divided into Permanent Active Militia and Non-Permanent Active Militia units. This structure is similar, but not entirely analogous to the form of the British military at the time. The Permanent Active Militia came to be referred to as the "permanent force" and was, in effect, Canada's standing army. The NPAM was the "militia" or "reserve army". In this work, the terms "NPAM" and "militia" are synonymous. For an intriguing comparison of "regular" and "reserve" armies from an economist's perspective see George J. Neimanis, "Militia vs. the Standing Army in the History of Economic Thought from Adam Smith to Friedrich Engels" in *Military Affairs*, vol. 44 no. 1, February 1980, pp. 28-32.

² The merits of the study of military history have been pondered by many scholars both within Canada and without. Some of the more lucid and relevant commentaries include M. G. Dyer, "Military History and War Studies at Canadian Universities" in *Military Affairs*, vol. 33 no. 1, December 1969, pp. 385-393; Albert N. Garland, "Some Thoughts on the Writing of Military History" in *Military Affairs*, vol. 34 no. 4, February 1971, pp. 18-20; Major H. E. D. Harris, "The Value of History to the Soldier" in *The Army Quarterly Defense Journal*, vol. 85 no. 1, October 1962, pp. 79-87; Alan R. Millet, "The

cannot generalize when bandying about terms like "militia" or "reserve army". It is crucial to differentiate between the various military entities that have come into being since the rise of the modern nation-state. The reserve army of today's industrialized nation, though often sharing certain common elements with its forbears, is altogether distinct from its 17th, 18th, and even 19th century militia predecessors.³

Through any analysis of a particular military organization in a specific time period, we also come to realize that there can exist several distinct forces within the overall military structure of a state. In most cases, these are comprised of a regular force and embodied reserve. Each of these organs has its own function within the state and both are most often deemed essential but nonetheless, may not always function in concert and may even be in conflict. This is because any study of this subject cannot fail to reveal that in the modern world, military organizations are inherently political.⁴

Study of American Military History in the United States" in Military Affairs, vol. 42 no. 2, April 1977, pp. 1-30; Paul J. Scheips, "Military History and Peace Research" in Military Affairs, vol. 34 no. 1, February 1970, pp. 2-6; R. G. Albion, Introduction to Military History, (reprinted from 1929 D. Appleton-Century Company Inc. edition, New York: AMS, 1971); War as a Social Institution: The Historian's Perspective, (Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas C. Cochran, eds., New York: 1941); and E. W. Sheppard, The Study of Military History, (Aldershot: 1952).

³ A good example is the historiography of the American militia. There are a multitude of works which examine incarnations of the American militia during various time periods and each of these makes clear the distinction between the militias of different eras. See, for example, Ronald L. Boucher, "The Colonial Militia as a Social Institution in Salem Mass.: 1794-1775", in Military Affairs, vol. 37 no. 4, December 1973, pp. 125-130; and William Shea, "The First American Militia" in Military Affairs, vol. 46 no. 1, February 1982, pp. 15-18, for examinations of early militia units. John K. Mahon's "Bibliographic Essay on Research into the History of the Militia and the National Guard", in Military Affairs, vol. 48 no. 2, April 1984, pp. 74-77, is replete with sources worthy of further examination.

⁴ The degree of political involvement of military forces varies enormously between different governments, but even in states where the army has been most apolitical (typically, western liberal democracies), a definite social link between military and political elites exists and has always existed. In fact, it quickly becomes apparent to anyone examining the military as an organization that it must be studied in relation to the society in which it exists. For works which deal with the interaction of military and political elites, see Correlli Barnett, "The Education of Military Elites" in Governing Elites: Studies in Training and Selection, (Rupert Wilkinson, ed. New York: 1969); Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations, (Michael Howard, ed. London: 1957); Changing Patterns of Military Politics, (Samuel P. Huntington, ed. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe Inc., 1962); and Armed Forces and Society, (Jacques VanDoorn, ed. The Hague: Mouton

In order to gain a better understanding, in a broad context, of the unique position of militia or reserve forces in Canadian society, it is useful to look at the analogous militia forces of the United States and Britain and determine the degree of influence that these two nations may have had on the development of the Canadian militia, given the extent to which they have influenced the development of the Canadian military in the post-Confederation period.⁵ What becomes quickly apparent is that the very form and nature of a nation's military is greatly influenced by the circumstances of its creation and the events in its history. One need look no further than the very distinct military traditions of Canada and the United States, two nations that, despite their many similarities, have demonstrated very divergent patterns of

and Co., 1968). For a perspective on the interaction of military and civilian elites in Canada, see Stephen Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of A Professional Army, 1860-1939, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); and Howard Graham, Citizen and Soldier, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987). For an excellent analysis of Canada's power structures, see John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).

⁵ Works like "Lord Haldane and the Territorial Army" in Studies in War and Peace, (New York: The Viking Press Inc., 1971) by Michael Howard; and The National Guard in Politics, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) by Martha Derthick, which specifically discuss the National Guard and Territorial Army as distinct entities within the state should be examined. Each of these works explores the origins of modern military forces in some manner or another. Both Derthick and Howard hint at the "organic" nature of the reserve forces they each study, institutions which, as they develop and grow, are often influenced by several different interests, but seldom controlled by any single one. Essentially, both Derthick's analysis of the National Guard's history and rise to power as a pressure group in the US and Howard's exploration of the creation of the Territorial Army, a force whose eventual incarnation diverged sharply from its creator's (Lord Haldane's) vision, support a common conclusion: Far from being institutions that are created from scratch based on the needs of the time, completely divorced from their militia predecessors, modern reserve forces are organizations which bear the weight of a nation's military heritage and exist as organic manifestations of a militia tradition that often dates back decades, if not centuries. This being so, the transformations in technology and organization by no means negate the palpable influence that tradition has on these forces. As the cases of the National Guard and the Territorial Army show, a military organization will evolve to reflect the national character as well as the society of which it is a part, perhaps against the best laid plans of its creators, the best efforts of stakeholders or the wishes of the government. Perhaps Howard explains it best in concluding his chapter on the T.A. with a comment on its transformation in the early part of the twentieth century, observing that the British people took Lord Haldane's proposals and tailored them to fit their own rather curious shape. For a more detailed examination of the T.A. see E.W. Sheppard, A Short History of the British Army, (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1959); or Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970, (London: Penguin Press, 1970). For more information on the National Guard, see ROTCM 145-60 American Military History: 1605-1953, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1956).

military development. Taking into account the variety of shaping influences, we are able to comprehend the circumstances which guided the development of the Canadian militia during its long history.

II

We now turn to an examination of the development of the Canadian militia during the early part of the twentieth century.⁶ Considering that Canada, unlike the U.S. or Britain, was at the turn of the century, a very young country and arguably, scarcely a nation at all, it is appropriate to consider factors other than "national character" that influenced this development. It is reasonable to state that as a dominion still very much under the sway of an imperial power, Canada's militia was subject to influences absent in the development of the Territorial Army and the

⁶ It is useful to remember the roots of the militia units of Canada. The first militia were infantry companies formed of volunteers, a tradition which began with the French colonists of the 17th and 18th centuries and continued through the arrival of British and American settlers in later times. These early companies saw action at the battles of the colonial wars of the eighteenth century between France and England, in countless skirmishes with the aboriginal peoples of the continent, during the American War of Independence, and in the War of 1812. The War of 1812 ended with the successful defense of Canada by British troops supported by local militia units of Upper and Lower Canada. (Gwynn Dyer and Tina Viljoen, *The Defence of Canada*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1990. p. 77.) These companies and battalions of the early 19th century, first formed over a hundred and eighty years ago, were Canada's first reserve regiments and represented a new type of military unit in British North America. Larger in size and better organized than previous reserve companies in Canada's colonial past, the militia regiments of this era would serve as the nucleus for Canada's 19th century militia (many of the units that fought in that conflict are the predecessors of numerous modern day units of southern Ontario). The somewhat limited success of the militia in the war against the Americans did show that the citizens of British North America could and should provide for their own defense by service in part-time companies formed in settlements and towns across the land. The advent of viable defense forces in Canada was an important step in defining a national identity. From the early 1800s on, Great Britain retained garrisons in Canada only as a "pledge of imperial concern rather than a badge of imperial authority". (Hector J. Massey, ed. *The Canadian Military: A Profile*, Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972. p. 16). For more on Canada's military history see D. J. Goodspeed, *The Armed Forces of Canada 1867-1967. A Century of Achievement*, (Ottawa: 1967); Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, (Edmonton: Heritage Publishers Ltd., 1990); Desmond Morton, *Canada and War*, (Toronto: Butterworth and Co. Ltd., 1981); T. W. Paterson, *Canadian Battles and Massacres*, (Langley, B.C.: Stagecoach Publishing Company Ltd., 1977); and G.F.G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers 1604-1954*, (Toronto: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1971). See also *Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960), edited by C. P. Stacey; and Stacey's book *The Military Problems of Canada*, (Toronto: 1940) for good introductions to the topic of Canadian military history.

National Guard. The militia of Canada was developing at a time when the country's "national character" was not clearly defined and therefore, the historian must seek alternate avenues by which this development can be explained.

Among the most obvious of these alternate influences was the young nation's close bond to Britain. In any study of the Canadian military during the era of British imperialism, the question unavoidably arises: to what degree was Canada's military influenced by developments in Britain (which, in the early part of the century, still exercised significant influence on Canadian policy, both foreign and domestic)? Several monographs provide clues to the answer. In his work, Canadian Defense Policy, R.A. Preston broaches the subject, discussing the post Boer War reforms in Britain.⁷ He notes that unlike Australia and New Zealand, Canada did not fully accept British proposals at Imperial Conferences to establish sections of the Imperial General Staff in the Dominions.⁸ In fact, in Canada during the first decade of the century, the British General Officers Commanding (GOC) were replaced by the Militia Council, a distinctly Canadian organization.

This in itself cannot be taken as evidence of Canada's desire to establish military autonomy from Britain, but it does highlight an interesting conflict between the goals of the young Dominion and the wishes of the United Kingdom in its efforts to consolidate the military structure of the Empire.⁹ Clearly, this was a period of

⁷ These reforms set up, among other things, a General Staff as well as the Defense Committee, both of which became Imperial in name as well as in scope of interest.

⁸ Richard Preston, Canadian Defense Policy and the Development of the Canadian Nation, 1867-1917, p. 17, (Canadian Historical Association Pamphlets, no 25. Ottawa: Love Printing Service Ltd., 1970). See also Desmond Morton, "The Military Problems of an Unmilitary Power" in Revue Internationale d'Histoire, (vol. 54, 1982, p. 1-30). For a good example of writing from the period on this subject see Captain Ernest J. Chambers, The Canadian Militia. A History of the Origin and Development of the Force, (Montreal: L. M. Fresco Publisher, 1907).

⁹ Another interesting facet of this apparent conflict is brought forward in Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1914, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970 pp. 31-39), which focuses on the conflict between the British Generals who commanded the

transition when, if the Dominion was not straining at the leash of imperial control, it was at least asserting that Britain's interests and Canada's interests were not always one and the same.

In the early years of the century there was an increase in military activity in Canada and this was accompanied by a noted decline in Britain's involvement in Canadian military affairs. The years 1904 and 1905 were important ones in the development of the Canadian military. It was in 1904 that a new Militia Act was passed and over the next two years, several new regiments and corps were added to the rolls, including many units which still exist.¹⁰ Just as events during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (like the Boer War and the Spanish-American War) greatly influenced the course of military reform in both Britain and the United States, the changing nature of Canada's relationships with its neighbour to the south and its mistress across the Atlantic was certainly demonstrated in the creation of the new Militia Act. A passage in Preston's work denotes the greater significance of this step:

By changing the formula that the Militia could serve "within or without Canada...by reason of war, invasion or insurrection" (which had been interpreted to mean across the American border) to the wider formula "beyond Canada, for the defense thereof", Borden's 1904 Militia Act quietly made it legal for the government to send the Militia overseas... Canada had thus advanced further toward the possession of military forces that could be used without restriction for the furtherance of Canadian interests, a notable step towards military sovereignty and competence.¹¹

Canadian militia during this period, and their superiors, the politicians, whose goals differed sharply from those of the British military establishment in Canada. This work also discusses the creation of the Militia Act of 1904.

¹⁰ The modern order of precedence of the Canadian forces is derived largely (though not entirely) from the restructuring that occurred during 1904 and 1905. (See Charles H. Stewart, The Concise Lineages of the Canadian Army, (Second Enlarged and Revised Edition), Toronto: 1982).

¹¹ Richard Preston, Canadian Defense Policy, p. 13.

This act might be construed to indicate both a *rapprochement* of sorts with the United States, the traditional menace from the south, and a greater degree of autonomy for Canada in the employment of its armed forces. This is not necessarily the reality.¹² The Militia Act of 1904 can be more realistically interpreted as a reflection of Canada's broadening interests, and the resulting desire to exercise its sovereignty through a military basically independent of direct British control, yet still subject to British influence through the Canadian government.

As it turned out, the 1904 Militia Act was not in force for long before another momentous change was to occur in the Canadian military, one brought about by war. In one fell swoop, the First World War would transform the country's attitude to both war and soldiering. With the industrialization of conflict and the mechanization of death, the military ceased once and for all to be a hobby and became a profession.¹³

¹² It is important to remember that until 1926, Defense Scheme One, which contemplated Canadian military action should the U.S. ever invade, was still in existence. As for military autonomy, one of the crucial tenets of Defense Scheme One was that Canada should fight a "delaying action" until British forces were able to deploy on this side of the Atlantic since it was quite clear to all involved that Canada would surely be quickly overrun without prompt British assistance. For more perspectives on the Canadian government and Canadian defense policy in the early part of the century see Desmond Morton, "Defending the Indefensible: Some Historical Perspectives on Canadian Defence, 1867-1987" in *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire*, vol. 54, 1982, pp. 1-30; and Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, *Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974).

¹³ Among the more cogent analyses of the Great War and its effects on both Canada and the world at large are Gregory S. Kealey, "State Repression and the Left in Canada; 1914-1920: The Impact of the First World War" in *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 73 no.3, September 1992, pp. 282-314; James W. Walker, "Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force" in *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 70, no. 1, March 1989, pp. 1-26; Alan R. Young, "The Great War and National Mythology" in *Acadiensis*, vol. 22 no. 2, Spring 1994; Arthur Bowley, *Some Economic Consequences of the Great War*, (London: 1930); Sandra Gwynn's fascinating narrative *Tapestry of War*, (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1992); Desmond Morton, *When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War*, (Toronto: Random House Canada, 1993); Desmond Morton and J. L. Granatstein, *Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War 1914-1919*, (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys Limited, 1989); and Jonathan F. Vance, *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997) which, like Paul Fussell's *The Great War and Modern Memory*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), but from a distinctly Canadian viewpoint, examines the impact of this cataclysm on a society's collective consciousness. For a Northwestern Ontario perspective, see Margaret Elizabeth Frenette's M.A. Thesis "The Great War's Defeats: 'Doing Your Bit' on Thunder Bay's Home Front, 1914-1919" (Lakehead University, 1996).

Among the interesting parallels that can be drawn between Haldane's reforms in Britain and the establishment of a new Militia Act in Canada, one of the most fascinating is the manner in which both of these were basically ignored when the Great War erupted. Just as Lord Kitchener, Britain's Secretary for War in 1914, chose to forsake the Territorial Army structure when Britain mobilized for the conflict, Sam Hughes, the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence, ignored the mobilization plans which had been previously laid out when Canada went to war in 1914. The Canadian Expeditionary Force (C.E.F.), as established by Hughes, was to have an adverse effect on the integrity and relevance of the militia, which units were shunted aside, marginalized, and transformed into mere recruiting depots for the C.E.F. The result of this was that further re-organization would become necessary in the 1920s and 1930s.¹⁴

III

The period following World War One was a very difficult one for the Canadian military. It was certainly a far cry from the jingoism of the pre-war period, when most of Canada embraced the British concept of imperialism and flocked to the colours when the need arose (as it had in 1899 in the Boer War and again in 1914). The ten-year period which preceded the Great War, beginning with the implementation of the Militia Act of 1904, had been one of unprecedented growth for the Canadian Militia. It had become quite fashionable in the latter part of the nineteenth century for prominent citizens to join the militia as officers.¹⁵ This was

¹⁴ Stephen Harris, "Or There Would be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada", in *Military Affairs*, Vol. 46 no. 3, October 1982, pp.120-126.

¹⁵ See, for example, Carman Miller, "The Montreal Militia as a Social Institution Before World War I", (*Urban History Review*, vol. 19 no. 1, June 1990, pp. 57-64).

the pinnacle of the militia's popularity. It represented the last gasp of the old militia tradition which, with its scarlet tunics and Crimea-era airs was already an anachronism of warfare in the early years of the new century, as the horrors of the Boer War and World War One would demonstrate. By the 1920s, the militia, a product of over a century of development, had lost its direction in the face of the transformation of war.

It is appropriate to narrow the focus of our inquiry at this point in order to properly establish the context for the growth and development of a particular militia unit. The subject of our inquiry, the Lake Superior Regiment (LSR), forms part of the Western Canada militia tradition. Although no real differentiation between eastern and western regiments exists in conventional Canadian military historiography, this distinction is entirely justified. The challenge of forming militia units during the late nineteenth century in sparsely populated frontier lands is one particular to the areas west of Lake Superior. This area of study offers a unique perspective which is exclusive to Western Canada's history.

Just as the Red River and Lakehead regions of the nineteenth century strove to unite themselves with the industrialized east by means of the railway, the main obstacles being a sparse population and huge distances, so did the early frontier militias struggle to maintain their numbers and the interest of the populace, facing some of these same obstacles. Among the infantry regiments of Western Canada, those of the Lakehead and Red River regions, the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment of Thunder Bay, and the Royal Winnipeg Rifles of Winnipeg, Manitoba¹⁶ are the two oldest, each of whose roots stretch back to the 1880s.

¹⁶ Many of the founders of western units began their military careers in the units of southern Ontario, including W. N. Kennedy, the founder of the 90th Bn. (Winnipeg) Rifles and S. W. Ray, the founder of the 96th District of Algoma Bn. of Rifles. The history of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles exhibits intriguing parallels with that of the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment. Founded two years before the "Lake Sups", the Rifles evolved along a similar yet distinct path. William Nassau Kennedy played a pivotal role in the creation of Manitoba's first real militia unit. He had arrived in Manitoba as a Lieutenant in the

Although the predecessor of the "Lake Sups", the unit that was to become the 96th District of Algoma Battalion of Rifles, did not participate in the Northwest Rebellion campaign of 1885, it is accurate to state that this conflict was the impetus for its creation.¹⁷ After hostilities had concluded, the newly-formed rifle company was not disbanded but rather continued as part of a provisional battalion along with new companies formed at Fort William, Kenora and Gore Bay in 1886. In 1887, the provisional battalion was given the name and number designation The 96th "District of Algoma" Battalion of Rifles. Later in the year, Samuel Wellington Ray, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the unit, was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, the youngest of his rank in Canada.

Wolseley expedition of 1870, recruited from the 57th militia regiment of Peterborough, and had decided to remain in the West. Upon his discharge, he reverted to his militia rank of Captain and raised the Winnipeg Infantry Company in response to the Fenian threat of 1871. On October 29 1883, Kennedy called a meeting with twelve other settlers to discuss the question of raising a militia battalion in Winnipeg. These men, most with militia experience in Ontario regiments, were to form the nucleus of the new regiment. They saw themselves as the guardians of an outpost of civilization on the Great Plains, "as a halfway house of a dominion stretching from sea to sea". The 90th Winnipeg Battalion of Rifles was created November 9th, 1883 in answer to the need of the citizens of Winnipeg to organize for themselves a regiment as a matter of civic defense and civic pride. Capt. Kennedy was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and appointed Commanding Officer of the first militia regiment west of Ontario. (from Bruce Tascona and Eric Wells, *Little Black Devils: A History of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles*, Winnipeg: Frye Publishing Ltd., 1983).

¹⁷ Both David Ratz, in his MA thesis "Soldiers of the Shield: The 96th District of Algoma Battalion of Rifles 1886-96, A Social and Military Institution" (Lakehead University, 1995), and G. F. G. Stanley in the LSR Regimental History *In the Face of Danger* (Port Arthur, Ont.: The Lake Superior Regiment, 1960), concur on this point, though their interpretations differ somewhat on when the drive to form a militia unit at the Lakehead originated. Ratz reveals that several attempts at forming a militia company at the Lakehead were made before 1885. Notwithstanding this fact, it was the Northwest Rebellion that enabled the formation of the region's first militia unit. When on March 26, 1885 some two hundred Metis from Batoche and surrounding areas commanded by Gabriel Dumont defeated a force of Mounted Police and volunteers at Duck Lake, Saskatchewan, militia headquarters in Ottawa took action. Instructions were issued for the mobilization of various militia units to form part of the expeditionary force being sent to the North West. At that time there were no regularly organized militia companies in the sparsely settled region between Lake Huron and Manitoba, but the towns in Northwestern Ontario were infected with the martial spirit which enveloped other parts of Canada. An independent company of rifles was formed under the command of Samuel Wellington Ray in April. This company was never required to take the field, however, because in May Louis Riel had surrendered to Major-General Middleton and his force of regulars and militia from Winnipeg and other areas (Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p.2.).

Despite this promising birth, however, the Regiment found itself confronted with the problems of great distances and sparsely populated regions, the same problems that had plagued rural militias since the early years of the volunteer system in British North America. These problems that created challenges of training and supervision in the vast area the unit covered (roughly the entire area of modern day Northern Ontario), combined with neglect and lack of interest from higher headquarters, made the survival the 96th and other units like it problematic. The fact was that the commanding officer, living in Port Arthur, could do little to train or assist many of his widely-dispersed men and probably never met those who lived on James Bay or other remote outposts.¹⁸ As a result, given its difficulty in mustering any force, the 96th was declared "non-effective" and was struck from the strength of the Canadian Militia in August 1896. However, its legacy would live on.

The 1904 Militia Act had a direct impact on the Lakehead when in July of the following year, the 96th Battalion was revived as the 96th "The Lake Superior Regiment". The new unit's headquarters were located in Port Arthur, with companies at Fort William, Fort Frances and Kenora. Three years later the battalion underwent another transformation particularly reflective of the changes occurring in Canadian society at the time. Just as towards the end of the nineteenth century society in Canada had become increasingly urban and industrialized, the nature of the militia

¹⁸ Shortly after their founding, the histories of the Lake Sups and the Rifles began to diverge. Though both were created in response to the need felt by settlers to have a military force for the purpose of defense, only one of the two was to see action before the start of the Great War. Herein lies perhaps the explanation as to why the Rifles thrived in those earlier years, while the Sups languished. If lack of interest (and action) could be considered a major factor in the survival of a fledgling unit, as well as geographical overextension and administrative problems, then it is easy to see why this occurred. While the Lake Sups could only drill and parade month after month, the Rifles saw action less than a year after being founded, and twice more before 1914. If boredom was the chief enemy of the citizen-soldier who sacrificed his spare time to train for combat he would never see, then the 90th Rifles had little to fear from this foe. Members of the 90th Winnipeg Battalion of Rifles fought in the Nile campaign of 1884, during which the Regiment's founder, Lt. Col. W. N. Kennedy died. The Rifles would also serve in the Northwest Rebellion of 1885 and as part of the Canadian contingent in the Boer War in South Africa at the turn of the century. During these conflicts the Rifles suffered twelve fatalities and were awarded five medals for gallantry. (Tascona and Wells, *Little Black Devils*).

began to change. Many regiments went from being predominantly rural units with companies spread across far flung villages and towns to battalions centered on one or two cities. The Lake Superior Regiment itself became a city battalion of six companies (later increased to eight) located in Port Arthur and Fort William. The former companies at Kenora and Fort Frances became the nucleus of a new regiment, the 98th Rainy River and Kenora Regiment. The increase in the population of the region had thus allowed for the creation of two separate infantry units in Northwestern Ontario and the apparently insurmountable problems of isolation and vast distances between companies within the 96th had vanished at a stroke.¹⁹

The revival of the 96th was a symptom of the times in other ways as well. Twice during its first years the regiment was called to aid the civil power in strike breaking and riot control, reflecting the increasing activism of the labour movement in the early part of the century. The distinct social and ethnic makeup of the battalion at this early juncture was to inevitably place it squarely at odds with certain segments of the Lakehead's burgeoning population.²⁰

In 1913, mobilization plans were drafted by the Canadian General Staff. District headquarters were told that in the advent of hostilities breaking out, it was assumed that Canada was secure from large scale invasion, but units should be prepared to combat local raids and acts of sabotage. A close watch was to be kept on suspected enemy agents and their possible targets. Some of the most obvious targets were located right at the Lakehead: the great grain elevators, stretching along the shore between Port Arthur and Fort William had a combined storage capacity of sixty million bushels and were a vital depot and transfer point in the movement of grain

¹⁹ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, pp. 3-6.

²⁰ This period is amply covered in David Ratz's Honours Thesis "The 96th Lake Superior Regiment in Aid of the Civil Power: 1909 and 1912" (Lakehead University, 1989), and therefore needs little elaboration in this work.

across Canada. It became the responsibility of the Lake Sups to guard this and other vital installations. The role played by militia units like the 96th LSR would become more important in the months to come.

When, on August 3rd 1914, German troops began moving into Belgium, the British government issued an ultimatum demanding their withdrawal. The ultimatum was ignored and at midnight on the 4th of August, Britain declared war on Germany. On the 5th of August, the 96th mustered with a strength of 32 officers and 240 other ranks. Recruiting began immediately in order to bring the battalion up to strength. It is a reflection of the spirit of patriotism that existed, as it did throughout Canada, in the isolated, sparsely populated communities of Northern Ontario that the recruiting drive was very successful. Initially, the 96th was to remain at home continuing its guard duties, while acting as a depot for the newly formed Canadian Expeditionary Force battalions. While maintaining their traditions and territorial affiliations, the militia battalions of Canada would also provide volunteers for the CEF.

As it turned out, these militia units, including the Lake Sups, were to be the main source of recruits for the Expeditionary Force so that the army assembled in the fall of 1914, despite Sam Hughes' complete disregard for the mobilization scheme in place, was largely a militia force and not a "conscript" army. Though the 96th Lake Superior Regiment was not to go overseas, it would receive its baptism in fire during the First World War through CEF units, to which the LSR contributed drafts of men. The 52nd Battalion CEF, which suffered nearly 3000 casualties and garnered eleven battle honours during the war, came to be most closely associated with the 96th LSR, whose members made up the bulk of the battalion.²¹ The 96th LSR survived the

²¹ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, pp. 6-10. On August 26th, 1915, the rolls of the 1st Provisional Battalion of the first Canadian contingent showed 5 officers and 314 other ranks from the 96th. Further drafts followed and other Lake Sups joined the 8th, 28th, 37th, 44th, 94th, and 141st overseas battalions during the course of the Great War. In 1915 the 52nd was formed. It was the first complete overseas battalion formed almost entirely of men from the Lakehead. The 52nd Battalion C.E.F. would

difficulties encountered during the early years, the barriers imposed by physical geography, sparse population and lack of interest to become a permanent part of the Canadian militia.

IV

The struggle to overcome the barriers of isolation imposed by geography and indifference from headquarters in Ottawa was a theme that pervaded the early years of Canada's first western militia regiments. Born during a trying time in Canada's history, when the young sons of southern Ontario families and immigrants alike found themselves isolated and facing the hostile wilderness of the frontier, the local regiment came to symbolize a great deal.²² It not only served its intended purpose as a provisional protection force against any foe that might present itself, but was a source of civic pride for the citizens of the scattered settlements north of Lake Superior. As the twentieth century wore on, this theme would be revisited when, following the cataclysm of the Great War, the militia was obliged to re-establish itself as a relevant segment of civil society in Canada, both as a military presence and as a

perpetuate the 96th Lake Superior Regiment during World War One and serve with distinction throughout the conflict, earning scores of decorations (a total of 380), including a Victoria Cross won by Captain C.P.J. O'Kelly, Officer Commanding "A" Company during the Battle of Passchendaele in October of 1917.

²² In his MA Thesis on the 96th District of Algoma Battalion of Rifles: "Soldiers of the Shield", David Ratz outlines the significance of the local militia regiment and what it offered an inhabitant of the Lakehead: For the affluent businessman, becoming a militia officer could be the key to social prominence. It was a chance to take a leadership role in the community, provided he could invest the money the time and energy. For the young worker, the militia represented the opportunity for adventure and, perhaps, glory at home or in a distant land. It could be a welcome relief from the drudgery of daily labour and a chance to forge a sense of camaraderie and esprit de corps. Other works which explore these themes are Christopher J. Anstead, "Patriotism and Camaraderie. Workingmen in a Peacetime Militia Regiment 1907-1954." in *Social History*, vol. 26 no. 52, November 1993, pp. 247-263; and Carman Miller, "The Montreal Militia as a Social Institution Before World War I" in *Urban History Review*, vol. 19, no. 1, June 1990, pp. 57-64.

social institution. The story of how the LSR went about accomplishing this task and its twenty-odd year existence between the wars constitute the bulk of this inquiry.

Chapter One will examine the LSR as a military organization, tracing the course of the unit's development from its re-establishment in 1921 to its eventual transfer to the Canadian Active Service Force in 1940 and detailing its leadership, structure, strength, equipment and training wherever possible. This not only allows a picture of the unit's day-to-day life to emerge, but the particular issues and challenges highlighted in this section will provide the reader with the necessary background and context with which to view the following chapters.

In Chapter Two, many of the themes introduced in the first chapter will be developed as the Regiment's links to the Lakehead communities (Port Arthur, Fort William, and to a lesser extent, the outlying towns or townships of the area) are examined. This section will make use of varied sources, including archival documents, regimental records, news articles, correspondence and an interview to delve into the unit's community activities and its relationships with different segments of local society, determining how it was perceived by local authorities and the general public of the time.

Finally, Chapter Three will highlight the unit's involvement in a particular series of civil disturbances at the Lakehead. The concept of the militia as a "force for order" will be introduced and its practical application evaluated. This "case study" will provide both an example of militia/community relations during the era and an insight into the policies, both official and unofficial, which governed these relationships, taking into account economic, social, and political developments in the region and in the rest of Canada during the period. It will also address the critical

question of the unit's "relevance", both as a military formation and as social institution.²³

Ultimately, it will be shown that it is possible to form a more complete history of the militia in Thunder Bay, one that goes beyond the accounts of battles and campaigns fought overseas. This examination will provide a perspective on a period of local military history which has to date remained relatively unexplored and it will also allow us to evaluate the LSR's success in playing its dual role as both a social and military entity.

²³ For more on the "relevance" of the militia, see T. C. Willet, "Canada's Militia: A Heritage at Risk" in *Forum Conference of Defense Associations*, vol. 4 no. 1, 1989, pp. 14-19.

Chapter 1

The Lake Superior Regiment: The Militia Battalion

I

The title of Chapter IV of the official history of the Lake Superior Regiment, G.F.G. Stanley's In the Face of Danger, is "The Dull Years". This in itself reveals a great deal about that author's attitude and, indeed, the conventional opinion of military historians regarding the interwar period from 1919 to 1939. From the point of view of military activity, these were the years of uneasy peace which followed the Treaty of Versailles, when Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) units like the Lake Superior Regiment were largely left to stagnate in the face of post-war exhaustion and indifference. Stanley devotes a scant eleven pages of his regimental history of the LSR to discussing the unit's re-organization and its training between the wars.²⁴ Though this account is brief, it is nevertheless worthy of notice as it provides a stepping stone to a deeper examination of the Regiment. Before attempting this examination, however, it is useful to develop a profile of the unit and flesh out the details of the LSR's military development during this twenty-year period.

In many ways, the LSR was a typical NPAM unit of the twenties and thirties. It dealt with many of the same challenges that units across Canada had to face. However, as we shall see, there were also problems that arose out of the Regiment's particular circumstances. These problems had their root in the geographic location of the unit and its isolation from higher headquarters. The theme of isolation and the challenges it brings is one all too familiar to any student of Northwestern Ontario history. Thus, the trials of the LSR should be viewed in this context. Isolation was a

²⁴ Stanley wrote this regimental history mainly for the veterans of the Lake Superior Regiment (Motor) and therefore it is understandable that two-thirds of his book is devoted to an account of the unit's service in World War Two. (TBHMS, 978.43.58, L2/4/1, Lake Superior Regiment History Letter, 1946-47.)

major concern for the Lakehead militia during the 19th century, in the years before the Great War, and in spite of improvements in communication and transportation, it would continue to be a concern in the years following that conflict.

II

During the early war years of 1914-1916, the 96th LSR had performed guard duty on vital installations at the Lakehead while providing drafts of men to CEF units. After 1916, it remained simply a theoretical depot, carrying on its recruiting function but doing little else. For all intents and purposes, the 96th ceased to exist as a military unit from 1916 on and except for during the Royal visit of 1919, played no role in the Lakehead communities.²⁵ At the conclusion of the war, the CEF was demobilized, and despite several blunders and gaffes, most of the Overseas force, including the Lakehead's 52nd and 141st Battalions, had returned to Canada by the end of 1919.²⁶

²⁵ In 1919, when the Prince of Wales visited the Lakehead, the 96th provided an Honour Guard. The equipment inspection reports of the 96th reveal that the unit barely existed at the time of his arrival: "All the men on the Guards of Honour were only on the strength of the 96th Regiment for the period the Guards were on duty - as the Regiment not being re-organized at the time. obtained them from the Great War Veterans Association at Port Arthur and Fort William for this particular duty." (NAC RG 9, series c-1, file 1631, letter of 2 May 1921, from GOC MD #10 to Secretary, Militia Council) Lieutenant-Colonel S.C. Young is mentioned as the Acting CO. Lieutenant-Colonel Young had been an officer before the war. He was appointed to command the 44th Bn. CEF, but was seriously injured in training and was obliged to return to Fort William. He was elected Mayor of Fort William and served for two years (1914-15).

²⁶ Desmond Morton's " 'Kicking and Complaining': Demobilization Riots in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1918-19" in *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 61 no. 3, March 1980, pp. 334-360, deals with government mismanagement of demobilization at the end of the Great War. His contention that the soldiers who fought in this conflict were essentially "civilians in uniform" is supported by the fact that once the war had ended, these men reverted to their civilian attitudes and "showed widespread reluctance to follow military norms", (p. 334) most being anxious to return to their homes and families in Canada as soon as possible. There were delays and a lack of foresight in developing a plan to expedite this return. In the end, the plan adopted was essentially a compromise between two opposing concepts: bringing the Corps home intact against bringing troops in order of priority. It showed that few were concerned about the effect delays would have on the morale or deportment of the soldiers. The fact that men had endured bureaucratic delays for four years was no guarantee that they would continue to do so. Sagging discipline and the negligence of officers conspired with transportation delays and logistical difficulties to create the explosive situation that Morton documents in his article. After a number of upheavals, including a serious riot at Kimmel Park in which several Canadians were killed, the Ministry of Militia and National Defense was moved to

Now the question arose: What was to be the fate of the non-fighting militia units which had been overlooked in 1914 by Sam Hughes? To answer this question the Canadian government commissioned a special committee under the chairmanship of Canada's venerable old soldier, General Sir William Otter, to consider what the future of Canada's militia was to be and how it should be reconstituted in order to fulfill its responsibilities.²⁷

Otter's committee recommended that in the future Canada should be able to mobilize a force of six infantry divisions and one cavalry division in the event of another overseas conflict. However, the main problem envisioned by the committee was the defense of Canadian soil against American attack. It concluded that the military organization of the country should be revised to ensure the rapid mobilization of a force which could hold off an invasion from the south, fighting a delaying action until help arrived from Great Britain. This plan would come to be known as *Defense*

expedite the process of demobilization, realizing that the alternative could prove disastrous. By February of 1920, all but a few Canadians serving prison sentences in England had returned to Canada. There is no evidence that the soldiers of the 52nd, 94th, and the 141st were involved in any of these disturbances. Most Lakehead soldiers had left England by March of 1919 (Stanley, p.38). For related works on the return of Canada's soldiers after World War One, see Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright, "The Bonus Campaign, 1919-21: Veterans and the Campaign for re-establishment" in *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 64 no. 2, June 1983, pp. 147-160; or their book *Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life, 1915-1930*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), Desmond Morton, "'Noblest and Best': Retraining Canada's War Disabled, 1919-1923" in *Journal of Canadian Studies*, vol. 16 no. 3, Fall/Winter 1981, pp. 75-85; and Desmond Morton "Resisting the Pension Evil: Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Canada's Board of Pension Commissioners, 1916-1933" in *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 68, June 1987, pp. 199-224.

²⁷ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 40. Major-General Sir William Dillon Otter, K.C.B., C.V.O. joined the militia before Confederation. He had fought the Fenian raiders in 1866 and had commanded the Queen's Own Rifles, a Toronto militia regiment, during the Northwest Campaign of 1885. He also served in the Boer War, published a manual entitled: *The Guide: A Manual for the Canadian Militia (Infantry)*, (Toronto: Copp Clarke Company Ltd., 1916), and enjoyed a distinguished subsequent career in the early twentieth century. In their book, *War and Peacekeeping* (Toronto: Key Porter Books Ltd., 1991), J. L. Granatstein and David Bercuson described his career up to the Boer War as having "paralleled the military development of the young Dominion of Canada; he had played a role in virtually every important event in the country's military history." (p. 6). There are several worthy biographies of "Canada's Grand Old Soldier" available, including Desmond Morton's *The Canadian General Sir William Otter*. (Toronto: Hakkert, 1974).

*Scheme #1.*²⁸ The Otter Committee also devoted itself to a reorganization of the various arms of the Canadian Army. The recommendations included a proposal that infantry regiments like the 96th should be re-designated, the numerical prefixes used by the militia since 1859 dropped, and its units reorganized on a four company basis, with at least one active battalion and an equivalent or higher number of reserve battalions.²⁹

The recommendations of the Otter committee were submitted to the Department of Militia and Defense and quickly adopted. In 1921, following two years of upheaval during which it had been in a state of disorganization, the Canadian militia underwent a complete overhaul. Despite the fact that several battalions and corps were disbanded or amalgamated and some new units created, the 96th emerged relatively unscathed. On 15 July 1921 by General Order 246-21, the Regiment was disbanded for the purposes of re-organization and reconstituted the same day as "The Lake Superior Regiment".³⁰

²⁸ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, pp. 40-41. This concern over the possibility of American invasion reveals a certain wariness on the part of military authorities and the Canadian Government regarding British-American relations immediately following World War One, notwithstanding the cordial "official" relationship between the two.

²⁹ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 41. The reserve battalions might only exist on paper in peacetime, but in war they would serve as reinforcement depots for active battalions. Such was the case with the LSR, whose records reveal the existence of a 2nd "Reserve" Bn. to which non-parading officers were transferred between 1921 and 1939. (NAC, RG 24, Vol. 1602). These Infantry Reserve Battalions were abolished effective 14 December, 1936 but the perpetuated C.E.F. units were continued by the Regiments. ("Brief Historical Account of the Lake Superior Regiment" DND Directorate of History, Vol. 197, file 145.221003(D1)).

³⁰ NAC, RG 24 series C-1 and C-3, Vol. 197, files 145.2, 145.24 on "The Lake Superior Regiment". In order to restore the continuity which Sam Hughes had destroyed, the LSR was permitted to assume the Battle Honours of the 52nd Bn. CEF. It was thus considered the "perpetuating Regiment" of that renowned battalion. This connection was more than merely an official one. Many officers who came to serve in the LSR after the war had been members of the 52nd during the war, including several of its Commanding Officers. It is also worth noting that all of the officers who joined the Regiment upon its reconstitution in 1921 had seen service with the 96th before the war. (Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 41). The unit also inherited two battle honours of the 8th Bn. CEF ("Ypres, 1915" and "Festubert, 1915") through its contribution of personnel to that Battalion in the early months of the war. (General Order 110 of 15 September, 1929.)

III

The new establishment consisted of a headquarters and four companies with an authorized total strength of 33 officers, 508 other ranks, and 5 horses (to be stabled in the basement of the Port Arthur Armoury).³¹ Headquarters, "A" and "B" Companies were located in Port Arthur and "C" and "D" Companies in Fort William.³² This double-company system was, on paper, similar to the arrangement which had existed before World War One. The 96th had been established as a "City Corps" before the Great War with two companies in each city of the Lakehead, No. 5 Company at Fort Frances, and No. 6 Company at Kenora (by G.O. 236 of 1 December 1905). These last two had been detached from the 96th in 1910 to form the nucleus of a new regiment, the 98th Rainy River and Kenora Regiment. The company structure that had existed from that point was to continue through the twenties and thirties. Likewise, the unit would remain under the command of Military District #10, the district to which it had been assigned before the war.³³ In May of 1922, the unit was issued a new cap badge to go with its new name. This

³¹ NAC RG 24 series c1, reel c-8366 file 8626-5 This was the usual authorized establishment of a NPAM Battalion during the inter-war period. The NPAM Battalion's establishment at wartime strength was set at 33 officers and 646 other ranks.

³² General Order 206-20. Several other General Orders issued on 15 July 1921 established the structure of the unit: General Order 120-15 established a four Company system for the LSR. G.O. 29-20 and 246-21 established the 1st Bn., LSR (perpetuating the 52nd Bn. CEF) and the 2nd (Reserve) Bn., LSR (perpetuating the 94th Bn. CEF). The 94th Bn., CEF was replaced by the 141st Bn., CEF on 1 September of the following year.

³³ Stanley *In the Face of Danger*, p. 46. In the early part of the century, the Department of Militia and Defense divided Canada into a number of military districts for administrative purposes. These districts were commanded by Colonels, Brigadiers or, on some occasions, Generals. The officer in charge of a district was referred to as the "District Officer Commanding" (DOC). Military District #10 (also referred to as Militia District #10 in some documents) was comprised of the militia units of Manitoba and Northwestern Ontario. The LSR was not brigaded with any other unit of MD #10 in the annual Militia List. It was categorized under "other troops in the District". As will be seen, problems arising from of this arrangement were to be experienced by the regiment on several occasions.

badge included its new motto: "Inter Pericula Intrepidi" (or "Fearless in the Face of Danger").³⁴

During the interwar years, the unit was blessed with a pool of experienced Great War veterans from which to draw officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).³⁵ Enthusiastic leadership and sound guidance was of critical importance to the regiment in those early days, the climate of war-weariness being not at all conducive to the health of a militia battalion. The unit, separated by over 700 km of rough roads and rail from headquarters in Winnipeg, developed an independent bent very early on, mostly out of necessity. The Lake Superior Regiment, unlike its brigaded brethren of Manitoba, was a solitary formation, training alone nearly the whole year. It was also a small formation; Although the surviving records of the LSR during this period seldom reveal the unit's actual total strength, given the records available, it is probably safe to say that the Battalion never achieved its authorized numbers in those early years. The records for serving officers, for instance, reveal that the unit was chronically understrength.³⁶ There are several reasons for this dearth in numbers.

³⁴ Militia General Order No. 71, 1 May 1922, describes the authorized badge as follows "In gilt with silver monogram. A double circle inscribed, 'The Lake Superior Regiment'. Within the circle on a plain disc the letters 'L.S.R.' in the form of a monogram. On each side of the circle a spray of maple leaves. At the top, a beaver on a log, resting on the circle and between the points of the sprays. The whole supported by a scroll inscribed "Inter Pericula Intrepidi". This new badge replaced the old "96th" badge which had been authorized by General Order No. 85, 2 July 1910. Described as "A circle inscribed "Lake Superior Regiment" surmounted by a beaver on a log; below a scroll bearing the motto 'Animo et fide'. In the centre of the circle the numerals "96", and on either side, a wreath of maple leaves." (Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 42.)

³⁵ The first Commanding Officer of the re-organized unit was Lt. Col. J. D. Young, a highly decorated officer of the 52nd who rose to the rank of Major during the war and was a recipient of the Military Cross (2 Bars), as well as the Distinguished Service Order and a Mention in Despatches. (Stanley, *In The Face of Danger*, p.338.) He was joined by Captains J.C. Hunter, D.M. Bowron, K.N.B. MacKenzie, and T.L. Williams (Mentioned in Despatches), as well as Lieutenants H.E. Smith, W. Gibson, J.S. Cattanaach (who, as a Sgt., received the Military Medal during the war), J.A. Dube and W.A. Carley.

³⁶ NAC, RG 24, vol. 206, vol. 1599, vol. 1602. "Lake Superior Regiment" Active Militia Files.

In some ways, the experience of World War One had turned many against the militia. Some questioned the relevance of a militia or peacetime "reserve" army. In the eyes of the Canadian public, the militia had certainly not played any great military role in the recent conflagration. By Sam Hughes' mobilization scheme, masses of untrained men had been recruited into Canadian Expeditionary Force (not militia) battalions, trained, and thrown piecemeal into the slaughter of the Western Front. Yet, these men had given a good account of themselves and, in some cases, had achieved glory in the fields of France and Flanders. Could it not be reasonably expected that in the unlikely event of another war the same would occur again? An event which reinforced this attitude and compounded the problem was the creation of the League of Nations, an organization designed to safeguard the peace which had been bought at so great a cost. The League was a symbol of the new pacifism which pervaded the international policy of the western powers after the treaty of Versailles and for some, it was also a convenient excuse for neglecting matters pertaining to national defense.³⁷

The natural response of the majority of citizens of the Lakehead, like that of the rest of Canada after four years of personal suffering and privation, was to try to put the war behind them and get on with life. For these people, the militia served only as a reminder of the dark days of 1914-1918. Stanley comments on the attitude at the Lakehead: "The roaring twenties (...) were the years of the flapper, jazz, short skirts, the Charleston and American prohibition. Life was made to be enjoyed and not to be

³⁷ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, pp. 42. A more detailed perspective of the Canadian public's attitude regarding the military following World War One can be found in the article by Alan R. Young, "The Great War and National Mythology," in *Acadiensis*, vol. 22 no. 2, Spring 1994; in Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright, *Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life, 1915-1930*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); and in James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Vol. II: From the Great War to the Great Depression*. (Toronto: 1964). All of these works discuss in depth, and from various perspectives, the Canadian view of the Great War.

frittered away on dull matters like militia drill.”³⁸ Indeed, this fairly sums up the attitude of most Canadians during the decade.

The task of increasing the strength of the LSR, bringing it to a state of efficiency and keeping it there was therefore a daunting challenge for the leadership of the regiment. The realities of government policy, as will be shown in a later chapter, conspired to make this endeavour even more difficult. There was, for instance, the matter of money. The Canadian government provided very little in the way of equipment and uniforms, or a training budget. When the old arms and uniforms began to show signs of wear, very little was done to replace them. As for the fancy pre-war dress tunics that might have appealed to potential recruits, these were mostly kept in storage. As a result, unless he joined the regimental band, the militia soldier was forced to parade in a drab unattractive uniform and to train with weapons that were obsolete if not altogether useless.³⁹ This image did little to draw new young recruits to the colours. There was also little the LSR could do to attract the veterans, many of whom preferred to spend time in Legion Clubs reminiscing about their service overseas rather than practicing the soldiering skills they had wished to be done with after the war.

³⁸ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, pp. 42-43. Also, see Joseph Mauro, *Thunder Bay: A History*, (Thunder Bay Ontario: Lehto Printers Ltd., 1981); and T. Tronrud and E. Epp (eds.), *Thunder Bay: From Rivalry to Unity* (Thunder Bay: Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society Inc., 1995), for perspectives on life at the Lakehead during the twenties.

³⁹ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, pp. 43-44. Major Jim Symonic's "The Lake Superior Regiment (motor) Reunion Sept. 13-15. 100 years of Service. Northwestern Ontario's Fighting Regiments, 1885-1985" special insert in *Lakehead Living* (10 September 1985) also offers some recollections from the era: "The LSR trained (...) with WWI rifles and Lewis guns, some obsolete and some useless. Uniforms were the khaki tunics with choker collars and web puttees left over from 1915-1919. Summer training was carried out in Shilo Manitoba and most of the time the boys from the Lakehead had to play the role of the "enemy" in the training battles against the Manitoba Militia district." p. 15. The LSR, isolated as it was from the rest of Military District #10, was accustomed to fending for itself, even, it would appear, in its field training exercises. With regard to dress uniforms, it was the singular privilege of the Regimental band to sport flashy scarlet dress tunics.

Despite these obstacles, the militia spirit gradually began to revive in the Lakehead during the twenties, aided by the efforts of men who, whether because of patriotism or other motives, were willing to offer their time, experience, and money in service of the Regiment. In October of 1923, Lieutenant Colonel Hunter, who had previously served as the Adjutant of the LSR, succeeded to the command of the Regiment.⁴⁰ He was succeeded in turn by Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Crozier in 1924. In 1927, Lieutenant Colonel F. Y. Harcourt was appointed to command the LSR. He was followed by Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Ruttan in 1930.

As will be demonstrated below, all of these men pursued a specific policy in what we would now call the "management" of the LSR, adopting approaches, with varying degrees of success, aimed at safeguarding the survival of the militia in Port Arthur and Fort William. The short tenures of all of these Commanding Officers, however, meant that regardless of their dedication to promoting the welfare of the unit, they were given little opportunity to improve the lot of their soldiers. It was in this manner that the militia system of promotion guaranteed that only the most active and energetic of colonels could make a difference during their brief term of command.

Throughout the twenties and thirties, the military life of the regiment changed very little. The LSR offered limited opportunities for employment, to the tune of ten days of militia pay per year. There were weekly parades at both the Port Arthur and Fort William Armouries (the latter an unused store on Simpson Street) on Tuesdays, the occasional range shoots at the Mount McKay Range (budgetary circumstances

⁴⁰ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p 43. At this point, the officers of the unit included Maj. D. M. Bowron (appointed Deputy Commanding Officer in November of 1923), Majors H.A. Ruttan and A. F. Macdonald; Captains S.H.W.S. Wilson, H. E. Smith, W. Mackenzie, G. W. Gorman, O. Steen, W. F. Ede, W. E. Wigmore, and A. M. Morrison. The unit also had a Quartermaster, Lt. G.C. Hutcheson, a Paymaster, Lt. G. W. Smith, a Medical Officer, Major G. E. McCartney, and a Chaplain, the Rev. W. H. Pavy. (NAC, RG 24, Vol. 206, Vol., 1599 and Vol. 1602, files "Lake Superior Regiment") The departures or transfers of half of the founding officers within the first two years reveals something about both the transitory nature of a militia career and the rate of attrition of a NPAM battalion during this era.

permitting), and a yearly week long exercise at Camp Shilo in Manitoba. There were also NCO training courses at Fort Osborne in Winnipeg for those wishing to qualify for higher rank.

The unit's training was under the supervision of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry instructional cadre whose NCOs' primary task was to ensure a high standard of performance in military matters like dress and drill.⁴¹ Aside from the supervision of the instructional cadre, the LSR had a great deal of autonomy in the conduct of its day-to-day operations. Inspections by senior officers were a rare occurrence.⁴² Once again, this was likely a result of its isolation from headquarters. It was not until the outbreak of the World War Two that the Battalion began to undergo periodic general inspections.⁴³

⁴¹ Interview with Colonel E.J.O. Gravelle on 15 January 1999. The instructors were usually PPCLI soldiers stationed at the Lakehead. (The PPCLI were a permanent force infantry regiment with a battalion stationed in Winnipeg). These activities will be dealt with in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

⁴² The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle reported on 20 October 1930 of an inspection by Brigadier General T. V. Anderson of a Regimental exercise on 18 October 1930. The article described the exercise which, along with a classification shoot of Lewis Guns at the Fort William range to be held later, formed part of the annual efficiency of personnel competition in Military District #10. After a morning of rehearsals and lunch at the Armoury, the unit was paraded for the DOC's inspection of personnel and arms and then went out to the field to conduct a "war game". The Brigadier addressed the troops after the attack was completed and expressed his satisfaction with the day's proceedings.

⁴³ The results of these inspections were generally recorded on a standard military form entitled: "Permanent Active Militia Annual Confidential Report (C 4974)". These reports were designed for assessing Permanent Force units, militia inspections rarely being this thorough. The format was as follows:

- Abridged Report of the Annual Inspection for the fiscal year _____
 Inspected at--- On---by--- The Last Annual Inspection was made----by---.
1. CO: efficiency and fitness for his position
 2. 2nd in Command: efficiency and fitness
 3. Officers: efficiency generally, naming any esp. good
 4. WOs, NCOs, men: Efficiency, Class and physique
 5. Guns and small arms, pattern or mark, condition, whether complete
 6. Equipment, pattern and condition, whether complete.
 7. Clothing, (incl. boots) condition- does it comply with dress regulations?
 8. Horses, suitability and condition, horsemanship riding and driving.
 9. Harness and saddlery, suitability condition whether complete.
 10. Strength: A Officers, B WOs, C NCOs, D Privates
 11. How far above or below establishment in officers and men
 12. Efficiency of unit at gun, machine gun, light gun or rifle practice, drill, and its regular duties

IV

Over the course of the twenties, as militia units like the LSR struggled to re-establish themselves, the function of both the NPAM and the regular army was re-appraised and its role in the event of war determined. In accordance with the Otter Committee's report, a plan for home defense in the event of an American invasion began to take shape under the direction of Colonel J. Sutherland Brown, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMOI). This was Defense Scheme #1., predicated on the maintenance of British naval supremacy, which would ensure that reinforcements could arrive from Great Britain in the event of war.

The Washington Conference of 1922, which had established the principle of naval parity between the US and Britain, in essence put an end to any realistic implementation of the scheme, before the Canadian plan had been formulated.⁴⁴ The movement of the Dominion of Canada from the defense orbit of the United Kingdom to that of the United States in the years that followed was inevitable. This occurrence, when considered alongside other developments during the period, can be seen in the larger context of Canada's loosening of its ties to the Empire during the interwar years when "the tendency was for the dominions to go their own ways".⁴⁵

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- | | | |
|---|---|--------------|
| 13. Discipline | 14. Books and Records | 15. Canteens |
| 16. Barracks, Armouries and quarters generally | 17. Deficiencies in Arms and equipment. | |
| 18. The deficiencies or irregularities reported at the last inspection have been corrected or corrected except: | 19. General Observations: | |

⁴⁴ Nevertheless, planning on Defense Scheme #1 continued until 1926, though it was never completed.

⁴⁵ Bernard Porter, *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1983*, New York: Longman Inc., 1984, p. 267. In discussing this tendency, Porter brings up as examples the refusal of Canada to back British policy in defending the straits of Chanak against Mustapha Kemal in September of 1922 and Canada's first treaty with a foreign power negotiated without reference to Britain in 1923 (the Halibut Fisheries Treaty with the United States). The Imperial Conferences of the inter-war years and the Statute of Westminster (1931) gave Canada complete freedom in conducting its own affairs.

Two other schemes were also considered, though it was mainly Defense Scheme #3 that was to absorb the attention of the Canadian General Staff during the thirties.⁴⁶ This plan, though subjected to numerous revisions, directed that Canada would mobilize an expeditionary force for service overseas while making provisions for home defense in the event of a war overseas. After a period during which Canada's defense planning had lacked direction and priorities, by the 1930s, military districts across Canada had been given information relating to their role in Defense Scheme #3 by the Department of National Defence (this despite the fact that the scheme had not yet been officially adopted). Accordingly, each military district was expected to assist in developing a plan whereby its units would either mobilize or provide security on the vital installations across Canada. Each district was allocated new duties as Defense Scheme #3 was modified during the decade and it was the task of the district staff to select units that would carry these duties out.⁴⁷

The militia had suffered neglect or indifference throughout the twenties because of the political and economic climate of postwar Canada; this situation did not change completely during the thirties. As the situation in Europe deteriorated, many conscientious officers sought to improve the readiness of Canada's military. Through an arrangement with Great Britain, selected officers of the Canadian army were enrolled in staff courses at the Imperial Defense College,⁴⁸ This undoubtedly

⁴⁶ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, pp. 44-45. Defense Scheme #2, like #1, was a home defense scheme. It began as a contingency plan in the case of an attack by Japan but never reached its final form. During the thirties it was revised as a tri-service defense scheme for the defense of Canadian neutrality in the event of a war between the US and Japan. See Richard A. Preston, *The Defense of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America 1867-1939*, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977).

⁴⁷ It would seem that the LSR, isolated as it was from MD #10 headquarters in Winnipeg, was sometimes forgotten or simply passed over during this process. There were few if any directives during this period regarding home defense or mobilization plans. Throughout the thirties, the LSR conducted its training with no clear idea of what its role in the scheme was to be.

⁴⁸ NAC RG 24, reel 5030. The Imperial Defense College was established in January of 1927 (file

helped to give some senior officers a broader outlook regarding strategy and tactics, but it also served to instill flawed thinking regarding mechanization and the employment of armour. These flaws would quickly become apparent at the outset of World War Two, and the Allies were to learn a bitter lesson from the German *Blitzkrieg*.⁴⁹ Certainly, there were some new initiatives in certain areas: it was during this period that efforts were made to clarify the Permanent Force's role in training the NPAM.⁵⁰ But these were the years of the Great Depression, and initiatives were often abandoned in the face of fiscal realities.

V

At the Lakehead, the command of the LSR passed from Lieutenant Colonel Ruttan to Lieutenant Colonel L. S. Dear, a local doctor, in 1933. Lieutenant Colonel H. Cook took over in 1937 and commanded the unit until December of 1942.⁵¹ During the tenure of these three officers the Lake Superior Regiment was given an

113) Members of the Permanent Active Militia who attended agreed to serve for a minimum period afterwards. The Army Officers who attended IDC were: 1927 Maj. Gen. AGL McNaughton, '28 Brig JS Brown, '30 Brig WG Beeman, '31 Col. RJ Orde, '32 Brig HE Boak, '34 Brig HDG Crerar, '36 Col. MA Pope, '37 Brig CR Pearkes, '38 Lt. Col. GR Turner, '39 Lt. Col. ELM Burns. Some of these officers went on to distinguish themselves during the Second World War (see David Bercuson and J.L. Granatstein, *Dictionary of Canadian Military History*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992). One of the duties of the Imperial Defense College staff was to inspect NPAM units across Canada. The LSR was visited by members of the IDC on several occasions. Lt. Gen. Maurice A. Pope provides an interesting account of his time at the IDC in his autobiography *Soldiers and Politicians* (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1962).

⁴⁹ Robin Higham, *The Military Intellectuals in Britain: 1918-1939*, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1966. pp. 7-21, 26-31, 49-50.

⁵⁰ NAC RG 24 series c1 reel c-5079, file 5695 During 1931 and 1932 the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) General A. McNaughton considered a proposed establishment estimate of expenditure required to maintain a permanent force of 1000 officers and 9000 Other Ranks to train 90 000 members of the Non-Permanent Active Militia for 30 days annually which had been submitted by Lt. Col. H D Crerar (Dec 29 1931). This plan was not adopted, however, and the Militia continued to parade 10 days annually throughout the thirties.

⁵¹ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p.43.

infusion of new blood. Throughout the decade, the ordinary militia soldier continued to train using the same outdated equipment and arms. Nonetheless, in Port Arthur and Fort William, a new generation of young officers and men were attracted to the colours. Some of these officers would eventually command platoons, companies, and even the battalion itself during the Second World War. Likewise, many of the young privates who joined the Regiment during this period would also rise in rank to become NCOs or even officers during the war.⁵² Unfortunately, it must also be noted that many officers and men of the Regiment who joined during the interwar period would, for various reasons, never have the opportunity to serve overseas with the Lake Superior Regiment.⁵³

⁵² NAC RG 24 Militia Pay Lists, LSR. This new generation included men like Lt. Colonel Robert Angus Keane DSO and Major Herbert George Dawson DSO who joined as Lieutenants in 1935 as well as Lt. Colonel E. J. O. Gravelle and CSM Raymond Cousineau who joined as Privates that same year. The Regiment became a family affair for some: In 1938 Edward Styffe joined the Regiment, followed shortly thereafter by his brother Roy in 1939. These young officers were the sons of Oscar Styffe (1885-1943), a Norwegian immigrant who ran a successful timber business. Oscar, who had graduated from a state military academy in Northern Norway in 1906 at age 21, was deeply interested in community affairs and had been a member of the board of trade. He was elected to Port Arthur city council in 1935, 1936 and 1937. In 1936 he became honorary Vice Consul of Norway in Port Arthur. Both Roy and Edward served with the Regiment as Majors during World War Two. Edward was killed in action on 14 August 1944 in France, but Roy survived the Northwest campaign. In 1946, the three surviving Styffe brothers, John age 38, Hobart, age 35 and Roy, age 27, took over the management of their father's firms, Oscar Styffe Ltd. (lumber) and Gravel and Lake Services Ltd. (a harbour tug business). (John Styffe, *Oscar R. Styffe 1885-1943: The man and his companies*, Thunder Bay: LU Library, 1985. (Northern Studies Resource Centre Collection); and Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 351).

⁵³ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, pp. 91-92 In this study, a sharp distinction must be drawn between the inter-war NPAM Battalion called the Lake Superior Regiment and the Canadian Active Service Force unit known (after January 1942 as the Lake Superior Regiment (Motor). The years 1940 to 1944 witnessed a fundamental transformation in both the makeup and character of the battalion and it cannot be said that the unit which set foot in France in July of 1944 was essentially the same Regiment which had departed the Lakehead three-and-a-half years earlier. Through the weeding out process that must inevitably accompany any training for war, the Lake Sups lost many militia era NCOs and officers during the early years of the conflict. As Stanley himself puts it, "(In Debert) the weeding out of category men continued. This meant, unfortunately, the loss of popular officers and NCOs, of men who had supported the regiment back in the dull discouraging militia days, when neither government nor public opinion did much to encourage the volunteer soldier, who had offered their services in the first mad days of mobilization (...) Those subjected to this "unkind quirk of fate" included Major Bennett, Major Marshall, Captain Bartley, Captain Phillipott, Lieutenant Cryderman and RSM Donaldson of whom Lieutenant Colonel Keane wrote in 1946, "our first Regimental Sergeant-Major, (...) was largely responsible for the fine esprit de corps and produced the framework of our W.O.'s and

These new "Lake Sups" were often the children of men who had served in the Great War, and they themselves now came to serve under the superannuated officers who had led their fathers and uncles a generation before. It was probably not the promise of remuneration that brought these men into the fold, for the pecuniary rewards of the job were negligible. Along with the opportunity of acquiring military skills and discipline and the thrill of competing with one's peers, there were other, less tangible and obvious benefits to joining the militia for both officers and ORs (other ranks). These benefits, which will be dealt with in the next chapter, included many incentives and advantages inherent in the regimental system of the Canadian Army which compensated for the meagre pay.⁵⁴

Sergeants." (Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 29 January, 1946). Lieutenant Colonel Cook and Major McLeod were also obliged to leave the unit during its time in England. (Stanley, pp. 104-105)

⁵⁴ The Militia Pay list dated 17 Feb 1928, gives the following pay rates for the NPAM:

Officers:			
Colonel	9.20 per diem	13.60 with allowances (married)	12.40 with allowances (single)
Lt. Col.	7.20	11.90	10.70
Maj.	6.50	10.30	9.20
Capt.	5.80	8.40	7.50
Lt.	3.60	6.20	5.40
2Lt	3.00	5.60	4.80
Non-Commissioned Members:			
WO1	3.70	6.00	5.20
WO2	3.40	5.70	4.90
QMS, CSM	2.80	4.90	4.20
Coy QMS, S/Sgt.	2.20	4.20	3.50
Sgt.	1.90	3.90	3.20
LSgt., Cpl.	1.60	3.50	2.80
LCpl.	1.40	3.30	2.60
Pte.	1.20	3.10	2.40
Boy	.60		1.70

Given that a militia soldier could not be paid for more than 10 days annually, a private's annual earnings would not exceed \$12 for an entire year. (allowances were not paid for normal parading.)

VI

Following a reorganization of the Canadian militia in 1936, Defense Scheme #3 was officially approved by the Minister of National Defence, Ian Mackenzie, in 1937 and circulated to the various Military District Headquarters in the following year. It held that the primary objective would be the raising of a field force, or Mobile Force as it came to be designated, comprised of a corps headquarters, two infantry divisions and a cavalry division for rapid deployment overseas. Although no plan was put in place for the expansion of this force, conventional thinking at the time generally followed the proposals put forward by Otter that a force of six infantry divisions would ultimately be raised in the event of a war. In view of the technical advances of the interwar period, however, the proposed cavalry division was dropped.

Unfortunately, the reorganization of 1936 was a reflection of both antiquated British thinking and the unwillingness of the government to spend money on defence. Though some cavalry and infantry regiments were converted to artillery and armoured units, they did not receive the equipment and weapons necessary for their new tasks. Aside from the elimination of the cavalry division, the so-called "Mobile Force" of Defense Scheme #3 remained unmodified. In 1937 it was still composed of old-fashioned infantry divisions (comprising four infantry battalions and one machine gun battalion per brigade).⁵⁵ In light of the revolutionary mechanization of armies during the thirties, this force could hardly be called "mobile".

Because the planners never contemplated any threat greater than a raid on Canadian soil by the enemy, preparation for home defense was established as a secondary priority. Prior to the circulation of Defense Scheme #3, the DOCs of each

⁵⁵ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 45, p. 86. The composition of the Mobile Force was not fixed permanently. It was to be modified yearly at the discretion of the DND based on the reports from the District Officers Commanding. Battalions were selected on the basis of both efficiency and geographic location. With its lack of mechanization, the Mobile Force could hardly live up to its name.

district had largely used their own initiative in planning measures for security and home defense.⁵⁶ It was during this period that the LSR's isolation from headquarters in Winnipeg was truly felt. This was not simply a question of geography, but one of psychological remoteness. If members of the LSR had felt removed from the rest of the district in earlier years, they might, with justification, have felt abandoned by their superiors in Winnipeg after the introduction of the scheme.

It was clear from MD #10's response to the directives laid out by the Scheme after its official adoption that the LSR was not to play any role in the District's plan. The Lake Sups were not to be a part of the Mobile Force,⁵⁷ nor would they be called upon, for the time being, to perform guard duty of any vulnerable points along Canada's communication system.⁵⁸ The Lake Sups, it would seem, had been left without employment. It was not until September of 1938, as the tempo of military activity in Canada quickened in response to alarming developments in Europe, that any reference was made to the task of defending the vital installations in the area of

⁵⁶ NAC RG 24, series C-1, reel c-8301, 7 July 1937 letter to DND secretary re: Protection of Armouries and War Equipment Contained Therein from Brigadier B. W. Browne, DOC MD #10 stated that a force of 1 NCO and 6 ORs at the Port Arthur Armoury and 2 ORs at the Fort William Armoury would be deployed for guard duty if circumstances dictated.

⁵⁷ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 46. When General Order 135 was issued on 1 September 1939, the NPAM units selected for the Mobile Force from MD #10 were all based in Winnipeg. They included the Fort Garry Horse, The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, The Winnipeg Grenadiers (M.G.) and the Winnipeg Light Infantry (M.G.). Had all of these units been selected for immediate mobilization, this arrangement would have left the city of Winnipeg nearly denuded of NPAM infantry units.

⁵⁸ NAC RG 24, series C-1, reel c-8301, file 5129, p 8. In a Secret Communication on 18 April 1938 to the District Officer Commanding (DOC) MD #10 regarding Defense Scheme #3 the DMOI writes: "With reference to section 13(b) of Defense Scheme #3, I am directed to inform you that in the event of war with Japan, Military District 10 will be required to dispatch one infantry (rifle) battalion to MD 11 on a peace establishment and with peace equipment... I am to ask therefore that you submit without delay, for approval by National Defence Headquarters, the name of the battalion selected for this duty." It is interesting to note that the battalion selected was the Royal Winnipeg Rifles. (Designated by CR Grant, Lt. Col., DOC MD 10 on 22 April 1938) whose dispatch would require the reorganization of MD #10's infantry brigade. The LSR was an "unbrigaded unit" and at that point, had not been designated to defend any vulnerable points. Its dispatch would have required little reorganization of MD # 10.

Port Arthur and Fort William.⁵⁹ An examination of the correspondence between the District Officer Commanding MD #10 and the Department of National Defence reveals the lack of knowledge concerning the Lakehead on the part of the former, and the inherent parsimony of the latter with regard to expenditure on home defence even as war loomed on the horizon.

In response to a directive issued by the A/DMOI, on 22 February 1939 the DOC MD #10 sent "Proposal for Defense Scheme 3, Protection of Vulnerable Points" to the Secretary, Department of National Defence whereby the LSR would be tasked with running a "Training Company" and guarding the elevators at the Lakehead. An excerpt from the document reveals the scope of this proposed undertaking:

Detail of Guards For Vulnerable Points MD 10

D. Guarding of Grain Terminals at Port Arthur and Fort William

1. Unit: LSR
2. Points to be guarded: 27 elevators
3. Guards: a) 8 officers (elevators fall into four main groups, 2 officers per group)
 b) 2 NCOs 15 ORs: to each elevator (27)
4. HQ and administration 3 officers, 3 NCOs, 20 ORs
5. Training Coy: 2 officers, 4 NCOs, 50 ORs
6. Total required The Lake Superior Regiment;
 - 15 officers
 - 61 NCOs
 - 545 ORs⁶⁰

The response to this proposal was sent from National Defence Headquarters on 25 February 1939. It was the opinion of DND that the estimated strength of the

⁵⁹ NAC RG 24, series c-1, reel c-8301, HQS 3498, vol. 9, Sept 9, 1938. re: Defense Scheme no. 3: Protection of vulnerable points. The A/DMOI directed in Appendix A, p. 3 that "Guards will be provided only for the elevators at the terminals at Port Arthur and Fort William." (and no other grain elevators in MD #10.)

⁶⁰ NAC RG 24, series c-1, reel c-8301, Secret Communication, 22 Feb 1939, from DOC MD #10 to Secretary, DND. Proposal: Defense Scheme 3, Protection of vulnerable points.

force needed to guard the elevators was too high and that at its current strength of 175 (all ranks), the LSR would be unable to recruit and train men in sufficient numbers to fulfill its role. The secretary noted that during World War One a total of 344 soldiers were employed in performing these duties. It was suggested that other measures be considered, such as the erection of fencing and cooperation with the civil and private authorities, to reduce the numbers of NPAM members involved in this duty. The DOC MD #10 was therefore directed to submit a new estimate to DND.⁶¹

On 2 Mar 1939, the DOC Brigadier J.L. Gordon submitted the new estimate for Military District #10, including the caveat that the frontage to be covered was approximately 18 miles in length, that the elevators were dispersed, and that there were two vital points to be guarded: the machinery for loading ships and trains, and the receiving machinery. The DOC also had concerns over sabotage and civil unrest.

The new estimates were as follows:

Alterations:

HQ	2 officers	2 NCOs	5 ORs
Guard Duties	8	54	243
Training Detachment	2	4	50
Administration	1	1	15
TOTALS	13	61	313 ⁶²

⁶¹ NAC RG 24, series c-1, reel c-8301, 25 Feb 1939 Reply from Secretary, DND, re: Communication of 22 Feb 1939, from DOC MD #10. Consideration having been given, the Secretary writes: "Para 4: With reference to your proposal for the guarding of the grain elevators at Fort William and Port Arthur, however it is felt that the proposed strength of the guards is excessive. It is noted that during the great war the maximum numbers employed on this task amounted only to 13 officers and 331 ors - a total of 344 as opposed to the 519 proposed by you. Further, at some unascertained date prior to Feb 1917, the whole of the wartime guard was withdrawn, the responsibility for protection then devolving on the civil or private authorities normally responsible in peace. Para5 : Moreover, it is noted that at the time of the last inspection for which a report is available (May 1937) the LSR had a total strength of only 175. To raise this to over 600 by recruiting will obviously require some time. But the greatest risk(...) will likely occur in the early stage of the emergency. Risks will have diminished by the time unit has recruit full strength indicated. Unit would be busy recruiting at the very time it should be guarding the elevators."

⁶² NAC RG 24, series c-1, reel c-8301, 2 March 1939, New Estimates for Defense Scheme #3, DOC MD #10. The DOC, Brig. JL Gordon also added that "The above would only be sufficient if there were no civil unrest and if the elevators were not operating. In the event of any civil unrest or during periods of normal activity, personnel should be increased by 162 ranks to 13 Officers, 61 NCOs, and

Subsequently, on 6 March 1939, Brigadier Gordon was directed by national headquarters to seek co-operation from the RCMP for "inside protection" of the elevators. It was also expected that the elevator owners would use their own employees to guard against sabotage attempts. In any event, the debate over the guard at the Lakehead proved to be unnecessary. Lieutenant Colonel Cook had made it clear at a battalion commanders' conference that year in Winnipeg that to post men as guards at the grain elevators was both impractical and a waste of public money owing to the vulnerability of these structures from the waterside.⁶³ It would appear that neither DND nor Military District #10 headquarters had any realistic concept of the logistical requirements of defending the Port of Thunder Bay and the former had no intention of coming up with a workable plan for defending the elevators from a waterborne threat. This "home defence scheme" was therefore summarily abandoned.

VII

When Canada declared war on Germany on 10 September 1939, the Chief of the General Staff sent out a telegram to the DOCs of all military districts (with reference to Defense Scheme #3) confirming that Canada was now at war with the Third Reich.⁶⁴ Even before this formal declaration of war, Defense Scheme #3 had come into operation. During the summer of 1939, various staff appointments had been agreed upon and on 25 August, the first militia soldiers were called out on service. On 1 September, orders were issued for the mobilization of the Mobile

475 ORs. In the event of an organized threat, the necessity of patrolling the railway would increase totals to original figure."

⁶³ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p.48. At the outbreak of the war, the LSR was not ordered to guard neighbouring vulnerable points as it had been in August of 1914. Guards were posted only at the Port Arthur Armoury.

⁶⁴ NAC RG 24 series c-1, reel c-8301, p.160, Telegram of 10 Sept 1939.

Force, which would be redesignated by a special Order-in-Council the "Canadian Active Service Force" (CASF). Accompanying these orders was a schedule listing both those units which would become part of the two Divisions of the CASF and those which had been designated for defensive tasks, as provided for by Defense Scheme #3.⁶⁵

Through the winter of 1939-40, not being part of the first two overseas divisions, the LSR could do little but watch events unfold and wait to see which units would form part of the Third Canadian Division. In the meantime, the militia unit continued to train as such, conducting drill parades and lectures at the Armoury. This was in keeping with the prevailing policy of the time, which left militia units which had not been transferred to the Active Service Force a fair amount of autonomy.⁶⁶ Officer and NCO classes were held on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday nights for those that wished to qualify for higher rank.

In February, a recruiting drive took place, but the LSR could not promise overseas service to new recruits, only opportunities "for advancing the military knowledge and usefulness of those who are desirous of doing their bit for home service, or ultimately joining the Canadian Active Service Force if they desire." Lieutenant Colonel Cook pointed out that "the transfer from the NPAM to the active force is entirely voluntary, but it will be readily appreciated that the recruit from a training unit is preferred."⁶⁷ Though war had broken out, the Lake Superior Regiment remained in every sense of the word a militia unit. The heightened level of military activity was purely voluntary.

⁶⁵ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 48. As already noted, the LSR was not a part of either the first or second Division of the CASF.

⁶⁶ NAC RG 24 vol. 15093, *The King's Regulations and Orders for the militia, 1939* stated: "The Militia is responsible for its own discipline and entrusted with its own internal administration."

⁶⁷ As quoted in Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 49.

In the Spring of 1940, NPAM units across Canada waited anxiously for word on the composition of the Third Division. The civic authorities at the Lakehead responded to wartime enthusiasm by supporting the Regiment's bid to be transferred to the CASF. In March of 1940, the Port Arthur City Council resolved to petition the Department of National Defense on this matter.⁶⁸ In spite of this support, some held little hope that the unit would in fact be included in the Third Division. It was pointed out that along with the LSR, the Winnipeg Light Infantry and the Royal Winnipeg Rifles of Military District #10 still remained unmobilized. There was little hope that all three would be "appeased" by the government. Moreover, as one critic has noted, "what chance would the Lake Superiors stand against The Winnipeg Light Infantry with the Commanding Officer of the latter unit a member of the Federal Parliament?"⁶⁹

In spite of pleas from Northwestern Ontario communities, the LSR was dismayed (but probably not surprised) to discover that it had been passed over in favour of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles when the units of the Third Division were announced in May.⁷⁰ That very month, however, an announcement was made in the House of Commons that nine more battalions would be mobilized as part of a fourth infantry division. On 1 June, a special news dispatch was sent to the Lakehead

⁶⁸ Thunder Bay Archives, Port Arthur City Council Minutes, 95 series 17, 11 March 1940. The city council resolved to petition the DND "that when the Third Division of the Canadian Expeditionary Forces is formed, the Lake Superior Regiment, which is the perpetuating militia unit of the Glorious 52nd Overseas Battalion, be incorporated to once again represent the district."

⁶⁹ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p.49. That this fact would be considered so important to the fortunes of the unit speaks volumes of the power of political patronage in the militia. This will be elaborated upon in the next chapter.

⁷⁰ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 49. These pleas included a telegram from the Mayor of Port Arthur to the Minister of National Defense sent early in May which read: "Understand from Canadian Press release that recruiting for the Third Canadian Division will be started within two weeks, and units for incorporation in that division are being designated. Would respectfully refer you to resolution of our Council requesting incorporation of local unit, The Lake Superior Regiment." Stanley also notes that the communities of Nipigon, Geraldton, and Fort William sent endorsements of this request.

informing the public that the LSR had been named by Defence Minister Norman Rogers as one of the nine battalions of the new division.

A report in the local newspaper by Royd E. Beamish, a member of the LSR himself, stated that the Lakehead unit, which for many years had been one of the most active battalions in MD #10, was to be brigaded with two regiments from Old Ontario, the Irish Regiment of Toronto and the Elgin Regiment of St. Thomas. The reporter considered it quite significant that the unit had been mobilized on its own, rather than as part of a composite battalion and believed that this could be "considered as full recognition of the esteem with which the unit is held by national defense authorities."⁷¹ On 2 June 1940, Lieutenant-Colonel Cook received confirmation that the LSR was to be transferred to the CASF and he and Captain J.E.V. Murrell, the Adjutant of the LSR, were summoned to MD #10 headquarters in Winnipeg.⁷² On 3 June 1940, Lieutenant-Colonel Murrell left Winnipeg to return to Port Arthur and begin the process of recruiting and training in earnest. Upon his return, organization was started for mobilization.⁷³

⁷¹ *The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle*, 29 January 1946 (TBPL, #73 Military Forces and Defense -Thunder Bay.) Beamish added that 5 of the 18 infantry units called up would be composite battalions embracing two or more cities. He also reported that the unit's present strength was about 300 men.

⁷² NAC, RG 24, LSR War Diary serial no. 942 Volume 1, June 1940, Port Arthur. "On 2 June 40, Lt. Col. H Cook notified by MD 10 that LSR to be mobilized immediately: 11th Bn., 4th division. Lt. Col. Cook instructed to take Capt. JE Murrell and Lt. PM Arthur to Winnipeg. Left at 2230 hours." This is the first entry in the LSR War Diary which chronicles the Regiment's transformation from a NPAM battalion in 1940 to the battle-hardened unit it had become by the end of the Northwest Europe campaigns in 1945.

⁷³ NAC, RG 24, LSR War Diary serial no. 942 Volume 1, June 1940, Port Arthur. Entries on June 3 and June 4. The Regimental War Diary, which recorded the day-to-day history of the unit, gives a good impression of the frantic activity at the Lakehead in the month following the unit's mobilization. Of particular interest are the periodic strength returns, which give an idea of the unit's rate of growth :
Volume 1

3 June 40: Lieutenant Colonel Cook Capt. J.E Murrell and Lt. RJ Arthur in Winnipeg discussing mobilization instruction. Capt. Murrell and Lt. Arthur left Winnipeg 1845 hours for Port Arthur.

4 June 40: Organization started for mobilization. On duty: Capt. Murrell, Lt. R Keane, Lt. R J Arthur, Lt. (OM) J McCormack, 2lt WM Babe, Major GE Bain (WG), Lt. DM Morrison, 2lt IC Wilson. Lieutenant-Colonel Cook left Winnipeg for Port Arthur at 1845 hours.

Thus, the First Battalion⁷⁴ of the Lake Superior Regiment, a Non-Permanent Active Militia unit since its re-organization in 1921, was transferred to the Canadian Active Service Force and the militiamen began the long, hard process of preparing for war.

5 June 40: Recruiting continues from NPAM personnel. Following Officers taken on strength at this date: Capt. NW Shields, Lt. HG Dawson, Lt. IC McGillivray, Lt. JL McCormack, Lt. HJW Cargo, Lt. EC Styffe, Lt. MW Babe, Lt. MJ Francis, 2lt TS Jones 2lt JW Mcinnis, 2lt D Arthur. On duty: Lt. Col. Cook, Lt. RJ Arthur, Major GE Bain, Major Murrell and Capt. R. Keane. Daily strength return: 18 Officers, 21 OR. The recruiting is going along well. Small squads are being formed on the floor for elementary training.

6 June 40: Recruiting continues from NPAM only.....the officers are all working to a late hour, doing clerical work of all kinds.

7 June 40: recruiting continues from NPAM. personnel appointments to date from 2/6/40:

Major Murrell 2ic Regt., Capt. Keane, Adjt., Lt. E Styffe, Trans O, Lt. Babe, Int O

8 June 40: 2lt Oscar F. Drumbrille taken on strength. Lt. Cargo, Lt. Francis, Lt. Styffe, 2lt McInnes, 2Lt Jones, 2Lt Wilson, 2lt Dumbrille with ORs proceed on command to Fort Osborne barracks, Winnipeg, on a Junior Leader Course.

11 June 40: Promotions among NCOs and WOs: RSM, WO1 Donaldson, WJ; A/T/ Sgt. Rickard, F; A/P/Sgt. Burke, GH; A/O/R/Sgt. Burt, AH.

12 June 40: Major Neeland taken on strength. strength return: 21 Os, 176 ORs.

17 June 40: Lt. Andrew Calder Green RCAMC appointed MO, Capt. AWS Bennett, taken on strength

18 June 40: Appointments: F Comes to be A/RQMS from 17/6/40

19 June 40: strength return 26 O, 255 ORs

30 June 40: strength return 26 O, 403 ORs

Battalion Orders: 7 June 1940

Training as detailed by Major Murrell

Training Cadre: Capt. Phillpott, Lt. McGillivray, Pte. (A/Sgt.) P Malach, Pte. R Woods, Pte. WP McLean.

⁷⁴ The Lake Superior Regiment became a Two Battalion Regiment after 26 July 1940, when the 2nd Battalion, LSR, was established under the command of Lt. Colonel Dear, the old CO of the NPAM LSR. This battalion was never to be mobilized but nevertheless, carried out the vital role of recruiting and providing reinforcements for the First Battalion throughout the war. The slate of officers in the new Battalion six months after its creation was as follows: Captain H.U. Weston- quartermaster, Major Walter Ede, Major O McGuirk- 2ic, Major NJG McKinney, Capt. WM Porter -paymaster, Capt. WA Heaver, Lt. AL MacFarlane, Lt. RHD Loucks, Lt. Allan Gray, 2lt W Aitkens, 2lt T.A. Miller, 2lt George Eoll, 2lt LA Spencer, Lt. E.L. MacKay, 2lt George Tindall, 2lt S.J. Clark, Lt. Harry Chapman-MO, 2lt WH Peach, 2lt GJ Greer, 2lt W. Mulock, 2lt HA Field, Captain GR Dixon- Adjutant, Captain B. McMullin (Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 18 December 1940, TBPL Local History File #92 Military forces and defense, Thunder Bay) Stanley devotes several pages to a description of the 2nd Battalion's activities in In the Face of Danger (pp. 318-322).

Chapter 2

The Lake Superior Regiment: The Social Institution

I

In considering the development of the Canadian militia between the wars, the historian is hampered by a dearth of literature of a military nature dealing with that era. This is largely because, for the most part during this period, Canada's military lay dormant. The nation fought no wars, the government introduced no major military reforms after 1921, and little effort was made to modernize the Canadian Army until the eve of World War Two. Canada's military historiography is replete with works which examine the Army during each of the wars, but very few which have anything of worth to say about the dismal period between 1919 and 1939.⁷⁵ It would appear that until quite recently, the prevailing rule for historians has been that if a military organization was not engaged in fighting a war, it was unworthy of study.

One of the few exceptions to this rule is the autobiography of Lt. Gen. Maurice Pope, who comments extensively on his time with a southern Ontario militia unit during the twenties and thirties, providing an invaluable account of the challenges faced by the peacetime militia during this period. One of the most insightful sections of this book is the excerpt from Pope's paper dealing with the militia in which he explains the underlying reasons for the success of the Canadian militia system:

The NPAM is an organization evolved by Anglo Saxons and is particularly well suited to the genius of that people. It is basically a voluntary

⁷⁵ There are, however, a few first hand accounts written which describe the challenges inherent in "getting up" a NPAM unit in the interwar years. For example, a section of Gordon S. Howard's Memoirs of a Citizen Soldier 1918-1945 (privately published) deals with the efforts of the young World War I Artillery veteran in forming a reserve battery in rural Saskatchewan. He provides a vivid description of the activities of new recruits and veterans, the use of makeshift guns, camp and the struggle to acquire an armoury for the battery. Also discussed is Howard's involvement in the Wheat Pool, Canadian Legion, and Agricultural organization, suggesting a definite pattern of community activity.

system, the members of which enlist for a term of years and undergo annually a stated period of training, either at camp or at local headquarters. In a happily situated country such as Canada, the militia system is adequate to her needs—primarily for the reason that her needs are small. But the point to be noted is that should a unit aspire to a really satisfying standard of efficiency, much more is necessary than the 10 or 12 days of annual training for which Parliament makes provision. Now the curious thing is that among English-speaking city corps this additional training is freely given and in generous measure. Thus without additional expense to itself the State obtains more than it demands; it has capitalized on the enthusiasm of the individual. This extraordinary condition is probably unparalleled in any other civilized nation not forming part of the British Empire. It is not easy to assess the underlying reasons which make such a state of affairs possible. In the first place, many persons join the militia in the belief that they are thereby discharging a public duty. Others see in it an agreeable hobby. Another class may be attracted by the display of uniform, the satisfaction derived from public parades and by the enhanced position in the community to which they may arise through their associations with the militia.(...)⁷⁶

It is significant that only one of the three major factors that Pope outlines as reasons for joining the militia, the discharge of a perceived “public duty”, can be considered an altruistic motive.⁷⁷ The other two motives (that of the “agreeable hobby” and that of the “enhanced position within the community”) contain a definite element of self-interest. The message is clear: the militia does not simply demand something of the citizen, it provides something in return.

⁷⁶ Lt. Gen. Maurice A. Pope, Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of a Canadian Soldier, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1962, pp. 86-87. The General is quite correct in pointing out that additional training was given in generous measure. Considering that the militiaman of this period was only paid for ten days service annually, a simple calculation reveals that many members of the militia, parading for a half-day once a week for the entire year and allowing for occasional absences, were probably parading the equivalent of about twenty to twenty-five full days a year. (54 weeks x .5 days paraded = 27 days annually) In other words, at least half of the time, the militiaman paraded without pay.

⁷⁷ However, it is quite possible to make the argument that this “duty to the state” was seldom the only reason for joining the militia. An examination of the concept of “duty to the state”, with its roots in philosophical notions of nationalism, is a complex subject which warrants closer analysis than can be accomplished here. For works which delve into this concept see Peter Paret, “Nationalism and the sense of Military Obligation” in Military Affairs, vol. 36 no. 4, October 1972, pp. 92-96; Jock Haswell, Citizen Armies, (London: Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1973); Total War and Social Change, (Arthur Marwick ed., London: 1988); Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977); and Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession, (New York: 1937).

General Pope grasped that the value of the Non-Permanent Active Militia lay not only in its function as a military force but also as an embodiment of the citizen's duty to the state and an institution which provided social opportunities as well as military training to all members. Herein lay the genius of the militia system: its *duality* of function. Had it been an organization solely devoted to military pursuits, it is doubtful that in an era of fiscal restraint and relative peace, it could have survived by simply offering "opportunities" to young men for conducting hours of tedious drill and training with outdated equipment. In many ways, its secondary function, that of a social institution, was the key to the militia's success.

It is an inalienable fact that any competent NPAM commanding officer of the twenties and thirties recognized the necessity of creating a strong bond to the community in which his unit was based. The militia's secondary function became crucial to its survival when the fulfillment of the militia's primary function was made so difficult. The interwar period was an era of indifference toward the military when, as Richard Preston puts it, "the fundamental connection between military strength and national sovereignty was not fully understood".⁷⁸ It is as important to examine the "social" function of the NPAM during this period as it is to look at its "military" activities. It is only in looking at both facets, the proverbial "two sides of the same coin", that we come to achieve a true understanding of a militia unit during this era. That is not to say that these facets must be examined separately from each other. Indeed, as any serious study will reveal, they are inexorably linked.

The indifference of government toward the militia during this period was particularly acute when dealing with a unit's community activities. This fact is

⁷⁸ Richard Preston, *Canadian Defense Policy*, p. 19. As evidence of this lack of understanding, Preston states that in the thirties, Mackenzie King increased the establishment of the Permanent Force and the Active Militia, but reduced its appropriations to below pre-World War One levels. It is important to recognize that any study of a NPAM unit in the twenties and thirties entails an understanding of the major difficulties faced by such an organization during this period.

reflected in the paucity of official records on this subject kept by National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and even the regiment itself. We are forced therefore to look elsewhere for clues which enable us to paint a picture of the social life of the LSR. It is not possible to rely on the official published history of the unit. As is the case with many regimental histories, focused as they are on the exploits of men at war, George Stanley's In the Face of Danger largely ignores the "social aspect" of regimental life in the twenties and thirties, painting a picture of a supposedly dull and cheerless existence for the NPAM Lake Superior Regiment in the interlude between the wars.⁷⁹ But, if this was a dark time for the military, what kept the young militiaman involved? How did the unit justify its existence? What was its true social role?

Through a study of the Lake Superior Regiment's interaction and involvement in the social life of the Lakehead region, it is hoped that a more complete picture of the inter-war militia will begin to take shape. An examination of correspondence (both "official" and unofficial), newspaper articles, and the assistance of firsthand accounts, reveals that contrary to popular opinion, the twenties and thirties were an important era for Canada's military, if not in terms of military development, then certainly in regard to the establishment of social links and community activity.

⁷⁹ David Ratz's Master's Thesis: "Soldiers of the Shield: The 96th District of Algoma Battalion of Rifles, 1886-1896; A Social and Military Institution" (Lakehead University, 1995), pp. 17-18; and W.A.B. Douglas and B. Greenhous' "Canada and the Second World War: The State of Clio's Art", in Military Affairs, vol. 42 no. 4, February 1978, pp. 24-28; provide further insights into the value of Regimental Histories. Reginald H. Roy provides a review of In the Face of Danger in the Canadian Historical Review, vol. 24, no. 2, June 1961, p. 154. For examples of Canadian Regimental History, see Brandon A. Conron, A History of the First Hussars 1856-1980, (Canada: 1981); Capt. Leonard Curchin and Lt. Brian D. Sim, The Elgins: The Story of the Elgin Regt. (RCAC) and its Predecessors, (St. Thomas, Ontario: Sutherland Press, 1977); Brereton Greenhous, Dragoon: The Centennial History of the Royal Canadian Dragoons (Ottawa: Guild of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1983); Brereton Greenhous et al., Semper Paratus: The History of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regiment), 1862-1977, (Canada: W. L. Griffin Ltd., 1977); Colonel Paul P. Hutchison, Canada's Black Watch. The First Hundred Years 1862-1962, (Canada: The Royal Highlanders of Canada Armoury Association, 1987); and Bruce Tascona and Eric Wells, Little Black Devils: A History of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, (Winnipeg: Frye Publishing Ltd., 1983).

II

Recollections of a Militia Soldier:

In an effort to gain a more complete picture of the regiment as a social institution, it is important to understand what the unit meant to the individual involved in a general sense. Not simply as a "job" a "pastime" or a "hobby", but rather, as a "life" or, more accurately, "*lifestyle*". Since its beginnings, the Canadian militia has been modeled upon the regimental system of the British Army which, though it has undergone many changes and much restructuring, has been in use since the late seventeenth century.⁸⁰

The regimental system is based on the concept that the regiment must be an organization whose mandate goes far beyond providing military training. To its detractors, the regimental system is inefficient. Its critics charge that in addition to high administrative costs, competitive regional recruiting and the decentralization of support resources, the regimental system is rife with praetorianism, parochialism and nepotism. To its supporters, it is a socializing agent which provides a sense of family, looks after the individual soldier's welfare, and promotes group pride, adherence to tradition, and fighting spirit. In dealing with a concept this broad, it is

⁸⁰ Charles Messenger, *History of the British Army*, London: Bison Books Ltd., 1986, pp.12-19. Though the roots of the regimental system can be traced back hundreds of years (to the British mercenary companies who fought on the continent), the first true modern infantry regiments of the British Army were founded following the Restoration of the Stuarts in 1660. These included the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Foot Guards (later known as the Grenadier Guards and the Coldstream Guards) and the Dunbarton Regiment (later, the First Regiment of Foot or the Royal Scots) who trace their origins back to 882 and as their "Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard" nickname indicates, are considered the oldest regiment of the British Army. For more on the infantry regiments of the British Army, see Frederick Myatt, *The British Infantry 1660-1945. The Evolution of a Fighting Force*, (Dorset, UK: Blanford Press, 1983). John Keegan provides a unique perspective on the regimental system in "Regimental Ideology" in *War, Economy, and the Military Mind*, (Geoffrey Best and Andrew Wheatcroft, eds. London: 1976).

therefore useful to examine a soldier's sum total of experiences. It is in this manner that we may develop a comprehensive picture of life in a militia unit.

The LSR Song

Come let us sing about the LSR
 We are the better unit here by far
 We do our tactics more efficiently
 And do our fighting at the bar
 We drink our fill of whiskey rum and beer
 And love the lovely ladies when they're here
 So don't sigh, don't cry when you see us go by
 Just remember we're the LSR⁸¹

This little ditty eloquently expresses the sense of camaraderie, pride and friendly competition that characterized the unit in the years leading up to the Second World War. Although time has dimmed the memories of those who experienced life as militiamen at the Lakehead in the years before World War Two, there are still some who can recall what it was like to train with the Lewis Gun, or wear the ancient cast-off puttees of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. One of these few is a man with a particularly valuable perspective, having known life in the militia both before and after the war as well as having experienced the mobilization, training and eventual deployment of the Lake Superior Regiment (motor) during the northwest Europe campaign of 1944-45.

Edward Gravelle, a former Commanding Officer of the unit who joined in 1935 as a private, described the atmosphere in the Regiment during the latter half of the thirties as one of "confidence and enthusiasm".⁸² Part of this confidence, as he

⁸¹ Written in 1936 by Staff Sgt. Elgin W. Smith, 1st Battalion, Lake Superior Regiment (TBMMA collection).

⁸² Lt. Col. (ret.) E. J. O. Gravelle (1919 - 1999) was one of the most well-known and admired members of the Regiment. His career in the military spanned three decades, during which he held every rank in the Army (with the exception of WO1/RSM) from private to Lt. Col. He joined the LSR in 1935 as a 16 year old private and was commissioned during the war. He rose to the rank of major

saw it, was derived from the fact that all of the unit's senior officers (Commanding Officers, Company Commanders, and Seconds-in-Command) were World War One veterans and frequently highly-decorated soldiers. He believes that the young troops of the unit were undoubtedly influenced by the dedication of these experienced leaders who were capable of instilling an intangible quality in young part-time soldiers that Gravelle characterizes as "a change in attitude". The former CO recalls that young men were drawn to the military in those days chiefly because it offered discipline, group activity, and because it was an organization with "social overtones"-- a chance to be with other people who had similar interests. It was the training, the opportunity to compete and his own keen interest in learning that attracted Gravelle to the unit.

During the thirties, the Lake Superior Regiment was based primarily in Port Arthur. Gravelle states that during this era geographic considerations played a significant role in determining which unit a soldier would belong to and, therefore, transfers between units at the Lakehead only tended to occur if a member of the militia was moving from Port Arthur to Fort William or vice-versa. Although the Regiment shared the Armoury in Port Arthur with an artillery detachment, the 18th Medium Battery, based in Fort William, and the 4th Field Ambulance, which is famous for being the first Lakehead NPAM unit sent overseas, transfers between these units were few and far between.⁸³

during the conflict and commanded "A" Company during the campaign in northwest Europe. He was wounded in action three times and earned several decorations, including a "mention in despatches". He returned to the Lakehead at the end of the war and continued to serve with the Regiment. He was the Commanding Officer of the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment from 1951 to 1958. An interview was conducted with Colonel Gravelle on 15 January 1999.

⁸³ The only other major NPAM unit at the Lakehead based in the Port Arthur Armoury which Gravelle does not mention was Number Three Company, 10th Division Signals, Canadian Corps of Signallers, which was formed in Port Arthur in 1923, with Major AWS Bennett (who also served with the LSR) in command. He was succeeded by Major H.S. Hancock, who was in turn succeeded by Major A.F. Macdonald. Major Macdonald relinquished command in May of 1934 and was succeeded by Acting Major McNeill. The News-Chronicle reported in 1934: "Both units (meaning the LSR and

Although most Lake Sups during this period were Port Arthur men, Headquarters, "A" and "B" Companies being located at the Port Arthur Armoury, after the start of World War II the unit did establish a more substantial presence in Fort William and Dryden.⁸⁴ The LSR Regimental Band, also headquartered in Port Arthur, played a significant role in the life of the unit. On many occasions, when the unit underwent its annual inspection, the band would play as the inspecting officer reviewed the troops. Gravelle, who had been involved in the military since the early thirties as a cadet, recalls in particular, the contribution of Bandmaster Gutteridge, who had the band as well trained and well-disciplined as any musician could ever have done.

Gravelle relates that because of the "bare bones" nature of funding during this period, the troops of the regiment went without much of the equipment needed to perform even the most rudimentary training. This did not really induce discontent or frustration among the soldiers of the Regiment because, as he claims, most were largely ignorant of what equipment might otherwise have been available. On occasion, because of low attendance (the regiment sometimes comprised as few as thirty or forty members, parading as many soldiers as there were members of the band!), company drill was often performed with a Right Marker and Left Marker holding a length of rope between them to represent a "notional" platoon. To Gravelle,

#3 Company, 10th Div. Signals) have their headquarters in the Armoury, Park Street, while the First Lake Superior Regiment also has two companies in Fort William." (*Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle*, 23 June 1934, "Colonel Ray and Colonel Dear attended annual New Years Day "at home" on 1 January 1934")

⁸⁴ According to Gravelle, "C" Company of the LSR was based out of Fort William and trained in McKellar Park behind the Old Armoury, a former Post Office, which was eventually abandoned in favour of a building on Simpson street built in 1930-31. As we have already seen, records reveal that both "C" and "D" Companies were in Fort William. It is quite possible (though by no means certain) that until the start of World War II "D" Company was most often understrength, and therefore, was only considered a Company for administrative purposes. As has already been mentioned, during the war the unit also established a Second Battalion, comprised of men not on "Active Service". This formation was dissolved after World War II.

these conditions merely serve to show the dedication of the members who paraded regularly, once a week, on Tuesdays. The troops were only paid for ten days of service annually, but most came in on their own time throughout the year, the “money aspect”, not being a crucial part of the job’s appeal.⁸⁵

According to Gravelle, the nature of the militia at the time was such that disaffection was never really a factor. Because there was no contract to sign, a young recruit was simply taken on strength and went through on “Part Two Orders” (the official documentation, most of which no longer exists). There were no repercussions for those who failed to parade. As Gravelle puts it, “You were there because you wanted to be there, and if dissatisfaction came about for one reason or another, you merely didn’t show up anymore.” The strength of the unit on parade therefore became a useful tool for measuring the morale of the troops. “If your strength was there, everyone was happy, if you found that there was a ton of them disappearing, then obviously something was making them not come back”. Unfortunately, this method made it quite difficult to keep track of precise numbers within the unit at any given time.

Discussing the unit’s training, Gravelle relates that outdoor exercises were chiefly one-day shoots held three or four times a year at the Mount McKay rifle range (which would continue to be used extensively right up until the 1990s).⁸⁶ He

⁸⁵ This view is corroborated by Monty Phillpott in his letter to Harry Smith “Notes on the activities of the LSR prior to Mobilization June 1940” (held by the TBMMA). He writes “All schemes or activities extra were at no expense to the public. Very small command pay allowed to C.O. for reg’t fund. Most of pay turned in to regimental (sic) fund.” There is some discrepancy in Gravelle’s and Phillpott’s accounts of how pay was allocated. According to Phillpott, soldiers were only paid for 5 days a year, plus 6 extra days if camp was attended. This does not correspond with several other sources which, as we have seen, state that 10 paid days were allocated for each soldier annually, however this is a minor inconsistency. We must assume that Gravelle’s description, supported as it is by archival sources, is more accurate.

⁸⁶ In “Notes On The Activities of the LSR”, p. 1, Phillpott writes “Several Schemes were put on, mostly at platoon level. Food and transport paid for by the Company Officers and their wives. Two weekend camps were put on at the Mt. McKay Range at the expense of the officers and what help we could arrange from different contractors. The annual classification was fired at these camps by all

remembers the presence of the PPCLI Instructional Cadre at the Armory, identifiable by the letters "I. C." worn on their lower sleeve. Although these drill instructors were seldom above the rank of Lance-Corporal, as far as the soldiers of the Regiment were concerned, they might have been "the God almighty himself".⁸⁷ These permanent force instructors were held in such regard that upon the outbreak of war, many of them were appointed as Warrant Officers or Regimental Sergeant Majors and a few were even commissioned as officers. Occasionally, the unit was also paid a visit by an instructional cadre RSM, certainly an event of great significance, and perhaps terror, for the young soldiers of the LSR! Another highlight of the year's training calendar for Gravelle and his young comrades was "Summer Camp", a yearly event whereby the soldiers of the unit traveled to Camp Shilo in Manitoba for a week of tactical exercises, the unit's one major trip out of town.

Discussing the composition of the unit, Gravelle recalls that the officers of the unit came from a number of different backgrounds, and not all were upper-middle class professionals: several worked for the government, there were a few grain elevator inspectors and Gravelle's company commander was a bank employee. The enlisted men of the unit were also from varied social backgrounds, but he notes that the Sergeant's mess, which, like the Officer's mess, formed a great part of the social life of the Regiment, seemed to be a social class unto itself within the unit.⁸⁸ He

ranks. The Mt. McKay Range had a road cross it at about the hundred yard range. This road had to be closed 24 hours once every year. The government allowed two days pay to mount sentries on the road for twenty-four hours".

⁸⁷ Gravelle interview. Similarly, Phillipott writes in "Notes": "An instructor from Winnipeg came down every year to help train us for Annual Inspection. All Provisional Schools were staffed by Permanent Force Instructors" (p.2).

⁸⁸ Phillipott, "Notes", p.2. All officers were members of the officers' mess and were expected to attend mess functions. Most of the officers had mess kits and the mess endeavoured to put on a mess dinner once a month. According to Phillipott, these dinners became difficult to finance after "one of the stewards absconded with the funds"(!).

recalls that although there was no mess for junior enlisted ranks, ambitious Corporals were permitted to join the Sergeant's mess. Without resorting to a statistical analysis of occupations and social status among the officers and men of the LSR, certain facts can be deduced: For example, given the relative frequency with which enlisted men (particularly veterans of World War One) made the leap to the officer's mess, it would appear that by the interwar period, the tradition of the class-based rank structure inherited in the 19th century from the British Army had already eroded a significant amount at the Lakehead, although there may have existed vestiges of elitism and snobbery.⁸⁹

Ethnicity was a more difficult factor to quantify for Gravelle because, according to him, this was never considered an issue within the LSR. The one exception to this rule was the case of "visible minorities". He recalls that several aboriginal Canadians were members of the unit, and these men tended to stand out by virtue of their excellent marksmanship on the ranges. This tolerant attitude toward the membership of visible minorities in the Regiment is perhaps somewhat surprising. It stands in stark contrast to the reluctance of authorities to enlist minorities into C.E.F. battalions during the First World War, but the passage of time and the vastly different circumstances of wartime active service and peacetime militia service (for example, the great difficulties in recruiting for the latter) must be acknowledged as important factors.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ For a discussion of social class distinctions within military organizations, see David Englander and James Osborne, "Jack, Tommy, and Henry Dubb: The Armed Forces and the Working Class", in *Historical Journal*, vol. 21, 1978, pp. 593-621; Sue E. Berryman, *Who Serves? The Persistent Myth of the Underclass Army*. (Boulder, Colorado: 1988); and *Life in the Rank and File*, (David R. Segal and H. Wallace Sinaiko, eds., USA: Pergamon-Brassery's, 1968).

⁹⁰ See James W. St. G.. Walker, "Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force" in *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 70 no. 1, 1989, pp. 1-26 for more on the subject of minorities in the C.E.F.

Like ethnicity, religion does not seem to have been a particularly salient feature of the Regiment's makeup from Gravelle's perspective. That the Regimental church, was an Anglican one had more to do with the presence of the 52nd Battalion's old colours (enshrined within the building) than the predominance of adherents to the Protestant faith within the unit. The former CO noted, however, that several Pastors of St John's Church were to serve as the *Padre* of the Regiment over the course of its history.

Regarding the function of the unit as a social institution, Gravelle recalls that the relationship between the community at large and the Regiment was "of a very high quality". This relationship was maintained by active participation in city events, parades, and Remembrance Day services. "Whenever any event was held in the Officer's Mess or The Sergeant's Mess it was very well attended by civic dignitaries". Gravelle remembers outstanding occasions, like the visits to Port Arthur of members of the Imperial Defense College (senior members of Commonwealth armies who attended the IDC in England) during their tours of Canada, when the Regiment would assemble on the floor of the Armoury and the band would perform for the visitors' entertainment.

In the thirties, the Regiment maintained a cordial relationship with the military units in Duluth, but this association was not as strong as it would be in later years. The social highlight of the year for the troops was the annual "Men's Christmas Dinner", when the unit's officers served the troops supper at tables set up in the long corridor in the basement of the Port Arthur Armoury. Another popular event was the New Year's Day Levee, which featured visits between the Sergeant's and Officers messes and were attended on occasion by the mayor, members of parliament and government officials from Ottawa.⁹¹

⁹¹ Both of these annual traditions have been maintained by the Thunder Bay Garrison and the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment, the descendant of the LSR, up to the present day. For more on the various

These recollections paint a vivid picture of a regiment that, having survived through the lean years of the twenties and thirties, was poised to take its place among the units of the Canadian active service force upon the outbreak of World War Two. The early months of the war also saw a transformation in the makeup of the officer complement of the Regiment, as World War I vets were replaced by young NCOs who were commissioned.⁹² He also notes that when the Regiment went on active service, a number of men from outlying areas around the Lakehead communities came to Port Arthur to join the unit. Among these were several natives from nearby communities and reserves. Prior to the war, the "transportation factor" had made it impractical for men in rural areas to parade with the unit.⁹³ By 1940, however, with the transfer of the unit to the CASF, the Lake Superior Regiment ceased to be solely the "Lakehead's" Militia and became something much more substantial: an infantry battalion preparing to go to war with soldiers drawn from far and wide across Northwestern Ontario.

III

Having discussed the perceptions of a soldier who served in the LSR during the thirties, we must now examine the events of two decades which shaped these

Regimental traditions of the Canadian Army, see Edward C. Russell, *Customs and Traditions of the Canadian Armed Forces*, (Canada: Deneau and Greenberg Publishers Ltd., 1980). For more details on the LSSR's dress and regimental traditions, see Miles G. Penny, "The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment of Canada. Thunder Bay, Ontario" in *Journal of the Canadian Military Collector Society*, September/October 1982, pp. 4-9; and "the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment Regimental Catechism" (TBMMA: privately published).

⁹² Gravelle pointed out, as an aside, that by 1943-44, the Corps Commander had ordered that no one over the age of 40 could be on active service.

⁹³ According to Gravelle, after the war, the unit underwent another significant transformation. Those that had been a part of the militia prior to mobilization but who had not gone overseas, did not return to the Regiment. Perhaps there was the feeling that their time had passed. The post-war Lake Superior Regiment was a unit of fresh young troops, anchored and led by a core of veterans who, as time went on, gradually dropped out and moved on with their civilian lives.

perceptions. The foundations of the Regiment having been discussed in a previous chapter, it is appropriate to concentrate on the development of the unit's relationship with its community. The creation, or more accurately, re-establishment of links between the Regiment and the Lakehead community began almost before the Great War had ended. As we have seen, during World War One, the old pre-war militia unit, the 96th Lake Superior Regiment, had fulfilled several functions at the Lakehead.⁹⁴ By 1918, the Regiment was moribund. The "interim" Commanding Officer of the unit, however, took advantage of the few opportunities which presented themselves for public exposure at the conclusion of the conflict. These included patriotic public gatherings and rallies⁹⁵ as well as public receptions for returning soldiers.⁹⁶ Actions like these ensured that the local militia would not fade away completely during those uncertain years between the end of the war and the re-establishment of a viable militia force.

Following the re-organization of the Canadian militia in 1920, Lt. Col. J. D. Young, the new Commanding Officer of the LSR, made several important decisions regarding how the unit would present itself to the public. One of these was the

⁹⁴ TBMMA: Lake Superior Scottish Regiment Historical File, p.3 In addition to guard duty at the elevators and the Kakabeka Falls power plant 18 miles outside the cities, the 96th LSR, as we have seen, also provided several drafts organized for active service prior to the mobilization of the 52nd Battalion C.E.F. in 1915. These drafts totaled approximately 1000 officers and men.

⁹⁵ *The Fort William Daily Times-Journal*, December 16, 1918 "Crowds see colours of 52nd Bn." p. 1. The Battalion's colours returned to the Lakehead several months before the men of the unit came home and a public exhibition of the colours war organized. During this rally, Lt. Col. Young spoke to the crowd at length. His remarks included statements about the deplorable presence of "aliens" at the Lakehead: "2 out of every 3 boys seen on the streets of Fort William today were aliens. This must be rectified." —certainly a sign of the times.

⁹⁶ *The Fort William Daily Times-Journal*, December 27, 1918 "Reception to Soldiers" p. 5. One of the largest of these occurred on March 29, 1919, when the first drafts from the 52nd Battalion C.E.F. returned to the Lakehead. (TBMMA, photo 1995.001.166h and Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, pp. 38-39). In 1919, the Lakehead was also host to a convention of the GWVA (Great War Veterans Association) in January. (Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, Jan 15 1919, "War Vets Meeting" p. 8 The war may have ended in 1918, but in early 1919, the military was still very much in the public eye at the Lakehead.

retention of a strong affiliation with the 52nd Battalion C.E.F. The basis for this had already been promulgated by General Order No. 29 of 15 March 1920, whereby the First Battalion, Lake Superior Regiment was named the perpetuating unit of the 52nd Battalion CEF.⁹⁷ It was hoped that former members of the 52nd Battalion would recognize in the Lake Superior Regiment of the NPAM a descendant or "successor" of their wartime unit and be moved to continue their active participation in an organization for which many felt a great deal of affection and pride. Indeed, if any unit could claim descent from the 52nd, it was the Lake Superior Regiment. Its pre-war incarnation, the 96th LSR, had contributed the bulk of the troops for that battalion when it went overseas in 1915.⁹⁸ The CO of the LSR was also depending on the fact that the name recognition of the 52nd would prove a positive factor in recruiting efforts. This is made quite clear by newspaper articles and press releases of the time.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ DND Directorate of History, Vol. 197 File: The Lake Superior Regiment 145.221003 (D1) This designation, however, did not entitle the LSR to bear the 52nd Battalion's Battle Honours. This right was granted by the King on 15 September, 1929.

⁹⁸ Prior to November, 1915, the 96th LSR sent drafts of men to the 8th, 28th, 37th and 44th Battalions C.E.F. (DND Directorate of History, Vol. 197 File LSR 145.221003 (D1).) On November 3, 1915, the first complete battalion of the Regiment, the 52nd (New Ontario) Battalion C.E.F. left for France. A second battalion, the 94th Battalion, under Lt. Col. Macklin left on June 16, 1916, and a third, the 141st "Bull Moose" Battalion under Lt. Col. McKenzie left early in 1917. All three had been raised at the Lakehead and were comprised mostly of local men. The 52nd joined the Third Canadian Division upon arrival in England but the 94th and 141st were broken up and used as reinforcements throughout the division. In all, over 4000 troops and officers were recruited by the regiment and dispatched on active service. By the end of the war, the casualties numbered 140 officers and 2819 other ranks. (TBMMA: Lake Superior Scottish Regiment History File, pp. 3-4).

⁹⁹ The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle July 11, 1921. p.1 "Reorganization of Fifty-Second Battalion is About Complete" This article makes quite plain the fact that an affiliation with a Canadian Expeditionary Force Battalion was of great significance to the new NPAM unit:

"After a considerable amount of work on the part of the Officer Commanding (sic) and the Adjutant, the Fifty Second Battalion of the Canadian Militia has reached the state of re-organization where it is possible to commence enlistment. It is the aim in the militia to perpetuate the number and record of the old fifty-second New Ontario Battalion CEF which made a name of undying glory on the fields of France and Flanders. Under the new organization of the Canadian militia, the new battalion will be known as the First Battalion (52nd battalion CEF) Lake Superior Regiment. The officers are all ex-service men, some of them having served with the old Fifty-second.

Another important decision taken following a meeting of the unit's officers held on 14 July 1921, was to establish a regimental band. As the Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle reported the following day: "It was decided to commence the reorganization campaign by establishing a first class band, by which means it is hoped the battalion can be built up to full strength. This band will also, in the future, give band concerts in the armouries and elsewhere, to raise funds with which to equip the armouries with a gymnasium and to make it a meeting place for veterans and their friends."¹⁰⁰ The desire of the unit's officers to raise a band at this early juncture indicates something of the importance of this type of "auxiliary" organization to the viability NPAM battalion, an importance derived more from its "civic" function than its military one.¹⁰¹

Though it is difficult to determine what might have occurred had the unit embarked upon a different path, it is fair to say that both the decision to maintain a

The cadre of officers is not complete and the Commanding Officer is anxious to have it completed, and would be pleased to have any officer who served overseas either with the Canadians or the Imperial Army who wishes to join communicate with him or any of the officers listed below.

The corps is anxious to complete its strength before the visit of Baron Byng and the other generals in order that it may take part in the pageant being prepared for their reception, and form a guard of honour for the Governor General.

So a cordial invitation is extended to all overseas non-commissioned officers and men and the younger men of the Twin Cities who would like to identify themselves with the organization and keep up the traditions of the old Fifty-second.

The new unit will be outfitted in khaki service dress, with the same equipment as was worn overseas."(...)

¹⁰⁰ The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle July 15, 1921. p1 "King Sends a Silk Flag to Fifty Second" As the quote from this article indicates, the establishment of a band was expected to aid in recruiting. The article goes on to relate that the battalion had recently received a "silk flag" from HRM King George V (the Regiment's Colours). These were later to be officially presented to the unit.

¹⁰¹ The organization of a military band was purely optional for a NPAM unit. It was by no means a military necessity. The band's function, once the regiment was established on a firm footing, was mostly in the realm of "public relations". It was the crucial job of fostering public awareness of the military in the community while also providing a useful service. By any reckoning, this was a job the LSR Regimental Band performed admirably under the direction of bandmaster Lieutenant W. Gutteridge, a former member of the Royal Horse Guards (Blues) (TBMMA photo 1995.152.0025 Lt. W. Gutteridge June 1933). In 1934, Gutteridge was succeeded by S.C. McCready who carried on the fine musical tradition of the LSR.

close affiliation to the 52nd Battalion and the decision to form a regimental band were wise ones. From the early 1920s on, the regiment was to establish a relationship with the communities of the Lakehead with the 52nd Battalion affiliation and the activities of the LSR band as its principal foundations. Events like the annual 52nd Battalion Association Reunion Dinners, first held around 1924, provided opportunities for many members of the LSR who were also 52nd Battalion veterans to make social connections with the local dignitaries who were frequent guests to these functions. These Dinners, which continued to be held annually throughout the interwar years also served to promote the activities of the LSR through the performances of the Regimental Band, which was frequently featured as part of the evening's festivities.

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The dinners and social functions were merely one of the many common threads between the wartime and peacetime incarnations of the Regiment. A more substantial connection between the wartime and peacetime soldiers was the membership of many veterans in the Officer's and the Sergeant's Messes at the Armoury and the membership of many members of the Lake Superior Regiment in the Legion and other veterans' clubs.¹⁰³ This was only natural, as many of the

¹⁰² TBMMA doc 1995.152.004c and doc 1995.152.004d: The 52nd Battalion Association's annual meetings were frequently held at the Port Arthur Armoury, the headquarters of the Lake Superior Regiment. In "Notes on the Activities of the LSR prior to mobilization June 1940", Monty Phillpott wrote to Harry Smith: "Once each year the 52nd Old Boys had a parade and dinner and took out the colours (good feed etc. for the colour party)". By the late thirties, the annual dinners had become major community events attended by the Lakehead's most prominent citizens. The 52 Battalion Association's 14th annual reunion dinner held at the Royal Edward Hotel in Fort William on June 3, 1938, featured music by the LSR band (under the direction of bandmaster S.C. McCready). The 15th annual Reunion Dinner, held at the Port Arthur Hotel on June 3, 1939, also featured music by LSR Band and was attended by several city council members from Port Arthur and Fort William.

¹⁰³ More on the establishment of the Legion clubs and the Great War Veterans Association (which, in Port Arthur, became the Canadian Legion on 8 October 1926) can be found in Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright, *Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life, 1915-1930*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). A brief history of the Port Arthur Branch 5 of the Royal Canadian Legion by Theo Allen is included in the 1957 Convention *Bulletin and News* publication. pp. 50-63. (Northern Studies Resource Centre). Among the more prominent members of the legion who were also officers in the LSR were: W. E. Wigmore, Milton Francia, Harry Hogarth,

Regiment's Officers and Senior NCOs were veterans with strong ties to their wartime comrades. Perhaps the most important connection was that created by public perception. In the eyes of the public, there was a *defacto* link between the 52nd and the LSR--they were one and the same. In some of the newspaper reports of the time, the militia unit is referred to as the "First Battalion (52nd Battalion C.E.F.), Lake Superior Regiment". This perception was encouraged by the LSR, which, after 1929, appeared in public with the colours of the 52nd Battalion. This, of course, was the Regiment's right as the perpetuating unit of the 52nd.¹⁰⁴

The association between the 52nd and the LSR was not the Regiment's only military affiliation. In 1933, King George V was "graciously pleased" to approve an alliance between the Lake Superior Regiment of Canada and the Northamptonshire Regiment of the British Army.¹⁰⁵ This practice was quite common at the time and was a symbol of the link between Britain and the Empire, a link which, by the thirties, was more symbolic than political. Aside from some correspondence and vague gestures of goodwill, this alliance, like the casual relationship that the unit had with the Duluth National Guard, did not seem to play a significant part in the day-to-day life of the Regiment.

Such was also the case with the Regiment's association with local service clubs, which had come into existence at the Lakehead in the years following World

George Brophy, Harry Ruttan, Dr J. A. Crozier, Harry Walgate, Thomas L. Williams, L.S. Dear, A. H. Evans, A.W.S. Bennett and Neil Campbell, who was one of the proponents of the change from GWVA to Legion at the general meeting of 29 June 1926. Campbell was also very active in the early years of the branch's existence.

¹⁰⁴ TBMMA photo 1995.152.003 "Parade of old Colours at St. John's Church". The Lake Superior Regiment was officially granted the 52nd Battalion's Great War Battle Honours by General Order 110, 15 September 1929. (NAC RG 24 vol. 197, file: the Lake Superior Regiment).

¹⁰⁵ TBMMA, Lake Superior Scottish Regiment Historical File, p.6. The alliance, which was approved by General Order No. 57, 1933, remained unchanged by the subsequent redesignations of the LSR and amalgamation of the Northamptonshire Regiment with several other infantry battalions. An affiliation between the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment and the Royal Anglian Regiment, the descendants of these units, exists to this day.

War One. Although several LSR officers were active in these organizations, the unit itself did not collaborate with these clubs in their endeavours. The links established by these relationships were mostly among the upper-stratum of Port Arthur society, and did not extend down to the enlisted men of the NPAM. Nevertheless, the social activities of the Regiment's officers could be of benefit both to themselves and to the unit in terms of recognition and prestige, particularly in regard to their affiliation with one of the local service clubs which, as an editorial in the Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle stated, were "more than mere luncheon clubs."¹⁰⁶

IV

Just as the beginning of the thirties saw an influx of new young recruits into the Regiment, so did it bear witness to a renewed effort by the unit to involve itself in community life. It is during the ten years which preceded the Second World War that the battalion truly became a fixture at public events. The LSR, however, did not limit itself to participation in purely "military themed" events (like the occasional visits of General Officers to the Lakehead), participating in Port Arthur's 50th Birthday celebration on March 25, 1934,¹⁰⁷ parading publicly during King George V's Silver

¹⁰⁶ The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 20 October 1930. Editorial: "What good are service clubs?" The service clubs of Port Arthur at that time included the Rotary Club, the Kiwanis Club and the Gyro Club. All three were generally recognized and lauded for their contributions to the city.

¹⁰⁷ The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 24 March 1934, p. 2 "Programme Arranged at Armoury Sunday" and 26 March 1934, p.1 "In Churches and Public Service City Celebrates Its Birthday" The paper reported that 2500 people attended a concert put on in the Armoury by the LSR band under the direction of the new bandmaster, S. C. McCready. This event was attended by numerous dignitaries and former mayors of Port Arthur, including Colonel S.W. Ray, the Mayor of Port Arthur in 1911-12 and former CO of the 96th District of Algoma Rifles. TBA 3052, series 17, Port Arthur City Council Minutes: resolution 11652 mover: alderman McCuaig, 2nd: alderman Bartlett: Resolved: "That the clerk be instructed to write a letter of appreciation to the Canadian Broadcasting commission and to those responsible for the celebration ceremonies of PA's 50th Birthday on Sun March 25, 1934. also to the LSR band the Port Arthur legion singers and all others who assisted in making for the success of this celebration(...)" March 26, 1934.

Jubilee celebration on May 6, 1935,¹⁰⁸ and the coronation celebrations of King Edward VIII and King George VI in subsequent years,¹⁰⁹ in addition to the Declaration Day (August 21) and Armistice Day (November 11) services in Port Arthur and Fort William, for which the battalion's messes also occasionally hosted social functions.¹¹⁰

By 1939, as the tempo of defence preparations quickened in response to events in Europe and the Far East, there was an increase of interest in things military. Stanley relates that when "the Lake Superiors, with other militia units of the area and veterans of the Great War, paraded at the Cenotaph in Port Arthur and Orpheum Theatre in Fort William on April 24th, in commemoration of the battle of St. Julien, the streets were lined with thousands of onlookers."¹¹¹ The event which perhaps most raised the profile of the local unit prior to the Second World War was the Royal

¹⁰⁸ The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, May 7th, 1935 p.1 "Long Parade is held despite the weather" and TBMMA photo 1995.152.002d King George V Silver Jubilee Celebration May 6th 1935, Parade on Cumberland, LSR and Band. The Chronicle reported that Colonel L. S. Dear paraded with the "several units"(sic) of the Lake Superior Regiment, Port Arthur and Fort William, as well as the Tenth Signal Corps. Among the bands leading the parade were the "first Lake Superior Regimental" Band led by Bandmaster McCready, and the "Lake Superior Regiment bugle bands".

¹⁰⁹ The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, May 12, 1937. "Estimate 15000 see Port Arthur Parade. The Regiment's contribution included a colour party, the band led by Bandmaster McCready,(marching ahead of the 125th field artillery band of Duluth) as well as the 18th Medium Battery of Port Arthur and the Regiment itself led by Col. Dear and accompanied by Col. McDevitt of the American Artillery. TBMMA, doc 1995.152.004b: Coronation Celebration programme May 12, 1937 (The parade order names the LSR band and the LSR as third and fourth in the order of march, respectively.) Phillipott wrote that one Officer and One RSM were selected to attend the Coronation. But it is not clear whether any attended (M.D. #10 Headquarters seems to have reserved all the designated places).

¹¹⁰ TBMMA, Sergeant's Mess, 1st Battalion, LSR (52nd Battalion CEF) Military Armistice Ball Programme, Nov 11, 1935. (doc 1995.152.004a) Declaration Day Aug 29, 1937 LSR Band (photo 1995.152.002e) Annual Decoration Day Services Sun, Aug 21, 1938, LSR band present by permission of Maj. H. Cook, OC. (doc 1995.152.004e) Armistice Service, 20th Anniversary, Nov 13, 1938, music by LSR band (doc 1995.152.004f). In "Notes on the Activities of the LSR prior to Mobilization June 1940" (held by TBMMA), Monty Phillipott offers recollections on the Regiment's activities: "All Lakehead units paraded through Port Arthur and attended church service in Armoury on Armistice Day, Nov. 11". The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle and The Fort William Daily Times-Journal.

¹¹¹ Stanley, In the Face of Danger, p. 47 and Phillipott to Smith: "Some units paraded through Fort William on St. Julian's (sic) Day (Nearest Sunday to April 23rd.), the day the battle of St. Julian in World War started (in 1915). Services held in the Orpheum Theatre of Fort William."

visit of 1939. In May of 1939, the LSR was given the task of providing an honour guard for King George VI on the occasion of the monarch's visit to Port Arthur, an event witnessed by thousands at the Lakehead.¹¹²

During the thirties, the Regiment also endeavored to foster a closer relationship with civic authorities, inviting city officials to attend not only social functions, but "military events" like inspection parades.¹¹³ It would appear that this policy paid dividends for the unit as during the decade, the Regiment was to receive increasingly large annual grants from Port Arthur City Council for its band, which by July of 1939, reached \$900 per annum¹¹⁴ --an impressive sum if one takes into account that these were the years of the Great Depression. This financial support was also to continue into the war years when the band became an important part of the recruiting effort at the Lakehead.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 47, Souvenir Programme, Princess Beatrice Chapter IODE (NSRC), Souvenir Album, Consolidated Press, Fort William (NSRC), and TBMMA photo 1995.001.166a. George VI inspected the LSR Guard of Honour during his Port Arthur visit, May 23, 1939. The guard, under the command of Captain J. E. V. Murrell, was complimented by the King on their appearance and bearing. This was not the only time that a guard of honour had been mounted at the Lakehead. Phillpott writes: "Several guards of honour were mounted by the Lake Sups for the visits of all Governor Generals and for the visit of the King and Queen in 1939, when the artillery also mounted a battery to fire 21 guns."

¹¹³ TBA 3052, series 17 Port Arthur City Council Minutes: letter from LSR inviting Port Arthur aldermen to attend inspection June 13, 1933. submitted June 12. These inspections, though infrequent, provided opportunities for the Regiment to display its skills to senior commanders like the District Officer Commanding. (*The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle*, 20 October 1930).

¹¹⁴ TBA 3052, series 17, Port Arthur City Council Minutes: Resolution 12056, June 10, 1935: Report #20 of finance committee, June 7 1935: #9... "that a grant be made to LSR band of 400\$". Resolution 12433 July 13, 1936: Report #25 of finance committee, July 3, 1936. 1... "Grant to LSR band: 400\$". Resolution 12695 July 14, 1937: Report #20 of finance committee, July 4, 1937 3... "Grant to LSR band 750\$ as provided for in estimates". Resolution 13074, July 25, 1938: Report #30 of finance committee, July 18, 1938 #5 "cheque (sic) be issued to LSR band for 900\$ as provided for in estimates", and Resolution 13450, July 24 1939: finance committee report #4 ... "that a cheque (sic) be issued for 900\$ as set out in the estimates".

¹¹⁵ TBA 3052, series 17 Port Arthur City Council Minutes: August 26, 1940, September 30, 1940 and December 2, 1940. Grants of \$1000, \$100 and 250\$ to LSR band.

Further evidence of the close relationship which had developed between the Regiment and civic authorities are the official condolences sent by the Port Arthur City Council upon the death of Colonel S. W. Ray in March of 1939, widely regarded as the founder of the prototypical Lakehead Militia Unit, the 96th District of Algoma Battalion of Rifles.¹¹⁶ All of these examples serve to indicate that the relationship between the LSR and the communities at the Lakehead may very well have been, as Colonel Gravelle indicates, "of a very high quality" by the late thirties. As it turned out, the cities of Port Arthur and Fort William (as well as the outlying communities of the Lakehead) would soon have new opportunities to demonstrate their support for the Regiment through various means during the spring and summer of 1940.

V

The success of the Regiment in establishing ties to the community during the inter-war years meant that by the outbreak of World War Two, the unit could count several prominent local politicians among its boosters, including the Mayor of Port Arthur and several members of City Council. As we have seen, this support was most clearly manifested in March of 1940, when both the Mayor and Council sent a request to the Department of National Defence that the LSR be mobilized and included in the Third Canadian Division.¹¹⁷ The show of support, however, was not limited to the communities of Port Arthur and Fort William, where the unit's profile

¹¹⁶ TBA 3052, series 17, Port Arthur City Council Minutes: resolution 13344, March 7: Report 7 of finance committee, March 7 1939, 8: "That this council sincerely regrets the loss to our community of a very much loved and valued citizen in the passing of Colonel SW Ray and wish to express their sincere sympathy." Ray, a real estate broker and banker, had been a prominent citizen of Port Arthur, serving as Alderman and Mayor as well as being very active in several athletic clubs and fraternal societies. (The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 7 March 1939).

¹¹⁷ Stanley, In the Face of Danger, p. 49 and TBA 3052, Port Arthur City Council Minutes, 95 series 17, Resolution 13665 11 March 1940: Report #6 of finance committee, March 4, 1940.

was raised as its tempo of activity and visibility at the Lakehead increased.¹¹⁸

Several community leaders from other Northwestern Ontario towns also expressed a similar desire that the LSR be mobilized. This is not surprising, considering that some of these communities, like Kenora, had a historic link to the 96th LSR.

In the late thirties and the early months of the war, the LSR had made appearances at public gatherings in several Northwestern Ontario towns, creating new links as well as renewing old ones.¹¹⁹ The results of these efforts were to pay dividends after the mobilization of the unit on June 5th, 1940 when several recruiting parties were dispatched to the small towns of Northwestern Ontario and yielded impressive results.¹²⁰ On June 19th, when general recruiting for the Regiment began in Port Arthur and Fort William, "there was none of the hysterical excitement, the shouting and the flag waving of the earlier war".¹²¹ Those who came did so with a sense of curiosity or a sense of purpose, and at any rate, there were more recruits than could be easily processed. Stanley characterizes the response as "if not overwhelming, at least satisfactory".¹²²

¹¹⁸ The increased activities of the unit included the mounting of a guard at the Armouries of Port Arthur and Fort William. (TBMMA photo 1997.022.002m Nov 8, 1939, guard at Port Arthur Armoury.)

¹¹⁹ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 49, p. 53, and TBMMA doc 1995.152.004g. For example, at the veterans' goodwill assembly dedication of the Dryden War Memorial on September 3, 1939, music was provided by the LSR band, under the direction of bandmaster McCready.

¹²⁰ NAC RG 24, LSR War Diary serial. no. 942, Vol. 1-3, July-Aug 1940. and Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 53. The war diary contains several entries detailing the success of these short expeditions, which frequently returned with ten or twenty new recruits at once. Stanley relates: "In addition to men from the twin cities came others from Kenora, where at one time, there had existed a company of the old 96th, from Dryden and Fort Frances, the mill towns of the west and from Geraldton, the mining community to the North. They represented every activity within the community, clerks, mechanics, labourers, lumberjacks, miners, and almost every nationality in that ployglot population of New Ontario, Englishmen, Scotsmen, Irishmen, Ukrainians, Finns, Poles, Frenchmen, Indians, half-breeds, Canadians all."

¹²¹ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 53.

¹²² Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 53. The speed of the process was largely determined by how

As the Regiment grew in size, it became necessary to find accommodations for those recruits who had come from outside Port Arthur and Fort William.¹²³ Initially, the Sailor's Institute in Port Arthur and the Salvation Army hostel in Fort William were used for this purpose and later, the Forestry Building, the Library, and the Administrative Building of the Ontario Hospital were offered as space for billets. McKellar Park in Fort William and the grounds of the Technical School in Port Arthur were made available as training grounds for the Regiment, which in spite of a chronic lack of instructors, uniforms, and basic military equipment, conducted training as best as it could. During the course of the summer, as basic equipment and uniforms slowly filtered in, patriotic enthusiasm within the rapidly expanded unit was maintained by the officers and NCOs and, as Stanley maintains, "partly, too, by the interest shown in the progress of the regiment by the people of the Lakehead."¹²⁴

This interest manifested itself in various ways, ranging from the aforementioned provision of billets and training grounds to the donation of goods and equipment.¹²⁵ Kind actions such as these helped boost the morale of the new recruits as did some of the measures undertaken by the regiment itself. Continuing the precedent set during the militia years, the unit formed a new brass band (with musicians who could be qualified as stretcher bearers) and also established a pipe band of four pipers and three drummers, which "did much to maintain the spirit of the

quickly recruits could be attested and undergo a medical examination, just some of the many bureaucratic difficulties which plagued the Regiment during the early days of mobilization.

¹²³ NAC RG 24, LSR War Diary serial. no. 942, Vol. 2. By 31 July, 1940, the unit's strength return is listed as 26 officers, 901 other ranks.

¹²⁴ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, pp. 53-54.

¹²⁵ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 54. "During this period a number of local men and groups came to the assistance of the unit by providing binoculars, pistols, compasses and welfare benefits." Stanley makes special mention of one of the most generous of these donations, by Mr. J. F. Hewitson, "who furnished the whole unit with running shorts and sports singlets and shorts for P.T."

troops” and “was in constant demand on route marches.”¹²⁶ The unit also cemented its link to the community by its organizing of a “concert party and chorus” known as “the Superior Songsters” which performed for the public at the Colonial Theatre,¹²⁷ as well as by its participation in city sports, an endeavour that only came to an end when the unit was ordered to move to Camp Borden in Southern Ontario.¹²⁸

By the end of August, the Regiment had completed its transformation from Non-Permanent Active Militia unit to Canadian Active Service Force battalion. It was to undergo many more significant transformations and re-organizations before it saw action nearly four years later. At this early juncture however, before the rigours of training and the natural process of selection took their toll on some of the more senior men, the officer complement of the battalion was overwhelmingly composed of erstwhile militia officers who had joined prior to 1939. This core group of leaders included, among others, the “capable” Lt. Col. Cook, who had served in the military since 1915,¹²⁹ Major J.E.V. Murrell, the second-in-command, who would command the Regiment in England and Captain R. A. Keane, the Adjutant, who would take over command of the unit following Murrell’s wounding on the 9th of August, 1944,

¹²⁶ Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, pp. 54-55. Stanley goes on to remark: “Usually one piper was allotted to each company not only to keep the awkward legs of new recruits moving in comparative unison, but also to lift their blistered feet over the weary miles.” —One of the many roles which the bagpiper has fulfilled since his appearance in the British Army.

¹²⁷ *The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle*, 10 August 1940. The chorus director was Bert Dockrey.

¹²⁸ *The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle*, Sept 3 1940. Several LSR entries enhanced the Labour Day Sports meet held in McKellar park in 1940. More on the military’s participation in sports at the Lakehead during World War Two in Ron Lappage, “The Competitive Spirit in Sports”, p. 172 in *Thunder Bay: From Rivalry to Unity* (Tronrud and Epp, eds., Thunder Bay: TBHMS Inc., 1995).

¹²⁹ NAC RG 24 series C-1, reel C-4979, file 8328, DND Abridged report of inspection. LSR CASF Inspected at Port Arthur and Fort William on 10 August 1940. This inspection report includes the general remarks of western Canada’s inspector general, Maj. Gen. W.A. Griesbach, regarding Colonel Cook: “23. The CO Lt.-Col. Herbert Cook is a contractor in civil life. A quiet spoken but apparently capable man to whom this battalion, I think, may be safely entrusted.” The report also includes a listing of the battalion’s officers.(See below)

and would hold it until the end of hostilities.¹³⁰ The continuity evident in the officer corps from the militia era into the unit's "active service" era (1940-1946)¹³¹ shows without a doubt that the LSR of the NPAM was an organization whose leadership took its role as a military force quite seriously. The efforts of the Regiment to establish and maintain links to the community, particularly in the years leading up to the war, demonstrate that the unit took its role as a social institution equally seriously.

For its efforts in the latter area, the unit reaped a windfall of support and enthusiasm in the middle months of 1940 from the citizens of the Lakehead that transcended mere patriotism. An entry in the Regimental War Diary for October 10th, 1940, reads:

10 October 1940

At 1115 hrs, the first section of the Battalion., namely HQ, A and B Companies moved out of the Armoury under command of Maj. Murrell and entrained from Port Arthur at 1201 hrs for camp Borden (train consisted of 12

¹³⁰ NAC RG 24, vol. 206, 1599 and 1602, LSR files, and Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p.55. According to Stanley, the other officers who were on the battalion's strength by the end of August included: *Battalion H.Q.*: Lt. M. W. Babe, Lt. A.C. Green, *Headquarters Company*: Major R.H. Neeland, Lt. H.G. Dawson, Lt. I.C. McGillivray, Lt. J.L. McCormack, Lt. R.J. Arthur, Captain R.A. Bartley, *A Company*: Major W. McLeod, Capt. R. G. Walgate, Lt. M.J. Francis, *B Company*: Capt. A.W.S. Bennett, Lt. J.D. Morrison, Lt. E.G. Styffe, *C Company*: Capt. D.M. Marshall, Capt. N.W. Shields, Lt. H.J.W. Cargo, *D Company*: Capt. M.F. Phillipott, Lt. T.S. Jones, *First Line Reinforcements*: 2lt I.C. Wilson, 2lt J.W. McInnis, 2lt D. Arthur and 2lt O.F. Dumbrille (All the 2lts listed were, in fact, qualified as Lieutenants by August 10, 1940 according to Griesbach's inspection report).

¹³¹ NAC RG 24 series C-1, reel C-4979, file 8328, and Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 55, p. 134. Notwithstanding this continuity, of all of the officers who were members of the Battalion in August of 1940, only Murrell, Keane, Babe, Dawson, R. J. Arthur, Francis, E. G. Styffe, Cargo and Dumbrille would accompany the battalion to France in July of 1944 (perhaps an indication of the rigours of training for war and the high standard of physical fitness required). However, three other members of the Regiment who were listed in Griesbach's report as officers (taken on strength in September) but are not mentioned by Stanley, 2nd Lieutenants R. Styffe, R.A. Colquhoun, and R.E. Purves, would also be with the Regiment when it crossed over to France. Also, as already mentioned, several former militia NCOs would also cross over to France as Officers in their old unit. At the time of Griesbach's inspection, eight NCOs were taking the officer qualifying course at MD 10 and attached to the Regimental Wing of the District Depot in Winnipeg, the first batch of many NCOs to become officers in the CASF, LSR. These were: Malach, P., A/CSM; Rogers, W.R., A/CQMS; Hardy, L.A., A/CQMS; Murray, T.H., A/Sgt; Neil, J, A/Sgt; Skinner, W.H. A/CSM; MacKenzie, R.D., A/CSM; and MacRae, A., A/Sgt. Of these, Malach, Murray, McKenzie and MacRae would go over to France in July of 1944.

Officers and 408 ORs). At 1215, the rest of the Battalion left Port Arthur Armoury under the Command of Lt. Col. H. Cook and entrained from Port Arthur for Camp Borden at 1301 hrs. (train comprised of 12 officers and 429 ORs) Wet drizzly rain falling but huge crowds lined the sidewalks as the two parades moved through the streets headed by the band in their scarlet uniforms and an immense crowd gathered at the CPR station to send off the boys with a cheer, a song and not a few tears.¹³²

And so it was that when, on October 10th 1940, the Lake Superior Regiment CASF, departed the Lakehead for Camp Borden, it was given a warm farewell from the people who had come to recognize this erstwhile militia battalion as truly "The Lakehead's Own".

¹³² NAC RG 24 LSR War Diary, serial. no. 942. The war diary gives an interesting day-by-day, point form account of the unit's activities from Griesbach's inspection to the unit's departure to Borden. A portion of the Diary (6 Aug-9 Oct) is reproduced here. Of particular interest are the several events sponsored by local organizations for the Regiment's entertainment and the depositing of the colours at the Regimental Church:

Vol. 3

6 Aug 40: Muster parade PA and FW. Received notification from MD 10 to be prepared to move to Camp Borden ASAP.

7 Aug 40: Battalion segregated into companies. C and D in FW and remainder in PA.

8 Aug 40: First parade by companies. Training by companies commences.

10 Aug 40: GRIESBACH inspected the Regiment this morning, accompanied by new DOC Brigadier Riley.

12 Aug 40: Several Huts constructed at Current River for use of troops that may be quartered there in the near future.

16 Aug 40: Sgts and 52 Old Boys dance.

17 Aug 40: Out of town members of the regiment guests at Port Arthur chapter IODE picnic in Current River Park

18 Aug 40: Full Battalion parade at 1400 hrs, St Johns Church, PA, to deposit colours for the "duration"

23 Aug 40: Gracie Fields Concert in PA assisted by the Regimental Concert Party. Port Arthur Detachment of the Battalion there as guests. Battalion parade with our own band and the McGillivray Pipe Band.

Vol. 4

6 Sept 40: Battalion paraded in FW. LSR Band provided music.

9 Sept 40: Battalion parade in PA. LSR Band assisted by McGillivray pipe band.

27 Sept 40: Three additional officers taken on strength: 2lt Roy Styffe, 2lt Ralph Purves, 2lt Robert Colquhoun

30 Sept 40: Unit strength: 29 officers, 946 ORs, 5 ORs attached.

Vol. 5

8 Oct 40: Warning Order arrives for Battalion move to Borden.

9 Oct 40: Advance party under Capt. Walgate departs for Borden.

Chapter 3
**The Lake Superior Regiment:
 Community Relations and Crisis During the Interwar Period**

I

Considering the inherent duality of the Non-Permanent Active Militia battalion of the twenties and thirties which has been revealed over the course of the previous chapters, it is appropriate to determine to what extent units like the Lake Superior Regiment were able to reconcile two roles which, as will be seen, were occasionally at odds. As a social institution, the Non-Permanent Active Militia depended upon the goodwill and support of the community in which it was based. It was from this community that it drew recruits, raised funds and benefited from patronage. However, as a military unit, a militia regiment depended upon the ability to both train frequently and to exercise some type of military function to preserve a modicum of relevance.

This necessity was particularly true of the period being discussed, during which the NPAM was hamstrung by a lack of current weaponry and serviceable equipment and plagued by general public indifference. When these facts are viewed alongside the demonstrated reluctance of the militia's military and civilian masters to employ the NPAM in times of crisis, we are left with the unavoidable impression that in strictly military terms, the militia was basically a "phantom force", expected to provide a military presence within the community in which it was based but do little else.¹³³

¹³³ Among the better sources which discuss militia aid to the civil power is Desmond Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 1967-1914" in The Canadian Historical Review, vol. 51, no. 4 December 1970, pp. 407-425. Also, see James J. Hudson, "The Role of the California National Guard During the San Francisco General Strike of 1934" in Military Affairs, vol. 46 no. 1, April 1982, pp. 76-83; and Alan M. Osur, "The Role of the Colorado National Guard in Civil Disturbances" in Military Affairs, vol. 44 no. 1, February 1980, pp. 28-32; which provide examples of National Guard "aid to the civil power" operations in the US. A work which encompasses the period discussed is J.J.B. Pariseau, Disorders, Strikes and Disasters: Military Aid to the Civil Power in Canada, 1867-1933, (Ottawa: Directorate of History, National Defense Headquarters, 1973).

An examination of civil disturbances at the Lakehead during the interwar period reveals a catalogue of frustrations and missed opportunities for the LSR, when the use of the militia in aid of the civil power was dismissed or not even seriously considered. (This is particularly striking when the considerable community "police" activity of the 96th LSR between 1906 and 1914 is taken into account). It is possible that authorities had no faith in this organization. It is also quite likely that the military hierarchy discouraged any use of militia forces outside of their regular function, which was essentially to train periodically under certain constraints and serve as a reserve force to the regular army or "Permanent Force". To justify these assertions, we need look no further than the attitudes which were revealed in the course of settling a controversy during the late twenties and early thirties; the issue of "Sunday training".

Because of the part-time nature of militia employment during this era, it was necessary for a NPAM unit to conduct its training after normal working hours or during weekends. It was on this point that a controversy arose during the inter-war period, and the efforts made by the Department of National Defence to come to an agreeable solution reveal the underlying prejudices and agendas of military and civilian authorities and illustrate the challenges posed by the dual nature of the Non-Permanent Active Militia. An examination of this issue provides a prologue for a closer examination of certain events which occurred at the Lakehead during the early thirties.

II

During the 1920s, in response to concerns raised over the conduct of exercises on the Lord's Day, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) sent a message to all District Officers Commanding (DOC) on December 1st, 1927, stating: "In cases where exercises are held on a Sunday, care should be taken to avoid giving them

unnecessary publicity ... particular care should be taken to keep them out of the newspapers.”¹³⁴ This communication was acknowledged by all DOCs , including Major General H.D.R. Ketchen, the DOC of Military District #10 (to which the LSR belonged), who, on 5 December 1927, agreed to adhere to the directive regarding tactical exercises and war games on Sunday, the traditional “day of rest”.

It is clear that no mention was made of ceasing military activities on Sunday, a measure which would likely have severely hampered training, effectively eliminating two-day weekend exercises. It was simply decided that individual units should use discretion in conducting military exercises on the Sabbath Day in order to not offend religious sensibilities. This was a good example of an attempt to placate civic groups while maintaining the integrity of the militia’s training scheme. This issue, however, was far from settled and was to be resurrected a few years later when, in a communication on 29 November 1932, the CGS requested a report on the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment Infantry Association competition; an unsanctioned event that had occurred on a Sunday and that had drawn complaints from members of the clergy.¹³⁵

After consulting with the Commanding Officer of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, Brigadier N.B. Anderson, the DOC of Military District #3 explained that the exercise was voluntary and occurred following a regimental meeting and dinner held in the vicinity of Belleville.¹³⁶ The justification offered was

¹³⁴ NAC RG 24 series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5208. Letter from CGS to all DOCs.

¹³⁵ NAC RG 24 series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5208. Letter of 29 November 1932, Colonel W.C Berman for CGS to DOC Militia District #3.

¹³⁶ NAC RG 24 series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5208. Letter of 11 December 1932, from Brigadier N.B. Anderson, DOC MD #3 to CGS. Anderson stated his opinion in the letter that the exercise conducted by the unit, a skills competition incorporating tactics and fieldcraft, was no different than skiing or playing golf and that he did not think steps should be taken to prevent officers from conducting these types of activities at their leisure.

that this was not a proper military exercise, but rather a military competition held for the enjoyment of the members of the Regiment. Thus, upon the recommendation of the DOC MD #3, the matter was dropped by National Defence Headquarters.

The issue came to the fore once again in May of 1935, this time in British Columbia. On 3 May 1935, a report was sent to the CGS from the DOC MD #11 detailing a protest lodged by the Ministerial Association of Greater Victoria in July of 1934 over the common practice of Sunday shooting.¹³⁷ A reply was sent to the DOC of MD #11 by Colonel G.R. Pearkes on behalf of the CGS stating:

It is considered admirable that NPAM units that wish to maintain the interest of their men by arranging weekend and voluntary shoots should not be prohibited from so doing, provided that such shooting is not contrary to the law of the province. (...) It is not desired to have to take any action that might deprive keen Non Permanent officers and men of a means outside of the routine training by which they can improve their military efficiency.¹³⁸

This directive was in keeping with the policy outlined in 1927 but on 10 July 1935, another order was sent by the CGS to the DOC MD #11: "I am directed to inform you that no firing of machine guns or rifles by the militia is to be permitted on rifle ranges in Victoria on the Sabbath day."¹³⁹ This directive originated from the Minister of National Defense's office who, under pressure from civilian authorities faced with repeated complaints, overruled the CGS on this matter. This resulted in the shutdown of the range for nearly two years. The key statement in the 1927 directive which is easy to overlook is that DOCs and regimental commanders were ordered to follow the law of *the Province* with regard to Sunday shooting. Considering that DND installations fell under the jurisdiction of the federal

¹³⁷ NAC RG 24 series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5208. 3 May 1935 Report on Heal's rifle Range Sunday shoot.

¹³⁸ NAC RG 24 series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5208 14 May 1935. Col. G.R. Pearkes (for CGS) to DOC MD #11 re: Report on Heal's rifle Range Sunday Shoot.

¹³⁹ NAC RG 24 series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5208, letter of 10 July 1935, Pearkes to DOC MD #11.

government, had they wished to do so, military authorities could have argued that militia ranges or, for that matter, public ranges when in use by the NPAM, **did not** fall under the jurisdiction of the provincial government (although this interpretation might not have stood up to a careful scrutiny of the Militia Act).

On 15 May 1937, the DOC MD #11, Brigadier D. J. MacDonald, submitted a report to the CGS recommending the re-opening of the Victoria rifle range after an investigation revealed that the complaint was lodged by a former range caretaker, who objected to working on Sundays without additional remuneration. After consulting with the deputy minister on 28 May 1937 and following several bureaucratic delays, the CGS authorized the re-opening of the range on 11 September 1937.¹⁴⁰ It is indicative of the concern that the Department of National Defence had for relations with civilian authorities that, in spite of a questionable motive and based on a spurious complaint, a single person could force the shut down of a range for nearly two years.¹⁴¹

The approach used by military authorities in dealing with this problem over the course of a decade (1927-37) provides clues on “unofficial” DND policy at this time regarding the militia. The willingness of senior military officials and their political masters to sacrifice the military function of the militia in favour of preserving its civic function as a symbolic presence, the ambivalence of authorities toward promoting the welfare of the militia, the decidedly apprehensive attitude regarding the employment of NPAM personnel in any capacity aside from “regular training”;¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ NAC RG 24 series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5208, DND correspondence of 15 May, 28 May and 11 September 1937.

¹⁴¹ NAC RG 24 series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5208. This conclusion is backed up by the fact that on 13 September 1940, a report was submitted to DND by MD #11 stating that no further complaints over the use of ranges on Sunday had been made. Clearly, the shutdown had in fact been precipitated by a single complaint and this was, in fact, an isolated incident in MD #11.

¹⁴² This idea of “unofficial policy” is derived from the contrast between lip-service paid by politicians

all of these are indicative of a lack of faith in, and commitment to the militia. These themes brought up by the "Sunday training" issue can be related to incidents and developments at the Lakehead during the thirties. The intention, however, is not to infer broad trends, but to note general tendencies (as demonstrated by events in Port Arthur and Fort William) and to make some headway in differentiating between the real role and value of the NPAM and its perceived function during this period.

III

It is important to understand the circumstances which brought about a series of dramatic events at the Lakehead during the Depression. This was a drama in which the LSR was destined to play a role, albeit a minor one. On October 24, 1930, a confidential memorandum was sent to the Adjutant General of the Canadian Army by C.J. Desbarats, the deputy minister of Defence which read: "The Attorney General of Ontario has informed the minister that if the disorders at Port Arthur and Fort William increase, it may be necessary for him to apply for aid from the militia. Would you please take this into consideration so that if the call should come suddenly, the department may be prepared to meet it."¹⁴³

and government authorities to the promotion of the militia's welfare and the measures taken to ensure its survival: A good example of what the government professed to be its desire is seen in a speech by the Minister of National defense given in London Ontario on October of 1930 and reported by the Canadian Press: "It is important that the Canadian militia should be maintained in a high state of efficiency, perhaps more so at the present time than it ever has been in the past", declared hon. Donald M. Sutherland, Minister of National Defense, at a dinner tendered to him by the officers of MD #1 here tonight. "No one hopes more than I do that there will be no more trouble," he continued, "but if a man only uses common sense and ordinary judgement, he will see that there are no particular signs that point to world peace at the present time. "All over the world, with the exception of the United States and Canada, there is a great deal of trouble brewing, and I ask you, as sensible people, should we do away with the very small force that we have at the present?" (The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 1 November 1930. "Would Maintain the Militia's Strength for Eventualities").

¹⁴³ NAC RG 24 series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678. Confidential Memorandum of 24 October 1930, from Deputy Minister, DND, to Adjutant General.

The disorders to which the Deputy Minister referred had their roots in the labour strife which plagued the communities of Northwestern Ontario in the early years of the Depression.¹⁴⁴ The year 1930 was a difficult one for the people of Northwestern Ontario. Logging and paper production had been particularly hard hit by the nation's economic slump. Indeed, "Several Ontario mills were forced to shut down completely in 1930 ... Only one of the four Lakehead mills, the Great Lakes Paper Mill, managed to continue production, but it experienced slowdowns which caused the layoff of large numbers of workers."¹⁴⁵ In the face of this adversity, many workers turned to labour unions for support. Though it is impossible to relate in detail the developments which led up to the crisis, a brief summary of events will provide the context for what was to occur later.

In the spring of 1930, the bodies of Janne (John) Voutilainen and Viljo (Victor) Rosvall, two Lumber Worker's Union representatives who had vanished the previous winter, were found. They had last been seen alive on November 19, 1929, leaving Maki's Lumber Camp to cross the frozen Onion Lake. The findings of the Provincial Police investigation into their disappearance and death which ruled out foul play were backed up by the post mortem conducted by three local surgeons on Voutilainen's body. Local union officers, however, were not convinced. Employers had been determined to suppress the union and there had been several violent confrontations in the lumber camps. The union believed that the two

¹⁴⁴ For analysis of government policy, both leading up to, and during the Depression, see James Struthers, "Prelude to Depression: The Federal Government and Unemployment, 1918-1928" in *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 58 no. 3, September 1977, pp. 277-294; and Blair H. Neatby, *The Politics of Chaos: Canada in the Thirties*, (Toronto: MacMillan Company, 1972). For an overview of the Depression, see *The Depression in Canada*, (Michael Horn, ed., Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1988).

¹⁴⁵ James Stafford, "A Century of Growth at the Lakehead" in *Thunder Bay: From Rivalry to Unity*, p.49.

men, who had been sent to the Maki Camp at Onion Lake to organize workers as part of a general strike, may indeed have been the victims of foul play.

At the inquest into the deaths, on April 23, 1930, Dr. C. N. Laurie explained that the presence of three surgeons at a post mortem was unusual, "but was done for the purpose of satisfying all parties."¹⁴⁶ The conclusion reached by the examiners was that both men had drowned. This did not sit well with many labour leaders who insisted that the men had been murdered-- their cause now had two martyrs. When on April 28th, 1930, the "largest funeral cortege that ever passed through Port Arthur", a procession that included more than 2000 members of the Lumber Worker's Union and affiliated organizations, passed the communist headquarters on Bay Street and people standing on balconies saluted "with emblems of red",¹⁴⁷ the casual onlooker could not have been blamed for believing that trouble was brewing at the Lakehead.

As often occurred during an era when people were seeking an outlet for their fears and frustrations, many turned to those "fringe" organizations who offered hope and solutions to the crippling problems brought on by the Depression.¹⁴⁸ At the Lakehead, which was a stop-off point for transients and where scores of unemployed arrived daily from points east and west, thousands began to listen to socialist

¹⁴⁶ Joseph M. Mauro, *Thunder Bay: A History*, Thunder Bay, Ont: Lehto Printers Ltd., 1981. pp. 314-315. In an interesting coincidence, Dr. C.N. Laurie, who attended "partly on behalf of the crown and partly as an independent witness" had, in fact, served as the C.O. of the old 96th LSR from 1905 to 1911. Nor was he the only "Lake Sup" present. Dr. J. A. Crozier, who, as the Crown's appointee, had actually performed the examination, had also served as the LSR's C.O. from 1924 to 1927. (Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 333.) The third surgeon present, Dr. G. E. Eakins, attended as a representative of "friends of the dead man."

¹⁴⁷ Mauro, *Thunder Bay: A History*, p. 315. Mauro writes: "Voutilainen and Rosvall were buried while the decade of the 1930's was still young. They were not forgotten, however; their deaths symbolized for some citizens the struggle of labour versus big business in Thunder Bay during the Great Depression." The link between these deaths and the strife which was to follow in later months is quite apparent.

¹⁴⁸ Two works which discuss the Northern Ontario experience of the Great Depression are Barbara R. Huff's HBA Dissertation "Northern Ontario Relief Camps, 1932-1936" (Lakehead University, 1994) and Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "Relief Camp Workers in Ontario during the Great Depression of the 1930s" in *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 76 no. 2, June 1995, pp. 205-228.

speakers, attend union rallies, and march in demonstrations led by left-wing agitators. In the eyes of the civic authorities, these alarming events were the manifestation of an insidious threat -- that of communism. In particular, it was the Finns and Ukrainians of the Lakehead that were identified with this subversive movement and thus, like the Greeks and Slavs before World War One, became scapegoats for most of the disturbances. ¹⁴⁹

The fact that the Finns and Ukrainians at the Lakehead were singled out as threats was likely due not only to their perceived "communist tendencies" but also to both the relative sizes of these two ethnic groups, and their rapid growth during the interwar period. In 1931, the 3252 Finns of Port Arthur made up 16.4 percent of the population (compared to 10.5 percent in 1921), and were, in fact, the *second* largest ethnic group in the city (not the third largest, as Mauro contends) after people of "British" origin (which included those of English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh descent). The Ukrainians were the third largest ethnic group in the town, at 1062 souls, or 5.3 percent of Port Arthur's population of 19818. In Fort William, the 3322 Ukrainians, comprising 12.6 percent of the city's population of 26277, were the next largest single

¹⁴⁹ In Thunder Bay: A History, pp. 315-316. Mauro clarifies the use of the label "Communist" during the interwar period. The term "communism" did not carry with it the same connotations of political ideology as it does in its current usage. He explains: "Unionism, socialism, communism met and intermingled in a chaos of proclamations and credos in the 1930's. Authorities confused the terms even more. Little or no effort was made to distinguish between the three distinctive movements. They were lumped together as one inseparable, intolerable political manifestation -- Communism. Nor did officials hesitate to pinpoint the sources of communist agitation in Thunder Bay. Finns and Ukrainians, they believed, were at the root of the trouble. As in the case of Italians and Greeks during the pre-World War I labour turmoil, government officials and police merely selected the most vocal and visible ethnic minorities to condemn. The Finns were the third largest (sic) ethnic group in Port Arthur (...) and were most susceptible to the charge." (p. 315). David Ratz's Honours Dissertation, "The 96th Lake Superior Regiment in Aid of the Civil Power, 1909 and 1912", deals at length with labour strife prior to World War One and the involvement of the local militia in quelling disturbances. For an examination of labour at the Lakehead in the early part of the century see Jean Morrison, "Labour in Fort William and Port Arthur, 1903-1913", in Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society Papers and Records, vol. 1, Spring 1973, pp. 23-30; and Jean Morrison, "Ethnicity and Class Consciousness: British, Finnish, and South European Workers at the Canadian Lakehead Before World War I", in The Lakehead University Review, vol. 9 no. 1, Spring 1976, pp. 41-54. An examination of immigration in the early twentieth century which cannot be overlooked is James S. Woodsworth's seminal 1909 work Strangers Within Our Gates (reprint of 1909 edition, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972).

ethnic group after the "British".¹⁵⁰ In addressing the purported "red tendencies" of these groups, Chris Southcott offers an explanation for how the association of Finns, Ukrainians and Scandinavians with "Communism" came about:

The hostile anti-immigration environment of the Depression intensified the earlier trends toward ethnically based community support groups in the Lakehead. As it became evident that the Anglo-Canadian establishment was not prepared to accept the non-British immigrants as an equal part of their society, the latter continued to look inwards to their own ethnic communities as a means of defending their interests. During the late twenties and early thirties, the pre-W.W.I movement toward ethnically-based unions continued. These unions became involved in a series of bitter strikes during this period. This was especially true in the lumber industry, where drives and strikes by bush-workers led by Finnish-dominated unions, often erupted into violence. In addition to labour unions, certain ethnic groups carried their fight for better working conditions into the political realm. In the 1920s and 1930s, various ethnically based socialist organizations in the Lakehead-- Ukrainians, Finns, Scandinavians and others were established which actively participated in socialist movements. In particular, the Finnish Organization of Canada, the major Finnish social organization at that time in Thunder Bay, and the Ukrainian Labour Temple Association, a worker's organization which also included Poles, Russians and other Slavic nationalities, were given special status in the communist party of Canada.¹⁵¹

During the early months of 1930, the mass demonstrations, public rallies and parades organized by the "communists" began to occur with increasing frequency. In February, the Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle commented on a particular gathering: "Ostensibly the demonstration is to be held as a token of sympathy for the

¹⁵⁰ Statistics Canada, Census of Canada (1921-1931). From 1921 to 1931, the percentage of Port Arthur inhabitants of British origin decreased nearly 10% from 65% to 55.5% while that of Finns increased by 5.9%, (the greatest increase by any ethnic group in that 10 year period). The Ukrainian population increased by 4.7% from only 0.6% in 1921 to 5.3% of Port Arthur's population in 1931. In Fort William, the "British" population percentage decreased by 5.9% from 60.2% to 54.3% while the Ukrainian percentage increased by 2.4% from 10.2% to 12.6%. By 1931, the Ukrainians were the second largest ethnic group at the Lakehead, comprising 9.5% of the total population of Port Arthur and Fort William combined. The Finns were the third largest ethnic group at the Lakehead at 9.2%.

¹⁵¹ Chris Southcott, "Ethnicity and community in Thunder Bay" in Polyphony, vol. 9, no2. 1987. pp14-15. Anthony Rasporich's "Ethnicity in Lakehead politics 1900-1930" in Polyphony, vol. 9, no 2. 1987, p. 61-66 which examines the roots of repression and violence experienced by labour and ethnic groups at the Lakehead, largely supports Southcott's contentions.

unemployed ... In reality it is designed to advance the cause of Communism over the entire continent of North America."¹⁵² Whether or not this assessment was accurate is a moot point. The civic authorities would demonstrate by their actions that this perceived threat was to be taken seriously. The result would be a series of confrontations which polarized the Lakehead communities along class and ethnic lines.

IV

The "troubles" to which Desbarats alluded in his memorandum of 24 October 1930 began in earnest on the morning of October 21st, when two hundred "communists" attempted to hold a demonstration in front of the Port Arthur Post Office. They were protesting the detention of two men who "had been taken into custody the night before, when a shouting, chanting crowd of 500 marched on the Whalen building".¹⁵³ The DMOI related in a memorandum on October 28th, 1930 precisely what had occurred on the 20th and 21st:

On Monday, October 20, a report appeared in the press that serious trouble was brewing in Port Arthur due to the activities of the local communist organization in stirring up trouble among the unemployed. Later it was reported in the press that an organized mob had attacked the Chief of Police and one constable who were endeavouring to arrest one of the ringleaders. The mob assaulted the police and the prisoner escaped.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, The Port Arthur News-Chronicle and Mauro, Thunder Bay: A History, p. 316. Mauro also writes: "A circular, distributed in April, demonstrated that if the Communists ever got into a position to do so "murder would run riot through the highways and byways of every part of the Dominion."

¹⁵³ Mauro, Thunder Bay: A History, p. 316. and The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 21 October 1930, "The communists were planning to meet the Port Arthur City Council in session, but council was not in session and police ordered the marchers on" (p.1). On the 21st, The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle gave the names of the men arrested: Frank Bruce, who had been involved in an illegal parade in Fort William the previous May, and John Carey. Both men were released on the evening of the 20th but this "may or may not have been known to the Communists".

¹⁵⁴ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, DMOI's Memorandum of 28 October 1930. In

Lt. Colonel Ruttan¹⁵⁵, the Commanding Officer of the Lake Superior Regiment at the time, was sufficiently concerned over the situation to dispatch the following telegram to MD #10 Headquarters in Winnipeg on October 21st:

“Communist activities here very pronounced STOP Disturbance here last night and again today when police forces openly defied STOP Police chief feels he should have assistance and suggests cooperation mounted police STOP Will keep you advised”

(signed) H.A. Ruttan, Lt. Col.¹⁵⁶

Reserve or off duty police were called into service and as these reinforcements arrived on Tuesday morning, the crowd of approximately 1000 people, which had gathered at Arthur and Court street, marched away. Later that day, delegates from Port Arthur's "Unemployed Association" presented a petition with 825 signatures and a list of demands to City Clerk T. F. Milne and gave a deadline of 7:00 p.m. for the city to meet them. This ultimatum included demands for work and provisions for food and clothing as well as a hearing from the mayor and council. Police Chief Taylor is said to have responded: "I am of the opinion that it is not merely a case of unemployed endeavouring to get assistance, but that these reds are trying to stir up a

Mauro's version of events, Police Chief George Taylor and two other policemen attempted to arrest one of the leaders and thirty men attacked them. (Mauro, p. 316). The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle reported on 21 October 1930 that Taylor and Sgt. James Hutcheon, who had been "encumbered by their heavy coats", were set upon by a yelling mob and were obliged to use their batons to defend themselves. The Fort William Daily Times-Journal reported that same day that a crowd of 1000 had been on hand at the "near-riot" which took place at 10.30 in the morning, including members of the Communist Party.

¹⁵⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Henry Andrew Ruttan (1881-1958) was a prominent local realtor in the firm eventually known as Ruttan-Bolduc-Adderley founded in 1880 as Ruttan Estates. In 1926, Ruttan became the vice-president of the firm. He served overseas with the 94th Battalion C.E.F. and commanded the LSR from 1930 to 1933. (The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 1 December 1958 and The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 23 June 1934, in Thunder Bay Public Library Local Historical File, Business Firms -Thunder Bay, #24.)

¹⁵⁶ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, 5 WC-317 para. 1. Confidential message of 24 October 1930, from Brigadier T.V. Anderson, DOC MD #10 to Secretary, DND re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur, Ontario.

revolution..."¹⁵⁷ Lt. Col. Ruttan reported to MD #10 Headquarters a second time on the 21st of October:

"Situation here quiet at present but ultimatum delivered to city that unless certain demands are met tonight stores on main street are to be raided STOP Understand parade will take place at ten AM tomorrow STOP am placing guard on Armouries"

(signed) H. A. Ruttan. Lt. Col.¹⁵⁸

That Lt. Col. Ruttan thought it necessary to place a guard on the Armoury (which was, in fact, a repository for scores of rifles and machine guns) illustrates the "perceived" gravity of the situation. In response to the threat that the Unemployed Association were going to enforce their demands by fighting, the entire police force and a number of citizens sworn in as special constables were on hand that evening but no further demonstrations took place (nor did the demonstration that had been called for at 10 O'clock the next morning). To further strengthen the police force, on

¹⁵⁷ The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 22 October 1930. p. 1., and Mauro, Thunder Bay: A History, p. 316 The paper also comments: "the demands sent in by the communist party or unemployed association of Port Arthur are considered of an extreme nature especially at this time of the year when work is so scarce." The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle printed a copy of the demands submitted by the Unemployed Association in its 22 October 1930 edition. These were in the form of 14 separate articles and included demands for the formation of a council elected by the unemployed to organize assistance and relief work, the distribution of food and clothing on credit, free fare for travel to places of relief employment, suspension of debt payments, the abolition of vagrancy laws, the elimination of favoritism in relief work distribution, free medical attention and a minimum wage of 50 cents an hour for relief work.

¹⁵⁸ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, 5 WC-317 para. 1. Confidential letter of 24 October 1930, from Brigadier T.V. Anderson, DOC MD #10 to Secretary, DND re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur, Ontario. Brigadier Anderson included the following details to the Secretary with copies of the telegrams sent on the 21st of October:

"2. Col. Ruttan has been instructed that he should be guided in his actions by Sections 75 to 85 of the Militia Act. (This refers to the section of the Act dealing with military aid to the civil power).

3. In order to protect the arms, ammunition and equipment, a guard of three men drawn from the LSR has been placed on the PA Armoury. Authority is requested for the payment of this guard at public expense.

4. The OC LSR reported on the 23rd inst. that the situation was quiet with the possibility that another crisis might be expected on Monday the 27th instant."

A Minute was appended to the letter: "AG, Under the circumstances it seems reasonable that expenses incurred as outlined in para. 3 above should be a charge against the public. H H Matthews Col." (This single sentence was the first reference to an issue which would go unresolved for several months.)

Wednesday, 22 October 1930 the Port Arthur Police Commission decided to enroll members of the Port Arthur Branch of the Legion and other ex-servicemen and citizens "for special police duty".¹⁵⁹

The enrollment, which began in the Legion Club rooms on Cooke Street on the evening of the 22nd, had garnered several hundred volunteers by the afternoon of the 23rd. The auxiliary police force was placed under the command of Lt. Col. Milton Francis DSO (a member of the LSR until 1927) and Major J.G. Lumsen, MC, with Major A.W.S. Bennett, (an active officer of the Lake Superior Regiment) Captain J. Boswell and Captain T. Williams (another active officer of the Regiment) as platoon commanders, each in charge of a specific section of the city of Port Arthur. A system was also devised for dispatching the force whereby the siren usually used for fire alarms would alert the special constables.¹⁶⁰ At 8.00 p.m. on the 23rd, authorities occupied the Port Arthur Armoury for the further enrollment and organization of special constables.¹⁶¹ The Officer in Charge of the Armoury had received an urgent request from the Mayor of Port Arthur on that date requesting its

¹⁵⁹ The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, "Special Police to Help Force when Required", 22 October 1930. The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle announced the planned formation of an auxiliary police force comprised of city employees and citizens after a meeting of the Port Arthur Police Commission, representatives of the Provincial Police, officers of the Legion and several other citizens, most of whom were World War One veterans. Several past and present members of the LSR were on hand, including Milton Francis, Neil Campbell, and A.W.S. Bennett. It was also reported that the auxiliary force would be distinguished by badges. The News-Chronicle wrote of the registration drive for the force on the 23rd "The Port Arthur post of the Canadian Legion signed up practically as a body and in addition there were hundreds of other citizens including merchants, clerks businessmen, laborers and representatives of practically every walk of life. Included in the number are nearly fifty law abiding Finns, who, by credentials, showed themselves to be of the class known as "Whites" who are directly opposed to the principles of Communism."

¹⁶⁰ The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 23 October 1930, "Port Arthur Quiet After Communist Clash, Police Say" p. 5. Although no list of the "special constables" has been located, considering the great number of members of the LSR who were also members of the legion, it is not unreasonable to infer that, in addition to Major Bennett and Captain Williams, some of the "ex-military" personnel may have in fact been active members of the NPAM.

¹⁶¹ The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 23 October 1930, "Organization of Special Police Force Continues".

use. After this request was conveyed to MD #10 Headquarters in Winnipeg, the use of the Armoury was immediately authorized as an "emergency measure" by Brigadier J.V. Anderson, the DOC of MD #10.¹⁶²

The Unemployed Association may have been deterred from carrying out the threatened violence and raids by the enthusiastic response to the formation of the auxiliary police force. By the time 25 RCMP officers arrived in Port Arthur on October 27th, this "special force" had grown to several hundred members.¹⁶³ The arrival of the RCMP officers from Regina, however, was uneventful and did not precipitate the crisis alluded to by Lt. Col. Ruttan in Brigadier Anderson's October 24th letter to the Secretary. The Mounties, under Inspector T. H. Irvine, were temporarily quartered in the old General Hospital building with beds supplied by the Newaygo Timber Company.

Mayor Gibbon, who met the detachment on the morning of the 27th, stated "I am more than pleased with the expression of loyalty shown by the citizens of Port Arthur in their turning out as voluntary policemen, in having the Mounties on hand to assist local police, we hope to be able to get along without calling on the citizens."¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, WC 317, letter of 27 October 1930 from DOC MD #10 to Secretary DND re: Use of Port Arthur Armoury by special police force.

¹⁶³ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, DMOI's Memorandum of 28 October 1930. A portion of the report reads: "On Thursday October 23, the Deputy Minister informed the DMOI that the Attorney General of Ontario had spoken to him with regard to the unsatisfactory situation in Port Arthur and hinted at the possibility of requiring military aid to the civil power. The DMOI at once telephoned the Assistant Commissioner, RCMP, Lt. Col. A. W. Duffus, who informed him that reports received at RCMP HQ indicated that the situation at the time was fairly well in hand and that local authorities, while anxious, did not anticipate they would require military aid. *This more optimistic outlook was partly due to the fact that the citizens generally were behind the local and provincial authorities and were ready to organize a force of special constables in support of law and order.* (The italics are my own) Lt. Col. Duffus also stated that there were then in Port Arthur ten members of the Ontario Provincial Police and that a detachment of RCMP from the depot in Regina had been ordered to stand by ready to proceed to Port Arthur at a moments notice." According to Mauro, "'Several hundred' citizens joined the auxiliary police force" (p.316).

¹⁶⁴ The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 27 October 1930. "Detachment of 25 Here From Regina." The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 27 October 1930. The article "Tread of Riding Boots and

That very day the Mayor had met with D. M. Sutherland, the Minister of National Defense (and a former Commanding Officer of the 52nd Battalion) who was on his way back to Toronto after an inspection tour of Western Canada. Gibbon informed him of the situation in Port Arthur and the measures that had been adopted. "When told of the extensive organization effected he was confident that everything possible was being carried out and that the situation was in safe hands".¹⁶⁵

By the time the 800 members of the special police force marched from Legion Headquarters on Cooke street to the Port Arthur Armoury on the 27th to hear the Mayor speak, the crisis seemed to be over, though the state of affairs at the Lakehead was far from normal.¹⁶⁶ The police chief took advantage of the now favourable circumstances in the city to adopt a more assertive posture. The first of several raids was conducted at the Communist headquarters on Bay street which failed to uncover

Jingle of Spurs Heard in Old Hospital Corridors", offers a description of the RCMP's occupation of the hospital, and of their arms and equipment, which included "formidable looking" .303 Lee Enfield rifles and steel helmets "such as the soldiers used overseas" (p.1).

¹⁶⁵ The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 27 October 1930. "Defense Minister Met At Station."

¹⁶⁶ The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 28 October 1930, "Special Army Lines Streets of Sister City" and Mauro, Thunder Bay: A History, p. 316. At this meeting, Chief of Police Taylor referred to the communists as "a lot of dirty parasites without courage", stating "We are not going to be dragged into the mud by a lot of dirty parasites." and "The one thing that they fear is deportation and we want to get rid of them if they are not prepared to take their chance with the rest and keep the peace". Mayor Gibbon of Port Arthur stated "The Union Jack will stay nailed to the mast" and Lt. Col. Francis congratulated City Council for its efforts and expressed his hope that those members of the special force who were out of work would be given a job first. In Fort William, city council met that evening to discuss the policy to be pursued in the event of a situation similar to the disorders in Port Arthur the week before. The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle reported on 28 October 1930 that Colonel Francis explained that the special force was not being disbanded and warned the men to be on guard. It was while the Port Arthur city council was in session that the auxiliary force made its demonstration of strength. "each man was given a white armband to identify himself in case of confusion...While the auxiliary force was on parade constables in pairs were doing their regular patrol work. Each city man on his usual beat was accompanied by a provincial officer. Four men were posted to the entrance to the city buildings where the council was in session. The mounted police detachment...stood ready at their local headquarters but received no call."(p. 8).

a suspected cache of weapons, but resulted in the confiscation of a great deal of Communist literature.¹⁶⁷

The annual Armistice Day ceremony that year afforded civic authorities with an opportunity for a show of strength. To that end, what the Fort William paper described on 11 November 1930 as an “imposing” parade had been held the previous Sunday (9 November 1930) before an audience of thousands at the Port Arthur Armoury. The parade had formed up at the Veterans’ club rooms on Cooke street and marched to the Armoury with the MacGillivray Pipe band in the van, followed by the Sea Cadets, the Boy Scouts, the Girl Guides, the LSR Regimental Band led by Bandmaster W. J. Gutteridge, members of the RCMP detachment stationed in the city under the command of Inspector Irvine, 400 members of the Port Arthur Legion, the Ladies Auxiliary to the legion, the “1st Lake Superior Regiment, 52nd Battalion C.E.F.” commanded by Lt. Col. Ruttan, as well as the Signals Corps commanded by Major A. F. McDonald and the Medical Corps under Colonel Hardiman. The address was given by Brigadier General Alex Ross, CMG DSO, who had also addressed a gathering of ex-servicemen at the Legion the day before.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 29 Oct 1930, “Red Headquarters Raided by Police” Search warrants were taken out and searches conducted for weapons at the 216 Bay street premises. The search failed to locate any weapons but “considerable red literature was confiscated.” In The Scandinavian Home Society, 1923-93, (Thunder Bay: Scandinavian Home Society, 1996), Elinor Barr comments on the events of October from the perspective of some of the unemployed: “October 1930 was a month that could hardly be ignored. Opportunities for winter bushwork were so limited that the Port Arthur Police chief called in the RCMP to help deal with the demonstrations he expected to take place. Police Activities included raids on several Bay Street addresses, including the office of the Unemployed Workers Association which counted many Swedes among its members.”

¹⁶⁸ The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 11 November 1930, “Imposing Military Parade is Held by Port Arthur Units” and The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 11 November 1930.

V

But what of the LSR? If the Regiment had played a part in the “show of strength” orchestrated by authorities during the Armistice Day ceremony, why was it not called upon to form part of the auxiliary police force itself? Aside from the provision of a guard at the Armoury from the 21st to the 31st of October, the Regiment was destined to play the role of spectator to the drama which unfolded from October 20th to early November. An article in the Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle of Monday, October 20, 1930, which reports on the visit of Brigadier-General T. V. Anderson DSO to the Lakehead on the 18th indicates that the LSR could have fielded at least a platoon’s worth of troops (30-40 soldiers) during the disturbance. The article also reported that the Brigadier-General had been quite pleased with the unit’s performance. Such an endorsement from a high-ranking and decorated “professional” soldier should have laid to rest any questions concerning the LSR’s “reliability” or “suitability” for service in aid of the civil authorities-- and yet the unit was not called upon.¹⁶⁹ The DMOI seems to raise the question of the use of troops in his October 28th report:

With regard to the possibility of calling out troops, Lt. Col. Duffus thought this remote at the moment, and in reply to a query by the DMOI stated that in his opinion if such a contingency arose, it would be advisable to bring troops from Toronto and London rather than from Winnipeg. He agreed with the DMOI in support of this, that if Winnipeg were denuded of troops the communist activities might be transferred there from Port Arthur, Winnipeg still being an important HQ of the communist party of Canada, and the large

¹⁶⁹ The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 20 October 1930, p.3. “Visiting Officer Inspects Platoon at Manoeuvres”. Based on NAC RG 24, series c-1, reel c-8301, (25 Feb 1939 Reply from Secretary), the only reliable estimate of the unit’s numbers during the inter-war period, it can be deduced that the LSR had a total strength on paper of between 40 and 175 all ranks, a number which likely varied considerably from year to year. The Fort William Daily Times-Journal reported on 11 November that the LSR had 70 men of all ranks marching in the Armistice Day ceremony held at the Cenotaph in Waverley Park. It is therefore certain that the unit had at least 70 men capable of coming to the assistance of civic authorities.

percentage of foreign population there creates a fertile soil for the cultivation of seeds of trouble, particularly among the unemployed.(...)

The press on October 27 reported that a detachment of 25 mounted police, with horses, under one officer, had been dispatched from Regina to Port Arthur, there to remain as a reserve in case of emergency, but to take no active part in policing the town unless specially called upon by the municipal authorities.¹⁷⁰

The troops referred to in the report were Permanent Force soldiers, not militiamen. In fact, it would appear that the option of using the militia to help quell any disturbances too great for the police to handle was not even considered by the government and military commanders. This begs the question "Why Not?" Certainly, there was a precedent for this type of intervention at the Lakehead; the 96th LSR had twice come to the aid of the civil power prior to World War One and had acquitted itself fairly well in discharging its task.¹⁷¹

There seems to be no clear answer to this question. By all appearances, Lt. Col. Ruttan was prepared to render assistance to civic authorities in an "official" manner with the deployment of troops had they requested it (as opposed to the unofficial support offered by individual members of the LSR who joined the auxiliary police force), but it appears that no such request was ever made, at least not formally in writing. An editorial in the Thursday 23 October 1930 edition of the Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle raised the question of who would pay for the maintenance of the special police force being formed at the time. It stated "the organization and maintenance of this force, probably through the winter, will entail a considerable expense, even if it should never be called on for active service" and asked "Why should not the Federal Government assume the expense?"¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, DMOI's Memorandum of 28 October 1930.

¹⁷¹ Ratz, "The 96th Lake Superior Regiment in Aid of the Civil Power, 1909 and 1912", pp. 55-66.

¹⁷² The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 23 October 1930. Editorial: "Who Pays for This?" The editorial argued that "each community is required to maintain law and order among its own citizens. When it is unable to do so, it may even call for military or other help." but that the situation in Port

Though the writer was probably unaware of it, he may have touched upon the very reason that the militia had **not** been called out: the likely considerable expense to the crown of equipping, feeding, housing and paying for a substantial NPAM force over an undetermined period of time. Though the establishment of a far smaller RCMP detachment also involved an expense to the crown (but *not* the DND), it was one that was more easily justifiable, given the likely necessity of keeping that force available to quell any further disturbances which might occur and the fact that RCMP officers had to be paid regardless of where they were posted. If the question of who would cover the cost of the "volunteer" force was open to debate, the result of the deployment of the militia was quite apparent; the federal government would foot a significant proportion, if not all, of the bill.

To ascertain that the Department of National Defense was quite unwilling to absorb this considerable expense, we need only look at the controversy which arose surrounding the deployment of the small guard detail. The CO of the LSR, already constrained by directives from higher headquarters, was likely discouraged from taking a more active role in the disturbances by the debacle over the simple posting of a guard at the Armoury, which itself generated such a debate as to appear almost comical to the dispassionate observer. Undoubtedly, it was far from comical at the time. The paper trail which chronicles this controversy begins with a memorandum dated 31 October 1930, from the Adjutant General of the Army, Brigadier A. H. Bell, to the DOC of MD #10. In this memo, the Adjutant General grants approval, after the fact, for the employment of 3 men to guard the Port Arthur Armoury, adding: "Due to

Arthur was not simply local in origin or significance but a "movement of revolution aimed at the destruction of constitutional government" and that "unemployment is but the excuse" as proven by the literature distributed in Port Arthur. The editorial argued that the Canadian government, which had weapons and means not available to municipalities, should "take up its own defence" in this emergency.

the detachment of RCMP quartered in Armoury, it is presumed that the guard has been withdrawn."¹⁷³ (It was in fact withdrawn that very day.)

Civic authorities did not share the Adjutant General's belief that the arrival of the RCMP meant that the situation in Port Arthur had returned to normal. Such was the atmosphere of tension at the Lakehead that early in November, Mayor Gibbon of Port Arthur urged the authorities to establish the temporary detachment of Mounties as a permanent detachment in the city.¹⁷⁴ On 6 November 1930 officials of the force declared that the detachment would stay at the Lakehead until such time as the Attorney General of Ontario deemed that their services were no longer required.¹⁷⁵ Contrary to the assumptions of the Adjutant General, however, these men had not been quartered in the Armoury, but in the Police Station downtown.¹⁷⁶ They were to remain at the Lakehead indefinitely while the danger of further conflict remained.

If there had been any doubts at MD #10 headquarters in Winnipeg of the necessity of posting a guard at the Armoury during the crisis they should have been

¹⁷³ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, HQC 363-28. Confidential Memo of 31 October 1930 from Adjutant General to DOC MD 10 re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur, Ont.

¹⁷⁴ The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 3 November 1930. The News-Chronicle reported on Mayor Gibbon's trip to Toronto: "Mayor goes east in regard to police. For the purpose of interviewing Attorney General W. H. Price and Hon. William Finlayson with a view to having the Department of Justice maintain a detachment of RCMP at Port Arthur during the coming winter, Mayor George Gibbon and D.J. Cowan, MP, left this morning for Toronto. They have an appointment for tomorrow morning at 11 O'clock. In the event of their being unable to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Attorney General of Ontario, it is Mayor Gibbon's intention to proceed to Ottawa with Mr. Cowan to personally interview the Acting Minister of Justice." (p.2).

¹⁷⁵ The Montreal Gazette, 6 November 1930. "Want Mounties to Stay Permanently" and The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 6 November, 1930. "Mounties to stay in Port Arthur Till Trouble over. The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle reported on 5 November 1930 that a telegram sent by Mayor Cowan had been received from Toronto indicating that he had been successful at having the RCMP retained in Port Arthur. On 6 November 1930, the paper stated "So far no representations have been made to establish a permanent post at Port Arthur or to reinforce the already existing permanent post at Fort William. The prospects are that when the present trouble subsides, the Royal Mounted will return to Regina." (p.1).

¹⁷⁶ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Confidential Letter of 3 January 1931 from DOC MD #10 to Secretary DND.

quickly dispelled by a report out of Hamilton published on 8 November 1930 in both the Times-Journal and News-Chronicle. The paper reported that several military weapons had been stolen from the storehouses of a construction company where they had been secured for several months. Hamilton police authorities believed that Communists in that city were responsible for the theft of ten "Snyder" pre-war army service rifles, 500 rounds of ammunition and 30-40 bayonets.¹⁷⁷

A few weeks after the disturbance, the CO of the LSR sent a request to district headquarters in Winnipeg to authorize pay for the officer who was placed on duty at the Armoury to supervise the guard throughout the crisis. Brigadier Anderson, the DOC MD #10, forwarded a recommendation to the Secretary DND that "authority be granted for one officer to receive pay and allowance during the period of his employment with the guard."¹⁷⁸ On December 20th, Brigadier A.H. Bell, the Adjutant General, sent the following response:

re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur, ONT.

1. I am directed to point out that there is at the present time a detachment of ten or eleven Mounties, 3 members of the NPAM and 2 caretakers, one of whom is a resident in the Armoury
2. Attention is also drawn to 3DH letter of the 31st October last regarding the RCMP detachment, and it was thought the guard would be withdrawn following their arrival.
3. Before it can be decided to detail an officer for this duty, a detailed report will be required setting forth the whole situation in Port Arthur.

A.H. Bell, Brigadier, Adjutant. General¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 8 November 1930, "Bayonets and Rifles Stolen From Storage" and The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 8 November 1930. The "Snyders" referred to in the articles were 19th century Snyder-Enfield rifles. It was believed that the old ammunition might prove defective and authorities feared an attempt by the thieves to steal a fresh supply. The Port Arthur paper also reported that the day before had been the thirteenth anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union and though literature relating to the Soviets' call for action was distributed in the city, there were no public disorders.

¹⁷⁸ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Confidential message of 17 December 1930 from DOC MD #10 to Secretary DND re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur Ontario.

¹⁷⁹ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Message of 20 December 1930 from

In the face of his superiors' intransigence, Anderson was obliged to prepare a report which was filed on January 3rd, 1931 in which he described the situation which had necessitated the posting of a guard supervised by an officer at the Armoury:

1. With reference to HQC 363-28-1 dated 20 Nov 1930, when Lt. Col. Ruttan first reported the necessity for mounting a guard on the armoury in Port Arthur viz. on 22 Nov, he neglected to mention the officer. On the 27th he mentioned the officer on duty with the guard, but meanwhile I had asked NDHQ to authorize a guard of 3 men only. Before submitting a supplementary request for authority to pay an officer as well Lt. Col. Ruttan was asked for more particulars. In due course I became satisfied that Col. Ruttan had acted wisely in detailing an officer for duty at the Armoury each day during which the guard was mounted viz. from the 21st to the 31st October, and it is for that period only that it is now desired to pay an officer.
2. The guard and officer were withdrawn on 31 October prior to receipt of HQC 368-28-1 of 31 October in which it was correctly presumed that such action would have been taken, but the assumption therein mentioned that the detachment of RCMP was quartered in the Armoury was incorrect; they were quartered downtown near the police station.
3. There had to be some officer to whom the guard could report and to be responsible for any action the guard might have been called upon to take and it was more economical to handle the situation as it was handled than to send a staff officer from here for the purpose.
4. I regret that my letter of the 17th December did not give fuller particulars and hope that in view of the above explanation my recommendation of the 17 ultimo will now be approved.

TV Anderson, Brig. DOC MD 10¹⁸⁰

After a great deal more correspondence between the LSR, District Headquarters in Winnipeg and National Defense Headquarters in Ottawa, it was determined that pay would be allotted for all officers and ORs who had mounted the guard in October.¹⁸¹ Though this might appear to have been the only fair course of

Adjutant General to DOC MD #10 re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur Ontario.

¹⁸⁰ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Confidential Report of 3 January 1931 re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur. sent by DOC MD #10 to Secretary DND.

¹⁸¹ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Correspondence of 8 January to 3 February 1931. re: Communist Activities, Port Arthur. Pay was recommended for the following Officer ranks:

action, there was a great deal of debate concerning the entitlement of the militiamen to this pay. The conflict over the necessity of posting an officer to supervise the guard is particularly puzzling since adequate supervision of the troops on duty should have seemed essential to all involved. It is difficult to not be struck by the miserly attitude of higher headquarters regarding the disbursement of these funds, considering the important task that the troops and officers of the LSR performed. It is important, however, to view this debate in the context of the time it occurred. This reluctance to spend money on legitimate security concerns was indicative of the economic climate of Canada and the prevailing attitudes in the Department of Defense during the Depression. Clearly, there was little chance that the Crown would have proved willing to deploy the LSR during the crisis, given the expense involved.

One Captain x 3 days
 Three Lts x 2 days each; 6 days
 One 2lt x 2 days
 Total: 11 days

The DOC MD #10 recommended that officers should receive pay appropriate to their rank with subsistence allowance:

Pay under article 269(a)

3 days at 5.20	\$15.60
6 days at 3.60	\$21.60
2 days at 3.00	\$6.00
subtotal	\$43.20

Subsistence under article 269(c) -if precluded from residing at their usual place of residence

3 days at 2.30	\$6.90
6 days at 1.80	\$10.80
2 days at 1.50	\$3.60
subtotal	\$21.30

TOTAL \$64.50

The Adjutant General recommended authority be granted to pay officers, amount not to exceed \$64.50.

Allowance for Officers included money for lodging, fuel, light, rations, and a servant: 1 dollar, 20-30 cents, 10, 50, 30-40 cents respectively. ORs allowance for these items was 50, 15, 05, 50 cents respectively (No servant's allowance). On 3 February 1931, Authorization was granted for all pay.

VI

Though the situation in Port Arthur had been stabilized by the end of 1930, civil strife would continue to plague the Lakehead over the course of the next few years. On February 25th, 1931, a demonstration by the "National Unemployed Worker's Association" was held in Fort William, where a group of 100 persons marched down Simpson Street to a vacant lot at Simpson and Dease and, before a crowd of 1000 city residents, listened to speeches under the watchful gaze of a dozen policemen. That very same day, a group of unemployed workers assembled on a vacant lot between Lake Street and Cumberland Street in Port Arthur. After listening to a speech, they paraded up Cumberland toward Arthur Street. On this occasion, however, the authorities were not caught unprepared as they had been in October. After being halted by a roadblock set up by City and Provincial Police at Lincoln Street, the crowd was dispersed by a squad of Mounties led by Inspector Irvine which "riding 10 abreast, swept down Cumberland."¹⁸² The demonstrators scattered and the parade was over. The quick and efficient manner in which this incident was handled, in which no violence erupted and none were injured illustrates that the establishment of a small RCMP detachment in Port Arthur had some positive effect.

During most of 1931, the focus of concern in the military district would shift from the communities of Northwestern Ontario to much closer to home for MD #10 headquarters: the city of Winnipeg itself. Already, in November of 1930, there had been some clashes between police and communists.¹⁸³ Early in the new year, there

¹⁸² The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 25 February 1931, "Unemployed Meet But No Disorders", p.1 and Mauro, Thunder Bay: A History, p. 317. Two Finns were arrested following the parade and charged with obstructing a police officer, vagrancy, and with unlawfully marching in a parade.

¹⁸³ The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 7 November, 1930. On 6 November, some two dozen police confronted about 500 protesters who raised their banners in front of city hall in Winnipeg. Though blows were exchanged on both sides, no arrests were made and none were seriously injured. Police managed to tear down the banners and restore order (p. 8).

was a sense that trouble was brewing among the unemployed in Manitoba, which by the 19th of February numbered over 5000 in Winnipeg alone. A secret letter warning of the possibility of Communist disturbances was sent by the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to Brigadier Anderson on the 23rd.¹⁸⁴ On 26 February 1931, the day after the Port Arthur and Fort William marches, a major demonstration which was attended by 2500-3000 unemployed persons was held in Winnipeg despite the fact that the police had refused organizers a parade permit the day before.¹⁸⁵

The atmosphere in Military District #10 remained tense after the disturbances at the Lakehead and in Winnipeg. On 29 April 1931, the DOC MD #10 sent an encoded message to the DND warning of the possibility of trouble on the 1st of May. The District Commander placed permanent force guards over militia properties in Winnipeg that day and made provisions to deploy Permanent Force soldiers if a request came from the Attorney General.¹⁸⁶ In Port Arthur, a May Day demonstration resulted in 18 "savage" sentences handed down to labour activists.

¹⁸⁴ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, wc 317. Secret Letters of 19 February 1931 and 23 February 1931. (Files 19 and 20).

¹⁸⁵ Winnipeg Evening Tribune, Thursday, 26 February 1931, p.1. Major occurrences like the Winnipeg demonstration meant that comparatively minor disturbances occurring simultaneously at the Lakehead went virtually unnoticed. It was thus perhaps fortunate that while authorities in the district were somewhat distracted by events in Winnipeg that might necessitate military intervention, no major demonstrations occurred at the Lakehead.

¹⁸⁶ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075, file 5678, Encoded message of 29 April 1931 from DOC MD #10 to DND. Permanent Force units, including the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians), were to be stationed in Winnipeg on several occasions during the thirties. On the 27th of June, the Deputy Minister asked the Adjutant General to dispatch the troops to Winnipeg from the Camp Hughes training Schools. An urgent telegram was sent on the 29th to the DOC MD #10 informing him of this order. The disorders in Winnipeg gradually petered out and, with the exception of a few incidents like the St Boniface strike of 18 September 1931 (file 58), Winnipeg was plagued by few significant incidents. Given the precedent for civil strife set in Winnipeg during the General Strike of 1919, it is understandable that the authorities there might have been inclined to nip any likely trouble in the bud early on. For more on the Winnipeg General Strike, see David J. Bercuson's "The Winnipeg General Strike, Collective Bargaining and the One Big Union Issue" in Canadian Historical Review, (vol. 51 no. 2, June 1970, pp. 164-177).

The outlawing of the Communist Party that year resulted in a crackdown on demonstrations and a stiffening of penalties.¹⁸⁷

During the following year, more demonstrations and parades were held at the Lakehead. On the morning of 18 October 1932, a demonstration led by S. Whalen in protest of the cessation of city council's meal-a-day programme was held in front of the old municipal building. After police arrived on the scene the crowd of 300-400 men dispersed.¹⁸⁸ Later that day, shortly before 7 p.m., 500 unemployed men marched on the Mayor of Port Arthur's residence, located at 380 Arthur Street. The marchers, who demanded a meeting with Mayor P.V. Ibbotson, were intercepted by a cordon of twenty foot police, which included seven provincial officers, and slowly dispersed to Waverley Park and the corner of Regent Street. This time, however, the intervention of the RCMP resulted in one arrest and a confused melee which left several demonstrators wounded, one of whom would die, allegedly from wounds sustained during his flight from the police. This tragedy would further strain the relationship between labour leaders and civic authorities during the thirties.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ "The Organization of Labour in Thunder Bay" in Thunder Bay: From Rivalry to Unity, p. 143. The Communist Party of Canada was declared illegal under Section 98 of the Criminal Code and eight of its leaders were imprisoned.

¹⁸⁸ The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 18 October 1931. It was announced that afternoon that "bonafide transients" with vouchers from the chief of police would be provided with one meal a day.

¹⁸⁹ The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 19 October 1931, and Mauro, Thunder Bay: A History, pp. 317-320. The paper reported that Police Chief George Taylor had stated some of the protestors offered resistance to the police. According to Mauro, Chief Taylor claimed that eight mounted RCMP officers intervened when marchers had refused to clear the street. Apparently the marchers were charged by the RCMP and chased through the park and over private property. Witnesses claimed that several marchers were left prostrated on the ground, but none appeared seriously hurt and no injuries were reported by the hospital. Though he had not ordered his men to use batons, Chief Taylor supposed that "they used their own judgement when resistance was offered." (p. 320) The "Canadian Labour Defense League" charged that Urho Jaaska, age 26, who died of tetanus on October 27th, had been a victim of police brutality. Prior to his death, the young Finnish immigrant was supposed to have said that he had been chased into some barbed wire and been knocked unconscious somehow. Dr. Eakins later reported that Jaaska's only injury had been a superficial scratch on his nose. An inquest jury reported that there had been no evidence of violence on the body and concluded that the young man had died of lock-jaw. In The Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 28 October 1932, it was reported that the victim had not received any medical treatment until he was brought to the hospital on 26

VII

What is remarkable, perhaps, is that in spite of the great numbers of transients and unemployed¹⁹⁰ at the Lakehead during the early thirties, there were few tragic episodes like the clash on 18 October 1932. To credit the LSR with any significant role in safeguarding the security of persons or property during these disturbances would be misleading. Aside from ensuring that no military weapons or equipment kept at the Port Arthur Armoury got into the wrong hands during the crisis of October 1930, the Regiment had very little to do with quelling the civil disturbances which plagued the Lakehead during the early thirties. The unit must therefore bear little of the credit -- or blame, depending on one's point of view -- for the manner in which these situations were dealt with.

We are presented therefore with, if not a discouraging picture, at least an enlightening revelation regarding the LSR of the interwar era. The militia at the Lakehead, far from being encouraged in its initiative in contributing to community order and security, was denied its function as a military force "in aid to the civil power". In spite of its precedent-setting intervention in the strikes of 1909 and 1912, the LSR was relegated to the role of spectator, shunted aside, marginalized. As we have seen, the first few months of the Depression witnessed at least one major crisis and several tense confrontations, and while all of this took place, the LSR stood by idly.

Was this a unique occurrence? Apparently not. In other such civil disturbances which were, if not endemic, certainly widespread throughout the

October, by which time the disease was so far advanced that it was impossible to save his life.

¹⁹⁰ NAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5075 file 106. A report from the DOC MD #10 to the Secretary DND dated 7 June 1933 (Ref: GS 380) estimated the approximate number of male unemployed in Port Arthur and Fort William at 2600.

turbulent decade of the thirties, we find that it was various branches of the police (city, provincial, and federal) occasionally supplemented by regular (permanent force) troops, who restored order.¹⁹¹ In a 27 October 1930 editorial in the News-Chronicle, citing the practice of appointing non-resident Crown prosecutors immune to local prejudices to deal with lengthy or important cases, the paper reflected on the sagacity of this type of this approach with regard to local security, stating that "It is not in the best interest of the community that residents be armed one against the other. Business and social relations cannot be entirely removed from consideration. Enmities that might be engendered, should a physical clash develop, would be potent with trouble for the future. It is much better that the preservation of the peace be left in the hands of an entirely impersonal organization."¹⁹²

Any contention that a NPAM battalion could be considered an "impersonal organization" must be dismissed. Indeed, if the preceding chapters have demonstrated anything, it is that the LSR was a military institution with deep social ties to the Lakehead communities. By their enthusiastic enlistment in the auxiliary police force, many members of the Regiment firmly demonstrated which camp they were in. Given the socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds of most of them, both their loyalties and prejudices could hardly have been in doubt. In this respect, the Lake Superior Regiment was rightly prohibited from involving itself in the disorders

¹⁹¹ For further examples of labour violence and civil strife in Canada during the interwar years see Stuart Marshall Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-66 (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1968); James Struthers, No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State, 1914-1941, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); and Judy M. Torrance, Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1986).

¹⁹² The Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 27 October 1930. The paper further praised the use of Mounties, stating that they constituted a "very visible and tangible representation of authority...which is concerned only with the preservation of life and of property, and the prevention of violence, leaving matters of policy to be settled in the constitutional way."(p.4). A later editorial on 6 November 1930, praised the retention of the RCMP detachment at the Lakehead, stating that "a permanently organized and thoroughly trained and equipped body like the Royal Mounted with the tradition associated therewith is much to be preferred" (over the use of an auxiliary police force of local citizens).

in Port Arthur and Fort William when a neutral alternative like the well-organized RCMP was available. The Regiment was therefore a victim, perhaps a fortunate victim, of thinking at the time which held that a militia battalion's military function was subordinate and secondary to its role as a social institution.

Conclusion

I

On 30 January 1946, the Lake Superior Regiment (motor) returned to the Lakehead after more than five years' absence. Among the throng of well-wishers greeting the veterans were several former COs of the battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Dear, Lieutenant Colonel Cook, Lieutenant Colonel Murrell and Lieutenant Colonel Keane, all of them men who had been with the unit since its NPAM years.¹⁹³ The day before the battalion's return, the Lakehead papers had printed special "welcome home" editions. Among the various articles and stories detailing the exploits of the Regiment in the Fort William Daily Times-Journal was "A Tribute To Those That Made the LSR Great" written by Lt. Col. Robert Keane. Part of this tribute read as follows:

A Tribute: To the tradition of the 52nd: There are so many individuals and associations to whom we must pay tribute. First of all, we have the spirit that kept the LSR alive during those years when it took a great deal of courage to even appear in a uniform in public. That courage sprang largely from tradition; the tradition of the old 52nd battalion CEF which the LSR(motor) has the honour to perpetuate. In our unit, we had many boys whose fathers served with the old 52nd, and to these lads, no other unit could take its place. This spirit helped mould the unit in its early days and was a strength when tough periods were encountered later on. Therefore, may I say, let us pay tribute to the 52nd battalion CEF all that it stood for, and all that it passed on to the LSR (motor).

A tribute to those who gave experience: In the early days of the war there was a certain group of men who gave up their businesses and civilian undertakings in order that the new unit could have the advantage of their experience which had been gained the hard way in the previous war. The majority of these men knew full well that they would never leave the country with the unit and yet they found the time, and devoted every effort and gave of their experience to train younger men to take their places and make the unit the strong, well-co-ordinated body of men that it turned out to be...¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Stanley, In the Face of Danger, pp.316-317.

¹⁹⁴ Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 29 January 1946. (TBPL Local History File; Military Forces and Defense-Thunder Bay, #2.)

As one who had experienced life as both a militiaman and a wartime soldier, Colonel Keane understood the contrast between militia and active service and was in a good position to truly appreciate the contributions of those who had kept the flame burning during the interwar years. By his eloquence, Keane expressed an understanding of the spirit of tradition and honour which compelled men to don military dress at a time when the military was very much out of fashion. It was one thing to serve in time of war when that was "the thing to do", it was something else entirely to serve in time of peace, when one was subjected to scorn or indifference from those who did not understand the purpose or necessity of a reliable militia force.

Though it cannot claim any great share of the credit for how the LSR(m) fared during the war, the men of the NPAM-era LSR certainly deserve recognition for carrying on the traditions of the "fighting Fifty-Second" through the twenty year interval between the wars. The fact that the officer who commanded the LSR(m) throughout nearly the entire Northwest Europe Campaign of 1944-45 acknowledged both the 52nd and the militia-era LSR in his tribute to his Regiment illustrates the strong sense of continuity that existed between these three different incarnations of the unit.

It was stated at the beginning of this work that the intent was determine to what extent one of these incarnations, the Lake Superior Regiment of the Non-Permanent Active Militia, fulfilled both its military role and civic role at the Lakehead during the twenty-year period from approximately 1920 to 1940. I have therefore charted the course that the unit took after the re-organization of the early twenties when, in the face of many changes, the militia was obliged to re-establish itself as a relevant segment of civil society in Canada. In order to emphasize the duality of the militia, the unit's military and civic functions were examined separately. This enables us to draw conclusions on its success in each of these areas and avoid generalizations for, as we have seen, a failure in one area did not constitute a failure

in the unit's mandate altogether. We also highlighted a particular series of events which were to demonstrate the attitudes of military and civilian authorities toward the unit, confirming what we had learned in the previous chapters and shedding light on the motives which governed their decisions.

II

In Chapter One we examined the LSR as a military organization, from its re-establishment in 1921 to its eventual transfer to the Canadian Active Service Force in 1940. In regard to leadership and organization, the unit could not have hoped for a more solid footing. Thanks to both the efforts of the battalion's dedicated promoters and the sense of duty and devotion which existed among a segment of the population, the Regiment attracted that core of veterans who were to be so crucial in ensuring the survival of the unit. Throughout the twenties and thirties, the unit's officer and NCO complement had a large proportion of World War One veterans. The experience and wisdom which these men brought to the unit was of immense benefit to the young militia era soldiers who enlisted during the interwar period. Many of these men would take the valuable lessons learned during these years with them when they crossed over to France in 1944 as leaders in their own right.

In examining the LSR's strength, equipment and training, a grim picture emerged as the countless difficulties and challenges facing the unit were revealed. As a military organization, the Regiment was largely ineffective, and no amount of wishful thinking can make it otherwise. The scanty reports and returns from that period bear this fact out. The unit was cursed with bad equipment, lacklustre training and low strength, compounded by the indifference of military authorities. The LSR, like many other NPAM units of the era, was also manifestly unprepared to undertake even small-scale military operations. It had little logistical or training support from MD #10 headquarters and few opportunities to train with other units in the district.

The themes of isolation, neglect and indifference on the part of higher headquarters which pervaded this section of my analysis also served to shed some light on the "personality" of the unit. If the accomplishments of the 52nd had established the foundations of the LSR's regimental character, the unit's difficult existence during the interwar years gave it an independent bent and rugged pride in "being able to get the job done" which were to characterize its service during the Second World War. It was in this manner that the unit was to benefit (although these benefits would not be apparent until much later) from the adverse circumstances under which it operated during the twenties and thirties.

III

In Chapter Two, I looked at the Regiment's social links to the Lakehead communities, delving into its relationships with different segments of local society, determining how it interacted with local authorities and the general public of the time and elaborating on the unit's many activities. I also examined the recollections of a soldier, by means of an oral history interview, who served with the unit during the thirties. This was a valuable perspective on the Regiment from one of the rank-and-file of that era -- particularly valuable considering the dearth of information on the enlisted members of the unit during this period.

The integration of oral history into this work was done quite deliberately, as in discussing a military unit within a social history context, it was important to capture the human element or perspective, all too often lost amidst the descriptions of organization, command structure and sub-formations which accompany regimental history. It was also felt that examining the interviewee's narrative in its entirety (within a single chapter) would convey the total experience of being a militia soldier of the LSR, including both the military and civic activities that he participated in. Through Colonel Gravelle's vivid descriptions, we come to formulate an idea of what

the militiaman of the thirties experienced, something which would have been difficult to determine if I had relied on more traditional sources. These recollections paint a picture of an active, robust organization which in the late thirties, though poor in equipment and weapons, was thriving in its role as a community institution.

The many successes of the unit in integrating itself into the communities of the Lakehead contrasted sharply with the difficulties experienced in military matters. From the outset, the officers of the unit pursued a policy of developing close links and recruiting within the communities of the Lakehead using the Regiment's affiliation with the renowned 52nd Battalion C.E.F. as one of its main "selling points". The unit also made great use of one of its most visible organizations, the LSR Regimental Band, as well as its messes and mess functions in cementing community links and raising the Regiment's profile. In addition, the unit participated in many parades and public gatherings, including civic celebrations as well as those of military significance, providing itself with consistent exposure to the public. The effectiveness of all of these activities was to be demonstrated by the groundswell of support from community leaders and ordinary citizens alike which materialized for the unit at the commencement of the war--support which, as we have seen, went well beyond the bounds of general patriotism.

It is quite possible that the various petitions and political pressure which were brought to bear on the government to mobilize the LSR, initially into the Third Canadian Division, and later into the Fourth Canadian Division, influenced the final decision. If this was the case, the unit's efforts in promoting itself among the communities of Northwestern Ontario had certainly paid off. The fact that the unit was mobilized as a complete battalion rather than as part of a composite battalion (an amalgam of several different units) meant that the name of the Lake Superior Regiment would be included among the units of the Canadian Active Service Force.

IV

The contrast between the unit's successes as a civic institution and its relative failure as a military entity having been revealed, it remained to determine how this situation manifested itself in the context of events at the Lakehead. In Chapter Three I highlighted the unit's involvement in the civil disturbances of the early thirties in Port Arthur and Fort William. It was revealed that the unit was not involved in the establishment of a security force and the restoration of order in Port Arthur, in spite of the fact that it had already discharged this type of duty twice earlier in the century. This "case study" provided both an example of militia/community relations during the era and an insight into the policies, both official and unofficial, which governed these relationships, taking into account economic, social, and political developments in the region and in the rest of Canada during the period. It also addressed the critical question of the unit's "relevance", both as a military formation and as a social institution.

The Lakehead disturbances, occurring at roughly the mid-point of this twenty-year period of study, provided a general idea of the government's attitude toward the unit and the NPAM throughout the period. That is not to say that militia and defence policy remained static from 1920 to 1940, for even a cursory examination of Canadian history reveals that as early as the mid-thirties, the military was becoming an increasingly important priority for the government¹⁹⁵. Rather, it allowed us to infer broad trends in policy. It was for this reason that the Sunday training issue was also examined, for unlike the labour disturbances which were particular to certain areas and military districts, Sunday training restrictions affected

¹⁹⁵ See, for example, Wilbur, Richard, The Bennett Administration, 1930-1935, (Canadian Historical Association Booklets, no. 24, Ottawa: 1970).

all of the military districts of Canada, and thus represented a policy decision which had a broad scope.

What a study of the disturbances cannot fail to reveal is that in spite of its mandate as a NPAM unit to assist civic authorities in time of need (through sections 75 to 85 of the Militia Act), the LSR's deployment in aid of the civil power was not considered a viable option by authorities at the time. We may even go one step further, citing the miserly attitude of higher headquarters toward the disbursement of any funds, and state that the LSR was discouraged from taking any action whatsoever during this crisis. The only real security measures undertaken, the placing of a guard on the Port Arthur Armoury, were through the initiative of the unit's Commanding Officer and did not originate through orders from NDHQ. Having confirmed within this analysis that the LSR did indeed have the manpower and capability to contribute to the "Security Force" which was created in the aftermath of the 1930 disorders, we can only conclude that the decision to exclude the unit from participating in this effort was based more on political and/or economic reasons rather than concerns over the unit's ability to discharge this duty.

It is quite possible that authorities recalled that in the aftermath of the 1909 and 1912 strike interventions at the Lakehead, the military had become very unpopular among certain segments of the Lakehead's ethnic communities. When, at the outset of World War I, the 96th LSR was tasked with providing guard details at various points in the region, its members, as representatives of the military, were subjected to abuse, insults and even threats of violence.¹⁹⁶ Authorities, realizing that a similar action in 1930 might reinforce this legacy of animosity toward the local militia among labour organizations (and the rapidly growing ethnic groups, like the Finns and Ukrainians, associated with this and other more "insidious" movements)

¹⁹⁶ Ratz, "The 96th LSR in Aid of the Civil Power, 1909, 1912", and Stanley, *In the Face of Danger*, p. 6.

were likely wary of recreating a situation similar to that which existed in 1909 and 1912. It is also possible that the authorities had doubts over the unit's reliability or suitability for the task at hand, though this would have been an unreasonable fear considering that the DOC had expressed his satisfaction with the unit's performance and discipline just days before the crisis erupted. Although the course of action adopted by military and civic authorities may have ultimately spared the unit from the animosity of a large segment of the Lakehead's population, ultimately, this decision amounted to disregarding one of the unit's military functions in favour of preserving its civic one.

V

This study was derived from the sad reality that in Canadian historiography, the role of the militia as a civic institution in peacetime has been largely overlooked. Due to this fact, the public at large has only a partial understanding of the role of militia units, ignoring the various peacetime contributions of reserve regiments (like disaster relief, a function the militia has carried out throughout its history even up to the present day) and failing to see the militia as an integral part of the community with historic ties often dating back well over a century.

The fact is that the Lake Superior Regiment was ultimately more important, and for that matter, more successful as a social institution than as a military entity. Despite the best efforts of some, this was an era when the militia, like the military in general, lacked clear direction and suffered neglect.¹⁹⁷ It was considered far more important to promote good relations and a positive public image than to achieve any high standard of military readiness. During this period, some of the alternative

¹⁹⁷ This neglect manifested itself in numerous ways, including, much to the detriment of posterity, slipshod record keeping. The result of this unfortunate lapse is a serious lack of information on the members of the LSR, particularly the non-commissioned members, which constituted a significant obstacle in this work.

functions which might once have been the domain of the militia were being taken up by the civic, provincial or federal police forces, which had expanded and developed a great deal since the early years of the century.¹⁹⁸

In the face of the declining necessity of maintaining the militia as a "force for order", that is to say, an auxiliary force or a pool of reinforcements which could augment the regular police in times of dire need, the NPAM sought to expand its role as a civic institution. To this end, units like the Lake Superior Regiment vigorously pursued their community interests, either consciously or unconsciously taking on a more ceremonial or symbolic role as a "garrison force": a largely passive or benign military representative of the federal government in civil society. That is not to say that these units abandoned their military role entirely; as we have seen, training carried on throughout the two decades of peace between the wars.

Because the LSR was not placed in a situation which put it at odds with a particular segment of Lakehead society as its ancestor, the 96th, had been, the unit enjoyed a notably harmonious existence with the community in general, not simply the civic authorities or the Anglo-Celtic portion of the population. Throughout the period of 1920 to 1940, there were no documented instances of clashes between militia soldiers and civilians at the Lakehead. This atmosphere, undeniably more congenial than that of the pre-World War One era, allowed the spirit of friendship between the Regiment and its home cities, to grow and develop throughout the interwar years, establishing a strong, lasting bond between them.

An editorial in the 29 January 1946 edition of the Fort William Daily Times-Journal aptly encapsulated this bond which, forged in peace and reinforced in

¹⁹⁸ For a description of the growth and development of the Ontario Provincial Police see, for example, Dahn D. Higley, O.P.P.: The History of the Ontario Provincial Police. (Toronto: The Queen's Printer, 1984).

time of war, tied the Lake Superior Regiment irrevocably to the communities of the Lakehead:

It is true that many of the members of the unit did not and will not reside at the Lakehead and it is true that many of our Lakehead servicemen were active in other units of the army or in the air and naval forces. The fact remains that the Lake Superiors, in an organizational sense, represent these two cities at the head of the lakes and the Lake Superior country.¹⁹⁹

This bond did not simply come into existence upon the LSR's mobilization. It was a link which came into existence through a long familiarity and friendship, nurtured by twenty years' worth of activity in the community, so that in 1940, the battalion which departed for Camp Borden truly represented "the two cities at the head of the lakes and the Lake Superior country".

To the dedicated men and officers of the militia era LSR must go much of the credit for this state of affairs. Perhaps their greatest contribution was simply their mere presence, their commitment to ensuring the continued existence of the militia tradition at the Lakehead by steadfastly carrying on with the mundane tasks which characterized the NPAM of the interwar period. That the unit survived a difficult period intact was the accomplishment. The fact that, in 1946, many erstwhile militia soldiers were able to witness the triumphant return of the battalion which bore the name of their Regiment, the name it had carried since 1905, was testament to this small victory.

¹⁹⁹ Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 29 Jan 1946, editorial (TBPL Local History File; Military Forces and Defense, Thunder Bay, #58 .) The realities of wartime service were such that by 1944, a large proportion of the LSR(m)'s officers and men, because of transfers or re-enforcement drafts, were not "Northwestern Ontario" men.

Appendix

Some Brief notes on the Commanding Officers of the LSR, 1921-1945:

Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Young was appointed the first Commanding Officer of the Lake Superior Regiment after its re-constitution on 15 July 1921. He replaced Lieutenant-Colonel S.C. Young, who had been the Acting CO of the 96th LSR which, from 1916 to 1921, had existed only as a theoretical depot. (In Stanley's In the Face of Danger, Lt. Col. J.A. Little is listed as the CO of the Battalion from 1911 to 1921). Colonel J. D. Young was a highly decorated officer of the 52nd who rose to the rank of Major during the war and was a recipient of the Military Cross (2 Bars), as well as the Distinguished Service Order and a Mention in Dispatches. He was succeeded by Lt. Col. J. C. Hunter in 1923. (Stanley, In The Face of Danger, pp. 41-42, p.338).

Lieutenant-Colonel James Campbell Hunter, born in 1881, first came to Lakehead in 1904. Prior to the war he was a member of the staff of G.R. Duncan and Company and a member of the 96th LSR from 1911 on. He enlisted when war broke out and served in the Army for five years. For part of this time, he was with the 52nd Battalion. After being invalided from France, he served for two years with the General Staff in England. He was discharged in July of 1919. After his return to the Lakehead, he was appointed assistant tax inspector at the inception of the Fort William office in 1920. In July of 1921, J. C. Hunter, a Captain at the time, was appointed the Adjutant of the newly reconstituted Lake Superior Regiment. In October of 1923, he became the Commanding Officer of the unit: "Inspector Hunter rose to the rank of Colonel (sic) succeeding Colonel John Young in that capacity when the Lake Superior Regiment was formed". In 1924 he was succeeded by Colonel J.A. Crozier. He was promoted to the inspectorship of the Fort William Tax

district on June 11, 1934. (Fort William Daily Times-Journal, June 11, 1934, "Colonel J C Hunter named Inspector for income taxes.")

Lieutenant-Colonel James Alexander Crozier was born near Orangeville Ontario, May 28th, 1875. The son of a Presbyterian minister, Colonel Crozier graduated in Arts from Queen's University in 1896 and in Medicine and Surgery from McGill in 1899. That year he joined Lord Strathcona's Horse and served in the Boer War. Upon returning to Canada, Dr Crozier practiced medicine at Copper Cliff, Ontario, briefly before moving to Port Arthur early in the new century. An active medical practitioner, he was medical consultant for both the CPR and CNR. He was a member of the advisory board of the old Railway Marine and General Hospital in Port Arthur and played a prominent role in the establishment of the new General Hospital. Among the many and varied offices he held were: President of the Port Arthur Club, the Conservative Association, Thunder Bay Medical Association, life member of the Shuniah Lodge 287, GRC, AF, and AM; and member of the Port Arthur branch, Canadian Legion. Dr Crozier was Medical Officer of Health for Port Arthur for many years and Surgeon for the District Jail. He served overseas in the First World War with the 8th Battalion CEF and at the close of hostilities, resumed his affiliation with the Lake Superior Regiment, replacing Colonel Hunter as Commanding Officer in 1924 and serving in that capacity until 1927. In 1942, Colonel Crozier retired from his medical practice and moved to Port Credit, where he passed away in 1951. (Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 2 January 1951, "Dr J.A. Crozier Passes at 75 at Port Credit: Prominent Lakehead figure for nearly half a century.")

Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Young Harcourt was born in 1878. A Civil Engineer by profession, he worked for the Public Works Department of Canada from

1905 until his departure from the region to serve in the Great War. In charge of Lake of the Woods and tributary waters navigation improvements from January 1913 on, he testified at the Public Hearings on The Levels of the Lake of the Woods, held in 1915. (TBPL Local History File, Politics and Government, NWO, Item #40, p. 873-884.). After the war, Colonel Harcourt joined the Lake Superior Regiment and was involved in several local engineering projects. He wrote the article "Breakwater construction in Port Arthur Harbour" (in Engineering Journal, vol. 14, April 1931, p. 215-226, noted in TBHMS Papers and Records vol. V, 1977, p. 22). In 1927, he replaced Colonel Crozier as Commanding Officer of the unit and held that appointment until 1930.

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Andrew Ruttan was born in Winnipeg in 1881, where he enlisted in the armed forces at the age of 16. He came to Port Arthur in 1905, transferring to the 96th LSR, and joined the Real Estate firm of Ruttan Estates Ltd. He participated in the 96th LSR's aid to the civil power operations as a Lieutenant in 1909 (Ratz, "The 96th LSR in Aid of the Civil Power, 1909 and 1912", p. 31). After the outbreak of World War One, on 5 August 1914, Ruttan, then a Captain, was put in charge of the elevator guard in Port Arthur and a few days later, took a detachment of 58 men to guard the power plant at Kakabeka Falls. (Stanley, In the Face of Danger, p.8) Later in the war, Ruttan joined the 94th Battalion CEF, and went overseas as a Major. He rejoined the LSR after his return to the Lakehead. He also went back to work at his old company, later serving as the President of Ruttan Estates Ltd., Ruttan-Bolduc Ltd. and in 1926, he became the Vice-President of the amalgamated firm of Ruttan-Bolduc-Adderley Ltd. In 1930, he replaced Colonel F. Y. Harcourt as the Commanding Officer of the Lake Superior Regiment and served as CO until 1933. He was active in the Navy League and served as the chairman of the Sea Cadets for many years. Ruttan was also a veteran member of the Canadian

Legion and belonged to St John's Anglican. Church. At the age of 77, Ruttan died in hospital following a heart attack. (Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 1 December 1958. "Prominent Port Arthur Man, Colonel Ruttan Passes.")

Lieutenant-Colonel Lionel Sextus Dear was born in 1883. His military career began in 1906, when he first enlisted in the LSR. He went overseas with the Winnipeg Rifles (8th Battalion CEF) as a Lieutenant. At the close of the war, he was Second in Command of the Reserve Battalion at Shornecliffe and Seaford. He was mentioned in despatches for "valuable service in the field". He continued his association with the Lake Superior Regiment as a Major after the war, and was appointed the CO of the Regiment in 1933, at which time he was promoted to the rank of Lt. Col. On 2 July 1940, the Port Arthur City Council appointed Dear as the Officer Commanding the Volunteer Civic Guard of Port Arthur (an organization of several hundred veterans) in accordance with the Canadian Legion, Port Arthur Branch's recommendation. Colonel Dear also became an honorary member of the OPP for civil guard purposes. (Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 3 July 1940, "Heads Civic guard")

Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Cook was born at Didsbury, Lancashire, England in 1892. He came to the Lakehead in 1911, joining the Barnett-McQueen Co, Ltd., a contracting firm of which he would eventually become President, in 1912. In March of 1915, he enlisted in the 52nd battalion CEF and was commissioned in August of that year. He went to France with the battalion, taking part in all engagements until November 1917 when he was appointed the Officer Commanding Casualty Company, 18th Reserve Battalion. After demobilization in July 1919, Colonel Cook returned to Barnett-McQueen, where he superintended the construction of some of the mammoth grain bins at Port Arthur and Fort William. (Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 29

January 1946, "Unit had tough march", TBPL Local History File; Military Forces and Defence-Thunder Bay, #70.) In 1933 he joined the LSR as a company commander with the rank of Captain. In 1937, he was promoted to Lt. Col. and was appointed to command the unit, succeeding Colonel Dear. After the transfer of the LSR to the Canadian Active Service Force in June 1940, he continued to command the battalion during the months of training in Canada and went overseas in 1942, ahead of the unit, meeting it there when it arrived on 1 September of that year. He commanded the regiment until illness forced his retirement as CO in November of that year. (Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 29 January 1946, TBPL Local History File; Military Forces and Defense Thunder Bay, #57)

Lieutenant-Colonel James Edward Victor Murrell was born at Southend-on-Sea England in 1904. He was a highway construction contractor by profession, and one of the road builders who "pushed the Trans-Canada eastward from the Lakehead through the wild rock and bush country of Lake Superior and up to Nipigon". (Port Arthur Daily News-Chronicle, 29 January 1946, "Unit had tough march", TBPL Local History File; Military Forces and Defence- Thunder Bay, #70). He first enlisted in Port Arthur in 1923 with no. 17 company, 10th Signal Battalion, Canadian Corps of Signalers. He transferred to the LSR in 1925, and became a Sergeant in B Company. In 1926 he received his commission. Shortly after, he was appointed the battalion signal officer and in 1935 was promoted to the rank of Captain and appointed adjutant, a position he held until 1939. He commanded the Royal Guard of Honour for their majesties the King and Queen in Port Arthur in 1939. From 1939 until mobilization he was the acting Second in Command of the battalion, and upon mobilization received a "well earned" majority and appointment as Second in Command. It was as Second in Command that he took the unit overseas in August 1942, being met by Colonel Cook at Liverpool. "After becoming CO in

March of 1944, Lt. Col. Murrell led the unit through final preparations for the crossing to France, and took the Regiment across the Normandy beaches in July. He led the Regiment in the heavy fighting which followed soon after the arrival in France until wounded and forced out of action in August 1944." (Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 29 January 1946, TBPL Local History File; Military Forces and Defense- Thunder Bay, #57 .)

Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Angus Keane was born in Fort William on May 14, 1914. At the age of 15 he enlisted in the Fourth Field Ambulance and was a Sergeant by 1930. In 1935, he received his commission with the LSR. In 1937 he went to England to gain experience while serving with the Middlesex Regiment. With the rank of captain, he was appointed Adjutant of the LSR in 1939 and continued to hold this appointment after mobilization in 1940. He trained with the Regiment until 1941 when he went overseas on detachment with the Cameron Highlanders for six months. Keane returned to his own unit in January 1942 and stayed with the LSR until mid-summer of 1942, when he joined the paratroop corps and began training at Helena, Montana. While making a practice jump he suffered a fractured ankle which forced him from the paratroops. He nevertheless continued on active service and was on the General Staff in Ottawa for 10 months, followed by a four-month staff course at RMC in Kingston. Upon arrival overseas in November of 1943, he was attached to General Staff Headquarters, Second Canadian Division. In May 1944, he returned to the LSR(m) just in time for the Normandy Invasion and was Second in Command when the unit went to France in July. He took command of the Lake Superiors when Lieutenant-Colonel Murrell was wounded in action in August 1944, and led the Regiment throughout the rest of the campaign. (Fort William Daily Times-Journal, 29 January 1946, TBPL Local History File; Military Forces and Defense- Thunder Bay, #57.)

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