Thesis:

Where Politics and Music Meet: Why developing critical consciousness is important to the education of professional musicians.

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ABSTRACT

My hypothesis is that the intersections of music and politics are not adequately addressed in professional music education as it is currently conceived and that the tools of critical theory and critical pedagogy and the goal of developing critical consciousness address this gap. My objective is to show the necessity to situate ourselves and our work in relation to political, economic, personal and communal locations.

This thesis is a conceptual study and draws on the literatures of philosophy of music education (i.e., B. Reimer; D. Elliott, T. Regelski and E. Jorgensen) and critical theory/critical pedagogy (e.g., Paulo Freire). I argue that critical consciousness enables us to consider political aspects of materiality, ideology, and power, thus affecting our understandings of ourselves as musicians, suggesting changes to our practices, and contributing to our capacity to participate as citizens in a democracy. In conclusion, I offer a series of recommendations, pointing to extant work that could contribute to a music program that has developing critical consciousness as a goal.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

"But what could be cruder than a human being who is limited to a narrow idea of knowledge and practice and has the naiveté of a child in most other areas? This is one of the elements that accounts for our clinical state of unconsciousness."
John Ralston Saul[1]

Hilary to Jackie: "You don't know anything apart from the cello. I don't know anything apart from the flute. We're babies, Jacks."
Dialogue from Film: "Hilary and Jackie"[2]

The above quotations, from a book by scholar John Ralston Saul and a popular movie about cellist Jacqueline DuPrès, point to a problem with specialist education that can leave graduates unprepared to grapple with questions beyond narrow limits. My aim in this thesis is to examine potentially narrow limits in the specialized field of education for professional musicians. Specifically, I investigate the possibility that studies of critical consciousness might usefully inform and broaden both the subjects and the manner in which professional musicians are taught.

This thesis has grown out of two sources. The first is my own experience of cognitive dissonance where my goals and aspirations as a professional musician have been in conflict with my growing understanding of myself as a politically located individual. The second is the literature of critical pedagogy[3]—a literature I encountered during a Philosophy of Education course—that offers a means of analyzing and possibly resolving that cognitive dissonance.

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[1] Saul, J. (1995). *The unconscious civilization.* Concord, ON: Anasi Press, p. 15

[2] Copyright: Alliance Vivafilm 1999

[3] In particular, hooks, b. (1994). *Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice of freedom.* New York: Routledge and Freire, P. (1990/1970). *Pedagogy of the oppressed.* New York: Continuum.

My project originates with the claims that there are many instances where politics and music intersect; my education as a professional musician did little to prepare me to address these situations adequately. In my experience, questions regarding corporate or government funding, questions about cultural appropriation or anti-racist repertoire, or questions about whether the arts should be subsidized as a part of the "public commons"[4] can rip the heart out of music organizations and performers.

My music degree prepared me primarily to replicate culture within the context of a professional symphony orchestra and traditional small ensemble; there was little sense that, as a producer of culture, I would have important artistic, ethical and practical decisions to make in my future career. My assumption, as a student, was that music in general, and western classical music in particular, transcended the day-to-day and had no relationship to political issues. I no longer believe this to be the case. My project thus begins from the position that separating music and politics is problematic. Contrary to the conventional perception that music education is apolitical or neutral, I believe that keeping music studies separate from political considerations is a political choice. I also argue that, educationally, it is an unnecessarily constrained and constraining choice.

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[4] "Commons are any sets of resources that a community recognizes as being accessible to any member of that community. The nature of commons is different in different communities, but they often include cultural resources and natural resources.... The most widespread instance of a common is the public right-of-way, a.k.a. public roads....resources "owned" equally by every member of the community, even though the community recognizes that only a limited number of members may use the resource at any given time." (*Commons*. Retrieved 7/7/04, from Wordiq: http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Commons.)

The nature of the study is conceptual. The initial problem is to determine whether the current philosophical formulations of the character and justification of music education are adequate to ground educational studies that would prepare professional musicians to deal effectively with the political dimensions of their work. I address this question in three steps: first I draw upon the philosophy of music education literature to generate a set of themes and key tensions that will serve as a baseline account of current philosophical foundations. Second, I identify a significant set of political dynamics relevant to the work of professional musicians. Here, I draw upon my experiences across a range of activities associated with professional music practice. Finally, I compare these two accounts and show that, with some exceptions, the philosophy of music education literature does not address effectively the political dimensions of professional music practice that I have found to be problematic.

The second problem involves studying the critical theory and critical pedagogy literature to identify an approach that might reasonably be expected to address the political dimensions of professional music practice. This problem is actually set up through a comparison of two different interpretations of the term "praxis". The first interpretation is based on an Aristotelian account of modes of thinking-doing. This version of praxis appears in the philosophy of music education work of both David Elliott and Thomas Regelski. The second, contrasting version, is based on a Freirean account, Marxist in origin, that characterizes praxis as a transformative kind of thinking-doing. This comparison then serves as a bridge to the account of critical consciousness that I develop based on a review of the literature of critical theory and critical pedagogy.

I do not endeavour to make claims about particular music programs or institutions in this study. Nor do I attempt to find solutions for specific political/musical problems. Rather, my goal is to make the case analytically that developing critical consciousness is important for musicians on several levels—personal, professional and societal.

This thesis is addressed to those who teach and study in Professional Conservatory of Music Programs, Professional Colleges and University Faculties of Music. By narrowing my discussion to this group of people, I am not implying that there are not other routes to becoming a professional musician, that "professional" implies musical merits unavailable to non-professionals, or that the "musics" studied in these contexts define what counts as musical culture. I address my thesis to those who work within these educational settings because these institutions offer full-time study of several branches of professional musical life. Thus, these institutions occupy a central place in our society where the *raison d'etre* for our being, and the relationships in which we will engage as professionals in the field of music can, and I argue, should, be subjected to thorough analysis as a part of our preparation to enter the field.

The literature of philosophy of music education is a rich source of discussion on the nature of music and music education. In order to establish the major themes of this field, I review selected works of four major, contemporary writers: Bennett Reimer, David J. Elliott, Thomas A. Regelski and Estelle R. Jorgensen. Each of these writers argues for the importance of having a sound and defensible "philosophy" to guide one's practice as a music educator. In my view, the argument for the importance of "philosophy," that is, for having a critical understanding of "why we do what we do,"

applies equally well to other music professionals such as performers, composers and musicologists.

The literature of philosophy of music education raises many issues of relevance to all music professionals—not the least being the relevance of pedagogical practices to our own music studies. Amongst the issues considered by these writers are: the nature of music, whether music represents a particular form of knowledge, how musicianship is best developed, how to define the nature of creativity and how this is best developed, what music offers to human beings as individuals and in relationship to others, and what extra-musical expressions of culture are relevant to the understanding of different musics.

The literature of critical pedagogy, on the other hand, offers a conceptualization of education, including a critique of various discourses, in which individuals learn to situate themselves by an analysis of socio/political relations as seen through the lens of historical materialism[5]. Education is conceived as a "practice of freedom"[6] based upon a dialectical and dialogical approach to knowledge. The following passage, from the 1987 "dialogue-book" by Paulo Freire and Ira Shor, both describes and exemplifies some of the principles and rationales of this approach:

> **Paulo** The methods of dialogical education draw us into the intimacy of the society, the *raison d'etre* of every object of study. Through critical dialogue about a text or a moment of society, we try to reveal it, unveil it, see its reasons for being like it is, the political and historical context of the material. This for me is an act of knowing, not a mere transfer-of-knowledge or a mere technique for

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[5] See Chapter Three for a definition of "historical materialism."

[6] See Shaull, Richard in introduction to Freire, P. (1970/1990). *Pedagogy of the oppressed.* New York: Continuum, p. 15; hooks, b. (1994). *Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice of freedom.* New York: Routledge, p. 30; Shor, I., & Freire, P. (1987). *A Pedagogy for liberation.* South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey.

> learning the alphabet. The liberating course 'illuminates' reality in the context of developing serious intellectual work.
>
> **Ira** I like that idea, Paulo, to 'illuminate' reality. And I also agree that liberating education is not a manual of clever techniques, but is rather a critical perspective on school and society, learning for social transformation.
>
> **Paulo** Besides being an act of knowing, education is also a political act. That is why no pedagogy is neutral.
>
> **Ira** They all have a form and a content that relate to power in society, that construct one kind of society or another, and they all have social relations in the classroom that confirm or challenge domination. (Shor & Freire, 1987, p.13)

Shor and Freire refer, here, to a number of issues. They suggest it is important to situate ourselves as engaged[7] learners and teachers within social, political and historical contexts and that the creation of knowledge is on-going and is better facilitated by a dialogical approach to pedagogy rather than transference of knowledge from teacher to learner. Education, they claim, is not neutral because it relates to the structures of value and power in a society. Classroom dynamics can challenge or reinforce accepted social relations. Thus, where social relations can be shown to be oppressive, social change can be advocated as a valid educational goal. By implication, they also reject the compartmentalization of knowledge — the practice of teaching subjects as isolated from social context as critiqued by Saul in the opening passage of this chapter.

Two further concepts important to the idea of education as the "practice of freedom" are "conscientization" and "praxis". Conscientization (*conscientização*), or critical consciousness, a notion made prominent by Paulo Freire, "refers to learning to

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[7] See also hooks, b. (1994). *Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice of freedom.* New York, London: Routledge, for a discussion of "engaged pedagogy" and Vaugeois, L., Epp. (1996, April). Classroom Dynamics and Feminist Pedagogy: Engaged Learning. *Applying Research to the Classroom., 14, 3*(Valuing Diversity), 26-30.

perceive social, political, and economic contradictions and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality" (Freire, P., 1990/1970, p. 19, FN: translator's note). "Praxis" is defined as "action and reflection upon the world in order to change it" (Freire, 1990/1970, p. 36; hooks, 1994, p. 14). Freire argues that achieving "conscientization" is a primary goal of education. It is the process that one undertakes to become aware of historical, political and social relations. "Praxis" is the necessary integration of theory and action. Theory, in itself, does nothing to change reality; however, action taken without adequate theorizing is equally ineffective in bringing about positive social change; inadequately theorized actions risk fanatic and destructive consequences (Freire, P., 1990/1970, p.19). Thus, the term praxis reminds us that action must always be informed by theory and theory must always review and anticipate action. Both "conscientization" and "praxis" are central to critical pedagogy as developed by Freire and Shor, amongst others. Music education philosophers David Elliott and Thomas Regelski also use the term "praxis;" however, their use of praxis is based upon an Aristotelian definition of the term and differs significantly from the way it is used by critical theorists. This difference becomes pivotal to my argument for the development of a form of critical consciousness that is attentive to politics.

I first read the literature of critical pedagogy in the context of general education but began to wonder if this literature might also have something to offer to the education of professional musicians. What I had been seeking was an approach to music education that encouraged musicians to make connections between the work we do and the society in which we live. I wanted an approach that would provide the analytical tools necessary to make informed decisions about the intersections of politics and music, that is, I wanted

to see my musical work in relation to my political, economic, personal and communal locations. I began to conjecture that developing critical consciousness would allow musicians to contextualize their work beyond the demand to re-produce culture. Further, I postulated that developing critical consciousness might allow musicians to grow beyond the limitations of a specialist education — a limitation that Saul notes as potentially restricting our capacities to act responsibly as citizens.

With the literature of philosophy of music education as one primary source of study and the literature of critical pedagogy as the second, my thesis will focus on two questions: Does the current philosophy of education literature address the intersection of music and politics that I have found to be problematic for professional musicians? And, is developing critical consciousness important to the education of professional musicians? My study is grounded on three assumptions: 1) that learning about the nature and value of music is important to music education; 2) that the intersection of politics and music matters and 3) that professional musicians must be able to address the issues that emerge from this intersection. For the purposes of analysis, I have identified five aspects of a musician's life where music and politics meet. I identify these aspects in terms of roles musicians experience as their careers and their lives progress. As they are lived, these roles are not mutually exclusive; however, for my purposes it is useful to address the elements they introduce separately. These roles are: wage earner, artist, member of a community, teacher and cultural producer. "Wage earner" refers to one who earns their livelihood through musical work. "Artist" refers to one who strives to express personal creativity through a chosen medium. In this category, I examine creativity and self-image. "Member of a community" refers to our locations within social and political

forms of organization. "Teacher," for the purposes of my thesis, refers to one who teaches within a university or conservatory setting—in classrooms or one-on-one as instrumental teachers. Finally, "Cultural producer" refers to one who contributes to artistic events that take place in public settings, such as performances and classes intended to be shared by people other than the producers involved. I have summarized these roles in chart form below:

Role or Aspect:	Definition for the purpose of this thesis:
Musicians as: "Wage Earners"	Those who earn their livlihood through musical work.
Musicians as: "Artists"	Those who strive to express personal creativity through a chosen medium.
Musicians as: "Members of Communities"	Our locations within social and political forms of organization.
Musicians as: "Teachers"	Those who teach within a university or conservatory setting--in classrooms or as one-on-one instrumental teachers.
Musicians as: "Cultural Producers"	Those who contribute to artistic events that take place in public settings, such as performances and classes intended to be shared by people other than the producers involved.

Figure 1:
Five aspects of a musician's life where music and politics meet.

These roles help to illustrate the connection between political circumstances and ways we actually live our lives as musicians. For example, as "wage earners", we face the difficulty of defending the value of classical music as a public expenditure. Many musicians find themselves participating in lobbying efforts to garner and maintain public support. At stake is our material survival — at least within the context of existing institutions; however, our rationales are often based on little more than self interest and a gut instinct that what we do "is important". Even where musicians are part of organisations formed expressly to advocate for better contracts and more favorable tax laws, lobbying efforts are not necessarily understood in terms of broad political and social issues. We often don't recognize ourselves as sharing common circumstances with other unemployed workers or people on social assistance, although we are dependent upon government (public) support. As cultural producers, classical musicians are accused of carrying the banner for the music of "dead white men." This role, or designation, is generally not examined during formal music studies. Should public funding go towards maintaining this particular tradition of music-making if it reflects values at odds with some contemporary values? The debate over public funding is one example of political circumstances intersecting the way we live our lives as professional musicians.

Philosophy of music education literature introduces us to factors that affect the ways we understand the nature and value of music and music education. Considering these factors is essential to the development of professional musicians; however, I argue that contemporary music education practice is limited by a preoccupation with what I call a view from the "inside". Developing critical consciousness requires that we examine

the structures of society and consider our roles, as musicians, within that larger context—what I refer to as the view from the "outside". By attending to an alternative tradition of praxis, my project reframes how music and music education are related to society. I argue that this view of praxis, and the attendant requirement to develop critical consciousness, affects our understandings of ourselves as musicians, suggests changes to our practices, and contributes to our capacity to participate, in a meaningful way, as citizens in a democracy.

The thesis is organized into five chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter Two presents a largely exegetical analysis of the work of the four writers mentioned previously: Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen. As much as possible my account reflects the priorities and objectives of each author as outlined above.

In Chapter Three I stay with the philosophy of music education literature and examine the work of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen. This examination is conducted in light of the five roles that frame my analysis of the intersection of music and politics (wage earner, artist, member of communities, teacher and artist).

Chapter Four has three parts. In Part One, I focus particular attention on the concept of "praxis" contrasting the Aristotelian definition used by philosophy of music education writers, Elliott and Regelski, with the tradition and use of the term based on the work of Karl Marx and developed by educators such as Paulo Freire, Ira Shor, and bell hooks. The contrasting analysis of praxis becomes a critical point of departure for my project. It is by arguing in favour of paying attention to the latter, currently neglected, line of thinking about praxis that I lay the groundwork for including critical consciousness as an element of music education. In Part Two, I discuss the meaning of

critical consciousness according to Paulo Freire, Ira Shor, bell hooks, Maxine Greene and other philosophers who write within the field of critical pedagogy. I look to these writers for an understanding of critical consciousness in relation to pedagogical principles and practices. Key concepts include: the development of critical consciousness (conscientization), problematization, use of a dialogical method and the relationship of education to the political. I close this section with a summary of the gaps between the issues raised in the literature of critical pedagogy and those raised in the philosophy of music education literature. In Part Three of Chapter Four, I offer weak, moderate and strong formulations of arguments in favour of integrating critical consciousness into general education practices.

Finally, in Chapter Five I present a set of conclusions that reviews the course of the arguments leading up to the advocacy of studies of critical consciousness. I bring forward examples of political dynamics of professional music practice that can be addressed via the tools of critical consciousness, problematization, and a dialogic pedagogy to look at these examples as they affect musicians' roles as cultural producers, wage earners, artists, members of communities, teachers and cultural producers. In this chapter, I also offer some limited references to literature by musicians[8] who write from within the disciplines of musicology, sociology and cultural criticism. Much of this latter work addresses political and cultural implications of various musical practices that could contribute greatly to a pedagogical program that has developing critical consciousness as a goal.

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[8] Susan McClary, Lucy Green, Christopher Small and John Shepherd, amongst others.

Finally, I review the weak, moderate and strong arguments in favour of critical consciousness studies, this time in the context of music education, and offer a series of limited recommendations for future study.

CHAPTER TWO:
PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION: A BRIEF SURVEY

Although the field of the Philosophy of Music Education does not have a long history in North America—it dates back little more than thirty[9] years—it is a rich source of discussion on the nature of music and principles of music pedagogy. Significantly, most of this literature is directed towards those who will become school music teachers or those who prepare them for this profession. The education of music teachers is generally assumed to be quite different from that required by performers, musicologists and composers; however, while there are particular subject areas that pertain to each division, I believe that having an understanding of the nature of music and the nature of music education is significant for all branches of the profession. Bennett Reimer directs his comments in the following passages towards future music educators; however, they apply equally well to all future music professionals.

> The need for a philosophy exists at both the collective and individual levels. First, the profession as a whole needs a set of beliefs which can serve to guide the efforts of the group. The impact the profession can make on society depends in large degree on the quality of the profession's understanding of what it has to offer which might be of value to society. (Reimer, 1989, p. 3)

> It is essential for the development of a sense of self-identity and self-respect that college students be given the opportunity to think seriously about their reasons for professional being. (Reimer, 1989, p. 5)

Each of the writers discussed in this chapter argues in favour of the significance of understanding "why we do what we do" and what the music profession has to contribute to society. In addition, each writer argues that "how" one is taught should

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[9] Bennett Reimer's *A philosophy of music education*, first published in 1970 is considered the first formal work in North America devoted to the philosophy of music education.

reflect the same values as "what" one is taught. In other words, one's philosophy of music should reflect one's philosophy of music education and *vise versa*. Likewise, it is important that "what and how" one is taught to be a performer or composer or musicologist reflects philosophical values one has identified as "of value to society." The literature of Philosophy of Music Education is thus an excellent starting place in any discussion about what philosophical and pedagogical principles should guide educational practices for all students at professional music schools.

In this chapter I map out major issues as identified by four philosophers of music education: Bennett Reimer, David J. Elliott, Thomas A. Regelski and Estelle R. Jorgensen. I discuss these writers in the chronological order of their major works.

Bennett Reimer

Bennett Reimer published the first edition of his book *A Philosophy of Music Education* in 1970, with a second edition appearing in 1989[10]. Reimer describes the nature of music *via* the aesthetic tradition[11], and uses his analysis to establish what he

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[10] A third edition of Reimer's book, *A Philosophy of Music Education. Advancing the Vision* was published in 2003. I have not included material from this edition as this portion of my thesis was completed prior to the book's availability. As my analysis functions primarily as a foil to introduce the need for developing critical consciousness I believe I can let my original analysis stand; however, I direct the reader to Reimer's 2003 publication. The new edition is substantially revised and includes responses to David Elliott and other critics of his work, discussions on the influence of post-modernism and much new thought on the nature of music and music education.

[11] Reimer cites Susanne Langer and Leonard Meyer amongst others as key sources of the aesthetic tradition. His references include: Langer, Susanne K. (1957). *Problems of art.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Langer, Suzanne K. (1942). *Philosophy in a new key.* New York: Mentor Books. Meyer, Leonard B. (1956). *Emotion and meaning in music.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

considers to be central to music education. His principal arguments are that music and the arts exist in order to express human subjectivity; that music must be experienced as sound to be understood as music; that "meaning" in a piece of music resides only in terms of its musical elements; and, that human subjectivity (or human feeling) can be educated through experiencing and deepening one's appreciation of art.

The function of art, according to Reimer, is to educate our feelings. Art serves to "*clarify, organize, broaden, deepen, concentrate, refine, sensitize*, [and] *discipline*" our feelings" (Reimer, 1989, p. 32, author's emphasis). "Creating art and experiencing art *deepen* our subjectivity" (Reimer, 1989, p. 36, author's emphasis). A person who *composes* music is "at once embodying his [*sic*][12]understanding about the nature of feeling and exploring new possibilities of feeling" (Reimer, 1989, p. 66). A person who *performs* music works with the expressive qualities of the materials of sound, explores and discovers the "expressive potentials in the yet-to-be-finished work of art, and [brings] those potentials to fruition in the performance of it" (Reimer, 1989 p. 65). A person who *listens* to music "s*hares* the artist's subjectivity captured in the work's expressive qualities and *explores* new possibilities of feeling opened to him by the work's exploratory nature" (Reimer, 1989 p. 67, author's emphasis).

Works of art must be "experienced" to be understood. Reasoning based upon the use of concepts is not sufficient for explaining the process of perceiving and experiencing music. A concept is "always about the phenomenon. It does not constitute the

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[12] Reimer uses male and female pronouns interchangeably throughout his text. My practice will be to cite author's pronoun references verbatim while alternating them in my own text.

phenomenon itself or the internal experience of the phenomenon" (Reimer, 1989, p. 83). He explains:

> Concepts always and forever yield *knowledge about (ab,* Latin = "away from"). They never yield *knowledge of.* Works of art yield *knowledge of.* The experience they exist to provide is of the immediate, singular, unnamed, dynamic interplay of structured forces embodied in their elements. In the experience of them we are engaged in a process of affective/perceptual structuring. Such an experience is not "about" anything. It is "of" a particular occurrence yielded by a particular expressive form at a particular moment in time. (Reimer, 1989, p. 83-84)

Reimer argues that music and the arts have a "special cognitive status" and that "the authentic, essential ways they [the arts] involve people in intelligent, reasoned, mindful experiences ...yield powerful forms of knowledge of their outer and inner worlds" (Reimer, 1989, p. 80). This distinction between the modes of acquiring knowledge in other disciplines and the "perceptual structuring" particular to arts learning is central to Reimer's argument for the need to include music and arts education as separate areas of study for all students distinct from any other non-artistic forms of education. The rationale for this imperative is that aesthetic learning develops a unique form of human intelligence that allows us to experience human subjectivity in its limitless forms. In Reimer's words, "music and the other arts are a basic way that humans know themselves and their world; they are a basic mode of cognition" (Reimer, 1989, p. 11).

Reimer uses the word "aesthetic" to describe the nature of the experience one has when engaging with a work of art. To clarify his own position, Reimer presents Formalist and Referentialist positions to show what he does *not* mean by aesthetic experience. The formalist position is that art refers only to itself: "Artistic events, such as sounds in music, mean *only themselves*: the meaning is completely and essentially

different from anything in the world which is non-musical" (Clive Bell in Reimer, 1989, p. 23). For Referentialists, an art work's meaning resides in the "ideas, emotions, attitudes, events" which the art work "reminds" one of or "tells about" (Reimer, 1989, p. 17). This viewpoint found its most extreme expression in Socialist Realism. The alternative position that Reimer argues in favour of is called "Absolute Expressionism." Absolute Expressionism "insists that meaning and value are internal: they are functions of the artistic qualities themselves and how they are organized" (Reimer, 1989, p. 27). Reimer acknowledges that external referents have a function in some kinds of music (music with text, for example) but maintains that such references are "always transformed and transcended by the internal artistic form" (Reimer, 1989, p. 27). He uses the term "aesthetic" to describe the particular cognitive process that is only available to us through artistic experience.

> The arts offer meaningful, cognitive experiences unavailable in any other way.....Such experiences are necessary for all people if their essential humanness is to be realized. (Reimer, 1989, p. 28)

Learning about different musical styles is an important pre-requisite to being able to respond to the pieces of music. Styles are like the "rules of a game;" they tell us what the tendencies and expectations are of any particular sphere of music.

> For sounds to have tendencies—to arouse expectations that certain things are likely to happen—and for musical tendencies to be manipulated in expressive ways by deviations, delays, resolutions, repetitions, uncertainties, and so on, a context must exist which provides people with a commonly accepted sphere of musical probabilities. Such a sphere of probabilities, in which a recognizable degree of predictability exists, is called a "style." When melody, rhythm, harmony, tone color, texture, and form are used in characteristic ways so that some unity of expectation is possible on the part of the perceiver, a style is in operation, providing the basic set of agreed-upon "likelihoods" for musical sharing to be built upon. (Reimer, 1989, p. 132)

Reimer argues that art is to be experienced on its own terms without reference to non-musical signifiers[13] as in the passage that follows:

> The expressiveness of an art work is contained in its artistic qualities rather than being pointed to in something outside of itself....The work does not communicate something—it embodies artistic qualities that can be experienced by someone who is aware of them and feels their expressive potential. (Reimer, 1989, p. 91)

Further,

> Aesthetic experience is not a means toward nonaesthetic experience and serves no utilitarian purpose. It is experience for the sake of the experience in and of itself....For an experience to be intrinsic it must be removed from practical, utilitarian concerns, so that it can be enjoyed for itself. In this sense aesthetic experience is "disinterested"—not lacking in interest but lacking in concern about pragmatic outcomes. (Reimer, 1989, p. 103)

Reimer does not intend this distancing from utilitarian aims to make art separate from life, however. On the contrary, he sees artistic experiences as being at the core of life's most meaningful experiences:

> Art is not esoteric or rarified or removed from life, but is a basic means for *making contact with life.* The particular way one makes such contact through art is by aesthetically experiencing it." (Reimer, 1989, p. 102)

The "value" of "the art of music" is in its ability to broaden our capacity to feel. By broadening this capacity, music can help us achieve larger social goals. Reimer quotes Dewey in the following passage about the socializing value of the arts.

> The power of art to cut through the surface of life and to give a sense of life's depths makes art our most effective tool for deepening the experiences of people into their shared nature. "In the end, works of art are the only media of complete and unhindered communication [sharing] between man and man that can occur in a world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience. This sharing

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[13] "Musical" signifiers, according to Reimer, include melody, rhythm, harmony, tone color, texture, and form. "Non-musical" signifiers could include such factors as biographical details of the composer's life and the social context in which the work was created.

> is, in essence, socializing, for it allows people to know—through actual experiencing rather than through preachments—about the common sentient condition of humans.... It is "inside" art that we find our deepest sense of community, as we feel deeply and empathize with others who also feel. (Dewey as quoted in Reimer, 1989, p. 68.)

To enhance this capacity, Reimer suggests that students study music from cultures different from their own so that they can experience and appreciate life as subjectively experienced by others.

> The reason the world does not have just one style of music is that each culture has its special shading of affective experience of the world. Music—and all art—is the most powerful way to explore and experience the specificity of how life is felt by each group sharing a communal subjective identity.
>
> We are instructed, by the diversity of ethnic music styles, that human feeling is universally existent but is also expressed uniquely by each culture. That is precisely the social lesson our children must learn through their musical education; that all human beings share the basic condition of subjective awareness and that each culture experiences this awareness with a special character. (Reimer, 1989, p. 145)

Reimer places creativity at the centre of musical experiences and also at the centre of his pedagogical vision[14]. Creativity can be found in simple musical constructions as well as complex ones, and it can occur in student work as well as the work of experienced composers. He describes musical creativity as engaging with the materials of music: exploring the possibilities of those materials, discovering the potentialities for expressiveness within those materials and organizing them in such a way as to create feelingful experiences.

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[14] In Reimer's 1996 response paper, he describes his view on creativity as a "continuum of abilities," reiterating his conviction that fostering creativity is vitally important to music education. Reimer, B. (1996). David Elliott's "new" philosophy of music education: Music for performers only. *Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education, 128,* 59-89.

> The growth process which is the essential characteristic of artistic creation is a process of *exploration*. It is a searching out and discovering of expressiveness. The exploration into feeling takes place through an exploration of the expressive possibilities of the medium in which the artist is working. There is no way for an artist to explore the realm of feeling except through exploring the feelingful qualities of things—words, sounds, colors, shapes, movements, acts. Artistic creation explores and forms the feelingful qualities of a particular medium. (Reimer, 1989, p. 59)

Reimer reiterates this in the following passage:

> Music education should help people share as fully as possible in the created expressive qualities of pieces of music, so they can experience the explorations and discoveries of feeling captured in those pieces. Music education should also involve people in the creation of music to the fullest extent possible, to experience their own explorations and discoveries of feeling through the act of creation. (Reimer, 1989, p. 69)

For Reimer, developing one's individual creativity is a central tenet. Three levels of creativity should be explored and encouraged in every music education program. Reimer cites the most important of these as "listening."

Listening is its own act of creation. The listener's "perception and musical reaction are brought to bear in such a way that he is, in a real sense, *creating along with the music* (Reimer, 1989, p. 129). Reimer considers listening to be the most important element of music education because "the major interaction most people will have with music is as listeners. (Reimer, 1989, p. 71)

The second way that Reimer suggests that people "experience music creatively is through composing" (Reimer, 1989, p. 71). Reimer considers the teaching of composition an important pedagogical goal that has, thus far, not been well integrated into school music programs.

The third way that music students can explore their own creativity is through performance. Here Reimer cautions that performance classes can sometimes result in

students learning technical proficiency without ever becoming engaged in making their own artistic decisions.

> To understand that there is a big difference between making the correct sounds and being involved in an act of creation, to employ the methodologies for making that truth come alive in the real experiences of our students, and to be guided by that goal—the goal of creative music making rather than that of competitive musical dexterity—remain among our most pressing needs as a profession. (Reimer, 1989, p. 72)

Reimer writes at length about potential problems of performance programs and cautions against programs that produce highly skilled players trained more as "artisans" than "artists" because they have had no involvement in artistic creation and artistic decision-making *per se* (Reimer, 1989, p. 69). In performance programs, because so much time is spent on large ensemble work, students may not have sufficient room to "contribute their own creative decisions as opposed to the unifying decisions made by the conductor, whose job it is to mould a coherent performance that is true to the piece itself" (Reimer, 1989, p. 71). Therefore it is important that performance programs create opportunities for students to develop their creative decision-making skills as performers.

In discussing "how" music should be taught, Reimer recommends an experiential approach and cautions against concentrating "on details at the expense of experiencing the actual music" (Reimer, 1989, p. 54). The teacher should

> ...help students become progressively more sensitive to the elements of music which contain the conditions which can yield experiences of feeling. These elements—the musical qualities of melody, harmony, rhythm, tone color, texture, form—are objective; they are identifiable, nameable, capable of being manipulated, created, discussed, isolated, reinserted into context. There is nothing mystical about musical events and how they give rise to a sense of significance. (Reimer, 1989, p. 54)

The "good" music educator must be careful not to place him/ or herself between the student and the work of music that is there to be experienced and perceived by each individual student. Nevertheless, good listening is not passive and therefore can be heightened through pedagogical strategies.

> A constant interaction between conception about expressive qualities of music, and perception of those qualities, should pervade every aspect of musical study. (Reimer, 1989, p. 117).

The teacher must constantly balance the need to bring musical concepts to the attention of students while facilitating opportunities for students to actually experience the music itself.

> In music, perceiving and reacting (aesthetically experiencing) occurs through listening. One need not compose in order to experience music. One need not perform in order to experience music. But one cannot experience it without listening. (Reimer, 1989, p. 168)

As stated earlier, Reimer recommends that the music studied represent different musical genres from many parts of the world. The music studied should also be of good quality; however, quality is not measured by genre but by how well a piece of music succeeds in capturing a sense of human feeling.

> Every good work of art, no matter when it was made and no matter how it was made, is good because its artistic qualities succeed in capturing a sense of human feeling. (Reimer, 1989, p. 51)

"Art, and artists, in the populist view, must be judged for excellence relatively to what they are creating" (Reimer, 1989, p. 112). Reimer eschews elitist[15] attitudes that would impose a hierarchy of values.

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[15] In his preface, Reimer explains that the term "aesthetic" is mistakenly interpreted to refer only to elitist conceptions of music: "Still another difficulty with the term is that it suggests to some people a focus on art for art's sake or music for music's

> Elitism is deadening to culture because it is unable to enjoy the great variety of life's good things. It is pernicious, of course, when it claims that access to culture should be limited according to social class, race, financial status, and so on, a position untenable in a democracy. (Reimer, 1989, p.112).

Reimer describes the criteria for determining what should be studied below:

> First, the musical compositions chosen for study, at all levels and in all aspects of the program, should be rich with expressive potential. Not every piece of music will be or need be at the masterpiece level of musical excellence and profundity; such pieces will always be exceptional. But every piece to be experienced should be marked by the qualities that testify to the presence of genuine musical creativity; craftsmanship in its construction, sensitivity to its expressive impact, imagination in its freshness, authenticity to its own musical demands and to the style of which it is an example. These qualities of excellence exist in the simplest idea as well as the most complex compositions, and in every period of music and every style of music" (Reimer, 1989, p. 70).

Reimer recommends a thoughtful and reflective approach to music education. His view that music is not related to anything but itself, however, results in a caution that sets definite limits to the type of discourse that takes place in music classrooms. Reimer believes that teachers must avoid engaging students in long discussions over nonmusical issues. He argues that the historical and social contexts in which music is created are only relevant in terms of recognizing particular musical styles in strictly musical terms. Reimer argues that teaching about nonmusical elements forces the "experience of music to be nonmusical, and, even more importantly, *teaches people that nonmusical responses to music are appropriate and desirable"* (Reimer, 1989, p. 124, author's emphasis). According to Reimer, this nonmusical approach to teaching about music is an "*antimusic* education" and becomes a "serious obstacle to the development of an important

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sake, which seems to mean that art or music are then unrelated to the everyday lives that we as human beings actually live. Further, such an esoteric or elitist view could certainly not be relevant for the "common people," whose involvements with art are earthy and freewheeling." (Reimer, 1989, p. xii)

component—the aesthetic component—of people's lives" (Reimer, 1989, p. 124, author's emphasis). In Reimer's view, all the arts should be "approached as expressive forms, perceived as expressive forms, responded to as expressive forms, judged as expressive forms, taught as expressive forms." (Reimer, 1989, p. 119).

To summarize and to facilitate comparison with other theorists, I present key themes of Reimer's philosophy in chart form in Figure 1.

Reimer
General Philosophical Approaches
Aesthetic philosophy of music and music education. Recommends reflective practices.
Music as knowledge fits into the liberal humanist tradition of education. Aristotelian concepts are used to support his viewpoints.
Music education fulfills humanist ideals.
What is the nature of music?
Musical works are "expressive forms;" Historical and social contexts do not affect the meaning of musical works. Music refers only to itself. It is not "about" anything.
Does music represent a particular form of knowledge?
Music represents a unique form of knowledge (perceptual structuring) that educates human "feeling"—a form of knowledge with intrinsic value. All arts should be approached as expressive forms.
How is musicianship best developed?
A variety of pedagogical approaches is recommended. All arts are to be approached, perceived, responded to, judged and taught as "expressive forms."
Listening is the most important way to experience and learn about music because the listener is "creating along with the music."
Becoming a successful performer should not be seen as the be-all and end-all of music.
Music education should include exposure to the music of many different cultures. An experiential approach is recommended. Comparison of the expressive qualities of the music of different cultures can lead to an appreciation that all human beings share the basic condition of subjective awareness.
What is the nature of creativity and how is this best developed?
Developing creativity should be an important part of music education. A continuum of creativity exists that all can access.
What does music offer to human beings as individuals and in relationship to others?
It is "inside" art that we find our deepest sense of community, as we feel deeply and empathize with others who also feel" (p. 68).
How is music evaluated?
Music is successful when it succeeds in expressing human subjectivity--when it is "feelingful." The role of the teacher is to bring about a greater awareness of the expressive qualities of the musical elements in operation.

Figure 2: Key Themes of Reimer

David J. Elliott

Elliott published *Music Matters*[16] in 1995 as an alternative to models developed by Bennett Reimer and other aesthetic music philosophers. Like Reimer, Elliott believes that "the nature of music education depends on the nature of music" and "the significance of music education depends on the significance of music in human life" (Elliott, 1995, p. 12). Elliott, too, wants to "encourage teachers to think philosophically as a regular part of their daily efforts" (Elliott, 1995, p. 12). He disagrees profoundly, however, with Reimer's analysis of the nature of music and the nature of music education. Elliott's principal arguments are that music is something that people "do" (i.e., music works are not "objects"), that music is fundamentally multicultural in nature, and that music represents a unique form of knowledge described as "praxis" (Elliott, 1995, p. 33)[17].

Elliott begins his argument with a discussion of historical reasons for the development of aesthetic philosophy and traces it to economic developments and a perceived need by composers and theorists to create a concept of instrumental music as a "nonfunctional, commodity-based art."

> The work concept of music not only provided musicians with a theoretical equivalent to the tangible and highly valued objects of painting and sculpture, it served to conceal music's social and performative aspects by diverting attention away from musical processes to musical outcomes conceived as autonomous objects. In these ways, music gained a place among the commodity-based fine arts. (Elliott, 1995, p. 25)

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[16] Elliott, D. J. (1995). *Music matters. A new philosophy of music education.* Toronto: Oxford University Press.

[17] Later in this thesis I focus, strategically, on "praxis" as a means of contrasting the focus of critical consciousness made available in each of these music educators' thought. Here, however, I refer to it more simply as one of the themes emphasized in Elliott's work.

Elliott explains that 19th century theorists elevated instrumental music, as opposed to music with text, to the highest status "because its sonic materials transcended all worldly matters" (Elliott, 1995, p. 25).

> Instrumental sounds were recast as the purest of aesthetic qualities because they seemed to lack any connection with the ordinary world. (Elliott, 1995, p. 25)

Composers were also conceived "as divinely inspired by being geniuses whose creations exist in an ideal world that performers strive to enter by being faithful to a work's written score." (Elliott, 1995, p. 25)

> These principles of ideal permanence and separability from the world were reinforced by the notion of aesthetic perception, a code of listening that obliged nineteenth-century audiences to cooperate with musicians in stripping musical sounds of their social and practical links with the world for the purpose of entering the quasi-religious realm of aesthetic experience. (Elliott, 1994, p. 25)

Elliott argues that, in contrast to aesthetic theories of music[18], music is intimately tied to its cultural and historical tradition. Where aesthetic theorists argue that works of music should be appreciated and understood for their intrinsic musical qualities (e.g., Reimer, 1989, p. 103)[19], Elliott argues that the social and historical context of music-making activities is part of the "nature" of music *per se*. He writes:

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[18] In reporting Elliott's claims I do not mean to endorse them. In my view, Elliott's representation of Reimer, as a representative of the aesthetic tradition, is not always accurate. He presents an either/or formulation that has resulted in a polarization of viewpoints on music education.

[19] "For an experience to be intrinsic it must be removed from practical, utilitarian concerns" (Reimer, 1989, p. 103). In this instance, Reimer's account is very similar to that made by Aristotle regarding the difference between *praxis* (intrinsic value) and *poesis* (instrumental value). This is noteworthy. Elliott argues that his formulation of a "praxial philosophy" is diametrically opposed to the aesthetic philosophy of Reimer;

> Every auditory aspect of a musical work is inexorably tied to some artistic-musical-historical tradition. Hence, there is nothing innocent, self-contained, neutral, or ordinary about the sound patterns of musical works or the processes of listening for musical sound patterns. (Elliott, 1995, p. 91)

> A musical practice is not something that operates autonomously in a culture; it constitutes and is constituted by culture and ideology. (Elliott, 1995, p. 212)

Continuing his critique of the aesthetic viewpoint, Elliot states that "[m]usic is not simply a collection of products or objects. *Fundamentally, music is something that people do"* (Elliott, 1995, p. 39, author's emphasis). Music is a form of "intentional" human activity that refers to far more than any possible collection of "esteemed works" (Elliott, 1995, p. 39) or "feelings." In Elliott's terms, rather than being an entry-point to feelings or human subjectivity, music is a kind of "doing-action" that is a multidimensional form of thinking, fundamentally multicultural in nature and intrinsically connected to the various conditions of its production (Elliott, 1995, p.14 & p. 207). He concludes that it is not possible to understand or evaluate a piece of music based purely on its expressive qualities as suggested by Reimer (Reimer, 1989, p. 54). On the contrary, one must explore the full cultural context of a musical practice in order to appreciate an individual work. In Elliott's words:

> Underlying each musical practice is a shared body of beliefs, concepts, and principles for constructing and listening for musical patterns in certain ways. As a result, musical works are never a matter of purely sonic information alone. ...Stated another way, every musical performance of a musical work *evinces* culture-specific and practice-based norms of musical artistry. (Elliott, 1995, p. 89)

Historically, Elliott's contribution to the Philosophy of Music Education comes after a long period of government cutbacks to arts education programs. He argues that

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however, like Reimer, he builds his arguments on the Aristotelian differentiation of these two terms.

the cutbacks are, in part, the result of flawed arguments about the nature and value of music and he offers

> ...new reasons to believe that music is one of the most consequential, dynamic, and practical pursuits in the human repertoire and, therefore, fundamental to the full development of the individual and the collective self. (Elliott, 1995: vii)

Elliott's view of the "fundamental" nature of music is that it is a form of knowledge, different and separate from other types of reasoning. "Music—as a unique form of thinking and knowing—deserves a central place in the education of all people" (Elliott, 1995, p. 14).

> Stated another way, artistic music making and intelligent music listening involve a multidimensional, relational, coherent, generative, open, and educable form of knowing called musicianship. (Elliott, 1995, p. 70)

Bennett Reimer also considers the perception of music to be a unique form of knowledge—one that gives us insight into human subjectivity (Reimer, 1989, p. 11); however, Elliott's definition of this musical form of knowledge includes "human action" and social practice."

> Musical experiences depend on culturally and contextually determined understandings, both tacit and verbal. The deep absorption and personal integration that musicers and listeners tend to experience while musicing and/or listening result from cognizing musical performances in relation to personal and practice-specific understandings and beliefs. Musical experiences only seem immediate. In fact, context-dependent forms of thinking and knowing arbitrate all human interactions with the physical events we call musical works. (Elliott, 1995, p. 125)[20]

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[20] "Let us refer to musical doers as *musicers*, to musical doing as *musicing*, and to the musical "something done" as *music* in the sense of performances, improvisations, and other kinds of audible musical achievements....I shall most often use musicing in the collective sense to mean all five forms of music making: performing, improvising, composing, arranging, and conducting." (Elliott, 1995, p. 40)

Elliott also challenges the use of the term "aesthetic" to describe musical characteristics that he says are better defined as "artistic qualities."

> MUSIC is the human endeavor of making and listening for musical sounds that are culturally rooted and practice-specific and, therefore, artistic through and through. Accordingly, musical works are not rightly conceived as aesthetic objects. Musical works are not aesthetic in nature, and they are not physical objects. (Elliott, 1995: 91)

By redefining musical characteristics as *artistic*, Elliott is emphasizing the *relationship* between musical works and the context of their production. These include the relationships "between musical patterns and matters of a religious, moral, social, cultural, historical, political, practical, or otherwise non-structural nature" (Elliott, 1995, p. 31). Described as "artistic", rather than "aesthetic," each level of performing, creating and listening is identified as a form of intentional human activity, rooted in cultural practice. Where aesthetic theorists argue that "all music everywhere—all music across all cultures—ought to be listened to in the same narrow way" (Elliott, 1995, p. 33), Elliott argues that most music in most parts of the world is not intended to be experienced in this way. Rather, music is grounded in the context of broader cultural practices. On this basis, Elliott argues that music "ought to be understood in relation to the meanings and values evidenced in actual music making and music listening in specific cultural contexts" (Elliott, 1995, p. 14).

Early in his text, Elliott introduces the term "praxis" to describe the nature of music-making and music learning. In contrast to Reimer's foundational premise that aesthetic experience is "the education of human feeling," Elliott argues that the descriptor

"feeling"[21] is not sufficiently unique to describe the sense in which one perceives a work of music; there is nothing unique about the way that music may or may not allow one to experience the world of feeling[22]. Elliott calls his philosophy a "praxial philosophy" of music in order to

> ...highlight the importance it places on music as a particular form of action that is purposeful and situated and, therefore, revealing of one's self and one's relationship with others in a community. The term praxial emphasizes that music ought to be understood in relation to the meanings and values evidenced in actual music making and music listening in specific cultural contexts." (Elliott, 1995, p.14)

He bases his use of the word "praxis," as a kind of "doing-action," on the works of Aristotle.

> I recommend *praxis* to summarize the essential nature of music making and musicianship....Aristotle used *praxis* to mean informed and deliberative "doing-action" in which doers (as ethical practitioners) are not merely concerned with completing tasks correctly (*techné*), but action committed to achieving goals (*telos*) in relation to standards, traditions, images, and purposes (*eidos*) viewed as Ideals that are themselves open to renewal, reformulation, and improvement. In *praxis* (and in knowledgeable music making as I have attempted to describe it), the feedback that arises from one's reflections is used to improve one's expertise and to refine (or redefine) the goals that guide one's making and doing. (Elliott, 1995, p. 69)

All of this takes place within the realm of performance. Elliott uses praxis to describe the nature of musical knowledge, the process of reflection that is the foundation of musical knowledge, and the relationships that exist amongst the various aspects of music learning/understanding. The reflective process that is inherent to praxis is used to

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[21] Note that Reimer emphasizes the word "feeling" rather than "feelings."

[22] "Why would anyone want or need insight into the general forms of feeling? There is nothing to distinguish these general forms from any number of natural and artificial patterns...." (Elliott, 1995, p. 37)

improve one's expertise as a musician. For Elliott, "situatedness" refers to locating oneself within musical traditions, including the social context of each tradition[23].

Based on the idea that music is a form of "doing-action," Elliott argues that all music students, whether in general or performance programs, should learn music by "musicing," that is, by actively performing, improvising, arranging, composing and conducting music. Listening to music and learning to listen well to music, is part of all forms of "musicing," but listening is not sufficient, on its own, to help students develop true musical understanding or musicianship. Elliott's view stands once more in direct opposition to Bennett Reimer's assertion of the centrality of listening. Elliott writes:

> Musicing is an important term.... [It] reminds us that performing and improvising through singing and playing instruments lies at the heart of MUSIC as a diverse human practice. As the philosopher Nicholas Woltersdorf insists, "the basic reality of music is not works nor the composition of work but music making." (Elliott, 1995, p. 49)

If true learning is achieved only by "doing" music then evaluation of a person's level of musical understanding can only be assessed by evaluating their level of music making—be it as a performer, conductor, composer, or arranger. "Evaluation is based on a student's ability to replicate, through practical music making, the values inherent in any particular musical tradition" (Elliott, 1995, p. 75)[24]. In order to be successful, students must achieve goals "in relation to standards, traditions, images, and purposes (*eidos*)

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[23] "Situatedness" has a different meaning in the context of critical theory and critical pedagogy. This difference is explored in Chapter Four.

[24] Note the contrast between Reimer's view that creative decision-making should be central to music education and Elliott's view that "replicating...the values inherent in any particular musical tradition" is of prime importance.

viewed as Ideals that are themselves open to renewal, reformulation, and improvement" (Elliott, 1995, p. 69)[25].

The content of music education courses should be based upon the understanding that music is multicultural in essence: "If MUSIC consists in a diversity of music cultures, then MUSIC is inherently multicultural. And if MUSIC is inherently multicultural, then music education ought to be multicultural in essence" (Elliott, 1995, p. 207). A multicultural music education consists of exploring different musical cultures by learning and applying different beliefs and practices through actual music making.

Through the process of risk-taking in which students learn to situate themselves in relation to others, Elliott also believes that humanistic goals can be achieved.

> Venturing forth to live the artistic and cultural-ideological meanings of an unfamiliar music culture provides students with an important growth opportunity that only active musical risk taking can provide: the opportunity to know one's self (musical and otherwise) and the relationship of one's self to others. Musical risk taking (and the temporary disorientation that may follow) activates self-examination and the personal reconstruction of one's relationships, assumptions, and preferences. Such musical confrontations enable students to develop the disposition to consider that what may seem natural, common, and universal to them is not. (Elliott, 1995, p. 209)

Elliott prescribes "induction" as the pedagogical method best suited for introducing students to different musics. "The educational process is one of inducting students into the way of life of a music culture; of engaging students in a living encounter with the knowings, beliefs, and values of a Music" (Elliott, 1995, p. 206). Elliott suggests that "the music educator's role is principally one of mentoring, coaching and modeling for music students conceived as apprentice musical practitioners" (Elliott, 1995,

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[25] The closest Elliott gets to defining these standards is to draw upon "expert "opinion, that is, those people acknowledged by other practitioners of a specific musical genre to be expert in their field.

p. 75). Ideally, experts from different musical cultures are available to mentor, coach and model different musical practices, and Elliott recommends that the private lessons and ensemble work that characterize traditional performance training should be offered to all music students within a variety of cultural contexts. This is to achieve both musical and social results:

> The induction of students into different music cultures may be one of the most powerful ways to achieve a larger educational goal: preparing children to work effectively and tolerantly with others to solve shared community problems. (Elliott, 1995, p. 293)

Reflecting upon the meanings embedded in different cultures and identifying one's relationship to these cultures leads students to understand underlying musical and cultural beliefs and ethnocentric attitudes. Reflective practices are an important part of a praxial approach to music education. Immersion into different cultures leads not only to self-reflection but to an acceptance of difference—a goal of humanistic education (Elliott, 1995, p. 293).

Elliott emphasizes performance repeatedly as the entry point to all musical studies.

> MUSIC is a performing art. Each and every aspect of a musical work that we listen for is always the result of an individual or collective interpretation and performance of a composer's musical design, or an improvised design, or a performer's rendition of a remembered design. (Elliott, 1995, p. 91)

> Musical works are *performances*, physical events that are intentionally generated by the knowledgeable actions (overt and covert) of interrelated human agents (composers, arrangers, performers, improvisers, conductors) to be intentionally conceived as such by other knowledgeable agents (musicers and/or listeners). (Elliott, 1995, p. 172)

All musical activity ultimately leads to the engagement with actual musical sounds. Music is not the rendering of fixed musical objects or "works." Put in the context of Elliott's description of praxis, musicing affects and is affected by traditional and

contemporary cultural values and practices. Other musicians, listeners, critics, and the time and place of a performance, have an effect on the meaning and shape of each particular performance/cultural event. Both musical practices and music education function "powerfully as culture." "A musical practice is not something that operates autonomously in a culture; it constitutes and is constituted by culture and ideology" (Elliott, 1995, p. 212). Performance thus reflects and creates culture. In addition to structural features of music, the relationships "between musical patterns and matters of a religious, moral, social, cultural, historical, political, practical, or otherwise nonstructural nature" are a part of the significance of every performance (Elliott, 1995, p. 31). While music is a performing art, however, it is also a "participatory art" in which "people join together in the communal and ritual actions of listening, watching, and participating empathetically as music makers bring forth unique musical events and experiences" (Elliott, 1995, p. 102). Thus, an audience member does not simply listen to a musical work; he or she is a part of a musical event.

On the subject of "creativity," Elliott disagrees strongly with his former mentor, Bennett Reimer, by arguing that creativity cannot exist without first developing a competent level of musicianship.[26] In Elliott's view, a musical expression can be

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[26] This notion parallels that of R.S. Peters view on the need to receive all the accumulated wisdom pertaining to a subject area before venturing to contribute to or critique that field.

> It is to have an awareness differentiated in accordance with the canons implicit in all these inherited traditions. 'Education' marks out the processes by means of which the individual is initiated into them. (Peters, 1965, p. 103)

considered creative only in the context of an entire musical tradition. The "continuum of possibilities" proposed by Reimer (Reimer, 1996, p. 84 as cited in Elliott, 1997, p. 27) is a "subjective notion of creativity" that "loses all meaning." Elliott suggests that creativity and musicianship should be taught concurrently by targeting students' attention, progressive problem solving, problem finding, musical generating and selecting, opportunity finding, and musical promise detecting (Elliott, 1997, p. 26 and Elliott, 1995, p. 234). Without placing music activities in the larger context of a musical tradition, Elliott does not believe that student work can be considered creative. Creativity, as well as value judgments on the quality of a musical effort can be made only in relation to existing musical traditions.

Elliott, like Bennett Reimer, believes that music education can fulfill larger social objectives. Though they disagree on how this takes place, they both argue that music education can fulfill the goals of a "humanist" education.

> To conclude, music education is not a neutral enterprise. Music curricula can and do function socially and culturally in powerful ways. With this in mind, I suggest that the implementation of a praxial philosophy of MUSIC education through reflective musical practicums offers the opportunity to develop students' musical understandings relative to the personhood of those who actually "live" various music cultures. In other words, by implementing a praxial philosophy of MUSIC education, teachers have a reasonable way of achieving the goals of humanistic education. (Elliott, 1995, p. 293)[27]

In the concluding passages of *Music Matters*, Elliott reiterates his belief that "self-growth, self-knowledge, music enjoyment, flow, and happiness" are intrinsic to the

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> The procedures of a discipline can only be mastered by an exploration of its established content under the guidance of one who has already been initiated. (Peters,1965 p. 104)

[27] For Reimer's comments on this theme see Reimer, 1989, pp. 28-29.

nature of music—that is, music is, in fact, intrinsically "good." *"MUSIC education is a unique and major source of several fundamental life values"* (Elliott, 1995, p. 308, author's italics).

In conclusion, Elliott distinguishes his philosophy of music education from that of Bennett Reimer in several areas; however, they also share a number of assumptions—particularly about the validity of a humanist approach to education.[28] In Figure 2, I lay out the fundamental ideas of Reimer and Elliott in chart form for comparison.

[28] Maria Spychinger examines both writers in light of their shared assumptions and apparent differences and places them at different points on the same semiotic circle suggesting that the differences between the two approaches are not as profound as Elliott asserts in his arguments. See: Spychinger, M. B. (1997). Aesthetic and praxial philosophies of music education compared: A semiotic consideration. *Philosophy of Music Education Review, 5*(1), 33-41.

Reimer	Elliott
General Philosophical Approaches	
Aesthetic philosophy of music and music education. Recommends reflective practices.	Praxial philosophy of music and music education. Defined in opposition to aesthetic philosophy. Recommends reflective practices defined as "praxis."
Music as knowledge fits into the liberal humanist tradition of education. Aristotelian concepts are used to support his viewpoints.	Music as a unique form of knowledge fits into the liberal humanist tradition of education. Aristotelian concepts are used to support his viewpoints.
Music education fulfills humanist ideals.	Music education fulfills humanist ideals.
What is the nature of music?	
Musical works are "expressive forms;" Historical and social contexts do not affect the meaning of musical works. Music refers only to itself. It is not "about" anything.	Musical works are not "objects." Music is a form of "doing-action." The meaning of musical works is embedded in social and historical contexts; the meaning of music is also created through all the elements present at any given performance.
Does music represent a particular form of knowledge?	
Music represents a unique form of knowledge (perceptual structuring) that educates human "feeling"—a form of knowledge with intrinsic value. All arts should be approached as expressive forms.	Music represents a unique form of knowledge, called "praxis" that represents a kind of doing-action—a form of knowledge with intrinsic value. The meaning is in the performance itself.
How is musicianship best developed?	
A variety of pedagogical approaches is recommended. All arts are to be approached, perceived, responded to, judged and taught as "expressive forms."	Induction is the best way to learn musical practices. One is initiated into the standards and traditions of different musics under the guidance of one who has already mastered these traditions.
Listening is the most important way to experience and learn about music because the listener is "creating along with the music."	Performance, (in the broadest sense) is the most important way to develop musical knowledge.
Becoming a successful performer should not be seen as the be-all and end-all of music.	Music is fundamentally a "performing" art.
Music education should include exposure to the music of many different cultures. An experiential approach is recommended. Comparison of the expressive qualities of the music of different cultures can lead to an appreciation that all human beings share the basic condition of subjective awareness.	Music education should include induction into the music of different cultures. Music is "by nature" multicultural, thus studying a multiplicity of musics is essential to grasping the inherent qualities of music.

Figure 3a: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott...

What is the nature of creativity and how is this best developed?

Developing creativity should be an important part of music education. A continuum of creativity exists that all can access.	Developing creativity should be an important part of music education; however, few will experience genuine creativity. Creativity is only a meaningful concept in the context of the full tradition of a musical practice.

What does music offer to human beings as individuals and in relationship to others?

It is "inside" art that we find our deepest sense of community, as we feel deeply and empathize with others who also feel" (p. 68).	"Immersion into different cultures leads not only to self-reflection but to an acceptance of difference—a goal of humanistic education" (p. 293). "Induction of students into different musical cultures may be one of the most powerful ways to achieve a larger educational goal: preparing children to work effectively and tolerantly with others to solve shared community problems" (p.293).

How is music evaluated?

Music is successful when it succeeds in expressing human subjectivity--when it is "feelingful." The role of the teacher is to deepen a student's capacity to experience the events taking place in a piece of music. Teachers, however, should not put their opinions between a person's experience of listening and the music itself. Their role is to bring about a greater awareness of the musical elements in operation.	Music is successful when it meets the standards and traditions particular to specific genres. Expert's specific to each musical genre are best able to assess musical quality. "Creativity," seen as a unique contribution in the context of a tradition adds value to a musical event.

Figure 3b: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott

Thomas Regelski

Thomas Regelski is interested in the forms of music making that take place in formal and informal, amateur and professional settings. He does not emphasize music education practices that will achieve a professional performance standard; rather, his emphasis is on the role that music education can have in "getting ordinary people into action musically" (Regelski, 1997, p. 45). Regelski has written a number of papers[29] on a "praxial approach" to music education. I draw upon these papers to give an overview of his philosophical premises and recommendations for music educators.

Like Elliott, Regelski wishes to create an alternative to the aesthetic philosophy of music and music education. He refers to a growing "volume of critical thinking" that uses a concept of "praxis" or "praxial view" that is evolving as a "corrective" to "institutionalized aesthetic ideology" (Regelski, 1997, p. 43). The intent of his work is to begin to establish the parameters of a praxial approach to music and music education. Regelski's basic premise is that

> Music is "a doing" guided by a *phronesis* for "right results" in human terms [that is] far more basic and ultimately far more significant than the psychologism, romanticism and elitism of aesthetic philosophies of music and music education. (Regelski, 1997, p. 43)[30]

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[29] Regelski, T. A. (1994/1995, Winter). Action research and critical theory: Empowering music teachers to professionalize *Praxis. Council for Research in Music Education. Bulletin, 123,* 61-89; Regelski, T. A. (1997). Prolegomenon to a praxial philosophy of music and music education. *Canadian Music Educator, 38*(3), 43-51; Regelski, T. A. (1998b). Schooling for musical praxis. *Canadian Music Educator, 40*(1), 32-43; Regelski, T. A. (1998a). The Aristotelian bases of praxis for music and music education as praxis. *Philosophy of Music Education Review, 6*(1), 22-59.

[30] "Phronesis was a term used by Aristotle in Nicomachean ethics to describe 'practical wisdom' or the ability to act on what one knows are [sic] good for man....Phronesis has a lot to do with choosing the ends one should accomplish. It is

Aesthetic philosophies fail to account for the "important ubiquity of music in human life" (Regelski, 1997, p. 45). Music, he says, has many different forms and functions that cannot be understood according to the notion of "musical works" as discreet objects.

Like Elliott, Regelski traces his ideas about music as a form of "doing" to an Aristotelian articulation of praxis. Elliott's arguments focus on establishing the nature of music as a form of knowledge; however, Regelski's arguments emphasize "the significance of music in human life." He introduces two concepts to help define the roles that music fulfills. The first of these is that all music is "functional".

> In a praxial view, all music is "functional" in particular social or individual praxis but the pragmatic benefits of that praxis are never strictly musical. They are always partly existential in contributing to the actions of human beings Being human. Even when highly practiced technical levels of performance are involved, and where musical process-values are primary among the "goods" served, musical praxis—for all involved, composer, performer, and audience alike—is never "purely" musical. There is always a larger social, existential, intellectual or some other human "good" served that music is 'instrumental' (in the pragmatic sense) in bringing to Be, and in ways unique to the musical praxis. (Regelski, 1997, p. 45)

The notion of functionality conflicts with the aesthetic value system in which "musical works" are seen as autonomous creations, separate from social and practical issues of production[31]. In contrast, Regelski defines all musical practices, at least in part, according to the functions that they serve at any given time.

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practical wisdom to know what goals one should seek." Source: Definition of Phronesis. Retrieved August 19, 2004, from http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Phronesis.

[31] Regelski's use of the term "functional" can be confusing as it could suggest instrumental rather than intrinsic values. I believe, however, that Regelski intends the word to refer to the "right results" defined by the concept of "phronesis." He is thus in

Regelski's second defining concept is that of "right results" and "goods" or "goodness."

> Certainly training in musicianship and the practiced perfection of production techniques are necessary to any musical praxis, but they are not sufficient to understanding, realizing or accounting for its "goods." Technique and musicianship vary considerably according to the musical ends in question—the musical "goods" sought—and their suitability is determined only in reflection upon such ends. The incredible variety of "goods" served by music throughout human history clearly points to the existence of a *phronesis* of "right results" that guide any musical praxis and that are thus the key to any praxial account of music. (Regelski, 1997, p. 44).

This notion of 'goods' and 'right results' comes from the Aristotelian concept of *phronesis,* an ethical 'injunction' concerned with "consideration of the 'goods' of human conduct in terms of desirable ends and goals—the 'right results'—for clients and constituencies" (Regelski, 1997, p. 44). The development of musical knowledge *per se* is one of the goals of music education, but this goal is accompanied by the ethical mandate of *phronesis* where the focus is upon what music is "good for" in terms of getting "right results" for "particular situations" (Regelski, 1997, p. 44). There is no one ideal rendition of a work of music. "Right results" are contingent upon particular situations. Virtuosity, while relevant to specific performance contexts, is not the only, or the most important, "right result" in music. Within amateur settings, he argues, the value of the music-making experience to the participants is paramount (Regelski, 1998b, p. 35).

Regarding the relationship between music, as sound events, and social context, Regelski argues, like Elliott, that music cannot be separated from its social context and experienced as an abstract object.

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agreement with Elliott's use of "praxis" as a term that refers to the intrinsic value of music. The meaning of "intrinsic" values is discussed at length in Chapter Four.

> Thus what is called "music" (i.e., "music itself"), as though it is isolated from the originating and shaping social context, conditions and meanings, is always and everywhere a multi-faceted alliance of social meanings and personal 'goods' that come into praxis as or through sound." (Regelski, 1998ba, p. 42)

Regelski is also in agreement with Elliott on the multicultural essence of music. Both writers begin by acknowledging that a definition of what music is must reflect that there are many different musical traditions with many different functions. "The abundance of musics is central to the study of the "humanities" and to any understanding of what music "is" or "is good for" (Regelski, 1997, p. 44). Where the two writers differ is in the role ascribed to learning about different cultures. For Elliott, immersing students in a foreign musical culture meets the goals of personal growth as well as the larger humanist goal of creating broad-minded citizens. The success of musical learning is measured in how well specific musical/cultural traditions are rendered by practitioners who have been "inducted" into these practices. Regelski, however, is explicit in broadening the notion of "value" or success to include amateur forms of music-making as well as forms not usually considered "good music" by formally trained musicians, such as music for weddings, military occasions, dances, etc. Regelski does not refer to "induction" or a necessity to become engaged in the study of different musical cultures; rather, he is interested in the breadth of musical culture in order to understand what music is good for in different contexts. For Regelski, it is the "ubiquity" of music that ensures its central importance in human experience. His arguments are not about acquiring meaning and significance through developing a deep understanding of other cultures; rather, he is interested in using music education to make music accessible to "ordinary" people (Dissanayake as cited in Regelski, 1997, p. 44).

> A praxial philosophy of music will focus on the role of music "in action" for ordinary people as a key means by which life is well-lived and "made special" (Dissanayake as cited in Regelski, 1997, p. 44)
>
> [Music] is a primary avenue for Becoming more fully alive or enlivened by the fullness life has to offer beyond merely surviving. (Regelski, 1997, p. 45)
>
> The Being and Becoming involved with musical practice—its "making special" of human time and events—is unique and available in no other manner, and each event will be unique in the "good time" resulting from its own praxis. (Regelski, 1997, p. 45)

As a result of his emphasis on music "in action," Regelski claims that music is to be valued and understood, not according to the disinterested and abstract principles of aesthetic philosophy, nor according to "great performances," as posited by Elliott, but according to the suitability of results in any given situation, with "suitability" as a much broader concept than technically excellent performance. Like Elliott, Regelski suggests that music is best experienced by doing; however, he does not agree that performance is the only way to develop listening skills.

> There is no doubt that performing can inform listening in a variety of ways. But to hold that performance is the proper or best education for listening—or that developing such selective attention to process-qualities through performance is therefore good or necessary for intelligent or rewarding listening—simply does not follow. (Regelski, 1997, p. 47)

Regarding pedagogy, Regelski looks at Aristotelian notions of *praxis*, *techne* and *theoria* (amongst others) in order to establish the nature of musical learning. According to Regelski, *Theoria* "implies speculative knowledge studied, arranged, and contemplated for its own sake as a source of both awe and enlightenment" (Regelski, 1998, p. 23). *Techne* "implies a *technological* or *technicist* knowledge and a *technology* of manual *techniques* 'practiced' through 'hands-on' learning by *technicians* or craftspeople" (Regelski, 1998a, p. 25, author's emphasis). Praxis, however,

> ... involves the kind of cognitive activity (*dianoia*) that has been associated with the "reflection-in-action" of "the reflective practitioner" (Schön 1993), namely the kind of intellect, analysis, criticism, deliberation and observation that dutifully reflects on the suitability of results. In this regard, *praxis* was seen as guided by the ethical injunction to get proper or "right results" for particular situations. (Regelski, 1997, p. 44)

Praxis requires a critical and rational knowledge of both the means and ends needed to bring about 'right results' for people.

> [P]raxis is governed by the kind of 'doing' called *phronesis*—an ethical knowledge of and for achieving 'right results' judged in terms of actual benefits for one's self or for others. Thus, praxis is centrally concerned with the critical and rational knowledge of both means and ends needed to bring about 'right results' for *people*....Praxis [...] involves judgments concerning the 'goodness' of such goals and ends in the first place. (Regelski, 1998, p. 28)

The 'right results' being served by music at any given time can only be assessed by determining the "situatedness" of each musical event.

> Situatedness takes the specific human context and purposes for which music is produced into specific consideration as a part of musical understanding and valuing. Situatedness, then, governs the "goods" sought as the "right results." It is the direct antithesis of what aestheticians have traditionally argued to be the transcendental and disinterested qualities of music. (Regelski, 1997, p. 44)

Theoria, techne and *praxis* represent three distinctly different kinds of knowledge with music best described as a form of praxis. Praxis is not a static form of knowledge and has the further characteristic that failures of praxis cannot be undone. "A poor result of an attempt at praxis becomes a new condition of any subsequent attempt to improve the praxis in question" (Regelski, 1998a, p. 28). When a craftsperson produces an ill-made product it can be thrown away; however, "the ethical dimension of praxis—its human element—puts a very strong emphasis on standards of care and excellence" (Regelski, 1998, p. 28). Regelski uses the example of the medical doctor who misdiagnoses a patient. It is not just a question of re-doing the diagnosis because now the

patient is even more ill as a result of the false diagnosis. Thus, Regelski argues that a poor attempt at praxis generates new conditions that may have long-term negative consequences.

A further point made by Regelski is that 'good' or 'right results' are not reproducible. Decisions about 'good' or 'right results' must continually be made anew.

> Because what is 'good' varies considerably from one person or human situation to another and over history, the 'right results' in each case require separate determination. There are, in other words, no singular or 'standard' instances of praxial results. The 'standards' involved are 'standards of care,' ethical matters involving phronesis, not the standardized techniques, practices, or outcomes of techne and poesis. (Regelski, 1998a, p. 28)[32]

Thus we see that a primary aim of Regelski is to introduce a kind of reflection that asks that the purpose and effect of any musical activity be deeply considered before any musical action is undertaken[33]. He describes an epistemology of praxis in the following passage:

> The action or agency of praxis thus entails the kind of knowledge required (a) to make the 'practical judgments' needed to discern and then to conform action to rational 'right results' (i.e., phronesis), (b) to guide the actions taken as they unfold (i.e., action feedback), and (c) to evaluate the 'goodness' of results in terms of the individual or group served (i.e. learning feedback). And 'right action,' in turn, amounts to successful or 'good results' as judged in terms of

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[32] Regelski distinguishes *praxis* from *techne* and *poesis*, another indication that he intends his use of the term "functional," found in earlier passages, to support the notion of the "intrinsic" value of music. Regelski does use techne to refer to aspects of teaching, e.g., "certain basic strategies, tactics, and the like" to establish useful classroom routines (Regelski, 1998a, p. 45).

[33] This is reminiscent of Bennett Reimer's caution that performance students take the time to reflect upon the purpose of their activities, beyond achieving technical skill or social acknowledgment (Reimer, 1989, p.72). The difference is that Reimer sees musical works as "expressive forms" to be experienced independent of external references. Regelski argues that music is, in itself, an activity shaped by context.

> particular situations and individuals according to their important differences. (Regelski, 1998a, p. 28-29)

In contrast to Elliott's descriptions of musical learning as a unique kind of knowledge with standards set through traditions of practice, such standards are not necessarily the measure of "right results." The requirements to recognize functionality and to take account of what music is "good" for, point to the need to educate reflective practitioners with "the kind of intellect, criticism, deliberation and observation that dutifully reflects on the suitability of results" (Regelski, 1997, p. 44). To understand the value and function of any given musical event, one must be able to situate oneself relative to the question of "right results" in a particular instance.

> Situatedness, then, governs the "goods" sought as the "right results." It is the direct antithesis of what aestheticians have traditionally argued to be the transcendental and disinterested qualities of music... And, in contradistinction to aesthetic claims made for the disinterestedness of music, the praxial view understands the value of music as centrally conditioned by its relation to life and the specific conditions of its use. (Regelski, 1997, p. 44)

As I understand Regelski's position, music educators at every level ought to be concerned not only with developing reflective practitioners but also with removing the hierarchies among different musical roles and practices. Within Regelski's framework, even institutions devoted exclusively to musical training within very specific musical traditions serve their students better by reflecting upon and being prepared to challenge assumed social and cultural values. Ways of providing meaning and "goodness," as a musician are defined more broadly, pedagogical objectives and practices are more flexible and evaluation and "success" can take many forms. Success is based on achieving "right results" in any given situation. The suitability, and thus the value, of

particular musical skills, for example, will vary depending upon the human "good" which is being served at the time.

Elliott argues for recognizing the social and historical context of any act of musicing; however, the value of that musicing is determined by the depth of understanding and skill achieved by performers within particular musical genres. In contrast, Regelski does not make the absolute quality of a musical activity, within the full range of its tradition, a condition of meaning or value. Rather, he asks how well a particular musical undertaking has served its purpose within a specific context at a specific time. One fundamental goal of music to which Regelski refers is "the function" of music to "make special" an occasion. Music is often intended to enhance other occasions, "[i]n fact, by far the greatest percentage of music made in the world is not made expressly to be listened to" (Regelski, 1997, p. 45). "The underlying consideration of praxis is a concern with what music is 'good for.' 'Good music,' thus, is music that serves the 'good' purposes that are its *raison d'être* on a particular occasion" (Regelski, 1998a, p. 40).

Elliott and Regelski both use the term *praxis* to refer to the kind of doing-thinking knowledge that is music, and both reject the view of musical works as "objects"—a view they attribute to the aesthetic tradition. Their priorities within this use of praxis, however, are quite different. For Elliott, the priority is to develop musicianship (i.e., and thus the "praxial knowledge" of music) by meeting the standards of various musical traditions. Regelski's priority, however, is not to meet the demands of different musical traditions but to recognize that different levels of music-making serve different purposes and are

evaluated based upon their success in serving the purpose of any particular occasion. For Regelski, the role of music education is to get people "into action musically" (Regelski, 1997, p. 45). His views are compatible with those of Elliott but his emphasis is different. Elliott's justification of the importance of music education is that it provides access to developing a unique form of knowledge. Consistent with a liberal humanist view of education, developing this knowledge at a sophisticated level is a means to living a "good life." Regelski is less concerned with meeting the standards and traditions of particular musical practices and is more concerned with getting ordinary people into music-making. His priorities for music education are to "promote an active life of music making" by providing the means for students to remain involved in music as amateur performers. Regelski includes the need to teach students how to practice effectively and to offer them experiences of playing in small ensembles while in school as well as playing along with computer accompaniments so that there are aware of possibilities for continuing their musical lives beyond their school years (Regelski, 1998b, p. 39). Regelski's justification of music education is based, not on the imperative to develop a unique form of knowledge, but on the many "goods" that music contributes to a life "well-lived and "made special" (Dissanayake as cited in Regelski, 1997, p. 44). Figure 3 compares the fundamental ideas of Reimer, Elliott and Regelski in chart form.

Reimer	Elliott	Regelski
General Philosophical Approaches		
Aesthetic philosophy of music and music education. Recommends reflective practices.	Praxial philosophy of music and music education. Defined in opposition to aesthetic philosophy. Recommends reflective practices defined as "praxis."	Praxial philosophy of music and music education. Offered as a "corrective" to aesthetic thinking. Recommends reflective practices defined as "praxis."
Music as knowledge fits into the liberal humanist tradition of education. Aristotelian concepts are used to support his viewpoints.	Music as a unique form of knowledge fits into the liberal humanist tradition of education. Aristotelian concepts are used to support his viewpoints.	Music as a form of knowledge fits into the liberal humanist tradition of education. Aristotelian concepts are used to support his viewpoints.
Music education fulfills humanist ideals.	Music education fulfills humanist ideals.	Music education fulfills humanist ideals.
What is the nature of music?		
Musical works are "expressive forms;" Historical and social contexts do not affect the meaning of musical works. Music refers only to itself. It is not "about" anything.	Musical works are not "objects." Music is a form of "doing-action." The meaning of musical works is embedded in social and historical contexts; the meaning of music is also created through all the elements present at any given performance.	Musical works are not "objects." The meaning of music is tied together with the contributions music makes to "Being human." Music is "instrumental" in serving social, existential and intellectual "good."
Does music represent a particular form of knowledge?		
Music represents a unique form of knowledge (perceptual structuring) that educates human "feeling"—a form of knowledge with intrinsic value. All arts should be approached as expressive forms.	Music represents a unique form of knowledge, called "praxis" that represents a kind of doing-action—a form of knowledge with intrinsic value. The meaning is in the performance itself.	Music is a "doing" guided by a *phronesis* for "right results" in human terms." All music is functional but never in a strictly musical sense. Music has intrinsic value.

Figure 4a: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott and Regelski...

How is musicianship best developed?

A variety of pedagogical approaches is recommended. All arts are to be approached, perceived, responded to, judged and taught as "expressive forms."	Induction is the best way to learn musical practices. One is initiated into the standards and traditions of different musics under the guidance of one who has already mastered these traditions.	Popular art forms are legitimate genres for the classroom if the result is to "get ordinary people into action musically."
Listening is the most important way to experience and learn about music because the listener is "creating along with the music."	Performance, (in the broadest sense) is the most important way to develop musical knowledge.	Getting ordinary people into action musically is the most important function of music education. Listening and performing are both valid approaches.
Becoming a successful performer should not be seen as the be-all and end-all of music.	Music is fundamentally a "performing" art.	The value of performance or any kind of music-making is in the "right results" achieved in any given situation.
Music education should include exposure to the music of many different cultures. An experiential approach is recommended. Comparison of the expressive qualities of the music of different cultures can foster an increased understanding of cultural traditions. All human beings share the basic condition of subjective awareness.	Music education should include induction into the music of different cultures. Music is "by nature" multicultural, thus studying a multiplicity of musics is essential to grasping the inherent qualities of music.	Music education might well include exposure to different cultures but Regelski's main goal is to get "ordinary people into action musically."

What is the nature of creativity and how is this best developed?

Developing creativity should be an important part of music education. A continuum of creativity exists that all can access.	Developing creativity should be an important part of music education; however, few will experience genuine creativity. Creativity is only a meaningful concept in the context of the full tradition of a musical practice.	Regelski does not give an account of creativity.

Figure 4b: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott and Regelski...

What does music offer to human beings as individuals and in relationship to others?

It is "inside" art that we find our deepest sense of community, as we feel deeply and empathize with others who also feel" (p. 68).	"Immersion into different cultures leads not only to self-reflection but to an acceptance of difference—a goal of humanistic education" (p. 293). "Induction of students into different musical cultures may be one of the most powerful ways to achieve a larger educational goal: preparing children to work effectively and tolerantly with others to solve shared community problems" (p.293).	Music contributes many "goods" that make a life "well-lived" and "made special" (Regelski, 1997, p. 44).

How is music evaluated?

Music is successful when it succeeds in expressing human subjectivity – when it is "feelingful." The role of the teacher is to deepen a student's capacity to experience the events taking place in a piece of music. Teachers, however, should not put their opinions between a person's experience of listening and the music itself. Their role is to bring about a greater awareness of the musical elements in operation.	Music is successful when it meets the standards and traditions particular to specific genres. Expert's specific to each musical genre are best able to assess musical quality. "Creativity," seen as a unique contribution in the context of a tradition adds value to a musical event.	Music is successful when it achieves "right results" for any given situation. "Right results" refer to "good times"— not to specifically musical standards. Ethical considerations are part of any assessment of "right results."

Figure 4c: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott and Regelski

Estelle R. Jorgensen

Estelle R. Jorgensen is the final writer on the philosophy of music education I discuss in detail in this thesis. Jorgensen has written many papers over the years on the topic of justifying the inclusion of music in a general education. Her book, *In Search of Music Education*[34], published in 1997, moves away from the question of justification and focuses on the questions and assumptions underlying music education itself, its objectives and methods. Jorgensen's approach differs from that of the other writers discussed in this chapter. Rather than setting out a definitive philosophy of music education, her goal is to identify factors that influence and shape musical experiences and to develop a set of analytical fields that can be used by educators as they creatively construct music programs appropriate to a range of cultural constituencies. Jorgensen's work is particularly valuable for its analysis of numerous learning contexts and pedagogical approaches.

Jorgensen begins her text by stating that her interest is in understanding

> ...how people come to know music, how so many diverse musical traditions and ways of teaching and learning music have emerged throughout the world, how musical and social systems maintain themselves, and what the responsibilities of musicians, teachers, and the public are to this multiplicity of musical and educational beliefs and practices. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. ix)

Here, Jorgensen suggests that we have a responsibility to understand the intersection of many factors that shape our roles as musicians, music educators and members of the public. This acknowledgement of responsibility is broader and more

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[34] Jorgensen, E. R. (1997). *In search of music education.* Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

explicit than in the work of the authors discussed previously. Jorgensen sets her project[35] against the backdrop of the pressure to address "educational accountability"—a pressure that she believes reduces discussion to the search for practical solutions without addressing the "humanizing qualities" of music and its "contribution to spiritual, imaginative, and social life" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. xi). She suggests that discussions about the philosophy of music education have been distorted and side-tracked by the project of "justifying music education." Jorgensen does not accept the polarization of music education philosophies into an aesthetic or praxial viewpoint and draws upon the literature of a variety of different traditions as she develops her analysis[36].

Jorgensen argues that music education has come to be seen "as a field of study that concerns itself only with music instruction in elementary and secondary schools;" however, as she points out, music education actually takes place in many different formal and informal settings (Jorgensen, 1997, p. x). The objectives, methods and tensions that shape music education will be seen differently if music education is considered in its many different settings, such as "families, churches, private music studios, universities, conservatories, and businesses, among other places" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. x). Her book

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[35] The term "project" refers to the overarching goal of the author's philosophical work. Semantically, it refers to the work by which the goal is to be accomplished as well as to the actual goal itself.

[36] Jorgensen cites John Dewey, Paulo Freire, Maxine Green, Susanne Langer, Israel Scheffler and Alfred North Whitehead as primary sources for her general philosophical approach. John Blacking, Patricia Shehan Campbell, David Elliott, Lucy Green, Vernon Howard, Anthony Kemp, James Mursell, Anthony Palmer, Bennett Reimer, Abraham Schwadron, John Shepherd, Christopher Small, and Keith Swanwick are cited as authors on music education with whom Jorgensen connects on various points (Jorgensen, 1997, p. xiii).

does not offer a "practical plan" for music education; rather, Jorgensen sets out "theoretical questions and principles" that are expected eventually to lead to specific practical recommendations"[37] (Jorgensen, 1997, p. xii).

Jorgensen states that music education "involves life-long teaching and learning, from the most elementary through the most advanced levels of musical artistry within the purview of a variety of societal institutions and exemplifying the gamut of world musical traditions" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. xii). Music education is an interdisciplinary field that "brings us face to face with the challenges of reconciling differences in language, culture, religion, life-style, age, and color, among a host of other boundaries that separate people" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. xii). In order to integrate the different facets/influences inherent in approaching music education in the broad context described above, Jorgensen recommends that "the best way to meet these challenges is to take a dialectical and dialogical view of music education, recognize tensions in need of resolution, and hope that through dialogue these tensions can be worked through and either reconciled or tolerated" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. xiii).

Dialectical[38] and dialogical processes are central to Jorgensen's concept of music education. Through these terms Jorgensen suggests that values and understandings are in a constant tension. There are no single "right" answers to questions in music education. Rather, through dialogue, music educators can work towards recognizing dialectical

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[37] That is, it would be possible to make practical recommendations based on Jorgensen's "theoretical questions and principles" in a later project.

[38] A protracted discussion of a dialectic method of analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis as well as my expertise. My reading of Jorgensen's examples of this strategy are that she sets up ideas, influences and solutions in polarities, reading one against the other and looking for a point of balance between them.

tensions and attempt to balance competing priorities. Jorgensen proposes that music, like other disciplines, be examined in light of the holistic paradigm described in the Gaia hypothesis.

> The Gaia hypothesis posits that all things on planet earth comprise part of an interconnected dynamic system in delicate balance, where the whole transcends the sum of its parts. Applied figuratively in the social realm, this hypothesis challenges the rule of technology, positivism, and rationality and posits the complementarity of the arts, the validity of nonscientific ways of knowing, and the importance of imagination and intuition. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 3)

The task of music educators is to balance competing tensions with a view towards wholeness.

Jorgensen sees herself as "complicating the task" of music education while providing a better grounding in the real complexities of the music education enterprise (Jorgensen, 1997, p. xiv). She argues that music educators need to consider a wide range of factors and influences in order to fully grasp the potential of music education and the "multifarious ways in which music education can be conducted with integrity" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 66). "Music and education are part of a complex network of cultural and social beliefs" and as a consequence, there are no simple answers or formulas for teaching music. Understanding this complexity provides opportunities for music educators to work effectively and creatively in the many places where music learning takes place (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 65).

Jorgensen explores two areas of inquiry before presenting her rationale and recommendations for a dialectical and dialogical approach to music education. The first is a discussion of different concepts of music education seen from a broad historical and social perspective. The second explores a concept referred to as "spheres of musical

validity." Here, she outlines a range of factors that cluster around different types of music and the audiences/participants involved with different musics. Jorgensen then considers "the numerous tensions" inherent in a broad view of music education that lead to her recommendations for a dialectical and dialogical approach to music education.

Jorgensen begins her discussion by stating that Western classical music can be seen as "only one of many diverse musics rather than the ideal" and that a "contextual, rather than idealistic view of music education and music making" provides the "basis for a broad and dispassionate view of music education" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 2). While circumstances, including limitations of time and expertise, might limit a music teacher to dealing with only one musical tradition, to understand "music education" as "a historical and global phenomenon" it is necessary to see music education in the broadest of contexts. Jorgensen suggests that "music should be studied as a world rather than just as a Western phenomenon, holistically and contextually rather than atomistically and separate from the rest of human experience" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 3)[39]. Similar to the three writers discussed here previously, Jorgensen envisions that a musical education, based upon the exploration of music in numerous cultural settings, can help achieve broader social goals.

> A comparative and contextual study of world musics can help students understand cultures other than their own and intuitively and imaginatively grasp the perspectives and expressions of others—what people have in common and how they differ—and foster tolerance of cultural differences with people in other societies, thereby providing a better basis for cooperation.[5] (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 3)

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[39] N.B.: In Bennett Reimer's most recent edition of *A philosophy of music education*, he proposes a "synergistic" approach to music and music education (Reimer, 2003).

Like the writers cited previously in this chapter, Jorgensen credits music with the capacity to fulfill important individual and social needs. Unlike her colleagues, however, Jorgensen does not espouse a particular aesthetic or praxial approach to music education; rather, she advocates an approach that acknowledges the tensions between competing values, goals and objectives while pursuing a holistic view of the roles played by music and music education in multiple contexts.

Jorgensen gives a detailed analysis of five conceptions of music education that, in her view, represent major global and historical approaches to music education. These include "schooling," "training," "eduction," "socialization" and "enculturation." Jorgensen's final recommendations are based upon a dialectical approach to these methods suggesting that an awareness of the tensions within and between these approaches is of equal importance to the concerns of each individual method. I offer a brief summary of the strengths and weaknesses she identifies for each of these conceptions of music education.

"Schooling," represents an education where a sponsoring group or institution "is charged with carrying out its sponsor's wishes, accurately representing and communicating its attitudes, beliefs, values, and mores, and devising definite programs of study consistent with these expectations" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 4). The approach tends to be teacher-directed and rule-oriented. With the focus on formal music education, schooling "may overlook the important informal dimensions ...in which one experiences the way of life of a musician" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 7). A ruled-based system may also "contribute to a discontinuity between music education and society." "Rules provide a sense of tradition and continuity, yet if viewed retrospectively, rather than prospectively

they make it difficult for music education to adapt to the changing circumstances of time and place" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 7). An advantage of "schooling" is that "students share a collective as well as personal experience derived from doing similar things and submitting to a comparable critical process;" however, this educational process limits its view to the school years only and doesn't address learning that may take place outside of the school context or school time (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 7). Thus, while a "schooling" approach to music education may make it possible to "ensure the survival of groups [and] institutions," the model is not sufficiently flexible to include the many types of music learning that take place outside the school setting.

The second conception of music education described by Jorgensen is "training."

> Training refers to the methods or ways whereby a person is taught or learns skills, know-how, or procedural knowledge, that is, how to do something, in contrast to propositional knowledge by which one "knows that" such-and-such is the case. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 8)

Training is "competency-based music education" and is experiential, contextual and generally, teacher-led.

> Training is accomplished through practice. Whereas drill implies the simple mechanistic repetition of tasks allied to conditioning, practice involves the application of critical thinking and imagination as one gradually moves toward the mastery of music-making skills. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 10)

Training relates directly to what practical musicians actually do; however, it is limited in that the type of knowledge explored tends to be procedural rather than propositional. Amongst the limits of music education conceived as "training" are that it can be "prescriptive," teacher-directed" and "hierarchical." Student input is limited.

> The one-way communication from teacher to student rather than two-way between teacher and student, may breed student passivity, convergent thinking, and dependence on the expectations of significant others rather than student

> activity, divergent thinking, and independent action. In this event, teaching reduces to a manipulative exercise of personal power over students for musical ends rather than the judicious use of influence or power with students implied in more egalitarian relationships. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 12)[40]

Jorgensen also argues that this conception of music education encourages a dualistic viewpoint with the mind separated from the body and theory separated from practice[41].

> The conception of music education as training also drives a wedge between the theoretical and practical aspects of music and perpetuates a duality that has persisted throughout musical history. The idea that one knows more directly and experientially through doing music rather than thinking about it—that what one does constitutes primary knowledge and what one thinks about what one does is secondary knowledge--also maintains ancient philosophical dualisms between body and mind, theoretical knowledge and practice, and the physical mechanism and its ideal purpose. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 12)

Jorgensen states that the training approach to music education can reduce music to a "craft" rather than an "art," where technique is emphasized over "the ideas that shape an artist's understanding" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 13).

The third conception of music education Jorgensen discusses is "eduction"[42].

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[40] See Judith Kogan's description of life studying at the Julliard School of Music and the acknowledgement that individual teachers have a huge influence over the well-being of students in their personal lives as well as in their careers. Kogan, J. (1987). *Nothing but the best. The struggle for perfection at the Julliard School.* New York: Random House.

[41] I am reminded of the classes in history and theory in which the instructor announced that performance students would not be "smart enough" to do well in their courses. Of course, as "performance majors" we also believed the oft asserted truism that history, theory and education majors were "failed performers," incapable of actually making music in any significant way. Thus we reflected back and re-inscribed the belief in a mind/body split.

[42] "The word *eduction* means to draw out, elicit, or develop" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 13).

> Eduction implies that a student's potential needs only to be drawn out by a teacher who skillfully arranges the external conditions such that growth and development naturally follow. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 13)

The teacher is responsible for constructing an environment that will draw out the potential of every student. This approach to education is described in Dewey's *Democracy and Education* and "suggests a naturalistic approach" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 14). The focus is on process over product; education is conceived as a life-long endeavour; and, the learning program is student-centred. Shinichi Suzuki[43] is cited as a prominent educator who follows an "eduction" model of education. The role of the environment is acknowledged, students are seen as active agents, and the personal relationships between teacher and student are acknowledged as important. This view of music education as growth inherent in the "potentiality of materials" parallels descriptions of the process of composition as described by Arnold Berleant (quoted in Jorgensen):

> The immediacy of the musical event reflects the directness of growth in which internal forces press forward to realize the potentialities that are inherent in the materials at hand." Although growth can be guided, he continues, "it is most successful when it works, in art as in biology, by fulfilling the possibilities that lie in the materials themselves and not by imposing external demands." (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 16)

Jorgensen does not believe, however, that the growth metaphor accounts sufficiently for "other operative factors—political, economic, religious, and familial" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 18). Excellent teachers do not always produce excellent, moral,

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[43] Shinichi Suzuki developed the "Suzuki" method used particularly in teaching violin and piano. In this method, students work in groups and begin to play pieces immediately through rote and imitation. Students are drawn into music-making by the pull of the music itself.

motivated students. There are factors other than the learning environment that influence the outcome of every teaching/learning situation.

> A fourth conception of music education is "socialization"—a process
>
> whereby a group or institution inculcates its beliefs, values, and mores in its membership and ensures that its members continue to act in certain ways and hold particular shared beliefs. As such, it represents one of the social processes that characterize all groups and are essential to their survival. Without socialization, a group or institution cannot achieve and maintain a sense of unity by which members share values and expectations about how they should think and act individually and collectively. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 18)

An example of musical learning through socialization is that which takes place in specific ensembles, where continued membership is dependent upon learning and conforming to the standards of the group. Learning is both formal and informal. Instruction may take place "by means of schooling and training, but also extends to incidental learning gleaned by participation in the activities of the group or institution" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 19). Beliefs and values are taught didactically but are also modelled. Organizations and groups have their own life cycles and may at different times be oriented towards tradition or towards change. Organizational structures may also influence the "content and methods" of groups (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 20). For example, teachers, by virtue of their background in classical music and their positions of authority in the classroom, impose a particular viewpoint on what counts as music. Jorgensen refers to John Shepherd and Graham Vulliamy who comment on music education's function as a form of socialization.

> Shepherd observes that music teachers are caught in the midst of a culture clash in the classroom that reflects "two conflicting patterns of socialization," One represents the interests of Western classical music establishment with which teachers identify; the other, the popular music industry with which students identify. Although they try to reduce this clash, Shepherd posits, teachers still "act as agents of social control" by applying ideas derived from Western notation uncritically and uncontexually to other musics. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 21)

Music education as socialization accounts for at least part of the social nature of knowledge that includes the vested interests of groups and the role of teachers as social agents.

> Given the symbiotic relationship between knowledge and social institutions (that is, knowledge both reflects and impacts on them), it suggests that teachers have the twin roles of conserving institutions by transmitting ideas validated in the past and subverting them by communicating ideas oriented towards change. It implies that subject matter and instructional situation are suffused with social meaning and can only be fully understood in their social contexts; that instruction is an essentially social process whereby a teacher and student interact with, relate to, and communicate with each other about subject matter (among other things); and that comparing ways of music making and approaches to musical instruction necessitates value judgments that are socially and culturally based. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 21)

Socialization does not, however, account well for music "as music." Nor does it take sufficiently into account "related anthropological, cultural, historical, philosophical, and theological issues among those that arise within the context of musical events" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 22). Socialization can tell us a great deal about how different institutions transmit knowledge but it cannot show us how we can reconcile specific instances in the "wider cultural and human situation" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 22). Jorgensen associates a Marxist view with the concept of socialization. "The Marxist view of music making solely in terms of ideological clashes between social classes is reductionist and simplistic, for example, precisely because it fails to take into account other systems of thought and approaches to causation" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 22)[44]. Thus, socialization is an observable phenomenon and can provide an analytical tool for understanding certain

[44] In my view, this account of Marxist influence is over-simplified and does not acknowledge the range of analysis made available through the historical materialist concept of "praxis." This question will be addressed in Chapter Four.

musical and educational processes but, unless one is prepared to accept reductionist thinking, one cannot use socialization as an analytical tool to generate global conclusions.

Enculturation is the fifth conception of music education described by Jorgensen. Enculturation has both anthropological and idealistic meanings. Under the first category, enculturation refers to the

> ...life-long process whereby people acquire a personal and collective cultural identity as humans—a way of life individually experienced and corporately shared within the context of a particular sociocultural group or society in which they live. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 23)

The idealistic view of enculturation includes the notion that culture is "something cultivated, something ripened" (Dewey as quoted in Jorgensen, 1997, p.23) and the "capacity for continually expanding the range and accuracy of one's perception of meanings" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 23). Paulo Freire takes this concept further by acknowledging that society also contains repressive elements. In this context, pedagogy envisioned as enculturation "is properly one of humanizing and liberating people from all forms of repression, challenging and enabling them to transform their world into a just and compassionate society" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 23). Jorgensen's own view of enculturation "recognizes the tension between these anthropological and idealistic views and attempts, somewhat paradoxically, to meld aspects of them" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 24).

> Enculturation may be likened, then, to a series of concentric circles representing progressively more inclusive understandings and extending outward from a particular culture to encompass a global view of humanity. It delineates the status quo and potentially encapsulates a transformative quality of making what now is into something better....To acquire culture, in this view, is ultimately to gain a wider knowledge than the foregoing notions of schooling, training, eduction, or socialization imply. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 24)

Enculturation implies that analyzing and performing particular musical works is not sufficient in itself. "One must also understand, among other things, the social, political, economic, philosophical, artistic, religious, and familial contexts in which music making occurs" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 25). Enculturation reflects many of the holistic principles set out by Jorgensen in her opening statements. It

> ... permits and encourages internationalistic and contextual perspectives that take account of multicultural societies. As a life-long process, it includes the various social groups and institutions in which music making takes place. Further, its relativistic approach to musical traditions and the ways by which people come to know music (and its recognition of the need to accommodate or reconcile competing and conflicting approaches) avoids cultural chauvinisms or imperialism and necessitates and facilitates dispassionate comparisons among music traditions and approaches to music education. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 27)

Thus, enculturation draws together theory and practice, examines context and underlying belief systems, "encompasses various systems of understanding and approaches to causation" and invites interdisciplinary study (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 28). Enculturation, however, also has its limitations as an educational approach. One criticism of enculturation is that it is not sufficiently exclusive. It includes activities that are unplanned and indirect as well as those that are explicitly planned as educational activities. Also, "if the notion of culture is ambiguous and complex, so, too, are the means and ends of enculturation" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 28). Other limits of enculturation are that it "does not shed much light on the source of associated psychological, philosophical, theological, ethical, religious, and musical understandings and does not do "justice to [musics] formal aspects" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 29).

In concluding this chapter, Jorgensen suggests that the dialectical tensions introduced by these different approaches need to be acknowledged. Music educators

need to recognize that their role is greater than "providing a limited range of musical knowledge." "They must see themselves [as] engaged in an enterprise that integrates music with the rest of life" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 30)[45]. The task, then, is to "find out how to make a reciprocity among these various visions of education and to accept the ambiguities, tensions, and even conflicts that necessarily result" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 31).

Jorgensen's second chapter is entitled "On Spheres of Musical Validity." In this chapter, she addresses the question of the "nature of music" by establishing a theoretical framework that allows comparison between different musical genres. She identifies a range of factors and relationships that can be used to analyse different musics and the social context in which these musics exist, and points out that music education has a role within the music-making process. In other words, the way that music learning and music teaching takes place has an influence on the way that culture is manifested through music. Jorgensen sets out to "illuminate the nature of social and musical change and the role of music education within the music-making process." She further explores "questions relating to the nature of the interrelationship between music and society, how social expectations of music arise, and how music, in turn, feeds social expectations" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 34). Her intent is to emphasize a process rather than a particular program. She depicts that process as one that explores tensions arising within particular social contexts, that identifies power relations and that determines how to translate these understandings into pedagogical practices.

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[45] This is a goal shared by the four Philosophers of Music Education examined in this chapter.

Three assumptions form the basis of Jorgensen's analysis of "Spheres of Musical Validity." The first is that "theoretical types" can provide ways to conceptualize musical and social events.

> "Theoretical types" (sometimes called "ideal types") provide ways whereby musical and social events can be conceptualized; their use is well established in the social sciences. Musicologists have also employed them to distinguish musical styles and historical epochs in music. Theoretical types organize many specific events by means of a manageable array of conceptual constructs or categories from which generalizations about other related events can more or less be made. They provide models, or ways of looking at the phenomenal world that are both literal and figurative, but they should not be confused with the world itself. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 34)

The second assumption is that musical events have been examined, historically, "from a social perspective in two principal ways: first, through an analysis of their structure and functions ... and second, by focussing on meanings and symbols inherent in musical events through an examination of their social processes" (Jorgensen, 1997, p.34). Jorgensen cites Honigsheim's analysis of the "process of musical sponsorship" as an example of a reconciling of these two approaches[46].

Jorgensen's third assumption is that "music is interrelated with society in multifaceted ways" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 35). According to Jorgensen, this set of relationships has been ignored by philosophers of music until recently[47].

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[46] Honigsheim describes "various structurally and functionally grounded categories, such as the influence of religious leaders, royalty, nobility, private individuals, impresarios and agents, and schools." (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 34)

[47] Jorgensen cites Alperson, P. (1994). *What is music? An introduction to the philosophy of music.* University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. The work of David Elliott and Thomas Regelski already cited in this thesis also includes examinations of these relationships.

> Music is part of society, and musical structures reflect and exemplify social structures. During the past half-century, writers from the social sciences and humanities have advanced the notion of an intimate and intrinsic relationship between music and society. They have argued that music is suffused with meaning that is musically and culturally interpreted and that it contributes in important ways to a sense of shared social consciousness that characterizes a given society. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 36)

Jorgensen describes the interaction between society and music as "dynamic." "Music not only follows society but also impacts, portends, and even constructs and reconstructs it. As such, music making involves a dialectic between social conservation and reconstruction" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 36).

In order to examine the factors that relate to the formation and maintenance of "diverse musical traditions, the publics within them, and the related challenges for music education" Jorgensen adopts the concept of the "sphere of musical validity" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 37)[48]. Jorgensen defines "spheres of musical validity" as follows:

> Similar cognitive, emotional, and physical understandings are communicated through a given musical event. The meanings conveyed, symbolisms grasped, and responses evoked are construed as beliefs, attitudes, understandings, feelings, and sensory and bodily impressions. These feelings and understandings are played out in actions and practices, moreover. Thus, when people make music, they do so within a community of those who share attitudes, understandings, and practical traditions. This community acts as any social group, corporately and individually, and assumes and maintains a life of its own. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 37)

A "sphere of musical validity" is both "inclusive and exclusive." "Individuals within a given sphere of musical validity have the collective sense that particular rules must be satisfied in order for a musical event to be appropriate or exemplary" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 38). Whatever type of music is being considered, the "community of the initiated" understands its significance. The nature of this understanding is cognitive,

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[48] Jorgensen attributes the development of this concept to Georg Simmerl and Peter Etzkkorn. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 37)

affective and corporeal (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 39). Jorgensen states that "like all social groups, spheres of musical validity tend to become institutionalized and self-perpetuating as each community seeks to maintain itself in time and place" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 40). Spheres of musical validity may contain many sub-groupings. Individuals may belong to several different spheres of musical validity and may be positioned differently within each of those spheres. Spheres contain elements that constitute "the establishment" and others that "may be considered subversive and anti-establishment" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 41). Some spheres may represent politically powerful elements of society and others may be "ignored, ostracized, and suppressed by more powerful elements in society despite the fact that they may have pervasively popular appeal (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 41). Spheres of musical validity are affected "by the societal orientation toward change or tradition" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 42)[49]. Each of these spheres contains dialectical tensions.

Jorgensen argues that at least five processes—with dialectical tensions apparent in each—influence the development of musical spheres. These processes are: family, religion, politics, the music profession, and commerce (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 45). In all five of these categories, Jorgensen acknowledges that musicians both influence and are influenced by the dynamics involved in each setting. I explore this interplay of influences in later chapters as part of my justification for developing critical consciousness. The following is a brief description of Jorgensen's analysis of each category. Familial and societal value systems have an impact on esthetic[50] values. Some

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[49] See also Jorgensen, 1997, p. 21 re socialization and role of teachers as agents of change and agents of conservation.

[50] Jorgensen's spelling.

models are patriarchal; some are matriarchal; some are elitist; some hinge on collective participation. Both formal and informal methods of transmission take place.

Using the term "religion" broadly to encompass a wide range of practices, Jorgensen points to the "interrelationship between musical beliefs and practices and the religious groups and institutions that both spawn and are fed by them" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 48). Music is used to create a sense of sacred time and place. Musical practices are governed by religious concepts and in turn, influence the way the spiritual events are experienced. "Politics" refers to "that having to do with the public and the state" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 51). Musical practices can be influenced by censorship, sponsorship, legislation, and education; however, musicians can also subvert political power by challenging the status quo. Within the music profession, "musicians are influenced by the musical practices characteristic of the traditions in which they work. They also reconstruct these traditions and create new ones, especially through their writings on, and activities in, music education" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 57). Musical institutions and music professionals within these institutions also serve as gatekeepers determining what attributes are important and what practices are considered valid.

"Commerce" refers to "a dynamic interaction between commercial or business beliefs, mores, and traditions and musical ideas and practices" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 59). Commercial interests can influence, develop and limit musical practices. The results can range from very positive to very negative depending upon one's musical, social, and economic goals and objectives.

The implications that Jorgensen draws from her examination of spheres of musical validity suggest changes to how one conceives of the work of music educators and other music practitioners.

> Seeing music as part of a complex network of cultural and social beliefs and practices suggests that music educators must understand these contexts and integrate their work within them. If music is part of life rather than apart from it, it cannot be studied in isolation. Rather, it must be seen as an important aspect of general culture. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 65)

Music educators thus need to be able to "adjudicate the various spheres of musical validity" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 66). Not all elements of all spheres can be addressed, but music educators need to "weigh these claims and devise strategies that meet them directly" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 66). There are "great" and "little" musical traditions linked together in symbiotic relationships; however, no particular form of music "has a corner on greatness" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 75-76). When planning curriculum, educators must avoid "superficiality and tokenism," carefully balancing the risk of "learning several musical languages poorly" against the more traditional approach of "simply following one musical tradition" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 77). Jorgensen suggests that music educators need to grapple with the numerous dialectical relationships described in her text and to accept that they "may sometimes need to be content with disturbance, disunity, and dissonance" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 69). Teachers must find balance between the past, present and future, "deciding the particular directions in which transmission and transformation should be directed" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 81). Jorgensen's final recommendation to music educators is that they conceive of themselves as "artists," empowered to "devise methods that creatively and imaginatively suit the needs of their students (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 91). With her recommendation to approach decision-

making creatively, Jorgensen encourages music educators to think beyond methodologies and to recognize their roles as creators of social relations and musical culture.

In conclusion, Jorgensen delineates a series of analytical fields that open up many avenues of investigation for music educators as well as other music practitioners. She draws our attention to power dynamics in teaching/learning situations and points out learning contexts where passivity might supplant the potential for critical engagement. Jorgensen also includes goals of social justice in her consideration of music education practices. She identifies spheres of musical validity which both influence and are influenced by musicians; acknowledges the need to balance competing tensions. Finally, she recommends a holistic approach to music and music education that is guided by dialogical and dialectical inquiries. Jorgensen does not construct a definition of music and music education in the same sense as Reimer, Elliott and Regelski; however, she discusses many issues comparable with the ideas proposed by these writers. In Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c, I compare the fundamental ideas of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen in chart form.

Reimer	Elliott	Regelski	Jorgensen
General Philosophical Approaches			
Aesthetic philosophy of music and music education. Recommends reflective practices.	Praxial philosophy of music and music education. Defined in opposition to aesthetic philosophy. Recommends reflective practices defined as "praxis."	Praxial philosophy of music and music education. Offered as a "corrective" to aesthetic thinking. Recommends reflective practices defined as "praxis."	Holistic view. GAIA hypothesis. Integrates social justice into her considerations of music teaching practices. Recommends reflective practices.
Music as knowledge fits into the liberal humanist tradition of education. Aristotelian concepts are used to support his viewpoints.	Music as a unique form of knowledge fits into the liberal humanist tradition of education. Aristotelian concepts are used to support his viewpoints.	Music as a form of knowledge fits into the liberal humanist tradition of education. Aristotelian concepts are used to support his viewpoints.	Does not use Aristotle to support her arguments. Advocates dialectical and dialogical processes. Analyzes different social/musical contexts to understand how people "come to know" music.
Music education fulfills humanist ideals.	Music education fulfills humanist ideals.	Music education fulfills humanist ideals.	Music education fulfills humanist ideals.
What is the nature of music?			
Musical works are "expressive forms;" Historical and social contexts do not affect the meaning of musical works. Music refers only to itself. It is not "about" anything.	Musical works are not "objects." Music is a form of "doing-action." The meaning of musical works is embedded in social and historical contexts; the meaning of music is also created through all the elements present at any given performance.	Musical works are not "objects." The meaning of music is tied together with the contributions music makes to "Being human." Music is "instrumental" in serving social, existential and intellectual "good."	Music is interrelated with society in "multi-faceted ways reflecting and contributing to social consciousness.
Does music represent a particular form of knowledge?			
Music represents a unique form of knowledge (perceptual structuring) that educates human "feeling"—a form of knowledge with intrinsic value. All arts should be approached as expressive forms.	Music represents a unique form of knowledge, called "praxis" that represents a kind of doing-action—a form of knowledge with intrinsic value. The meaning is in the performance itself.	Music is a "doing" guided by a *phronesis* for "right results" in human terms." All music is functional but never in a strictly musical sense. Music has intrinsic value.	Jorgensen develops the concept of "Spheres of Musical Validity" to describe multiple influences on our experiences of music.

Figure 5a: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen ...

How is musicianship best developed?

A variety of pedagogical approaches is recommended. All arts are to be approached, perceived, responded to, judged and taught as "expressive forms."	Induction is the best way to learn musical practices. One is initiated into the standards and traditions of different musics under the guidance of one who has already mastered these traditions.	Popular art forms are legitimate genres for the classroom if the result is to "get ordinary people into action musically."	A variety of pedagogical approaches is analyzed. Enculturation has much to recommend it; however, a dialectical and dialogical approach is necessary to balance the conflicting tensions of different musical needs.
Listening is the most important way to experience and learn about music because the listener is "creating along with the music."	Performance, (in the broadest sense) is the most important way to develop musical knowledge.	Getting ordinary people into action musically is the most important function of music education. Listening and performing are both valid approaches.	Holistic and creative approaches are necessary to balance the competing needs and tensions in serving different learning constituencies.
Becoming a successful performer should not be seen as the be-all and end-all of music.	Music is fundamentally a "performing" art.	The value of performance or any kind of music-making is in the "right results" achieved in any given situation.	Musical practices need to be considered in light of a holistic view of life. Music learning is a life-long process that encompasses as array of societal institutions.
Music education should include exposure to the music of many different cultures. An experiential approach is recommended. Comparison of the expressive qualities of the music of different cultures can lead to an appreciation that all human beings share the basic condition of subjective awareness.	Music education should include induction into the music of different cultures. Music is "by nature" multicultural, thus studying a multiplicity of musics is essential to grasping the inherent qualities of music.	Music education might well include exposure to different cultures but Regelski's main goal is to get "ordinary people into action musically."	Wherever possible, music programs should be designed to embrace and reflect, at least in part, the demographics represented in a particular learning setting. "Music should be studied as a world rather than a Western phenomena" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 3).

Figure 5b: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen...

What is the nature of creativity and how this is best developed?			
Developing creativity should be an important part of music education. A continuum of creativity exists that all can access.	Developing creativity should be an important part of music education; however, few will experience genuine creativity. Creativity is only a meaningful concept in the context of the full tradition of a musical practice.	Regelski does not give an account of creativity.	Jorgensen does not give an account of creativity per se; however, she favors approaches to music education that encourage independent thinking by students.
What does music offer to human beings as individuals and in relationship to others?			
It is "inside" art that we find our deepest sense of community, as we feel deeply and empathize with others who also feel" (p. 68).	"Immersion into different cultures leads not only to self-reflection but to an acceptance of difference—a goal of humanistic education" (p. 293). "Induction of students into different musical cultures may be one of the most powerful ways to achieve a larger educational goal: preparing children to work effectively and tolerantly with others to solve shared community problems" (p.293).	Music contributes many "goods" that make a life "well-lived" and "made special" (Regelski, 1997, p. 44).	"A comparative and contextual study of world musics can help students understand cultures other than their own and intuitively grasp the perspectives and expressions of others—what people have in common and how they differ—and foster tolerance of cultural differences with people in other societies, thereby providing a better basis for cooperation" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 3).

Figure 5c: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen ...

How is music evaluated?			
Music is successful when it succeeds in expressing human subjectivity--when it is "feelingful." The role of the teacher is to deepen a student's capacity to experience the events taking place in a piece of music. Teachers, however, should not put their opinions between a person's experience of listening and the music itself. Their role is to bring about a greater awareness of the musical elements in operation.	Music is successful when it meets the standards and traditions particular to specific genres. Expert's specific to each musical genre are best able to assess musical quality. "Creativity," seen as a unique contribution in the context of a tradition adds value to a musical event.	Music is successful when it achieves "right results" for any given situation. "Right results" refer to "good times"—not to specifically musical standards. Ethical considerations are part of any assessment of "right results."	There are "great" and "little" traditions of music. No tradition has a corner on greatness or goodness. Maintaining musical standards of excellence is important. Teaching multiple forms of music is not worthwhile if the results are mediocre.

Figure 5d: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen

In Chapter Two I have given an overview of the philosophical landscape as it has been developed and explicated by four major Philosophy of Music Education writers. In Chapter Three, I explore the roles of musicians as wage earners, artists, members of communities, teachers and cultural producers from within the framework of each author. I look at the context established by each author in order to establish the possibilities and limitations of their philosophical and pedagogical perspectives in relation to the roles I identify as places where politics and music meet.

CHAPTER THREE:
THE INTERSECTION OF MUSIC AND POLITICS

Introduction

The working hypothesis of this thesis is that studies in critical consciousness might usefully broaden the education of professional musicians. My own experiences as a professional musician have led me to posit that conventional music education does not serve professional musicians well with respect to issues arising within the intersection of music and politics.

This project does not give an empirical account of music education practices such as a catalogue of courses nor does it investigate the outcomes of particular programs; rather, it is an inquiry into the philosophical thinking underlying music education. Within this conceptual project, I have provided a survey of the principal philosophical themes and approaches offered by four major writers in the field of philosophy of music education. The work of these writers is directed to future music educators. My interest is related but more specific. I am concerned primarily with the education of professional musicians: performers, composers, conductors, musicologists and teachers. Though not directly parallel, I contend there are good reasons to believe that this literature can provide a useful point of reference for the philosophical themes underlying the education of professional musicians. First, the general shape of philosophical thought in the philosophy of music education literature is representative of liberal education themes dominant in North American universities. Second, this discourse predicates its recommendations upon a thorough-going analysis of the nature and value of music. It includes references to music performance, cultural significance, and pedagogy. Where differences arise between the general education and professional music education

discourses arise (with respect to the greater presence of mentorship in the education of professional musicians, for instance), it is possible to augment the general discussion with references of a more specific nature[51].

What remains, then, is to generate an account of the conflict that forms the basis of my hypothesis that studies involving critical consciousness might usefully inform and broaden both the subjects and the manner in which professional musicians are taught. In keeping with an analytic rather than empirical mode, I explore questions within the area of the intersection of politics and music that, in my experience, seem outside the standard bounds of contemporary music education.

Within this area of interest, I identify five roles representing avenues of professional musicianship in which significant intersections of music and politics occur. This division is analytic, not lived. These roles are not intended to provide a comprehensive survey of such intersections; rather, my goal is to map out recognizable areas of concern and to demonstrate that an argument in favour of studies of critical consciousness is plausible. In keeping with this goal, the point of this chapter is to illustrate a reasonably recognizable and reasonably coherent area—namely politics and music — which appears not to fall within the purview of contemporary music education for professional musicians (at least insofar as the survey of philosophy of music education can be taken to be representative).

The five roles I explore are: wage earners, artists, members of communities, teachers, and cultural producers. In each case my discussion is divided into two parts:

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[51] For references to the mentorship of professional musicians see Kogan, J. (1987). *Nothing but the best: The struggle for perfection at the Julliard School.* New York: Random House.

first, a narrative account of experiences in which music and politics intersect, drawn from the real and hypothetical lives of professional musicians, and second, an analysis of the educational resources for addressing these situations that can be found (or not) within the four accounts of music education introduced in Chapter Two. Two particular questions frame the latter: first, is it possible to address the issues identified on the bases of the philosophical and pedagogical positions articulated by Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen, and second, do they recommend that analysis of such issues be included within music education? In cases where the issues I introduce are not mentioned specifically within the philosophical discourse, I extrapolate "possible positions" that could be supported by their thoughts on other issues. As a preface to my discussion, however, I want to digress briefly in order to explain further what I mean by politics, materiality and ideology.

Definitions of Terms

In this discussion the reader will encounter terminology that I use to illustrate the particular kinds of conflict that I want to declare 'political.' Before proceeding with the discussion, then, I want to define these terms. The first step is to define what is political. Politics refers to "the total complex of relations between people living in society,[52]" in particular, social relations involving authority or power.[53]"

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[52] Definition of "Politics." Retrieved August 8, 2003, from Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary: http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=politics.

[53] Definition of Politics. Retrieved August 8, 2003, from WordNet 2.0 Search http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn2.0?stage=2&word=politics&posnumber=1&searchtypenumber=2&senses=&showglosses=1&showcontexthelp=1.

David Elliott uses a definition of politics that is consistent with my own use of the term. He writes: "To the Greeks, the word *politics* meant whatever involved people in human concerns beyond their own individual needs" (Elliott, 1995, p. 130). I am especially interested in politics as it refers to situations that involve, or arise from, the exercise of power and authority.

Some classic political situations are identified as such because they involve phenomena that are perceived, typically, as political, such as, the distribution of resources, decisions about the 'common good' and civic rights and responsibilities. In the scenarios I discuss in this chapter, I introduce two additional phenomena that I claim are also, typically, political: materiality and ideology. Both of these terms have strong associations with Marxist theory, but I want to broaden their meanings to encompass the extended terms of reference introduced by feminist, anti-racist and post-colonial theory.

In the Marxist context, materiality refers to a form of causality that is attributed to economic and technological systems, structures, and relations. Marx used the concept of materiality to get away from political theories that accounted for historical and social change solely in terms of human (or Divine) causes. He wanted to emphasize the effects that are introduced to history as a function of the organization of society. Feminists and other contemporary social theorists adopt Marx's account of materiality but associate it with forms of social organization broader than economics. Thus — in addition to class

— race, gender, disability, and colonialism are identified as forms of social organization that have a historical effect[54].

I use the term materiality to highlight situations where something about the conditions within which we live has an identifiable effect on us — for instance — when our being parents adds the burden of childcare to the costs associated with working long hours or attending school at night, or, in another example, when our being White or First Nations means we are likely to be received (and perceived) very differently even though we are engaged in otherwise similar tasks.

"Ideology" is another Marxist term that became prominent once it was interpreted by Althusser. It refers to the ideas, or sets of ideas, that represent the world through the distorted (by vested interest) lens of the ruling class. Marx argued that ideological representations served a specific function, namely, to obscure the ways that material interests of members of different classes were contradictory. Althusser's interpretation emphasized the influence of socializing institutions such as the family, the schools and the media, that perpetuated the ideologies of the ruling class, passing the distorted views off, in effect, as normal and natural.

I find the term ideology useful when I want to refer to sets of ideas or values that seem to be so entrenched, so naturalized, that they are almost incontestable. I do associate it, also, with situations where the ideas seem to be aligned with dominant (authoritative) interests, be they economic, gendered, or racialized. For example, artists

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[54] Definitions of Historical Materialism and Ideology. Retrieved August 15, 2004, from School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia: http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j024/inmod/ideology.htm.

are sometimes represented as Bohemians, people who are free or somehow separated from the responsibilities normally associated with adulthood or citizenship. To refer to this idea as ideology is to assert that it is a distortion that has material implications – it serves to separate artists from other workers.

I turn, now, to a discussion of the five roles of professional musicianship that I have identified for the purpose of analyzing intersections of music and politics.

Musicians as Wage Earners

Issues

In considering the role of the musician as "wage earner," I ask whether educational principles have been established to help music students explore the idea of music as "work." I am not referring to the specifics of preparing to win a particular job; rather, I am asking whether an educational context exists in which students might explore factors, apart from competence, that influence the availability of paid work, potential income levels, the relative stability of forms of work and working conditions. Such factors might include economic and political conditions, technological change, and social and demographic considerations. For example, in Canada, many forms of employment for musicians are influenced by levels of government funding (directly and indirectly through arts councils) including work in universities, schools, orchestras, arts festivals and as members of small ensembles. With changes in government policy, livelihoods can grow[55] or modes of work can disappear altogether[56]. Economic priorities affect

[55] When the national government is pursuing strategic objectives in specific countries or regions, international touring can be quite lucrative.

government decisions but underlying these priorities is the more fundamental question, that is, should public or private interests support various categories of "public service?" Without going into the specifics of this argument, it should be recognized that the material ramifications will affect people very differently, depending on how they are situated. For example, private funding of university departments is concentrated in engineering and science because research in these fields can result in marketable commodities. Those financially well-positioned in the private sector can profit by taking over public assets. Those in music departments, on the other hand, may find themselves without a department in which to work[57]. The ideological shift taking place within the current neoliberal[58] moment is from a notion of "public good" and shared public assets to a commodification of all aspects of life, including air and water.

Complementary to the question of public funding is the equally complex issue of corporate sponsorship[59]. Musicians must deliberate such questions as, Is it important that

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[56] When arts council funding is cut, regional sponsors lose their capacity to present concerts and opportunities to tour within the country disappear. Particularly vulnerable are the many smaller communities outside of metropolitan centres where corporate sponsorship is difficult to sustain because of the small "markets" involved.

[57] This is particularly true at smaller universities where arts faculties, including music, visual art, education and women's studies, are chronically underfunded.

[58] "A general characteristic of neoliberalism is **the desire to intensify and expand the market, by increasing the number, frequency, repeatability, and formalisation of transactions.** The ultimate (unreachable) goal of neoliberalism is a universe where every action of every being is a market transaction, conducted in competition with every other being and influencing every other transaction, with transactions occurring in an infinitely short time, and repeated at an infinitely fast rate." (Emphasis in original. Definition of Neoliberalism. Retrieved September 10, 2004, from http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/neoliberalism.html).

[59] Saul talks about the problem of the managerial class not being able to participate in public political debates because of conflicts of interest with their corporate

we agree with the goals and practices of a particular business when we accept their support in exchange for public relations benefits? There is no simple answer to this question. Without this support we may not be able to do our work as musicians (or festival presenters or opera companies). In addition, there are many examples of radical and culturally critical works of art sponsored by conservative corporations[60]. On the other hand, if we were asked to play at an event with which we were uncomfortable, would we accept the work (since we probably need the money) or would we put the "meaning" of our public presence ahead of the opportunity to earn income[61]. I will look at this issue again under the category of cultural producer.

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obligations. The same often holds true for musicians. I recall an occasion when members of a metropolitan orchestra organized a well-publicized Peace Demonstration. When one of their corporate sponsors heard about the demonstration, they threatened to cancel their sponsorship of the orchestra. The conflict was resolved when the players published a public apology for the "naivety" of their actions. Of course, the main issue was that they used their professional affiliation to help advertise the event; however, that professional affiliation is also what identified the players as members of a recognized community wishing to take a stand on a public matter—a mark of their credibility. Saul's comments follow:

> As for the individual, the one-third to one-half of the population who are part of the managerial elite are indeed castrated as citizens because their professions, their employment contracts and the general atmosphere of corporate loyalty make it impossible for them to participate in the public place. (Saul, 1995, p. 87)

[60] The works presented by the Danny Grossman Dance Company are an example of this. Many of Danny Grossman's pieces express social criticisms—criticisms in conflict with the philosophies of businesses supporting the company.

[61] My own ensemble was asked to play at an event in support of a Toronto bid for the Olympics. I was not in support of the bid and was very uncomfortable crossing the protest line that was set up by the group "Bread not Circuses." We were not hired as free-lance musicians for this event; rather, we were hired as a "name" group. Had we been anonymous, the performance would not have meant any more or less than the work provided by the caterers. As a group with a recognized profile, however, it was a source of conflict amongst our members as to whether or not we should be lending our name to

Issues like these directly affect a musician's capacity to earn an income. An added difficulty is that there are few forums for professional musicians to use for debate.[62] There are external factors as well that affect our ability to earn income as musicians, for example, the influence of local economies[63], the priorities of school boards[64] and the existence of audiences for particular forms of music[65]. Working

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the event (and accepting money from the organization). Of course, the fact that we were well-paid for the performance made the conflict that much more difficult. Here again, where one is situated is key. If the conflict is a choice between food and ethics, food usually wins out. Material relations will always intersect such decisions.

[62] My observation of local music publications is that most are dedicated to promoting events. I am aware that there are journals aimed at composers and producers of experimental music and performance art (*Musicworks Magazine* is one) that discuss notions of cultural production and meaning however these have limited circulation and are not part of the awareness of the general pool of working musicians. The one forum that is available to all working musicians is the monthly journal, *International Musician*, published by the American Federation of Musicians—the union representing almost all working musicians (who earn their income as performers) in North America. This journal does, in fact, address issues pertaining to musicians as workers and it does so with a clear articulation of our connection to the broader labour movement and the history of labour relations in North America. Writers for the journal often situate their concerns within the larger political and social landscape. A limitation of the journal, as one that has to inform a large geographic constituency on legal issues, health concerns, contracts and working conditions, is that it is generally not a place where a great deal of active debate takes place. The newsletters of national symphonic organizations (OCSM in Canada) also discuss job related issues and sometimes contain thoughtful pieces reflecting on larger issues affecting our working lives. Like the A. F. of M. magazine, however, articles are mostly written my members of the executive. These journals are not easily adopted as forums for lively debate on philosophical issues.

[63] Orchestral musicians face job losses and career crises as economic and demographic conditions push their orchestras into bankruptcy. Artistic and administrative decisions, out of the control of musicians, also affect the economic viability of these institutions.

[64] Music educators have lost positions or been reassigned to other disciplines as education authorities have eliminated funding for school arts programs.

conditions are affected by supply and demand and access to union support—not unlike working conditions in non-musical workplaces[66]. Social relations, including but not limited to gender relations, also play a role in the nature and quality of work opportunities[67] and on-going workplace negotiations.

It is easy to conflate the issues of income, personal and artistic success, celebrity and self worth. Without any sense of how we are situated within external structures, musicians (students and professionals alike) tend to see their career trajectories as purely personal. Individual ability, disposition and work ethic are factors in one's success as a musician; however, there are significant external factors that influence the conditions within which we practice our art and seek out employment.

Another significant issue is the oversupply of highly skilled and underutilized professional players. In the orchestral field, the number of positions available is extremely limited. In all but the major orchestras, the wages are low—sometimes below the poverty line and certainly well below what other professionals receive for equal levels

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[65] Audience development is an issue important to musicians in many genres; however, the fear of shrinking audiences is a constant theme for classical musicians.

[66] Musicians working in musical theatre face crowded working conditions, extreme noise levels, physical danger from objects falling into the orchestra pit and mental, physical and emotional fatigue from the repetition of the same show, eight times/week over months and years. As in other work environments, when there is an oversupply of qualified people, workers have limited leverage to demand safe working conditions.

[67] This is a topic worthy of a separate thesis. I touch on a few issues here: With so much work controlled by contractors and conductors, there is always room for subjectivity in who gets hired. It is important to please the contractor in such situations. Quality is important but so is fitting in with the expectations of the people in power. This leaves all kinds of room for pressure to conform to particular gender and social standards. Sexual harassment is only one expression of this dynamic.

of education. During my years at the University of Toronto, several instructors commented frequently in class that most of us "wouldn't make it." We were told we would never be good enough to succeed as musicians. This attitude represents two ideas relevant to musicians as workers: a narrow and specific view of what constitutes success and a belief that failure is due to personal inadequacy. The difficulties of earning a living as a musician in Canada, however, are systemic. The fact that some musicians are enormously successful does not change the general situation for most graduates—a situation that has specific historical material causes[68]. Other issues that I would like to see debated in depth include the hierarchical nature of orchestras[69] and how this affects the distribution of resources within an organization[70] as well as the issues surrounding class differences between members of orchestras and members of symphony Boards of Directors that determine the distribution of resources.

In summary, the following is a sample of generalizable themes that emerge from the examples I've provided; they reflect the intersection of music and politics in reference to musicians as wage earners:

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[68] The most obvious of these historical causes was the expansion of professional orchestras, (funded by the newly formed arts councils in the 1960's) and the expansion of university music programs created in part to satisfy the need for professional musicians. Orchestras outgrew the available funding while the numbers of students coming out of school music programs wanting to be professional musicians continued to increase. Supply vastly outweighed demand.

[69] See C. Small's analysis of the public meanings generated by orchestral performances in Small, 1998.

[70] See: Lebrecht, N. (1991). *The Maestro myth. Great conductors in pursuit of power.* London: Simon and Schuster Ltd.

- the effects of local, regional, national and international economic conditions and philosophical debates/political battles on the distribution of resources (money) in relation to individual and community needs;
- political advocacy;
- power dynamics in the workplace including organizational systems (hierarchical or otherwise);
- class relationships as they effect the distribution of resources;
- the effect of supply and demand on working conditions and the quality and availability of work;
- the role of unions;
- the availability of audiences for particular musical genres;
- ethical issues relating to the funding of musical work.

I look now to the work of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen for insight and pedagogical strategies that potentially address the kind of issues I have raised. Specifically, I look for educational frameworks that encourage students to think beyond the practice room in their conception of themselves as musicians—to see themselves also as wage earners in a larger social context.

Positions expressed by philosophers of music education

The authors address several aspects of the issues I have raised. In particular, each writer articulates the need for political advocacy, the relationship of sound advocacy strategies to philosophical positions and an acknowledgement that government funding affects the profession. Each author acknowledges that philosophical positions influence advocacy efforts and Reimer and Elliott, in particular, acknowledge the need for music

education professionals to work together to advance the profession as a whole (Reimer, 1989, p. 215 & Elliott, 1995, p.4). Discussions on the need for advocacy appear to be integrated into each author's concept of the preparation of musical education professionals.

More idiosyncratically, the philosophers offer divergent messages with respect to music as work. Reimer advocates building in opportunities for students to explore the contributions their work makes to society as a whole (Reimer, 1989, pp 3, 156, 193). He also articulates the need to be aware of changing paradigms and consequently, the need to reconsider our possible roles within shifting perceptions of the world (Reimer, 1989, pp 222-224). Reimer also notes that the meaning of musical experiences and the ways they are acknowledged, and/or valued monetarily, do not always correlate (Reimer, 1989, p. 207).

Elliott does not address the dynamics of musical work places. His project is focused on establishing a new definition of the nature of music and his discussions are focused on establishing how different kinds of music validate that definition. Elliott does name "politics" as a factor in music; however, it is, again, part of his project to define the nature of music itself (Elliott, 1995, p. 130). He appears to avoid references to larger scale political contexts. His concept that music is multicultural in nature has ramifications for the way professional music students see and value musical expression from different cultures. This could well result in increased audiences for a variety of music forms—a change in cultural dynamics that could result in formerly marginalized genres of music taking a more central place in society. Elliott, however, does not

articulate any of these political references ("political" in this case because they have material consequences) as they relate to musicians as wage earners.

Regelski also does not address directly any political issues affecting musical work. His project is to show what music is "good for." Within this context, however, he suggests that musical experiences of all kinds serve a limitless number of "human goods" (Reglski, 1998a, p. 31). In his approach to pedagogy within the school environment, he suggests teaching instruments that are easily accessible and less dependent upon ensembles for continued use into adult life" (Regelski, 1998b, p. 36) In this sense, he disrupts the notion that musical training, to be considered successful, has to look and function in a certain way. He does not, however, address issues pertaining to the numerous settings in which power dynamics have an influence on a musician's role as a wage earner.

Jorgensen raises a number of issues with significance for musicians in their roles as wage earners. In her discussion of spheres of musical validity, she identifies many factors that influence the nature and availability of musical work. She also describes numerous social, financial and ethical tensions that bear consideration at all levels of teaching and professional musical practice. Jorgensen provides a "conceptual framework for reflecting on and resolving current ideological clashes and methodological differences" (Bogdan, 1998, p. 71)[71] in the realm of music education; however, she does not deal specifically with the power dynamics of different work situations. The role of

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[71] Bogdan, D. (1998). Estelle R. Jorgensen, In search of music education [Review of the book *In search of music education*]. University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago. *Philosophy of Music Education Review, 6*(1), 71-73.

ideology is raised in numerous contexts as is the possibility that musicians can act as agents of change or agents of conservation (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 42). These themes provide important opportunities for students to evaluate how they are positioned within musical and professional frameworks and how they might wish to engage with such themes in their working lives.

Conclusions

There are some political issues that appear consistently in the philosophical accounts of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen. Each author argues strongly in favor of students taking the time to develop a philosophy to guide their career and life choices. Each author acknowledges that philosophical positions can affect advocacy efforts and acknowledges, as well, the political necessity of advocacy work. Each of the authors can be seen to address, particularly well, specific elements of the political issues I have raised. For instance, Reimer considers it important to take the time with students to explore their career goals in light of social needs. Jorgensen considers various factors that influence the nature and availability of work and she considers the influence of ideology in different spheres of musical validity; however, she does not consider how these factors might affect the musician as a worker within these environments.

What is missing for me in these accounts is an articulation of larger historical factors that shape the conditions of work, for example, capitalism, industrialization, colonization, globalization, the influence of technological change and the influence of demographics—all of which affect the nature, availability and quality of work as well as levels of pay. None of the authors considers the fundamental debate of private-versus-

public funding or the social/political factors that influence the dynamics of different workplace environments.

Musicians as Artists

Issues:

Who gets to count as an "artist?" What is the role of creativity in art? Is there something inherently "special" about being a creative artist (if indeed what I do is "creative")? How important is it to the self-image of musicians to be "special" and how do notions of "being special" affect our material locations?

In this section, I am not looking for definitions of art and the artist *per se*. All four of the authors examined in this thesis write extensively about the nature of music and art and both Reimer and Elliott, though from different viewpoints, write about the nature of creativity and its place in music education. I explore to what extent we can contest our conventional assumptions and beliefs about these categories within the context of current thinking by philosophy of education writers. Two examples illustrate my reasons for seeking a critical perspective on our concepts of art and artists.

First, there is a common belief that it is "creative" people who pursue careers in the arts and that careers in the arts allow us to "be creative." Susan Heald writes, in "Pianos to Pedagogy: Pursuing the Educational Subject,[72]" that "creativity is *assumed* to be a property of anyone who engages in activities which—through their association with what artists do—are assumed to demonstrate creativity" (Heald, 1991, p. 130, author's

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[72] Pianos to Pedagogy: Pursuing the Educational Subject. In H. Banerji, L. Carty, K. Dehli, S. Heald & K. McKenna (Eds.), *Unsettling Relations: The University as a site of feminist struggles* (pp. 129 -149). Toronto: Women's Press.

emphasis). Her experience of becoming an accomplished pianist, however, did not always encompass developing her own creativity.

> But "playing" still meant sticking to the music-as-written: any effort on my part to play in a way which might be "inventive" or "imaginative" – as the dictionary defines "creative" – was quickly censored by my mother, who would ask, "is *that* practicing?"
> As such, my entrance into the realm of the "creative person" was marked by an absence of precisely those features which define "creativity." (Heald, 1991, p.133).

Heald quotes Parker and Pollack on the concept of the "creative artist." I include this passage as it sheds light on some of our expectations and perhaps our confusions around the role of "creativity" in musical training.

> The concept of the artist as a creative individual is a modern one....The modern definition is the culmination of a long process of economic, social and ideological transformations by which the word "artist" ceased to mean a kind of workman and came to signify a special kind of person with a whole set of distinctive characteristics: artists came to be thought of as strange, different, exotic, imaginative, eccentric, creative, unconventional, alone. A mixture of supposed genetic factors and social roles distinguish the artist from the mass of ordinary mortals, creating new myths, those of the prophet and above all the genius, and new social personae, the Bohemian and the pioneer....Today, to be an artist is to be born a special person; creativity lies in the person not in what is made. (Parker and Pollack as quoted in Heald, S., 1991, p. 130)

The issues raised by Heald, Parker and Pollack suggest that our assumptions about what it might mean to be an "artist" need to be examined critically[73]. I am particularly interested in the effects of the notion of "being special." Is this notion problematized in professional music education? This is not just a question of self-image (although it has important consequences for individuals, particularly if they are not successful as musicians and are, therefore, no longer "special"). This notion of

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[73] My own classical training most definitely did not contain opportunities for developing creativity.

"specialness" has consequences beyond individual notions of self because it creates a hierarchy of categories: those who have value (as special people) and those who have less value (as "not" special people)[74]. I believe the designation of "specialness" has several implications. One is that it affects our view of what "counts" in ourselves, in others and in life. This designation separates us conceptually from other working people, keeps us out of labour market analyses[75] and relieves us of the obligation to make connections with others who walk different life paths. Is our designation as "special" part of the rational for paying musicians so poorly—since we have the privilege of loving what we do? Conversely, does our designation as "special" connect with our willingness to accept "starving artist" wages along with the label?

Consider a second example. I recently sat on a multi-disciplinary arts council jury evaluating grant applications for professional development. The jury was made up of two visual artists, a theatre director, a modern dancer and a musician. Applications represented every branch of the arts. In music alone, we were required to assess the work

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[74] The centrality of "competition" in advanced levels of musical development is another link to this "specialness." Competition is a means of distributing scarce resources while attributing the lack of resources to personal inadequacy. Here, again, the ideology of "being special" frames issues in terms of personal success or failure and masks economic forces. For example, twelve fabulous pianists might compete for a prize that includes recordings and international touring. Only one of the twelve will win the prize and thus gain the means to launch a sustainable career. The other eleven pianists will still be as brilliant as they were before the competition; however, they will not have access to the same opportunities to develop their careers. In spite of doing everything conceivable to develop themselves as musicians, their career trajectories are shaped, to a significant degree, by limits on available resources.

[75] A lot of lobbying efforts by arts councils are based upon analyses of the ways that artists contribute to the economy. Paradoxically, if we were acknowledged as part of the labour market, this form of argument would not be necessary. See: Ontario Arts Council. (2002, February). Economic and employment impact of the arts and culture sector in Ontario. *ArtFacts/Artifaits, 6*(1).

of composers (tonal, experimental, jazz, folk) and performers representing African, Middle Eastern and Latin genres as well as the western art forms of jazz, pop and classical. We needed to consider the mandate of the arts council to support artists from a diversity of communities and, with limited funds available, we needed to determine how the work of each applicant might contribute to the cultural growth of differently situated communities[76].

What struck me about this particular experience was the fact that the artists from other disciplines, and the visual artists in particular, had a critical analysis of cultural discourses about the nature and function of art. They brought with them an intellectual and activist mode of analysis that saw artists as participants in the creation of meaning. They were familiar with literatures from of sociology, philosophy, cultural criticism and aesthetics as they relate to visual art and had concepts of artists as cultural producers. It was clear from our conversations that this approach to art had been integrated into art education at the university level for many years. This is not the case in standard music studies. Music studies generally include music history, theory, form and analysis in addition to concentrations in one's area of specialty. Ethnomusicology is usually available as an elective, and composition programs might include forms of cultural criticism; however, generally speaking, music programs do not require studies in aesthetics, critical theory or the sociology of music.

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[76] The reader should not mistake these criteria as imposing a quota system. Artistic quality is the most heavily weighted factor in all evaluations; however, the responsibility of arts councils and therefore the people asked to sit on advisory or jury panels, is to evaluate the range of applications based on the needs of all segments of geographically and culturally diverse communities.

What preparation would be adequate to enable a musician to negotiate the critical issues of diversity and representation and thus participate meaningfully on such a jury? Decisions made by arts juries have material consequences for communities and for individual artists. With the authority and responsibility to determine what "counts" during a round of competitions, it is crucial that a jury member have the ability to analyze notions of art and value critically[77].

The intersections of music and politics are evident in the above examples in several ways. The ideological value of "being special" justifies huge material rewards for some as effectively as it justifies negligible wages for others[78]. The necessity to question frames of reference is apparent in the role of a jury of peers. Politically-derived questions include, What costs are incurred as we assume that creativity is the purview of artists and what values are suggested by this assumption? What means do we have to establish criteria for what "counts?" How does a professional musician gain a critical view of themselves as a member of a community of artists meeting the needs of a diverse population?

The frames of reference that we bring to decisions of value regarding art and artists set limits on what we can express musically, as well as on how those expressions will be heard, received, and assessed. By use of these two examples I try to illustrate the

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[77] Within this framework of competition for limited resources there will always be worthy applicants who are not funded.

[78] Some guest artists receive $50,000 for a single performance—about the equivalent of a year's wages for an orchestra member in a large centre. In a small centre annual wages range approximately $14,000 to $25,000 per year. Source: *Wage Scales and Conditions in the Symphony Orchestra. OCSM/OMOSC Orchestras.* http://www.afm.org: American Federation of Musicians. (2002-2003).

extent to which all of these activities bear political implications. As I turn to the philosophers' accounts of artistic value, I do not doubt the capacity of their analyses to provide reasonable, even nuanced, ways of explaining the value of music. What I am very interested in, however, is the capacity of their analyses to help musicians notice and contest the dominant ideologies that shape our conventional assumptions and beliefs about such values. I am interested to see whether their accounts open up ways of noticing not only the positive consequences of being recognized as artists but also the potential pitfalls. And I am interested in ways that they address the questions of what makes for mutually beneficial (as opposed to exploitative) sharing of differing musical values and traditions.

Positions expressed by philosophers of music education:

Each of the four authors discusses the nature of music and its value to human life. Though based on different rationales, each author argues for the need to explore the music of a multiplicity of cultures in order to appreciate the cultural values expressed in unfamiliar cultures.

Reimer stands in tension with the others with respect to the connection between socio-cultural factors and the nature of music. Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen consider that religious, moral and political factors, as well as audience, location and social context to be part of a series of relationships that contribute to the *nature* of music. Reimer does not consider such factors relevant and argues that giving them undue consideration

distorts the purpose of music education, which is to sensitize students to the expressive possibilities found in purely "musical" elements such as texture, dynamics and form.

Based on my interest in challenging taken-for-granted frames of reference about our roles as artists, I want to attend carefully to the kinds of reflection each philosopher advocates. Reimer, Jorgensen and Regelski recommend forms of reflective practice that have us consider how our work fulfills the needs of different constituencies. Jorgensen in particular offers an approach to balancing competing tensions amongst different ideological positions and the needs of different student constituencies. Elliott also recommends reflective practices; however, he uses the concept mostly in reference to the need to replicate the standards and traditions of different musical genres.

The question of creativity generates more complicated tensions with the field. The notion and role of creativity in music education is explored by Reimer, Elliott and Jorgensen. For Reimer, creativity is part of every aspect of musical experience, from listening to performing to composing. His pedagogical viewpoint is that it is crucial to create opportunities for creative decision-making during all levels of musical development (Reimer, 1989, p. 59 & 69) and he posits a "continuum" of creativity (Reimer, 1989, p. 84). He cautions that performance students may not get sufficient opportunity to develop their creativity within conductor-led ensembles and argues that more opportunities need to be created for students to develop their creative skills (for example, through composition and small ensemble work). Providing opportunities to develop independent thinking is key to Reimer's concept of creative development.

Elliott contests Reimer's definition of creativity. In Elliott's terms, creativity is synonymous with "originality" and can only be achieved by those who have absorbed and exceeded existing expressions within a particular art form. From within this framework, he offers definitions of what constitutes greatness, creativity and originality and offers a detailed description of his pedagogical approach to developing musical creativity[79]. Elliott suggests that all aspects of musical development are best accomplished through induction—an approach to learning that, in my view, does not necessarily encourage independent thinking. Elliott's approach is consistent, however, with his view that creativity/originality can only be achieved by first absorbing and exceeding existing musical standards.

Jorgensen does not attempt to define the nature of creativity; however, she examines its place within different pedagogical traditions clearly favoring those approaches that encourage opportunities for independent decision-making. Like Reimer, Jorgensen cautions against developing mechanistic skills without also learning to make creative and fully contextualized decisions (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 12). Jorgensen also discusses the notion of artists as agents of conservation and agents of change (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 42) and the need to balance these competing tensions in music education. She encourages music students and educators to accept the many dialectical tensions she

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[79] "Creativity and musicianship should be taught concurrently by 'targeting students' attention, progressive problem solving, problem finding, musical generating and selecting, opportunity finding, and musical promise detecting" (Elliott, 1995, p. 234).

Elliott offers six principles for developing creativity in students and describes the role of the music educator as "music teacher-as-coach, adviser, and informed critic, not teacher as proud mother, stern father, or know-it-all big brother" (Elliott, 1995, p. 234).

enumerates in her text and to see the need to balance competing goals and viewpoints as a positive challenge.

Finally, neither Elliott nor Regelski offer any view on the ideology reflected in the notion of "being special." Reimer suggests that the motivation to be "special" can shape priorities in ways that do not serve a musician's or society's best interests (Reimer, 1989, p. 197) and suggests the importance of looking outside of the world of music to understand what musicians might contribute to society as a whole. Reimer also introduces the idea that changing paradigms might ultimately alter our world views and thus our priorities (Reimer, 1989, pp 222-225). Jorgensen presents a more positive view of the desire to stand out from one's peers.

> Attempts to democratize music by emphasizing popular musical culture at the expense of classical traditions are misguided. They fail to recognize every musician's desire for immortality through her or his composition and performance—to be remembered as having achieved greatness, whether for hedonistic or other reasons; to attain the normally impossible or difficult; and to create something significant, even unique if possible, whether cooperatively or individually. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 77).

Of note for my discussion, Jorgensen challenges the notion that the meaning of music can be reduced to representing any particular class values and offers as an example the place classical music has amongst all "social classes, languages, and ethnic backgrounds" in Eastern countries (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 76). Jorgensen places music educators in the role of working for social change (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 80) and suggests that music educators "see themselves engaged in an enterprise that integrates music with the rest of life" (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 30).

Conclusions

Overwhelmingly, the predominant concerns regarding artists and the value of art expressed by Elliott, Reimer, Regelski and Jorgensen, have to do with reflections intrinsic to the nature of music. They dispute various details of one another's positions: Reimer questions whether creativity is fostered within existing teaching environments, while Elliott contests the availability of creativity at all in the absence of superior performance technique. They rarely question the place or representation of artists in society at large.

Each philosopher advocates a level of reflection (evaluation) of diverse musics from other cultures as well as varied genres. Yet without exception, the material conditions within which such exploration would take place are ignored completely. The historical paths by which certain art forms come to ascendancy and others languish are, for the most part, left unquestioned.

With Jorgensen as the only—and I would emphasize "qualified"—exception, none of the philosophers address large scale socio-political phenomena such as the role of music education in pitting music students one against another in a form of competition that sustains a star-based performance market and assesses the majority as "unfit" sooner than it offers opportunities for cooperation or a range of performance opportunities to all. Jorgensen's willingness to address the tensions inherent in musical pluralism warrants revisiting both for what she introduces to the discussion as well as to what she, too, leaves out.

Jorgensen's process-oriented focus on dialogue creates a context in which students can explore the tensions amongst artistic/cultural practices and traditions. In her

assessment of the role of classical music in Eastern Europe she rightly rejects essentialist and reductionist views on the nature of music. Nonetheless, her failure to create a space within which to examine critically the material effects of different discourses and positions weakens her account. She does not acknowledge that meanings are more than varied across contexts—they are also differently rewarded and/or impeded. No cultural context is ever "innocent". When classical music is performed by professional classical musicians on "Indian Reservations"[80], the music can not help but reflect the history of colonization[81]. Similarly, in other colonized countries, the founding of classical orchestras is part of a pattern of validating the arrival of middle-class Europeans and their values (Small, 1998 p, 18). Thus, while Jorgensen's advocacy of a holistic and dialectical approach to the contradictions that emerge in musical discourses, and her acknowledgement of the role of ideology that influences our viewpoints are advances over the basic pattern of silence that characterizes the philosophical literature more generally, she does not invite a critique of the material implications of these cultural skirmishes.

I conclude, then, that although each author questions how we function as artists in society, none of them creates a context within music education where students could explore musical practices and ideologies in association with historical and material

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[80] The term used on Canadian maps to designate lands set aside by the Canadian government for First Nations peoples.

[81] Recent visits to First Nations communities by the Thunder Bay Symphony Orchestra are an example of an attempt to alter this relationship and the meaning of our presence in those communities. The visits have been set as an opportunity for cultural exchange amongst equals.

factors. In my view, the programs offered by these authors do not create conditions that will prepare students to address the issues raised in my examples. Their sincere attempts to connect music with the rest of life fall short of accounting for the relationship between belief systems and material realities.

Musicians as Members of Communities

Issues

We are members of musical communities but we are also located within local, regional and national communities, shaped, at least in part, by social, economic and political structures. Recalling the passage by John Ralston Saul that opens this thesis, I am aware that, as musicians, we are one of the sectors of society that receives a highly specialized education. According to Saul, specialist educations leave professionals poorly prepared to situate themselves in a larger context. The perception amongst some groups of people is that formally trained musicians (particularly classical musicians) are elitist and privileged. We are seen as having benefited from expensive private lessons for most of our lives[82] and we play a form of music that appeals, at least in North America, primarily to members of the white educated middle-class[83]. Classical musicians, themselves, are mostly white and middle class. As musicians, we spend a lot of time associating with other musicians. We also tend to connect with people who support what we do—people, generally, with similar class and education backgrounds to

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[82] Those who financed their own studies through summer jobs and scholarships notwithstanding.

[83] Efforts made by various orchestras and musicians to alter this perception and broaden their audience base are evidence of the pervasiveness of the stereotype.

our own. How well prepared are we to put the work we do in the context of the larger society in which we live?

In this section, I explore to what extent the framework of each author facilitates an understanding of ourselves as "members of communities." I am particularly interested in how well we are able to participate and function as citizens in a democracy and if we are able to take in the realities of people who do not make their livings as musicians. A number of questions have arisen for me: how prepared and willing are we to engage in issues of local, regional, national and international concerns. When musicians decide to take job action, do we expect support from the broader community? If so, on what do we base this expectation? Do musicians understand enough about our economic and social interdependence to consider supporting other groups who go on strike or undertake other forms of protest? If a group of people in our community are struggling, are we able to recognize them as having needs similar to our own? Are we able to empathize and consider contributing in some way if the issue doesn't appear to affect us personally?

An event that shaped my own questions was a strike by members of a major Canadian orchestra during the 1990's. The basis for the strike was the difference in pay between American and Canadian orchestras of equal ranking. The situation was considered unfair because, as members of a top ranked orchestra, the players believed they were entitled to the highest wages in the industry. They also felt that they were losing talent to better paid orchestras south of the border[84]. Seen from the point of view

[84] I believe another issue was the distribution of resources within the organization itself with music directors and guest artists working at pay scales vastly out of proportion

of the players as members of an international calibre orchestra, the strike was justifiable; however, seen in the context of the larger community, its merits were questionable. The strike took place after a long period of government cutbacks to social services. In the years prior to the strike, welfare payments[85] had been cut back 20% (well below the cost of living in urban centres), the use of food banks increased many fold and the Ontario Arts Council had its funding cut by approximately 40%, affecting every arts group in the province. Layoffs were taking place in large numbers in many industries throughout the country.

Was this strike realistic considering the economic climate? Was it ethical, considering the severe economic hardships others in the same city were experiencing when members of the orchestra were still making comfortable middle-class incomes? Was it rational, considering the differences between Canadian and American social services? For example, all Canadians are entitled to health services where many Americans are not. The levels of poverty in American cities are far greater than in Canadian cities. Couldn't a difference in pay be justified between Americans and Canadians based on the social benefits offered in Canada? Finally, could the orchestra

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to those received by the members of the orchestra. It is possible, in fact likely, that the way this strike was framed by the media did not accurately reflect the aims of the orchestra members. This possibility does not alter the basis for my argument. Every group that launches some kind of protest is vulnerable to having their issues framed by the mainstream media as morally suspect. This reality further supports my argument that we need to see how we connect to people outside of our immediate work communities.

[85] People on welfare are also recipients of government support. The rationale for the cuts was argued to be a severe deficit.

justify its demands to the community as a whole? Did they have a view of how they fit into the social, economic and cultural needs of the broader community[86]?

Another situation that raises similar issues is the number of times in recent years that orchestras have faced bankruptcy. The causes of these financial crises vary somewhat depending on the particular orchestra. In many, if not most instances, the problems that lead to the crisis do not involve decisions made by musicians. Boards of Directors are ultimately responsible for the financial well-being of orchestras although managers, music directors and musicians (in greatly diminishing proportions) have an influence on board decisions. Whether or not the musicians feel responsible for, or victimized by the situation, the community profile of the musicians, themselves, is an important key to the recovery of the orchestra—if a recovery is to take place.

My questions in regard to this example are as follows: What is the profile of the orchestra in the community? Have members of the orchestra expressed and shown support to other people in the community facing hardships due to systemic change (such as government cutbacks or economic recessions)? How do different members of the community see the value of the orchestra in relation to their own concerns? Musicians have become involved in lobbying efforts with various levels of government in order to justify the importance of maintaining (or increasing) levels of support. When musicians are involved in such lobbying efforts, do they have a sufficiently broad and critical analysis to see the forces at play beyond the need to influence a particular group of politicians?

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[86] Although a majority of members of the orchestra voted to strike, there were members of the orchestra who did not support this strike based on many of the issues raised above.

With the above questions in mind, I look to each author for strategies that prepare students to address what we contribute to society, what our responsibilities might be as members of communities, and how we are interconnected to larger social and economic conditions.

Positions expressed by philosophers of music education

The philosophy of education writers do not have a great deal to say about how we might connect with others as members of broad-based communities. To the extent that they do address this issue, each of the authors sees music education as fulfilling important humanist goals[87] and writes of the need to reflect democratic values through teaching practices. In addition, each author argues that experiencing the music of different cultures will lead students to appreciate and understand the needs and experiences of others. Reimer recommends that students consider their careers in light of what their work contributes to society. Elliott writes at length about multiculturalism as a social ideal[88] and argues that it is music itself that will lead us to breech our differences .

> I shall take a leap of faith at this point and suggest that the induction of students into different music cultures may be one of the most powerful ways to achieve a larger educational goal: preparing children to work effectively and tolerantly with others to solve shared community problems. (Elliott, 1995, p. 293)

In other words, understandings of "otherness"— one of the primary goals of the humanist education that Elliott espouses — develops as one pursues musical development through multicultural experiences (Elliott, 1995, p. 309). Regelski also makes a case for the

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[87] See Reimer, 1989, p. 145; Elliott, 1995, p. 209; Regelski, 1997, pg. 45; Jorgensen, 1997, pg. 3.

[88] "But *multicultural* has an evaluative sense. It connotes a social ideal; a policy of support for exchange among different social groups to enrich all while respecting and preserving the integrity of each." (Elliott, 1995, p. 207)

value of music to communities; however, he does not explore how else we might connect to our communities, beyond sharing musical experiences[89]. Jorgensen includes a reference to Paulo Freire (Jorgensen, 1997, pp. 23, 78, 79) and the idea that education should have a liberating role in people's lives but does not provide a way to analyze material relations—a step that is integral to Freire's view of liberation (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 24).

Conclusions

Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen refer quite generally to matters of concern to communities disconnected from the field of music but they do so from a musical reference point. The tendency not to look beyond musical frames of reference (whether these are defined as aesthetic, praxial or spheres of musical influence) provides an excellent example of materiality. Most faculties of music are located in separate buildings. Our conversations are with other musicians, our concerns are about learning music and our colleagues and instructors tend to come from backgrounds similar to our own. Between lectures, assignments, practicing, rehearsing and attending concerts it is possible to fill up every minute of the day without ever leaving the building. Debates about issues taking place in other university departments are rarely heard of within the separate, and separated, spaces we inhabit. Within circumstances of psychic and physical separation, I suggest we are vulnerable to simple factual errors and the provincialism

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[89] See Bogdan, D. (2001, Spring). Musical listening and performance as embodied dialogism. *Philosophy of Music Education Review, 9*(1), 3-22, and Bogdan, D. (2003, Summer). Musical spirituality: Reflections on identity and the ethics of embodied aesthetic experience in/and the academy. *The Journal of Aesthetic Education, 37*(2), 80-98 for discussions on self-reflexivity, situatedness, and embodiment in musical experiences.

without a critical framework that lets us actively explore the economic and social forces that affect our communities, large and small, and our places within them. Such a framework needs to give us the means to see how we are situated relative to others and to recognize the relatedness of our circumstances.

Musicians as Teachers

Issues

Most musicians teach at one time or another in their careers. For some, teaching at the university level becomes an important aspect of their careers and self-identity. Instructors have a great deal of influence over the shape and quality of the university experience for music students. Instructors decide ensemble assignations. Groups of instructors within departments make decisions about who will get solo opportunities, whose compositions will be performed, who gets permission to take on external performance opportunities. Instructors can open professional opportunities for students and often help to develop a musician's career after they have finished their formal studies[90]. Whether instructors see their roles as formal, parental or collegial, these relationships have a tremendous impact on the quality of life for music students—during the university years and often long afterward[91]. These relationships are often complex. The shapes they take reflect the values and beliefs of the instructors, as well as the students, and range from extremely positive to indifferent to abusive.

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[90] Kogan, J. (1987).

[91] Instructors in other university disciplines may also have this kind of impact; however, a high level of personal involvement with students is typical in faculties of music.

A difficult power dynamic is built into these relationships. Musicians tend to see them-"selves" as one with their instruments (encouraged by the ideology of "specialness" associated with being a musician). The ego and self-worth of all parties is tied into the day-to-day workings of the relationships. This is especially true in the relationships formed in conjunction with one's area of specialization, whether it is composition, performance or an academic subject like musicology. Judith Kogan writes about the nature of the relationships between students and teachers[92] in her book, *Nothing but the best*:

> The student never forgets that he [sic] is the apprentice at the feet of the master....The teacher is no less concerned with the student. The teacher is an artist, and artists have egos. The student is an extension of his ego. The student is the vessel he speaks through. The student is his puppet, his lump of clay to mold, the apostle to spread his word. He lavishes attention on promising students. The others sometimes feel ignored....The result of this is that relationships between the teachers and the students are filled with the tension and gratitude of the most troubled relationships between children and their parents and with the love and hate of the most tempestuous love affairs. (Kogan, 1987, p. 86)

The level of intensity Kogan describes is typical of relationships between music teachers and their students at the advanced level. The Juilliard School represents an extreme end of the spectrum in terms of the skill level required to get into the school and the view of what constitutes success. In this extreme form, however, it is easy to see the systems of value that shape the professional music education project. This value system pits students against each other and establishes "beating out the competition" as the highest priority. Part of what is so disturbing to me about this value system is the way the "value of music to life" is reduced to a competition only a few people will ever be

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[92] I am referring here to instrumental/vocal instructors who teach one-on-one.

able to win. It is interesting to reflect on philanthropist Andrew Carnegie's reasons for refusing Frank Damrosch's request to fund the Juilliard School, at the turn of the century, when the school was founded:

> [Carnegie] thought that Damrosch would do more for music by spreading the love of music among "the people" than by establishing an expensive school for those who would become professionals....There can be music so finished as to rob it of feeling. The Great Musician, intense and wrought up in his calling, is very apt to miss what is really uplifting in music. There must be such character, but it is not such I wish to help....I must not have anything to do with this venture because I doubt very much its success, and I don't consider it the best work he can do for the spread of music in this country. (Kogan, 1987, pg. 4)

In Carnegie's comments we see a perceived conflict between the values and needs of professional musicians and members of a general public who might also wish to learn music. The passages above reveal that there are different ideologies attached to music education at the amateur and professional levels. This latter ideology contributes to high-stakes relationships between teachers and students that merits greater analysis.

I identify the dynamics of these relationships as connected to an economic environment that determines how many people can realistically make their living as musicians and how many can be "stars" before stardom loses its value. This is an economic environment in which competition ensures lower costs and keeps the value of a few very high. The tragedy is that this external reality is so personalized. Failure to succeed is construed as personal inadequacy with the burdens of this "failure" falling entirely on the shoulders of the individual musician and the benefits accruing entirely to the system.

Kogan describes Juilliard, this highest ranked of all music schools, as a viciously competitive institution where the need to "nurture a student's development" is

acknowledged, but where, in reality, the institution is a place of intense and relentless anxiety, fraught with highly charged and dangerous power dynamics between teachers and students. A single-minded view of life's priorities is a prerequisite to survival (Kogan, 1987), and people are valued almost exclusively according to their ability to perform. "Those worth knowing are on the top," those who don't play well are not worth knowing: "He's a jerk." "How do you know?" "He can't play." (Kogan, p. 13)

In light of these examples, my questions are as follows: First, is there a framework within which to critically examine the power dynamics in teacher/student relationships on a systemic level? Such an examination could include consideration of the impact of gender, race, class, sexual orientation and positions of non-conformity in the teacher/student relationship. Second, is there a critical framework within which the goals and objectives that shape university music studies can be considered? In other words, if the cultural environment has changed, do the goals and objectives of the institutions that prepare students to enter this environment need to be reconsidered? Does a new cultural environment imply different notions of what constitutes success?

For example, if the goal of the institution is to educate a large number of students in the hopes of creating a few star performers, composers, conductors, academics—those whose work will be acknowledged as valuable by large numbers of people—then a one-size-fits-all program makes sense. All students strive for the same ends, and those who do not achieve these ends need to accept that they have failed. Accompanied with the designation of failure these students are then advised either to go into teaching[93] or to

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[93] The care and passion expressed in the work of the four "educators of music educators" explored here as well as the many wonderful, committed school music

choose another career path altogether. In this model, individual achievement is the ultimate goal. The learning environment is intensely competitive, and even though music education (at the school level at least) is lauded as a place to learn how to work together to achieve shared goals, the imperative to compete accompanies every new skill developed.

In this section, I look at the work of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen to see first, whether they offer a framework to explore the effect of power dynamics in teacher/student relations and second, whether each writer offers a framework in which the goals and objectives of faculties of music can be examined critically.

Positions expressed by philosophers of education

Each of the authors offers a detailed discussion of the purpose of music education and recommends approaches to pedagogy; however, their references to the effect of power dynamics on teacher-student relationships are minimal. Elliott and Regelski do not address the subject, although, in my view, Elliott's advocacy of "induction" as the primary form of instruction leaves students without many opportunities to step outside of the mentor-student relationship. Reimer and Jorgensen both advocate teaching practices that encourage independent thinking. Jorgensen, in particular, provides a detailed analysis of different pedagogical approaches showing the philosophical underpinnings of

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teachers in the field notwithstanding, there is still a tendency to consider music education as a lower-ranked career for people who can't make it as full-time performers/composers/conductors. It is only necessary to be a student at a music school for a few weeks before it becomes apparent that there is a hierarchical order of value within music schools with performers ranked highly and music education students ranked at the bottom.

these approaches and the socio-musical enterprises they support. She favours pedagogical approaches that encourage independent thinking in students.

Conclusions

All four of these writers have committed the greater part of their professional lives to considering questions of music pedagogy. That they do not directly address the questions I raise is not surprising as their projects concern the preparation of music educators, not music professionals generally. With this caveat in mind, I suggest that a discourse that allows the examination of relations of power and meaning-making between teachers and students, considered both philosophically and pedagogically, is lacking. Second, I suggest that a critical framework is necessary to explore the goals and objectives of faculties of education, again considering meaning and meaning-making as they occur within these environments. Such a critique might challenge the assumed values of music schools in a way that could benefit all participants—students and instructors alike.

Musicians as Cultural Producers

Issues

Artists have a unique role in society in that we present objects and/or events that take place in public and that are purported to carry inherent public importance/value. Advertising also takes place in public spaces and is, indeed, a form of cultural production; however, the creators of advertising generally do not invite people to set aside special time in order to experience their work. Artists, on the other hand, and musicians in particular, invite people to step out of their ordinary lives to participate in unique, embodied events.

For the purpose of this thesis, I define "cultural producers" as people whose work, through the medium of their chosen art form, reflects and articulates the "attitudes, values, beliefs, modes of perception and habits of thought and activity"[94] of various communities. This definition includes musicians as "producers of culture" and "music" as a particular "process or kind of activity that expresses and creates values"[95] through the medium of sound. Musicians, in our role as cultural producers, have the means to generate values and ideas within the context of "lived artistic experiences." These lived artistic experiences translate into "life experiences," shared, in some form, by all who participate in artistic events whether as audience or performers. According to Christopher Small, location, clothing, performance rituals, audience, choice of repertoire, style of advertising, relationships amongst the performers, and relationships between performers and audience, all contribute to the meaning of any particular musical event (Small, 1998, p.10). Seen as "cultural producers," musicians thus generate meaning not only through the music we choose to write or perform but also according to the manner in which we choose to present our work in public. Music education is also an important site of cultural production as articulated in the following passage: "If the process of learning is an essential characteristic of culture, then teaching also is a crucial characteristic. The way culture is taught and reproduced ... is itself an important component of culture"[96].

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[94] Blackburn, S. (1996). *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[95] McClary, S. (1991). *Feminine endings. Music, gender, and sexuality.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

[96] Miraglia, E., Law, R., & Collins, P. *What is Culture?* (A Baseline Definition of Culture). Retrieved November 11, 2002, from Washington State University Virtual

Leaving the audience aside for the time being[97]—music educators and performers can be seen, clearly, to bear particular responsibility as cultural producers for the conscious and unconscious transmission of values.

The politics of cultural production are well-rehearsed in Canada, the home of French language laws and Canadian content regulations. Yet, as I attempt to show with my examples in this category, professional musicians frequently encounter political dynamics through the course of their activities as cultural producers for which they are ill-prepared. I want to draw particular attention in this category to the political implications of being unprepared (or unwilling) to rethink, let alone contest, conventional expectations of ourselves as people who generate meaning through the public-nature of our artistic work.

Two examples illustrate my concerns in this area. The first refers to a programming conflict, in which I was a participant which took place amongst members of a small ensemble. The conflict was over whether we should perform a humorous blues piece, written by a member of the group, that joked about the disappointment of a father who pays for his son to go to an Ivy league music school only to have him come home playing the blues. The piece was well written and funny (in a limited context) but, to my mind, was shamelessly indifferent to the history of blues music. I felt that the meaning we were generating by performing that particular piece denied the stark material

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Campus: http://www.wsu.edu:8001/vcwsu/commons/topics/culture/culture-definition.html.

[97] Audiences also have a role in cultural production—the most glaring example being the selection process for Canadian/American "Idols;" however, I do not explore this further.

differences between the way that particular cultural expression evolved (and the history and life experiences of the southern, poor Black people who created it) and the way that a well-heeled white boy could simply appropriate the art form without having to examine the relationship between his own material location and that represented by the blues. What the audience saw was five young white musicians wearing fine clothes, playing expensive instruments they learned in the process of gaining university degrees, making a joke by using an art form that originated in conditions of oppression. If the musicians were aware of the history of material conflict represented by the song and its performance, the audience as not apprised of their awareness.

The performance of this song generated a huge conflict in the group that quickly became personal. One of the reasons the conflict was so quickly redefined in personal terms is that we had no experience considering the broader significance of forms of cultural expression. We were meticulous about considering every aspect of our presentations: every member of the group was presented as an equal; every member spoke to the audience; we didn't let our roles be defined by gender; we worked at breaking down the barriers between audience and performer and we chose music that we felt committed to in the hopes that what moved us would also move our audiences. In other words, we made conscious decisions about how we were creating culture according to the frames of reference with which we were familiar. Likewise, we could only make light of the material circumstances associated with the blues because we had not been affected by this history.

I use this conflict as an example, not to debate whether it was right or wrong to perform any particular piece but to highlight the need for musicians to have a framework

that allows us to consider, critically, our relationship to the broader meanings embedded in musical/cultural forms. Such a framework needs to create a context within which it is possible to consider the relationships between social locations, the production and reception of cultural activities (who pays, who is paid, who attends) in our roles as cultural producers.

The second example goes back to an issue raised previously in the discussion of musicians as wage earners. Because we use public space to present our work, musicians' labour has some measure of symbolic value. This raises issues about our need for, and connection to, sponsorship of various forms. When we accept sponsorship from tobacco companies for example, to what extent does our partnership act as an endorsement of tobacco products? This is not an academic question. The Montreal Jazz Festival has depended upon tobacco sponsorships for its existence and now, since tobacco advertising has been banned, they no longer have access to this support. The Festival has protested against the new law because they need the funding; however, by protesting the law, the Festival is effectively lobbying for the interests of the tobacco company — interests that have been shown to be a major cause of illness and death. Such contradictions appear to be built into every aspect of our work as musicians. It is difficult to argue in favor of ethical choices when one's survival in at stake. What, then, are the ideologies that frame our cultural engagements and what are the material realities that shape our possibilities of engagement?

My questions are as follows: First, do the authors offer a critical framework in which to examine the "meanings" we generate through public events, including the "meanings" embedded in the music itself? Second, do the authors offer a critical

framework to examine the ideologies that influence where, when, how, with whom, and to whom, we present our work?

Positions expressed by philosophers of education

Reimer argues that factors external to the music itself should not be seen as influencing the nature of a musical work. Thus, even though Reimer raises the issue that process and value are often in conflict within our commercial world, it is not easy to find a way in his work to establish a critical framework to address such issues.

Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen do identify music and music education as both reflecting and creating culture. They consider numerous factors that have an influence on the nature and meaning of musical events, including other musicians, listeners, critics, the time and place of a performance and the style of music performed. The notion that music can have multiple meanings depending on context is also consistent with their positions. Jorgensen identifies gender as expressed in and through music, social codes as manifested in different musical genres, music in its role as supporting values of the status quo, and music in its role as subverting the status quo (Jorgensen, 1997, pp. 41, 51). Jorgensen and Elliott include discussion of the two-way influences of religion, politics and commerce; however, neither author creates a framework from within which to examine, *critically*, the ideologies and influences that shape cultural events. Elliott and Jorgensen refer to these many factors in a descriptive manner, showing how they contribute to the nature of music and how music contributes to the nature of society. What I am seeking, however, is a framework that would enable us to *contest* our assumptions and uncover the ideologies that shape our views of what is valid and what is possible. Regelski attempts to establish an ethical framework with the idea that *phronesis*

should govern our decisions; however, here, again, he does not tell us how we might recognize "right results" given that we have no means to analyze what is at stake in any particular setting.

Conclusions

Although Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen argue that music education should include the study of the various interrelationships between music and society, they do not create a space to examine the material locations of different musics and musicians or the ideologies that help create these material locations. Elliott and Jorgensen, in particular, acknowledge ideology as a factor reflected in the form and shape of music, but they stop at identifying what music "is." In my view, we can grasp neither the influences that shape our lives as cultural producers nor our responsibilities as cultural producers without looking closely at the ways that materiality and manifestations of power and authority proscribe our choices.

Summary of Chapter and Final Comments

In this chapter, I have analyzed each author's work in the context of roles representing places where music and politics intersect. My position is that the phenomenon of music and the lives we experience as professional musicians do not exist separate from the social, political and economic conditions that characterize our historical locations. There are material and ideological influences that organize our relations with other people and influence our knowledge and experience of different musics. Thus, my goal in this chapter has been to discover whether the viewpoints of these music education

philosophers illuminate the issues or provide philosophical and educational contexts from within which it might be possible to explore these intersections of music and politics.

Although the rationale of the authors is different, what each author shares are convictions that music and music education are important to human development and that they lead to the fulfillment of humanist goals. With the exception of Jorgensen, however, I find that the authors locate themselves and their arguments within the world of music, without reference to the structural conditions that also shape our experiences. Elliott, for example, states that induction into multicultural music experiences will lead us to appreciate and accept difference. This appreciation, in turn, will contribute to a multicultural society based on equality[98]. Elliott does, in fact, argue that we are in relationship with others; however, he limits his discussion to relationships that take place within musical communities and treats these relationships as a smorgasbord of musics available (ostensibly to all, in the same way and to the same extent) to provide growth opportunities for students. Elliott states that Canada represents a society that has multiculturalism as an ideal; however, he does not examine this ideal in relation to the actual relationships that define the terms of equality or inequality in Canadian society. As a result, he leaves the impression that the ideal of multiculturalism is attainable simply by opening our minds to new experiences, suggesting in turn that cultural conflict is

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[98] Elliott, Reimer, and Regelski typically use the term 'equality' in its classic liberal sense, meaning 'equality of opportunity.' It asserts that equality before the law ensures that individuals are starting on a level playing field. A historical material analysis argues that this view ignores material/social conditions such as class, race and gender that filter and alter those opportunities for differently situated people even in the absence of legal discrimination.

primarily an attitudinal problem. Attitudinal changes are important in the process of bringing about social change; however, without acknowledging the material causes of inequality, that is, the political realities of differently situated people's lives, the language of multiculturalism can serve to make unequal relationships invisible. In the following passage, Peter McLaren argues that understanding cultural relations (multiculturalism) also means recognizing social conflict.

> Diversity that somehow constitutes itself as a harmonious ensemble of benign cultural spheres is a conservative and liberal model of multiculturalism that, in my mind, deserves to be jettisoned because, when we try to make culture an undisturbed space of harmony and agreement where social relations exist within cultural forms of uninterrupted accords we subscribe to a form of social amnesia in which we forget that all knowledge is forged in histories that are played out in the field of social antagonisms. (Peter McLaren as cited in hooks, 1994, p. 31)

Elliott's framework does not suggest that understanding actual social relations, as opposed to idealized relations — is important to achieving the humanist values he ascribes to a multicultural music education. In my view, if we are to work towards a multicultural society in which all citizens are equal, we must first understand what is at stake and what interests have been and continue to be furthered through inequality. As Donald Macedo states, "one cannot teach conflict as if, all of a sudden, it fell from the sky. The conflict must be anchored in those completing histories and ideologies that generated the conflict in the first place" (Donald Macedo in Introduction to Freire, 2003, p. 24). Elliott's framework does not explicitly exclude political discussion; but if study of other cultures is defined in musical or even cultural terms, without reference as well to political relations, it is arguably more likely to result in a kind of multicultural

consumerism and/or colonization than a transformative experience in which social inequalities are addressed.

Regelski also leaves out the political in his consideration of the different functions and effects of music. He argues that exploring musics from different cultures fulfills important social needs and allows us to understand the various functions of music in making life special for human beings. His investigation focuses on the purposes that music can serve but is limited to a justification of music and music education and does not include reference to the material conditions that shape our relationships within and across cultural groups. He argues that recognizing the purposes that music serves in different cultural contexts will help achieve humanist goals but does not suggest how this recognition might serve to effect the changes required to meet these goals. For example, when exploring what purpose music serves in any given situation, one might also ask: "Who is served or *not* served by this music?" "What values are embraced and what values are rejected through this music/event?" If one is to understand the functions that music serves, one must be prepared to look beyond the actual "goods" or "right results" represented to ask whether the "goods in question" actually further humanist interests.

Bennett Reimer also believes that exploring music from different traditions will help achieve humanist goals; however, he argues that the value and meaning of musical works is unrelated to other cultural factors, thus reinforcing the concept that music transcends time and place. Music itself is understood to be neutral and, therefore, Reimer limits the exploration of musical meaning to strictly musical concepts. Reimer might well be in favour of addressing social inequality actively as some of his statements about the role of multicultural music education suggest. In fact, he argues that democratic

principles should be central to music pedagogy practices; however, such an exploration would presumably have to take place outside of music study. For example, in Reimer's framework, some classes might be devoted to exploring ethics, but, like questions about the cultural and historical context of musical practices, these questions would be treated as outside the purview of the music itself. Reimer's framework thus precludes an exploration of the ways that musical genres, and the musical language found within them, reflect values and political location. Lutheran Chorales, Rap, Music of the Rococo and Bob Marley's Reggae come to mind in this regard as forms of music that reflect values and political location in both their purpose and musical syntax that could only be examined as musical "works" within Reimer's framework..

Reimer, Elliott and Regelski focus on the uniqueness of the nature of music within human enterprises. I think of this focus as the "view from the inside looking out.[99]" Each author begins with a love of music and a conviction that music is important and then argues for its importance to the world outside of music. I believe this focus is due, at least in part, to the need to defend the existence of music education – particularly in the work of Elliott and Regelski. Music does serve unique human functions; nevertheless, I believe that, music, as we experience it, comes to us as part of political, economic and social structures. These structures are acknowledged to different degrees within the frameworks created by Elliott, Regelski and Reimer but not in such a way as to encourage analysis of political location, material relations and their possible implications for professional musicians. Granted that analyzing these factors was not their project, I contend, nevertheless, that the liberal humanist framework underpinning their

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[99] This analogy is developed further in Chapter Four.

philosophical arguments creates a conceptual barrier that, left uncontested, prevents us from considering the political and material factors that shape our lives as musicians.

Jorgensen develops a broader framework by encouraging musicians to consider the influence of a number of external structures. Her intent is both to identify the purposes that music serves and to establish a range of issues of significance for educators. Further, she encourages music educators to think of themselves as "artists" consciously making choices about approach and content as they create culture through their music education practices. Exploring our historical, economic and political locations and how these locations might influence our understanding of ourselves in relation to others—in musical and nonmusical capacities, is implicit in Jorgensen's framework. Reimer does ask us to consider "why we do what we do" but he limits the range of consideration. Jorgensen's framework is more satisfying in her argument that music teachers should see themselves as artists and thus take responsibility for making choices amongst elements of various spheres of musical influence and pedagogical practices. Jorgensen illuminates many factors that influence the nature of musical experiences and provides a context in which music educators can consider the larger social context of their work. This brings us closer to considering the political location of various aspects of musical experience. Nevertheless, although Jorgensen argues that teachers need to develop the capacity to think and act independently, her approach to spheres of musical validity tends to be descriptive. Each of the four authors discussed argues that music should not be seen as isolated from the rest of life. Nevertheless, there are significant aspects of our roles as cultural producers, musical workers, artists and members of communities that are not easily explored within their frameworks. In conventional music education, we learn to be

musically literate; yet, rarely, do we investigate the structures that organize our relationships, not only with other musicians, but with other members of society. We learn about music *qua* music – as an enterprise – but we don't know how this enterprise relates to other social institutions and we don't explore how social, political and economic values are embedded in music itself. In my view, we need to acquire a consciousness of these structures and our location within them. I am looking, therefore, for analytical and educational approaches that will help us recognize relations of power in our roles as wage earners, artists, individuals functioning within larger communities, teachers and producers of cultural meaning.

Praxis as a Bridge to Critical Consciousness

Regelski and Elliott both use the term "praxis" to help redefine the nature of music and music education. They use an Aristotelian definition of "praxis;" however, there is an extensive body of twentieth century literature, known as critical theory (and critical pedagogy) that defines and interprets "praxis" differently. This second view of praxis, based, in part, on a Marxist definition of the word "praxis," offers a possible framework for considering the political aspects of music education and musical practices. In the next chapter, I use the contrast between the two versions of praxis to introduce the concept of critical consciousness as a means to recognize and analyze relations of power.

Chapter Four begins with a comparison of Aristotelian and Marxian versions of "praxis" followed by an outline of the analytical tools that become available if we adopt the second view of praxis. By comparing Elliott and Regelski's use of the term with its use by critical theorists, such as Paulo Freire, bell hooks, Maxine Greene and others, I am

able to contrast the elements that are excluded from the one discussion and included in the other. Following this comparison, I look in greater detail at the literature of critical theory and critical pedagogy and outline at least some of the tools that are made available to develop critical consciousness.

CHAPTER FOUR:
PRAXIS, CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND EDUCATION AS A SITE OF CONTESTATION

The following chapter begins with a comparison of the term *praxis* as used by music philosophers David Elliott and Thomas Regelski with praxis as it is used in the parallel disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy. In Elliott and Regelski's view, praxis refers to a particular category of human activity; specifically, it refers to a form of knowledge, a form of thinking-doing. This view is drawn centrally from Aristotle. In the latter view, praxis also refers to a category of human activity—a form of thinking-doing—but this view emphasizes the integration of theory and practice—the materiality of thinking-action. This second view draws centrally upon a Marxist tradition of historical materialism. Most important for the purpose of this chapter, this second view of praxis invokes a *critical* approach to thinking-doing which I argue is not present in the Elliott-Regelski-Aristotle form of knowledge view.

Following my comparison of these two views of praxis, I look more closely at the disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy as they apply to general issues of education, examining premises, concepts and strategies developed within this body of work. At the close of this chapter, I propose weak, middle and strong arguments for integrating the principles of critical consciousness into educational practices. In Chapter Five I offer justifications specific to the field of professional music education.

The goal of this chapter is to identify the gaps between the two definitions of praxis and, further, to identify the questions that can be raised about educational practices

if we pursue the analysis offered by the second definition of praxis and the disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy.

Part One: Praxis: Aristotle versus Marx

The term *praxis*, based upon an interpretation of the Aristotelian use of the term, is central to the arguments of music philosophers David Elliott and Thomas Regelski. In Aristotle's writings, praxis is introduced as a particular form of knowledge that is one of a number of "excellences." It is the "acquisition or transmission of excellences that is the 'problem of education'" (Frankena, 1965, p.16). Aristotle distinguishes between knowledge that produces tangible objects and knowledge which is valuable for its own sake. In Aristotle's writings, *praxis* refers to "practical action, or "doing" (Frankena, William, 1965, pg. 26). This is in contrast to his concept of *poesis*, that is, "productive action" or "making," where the object is to learn the "correct" way of creating a tangible product. With praxis, there is no single "right way" to accomplish a goal nor is there a fixed goal. With praxis, consideration of context and situatedness is intrinsic to the "excellence" of "doing." "Doing has its value or excellence in itself...while making finds its worth entirely in that of its product. Both may be excellent, but the excellence of making is borrowed while that of doing is its own" (Frankena, 1965, p. 27)[100].

Music-making does not result in tangible objects such as buildings or pieces of pottery and therefore it does not have "instrumental value"—it is not a form of *poesis*. Music as a form of "doing," has intrinsic value. It falls into the category of *praxis* and

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[100] Frankena, W. K. (1965). *Three historical philosophies of education: Aristotle, Kant, Dewey.* Chicago: Scott, Foresman.

represents a type of knowledge, or an "excellence," that is worth acquiring for its own sake. Aristotle considers that music, as one of the "excellences," is intrinsically good and contributes to human happiness.

> "The excellences come in and are to be cultivated if and because they are prerequisites of the good or happy life... Happiness is the ultimate goal of all human striving; it fulfills both of the conditions stated, and therefore it is the highest good". (Frankena, 1965, p. 21)

David Elliott takes this Aristotelian definition of music almost verbatim. He uses it to define the nature of music and music education as a form of knowledge that is intrinsically valuable and, therefore, important to the education of all people. In Elliott's words,

> Among other things, this concept [praxis] contends that music making and music listening are unique forms of thinking and unique sources of the most important kinds of knowledge human beings can gain. The reasoning that supports these propositions allows music educators to affirm to themselves and others that music—as a unique form of thinking and knowing—deserves a central place in the education of all people. (Elliott, 1995, p. 14)[101]

Consistent with Aristotle's argument for the value of "excellences," Elliott claims that music, as a unique form of "knowledge," represents a human capacity that must be developed in order to fulfill our human potential.

Music-making as praxis has essential qualities—each consisting of numerous decision-making tasks. Elliott refers to musicers as "ethical practitioners," that is, as individuals who must make choices based on the relative merits of different possible actions (Elliott, 1995, p. 14). When making musical decisions one must be aware of

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[101] In this chapter I examine the authors' work through the lens of historical materialism. Occasionally, I repeat a passage quoted earlier in the thesis to help the reader recall details and to point out the significance of certain passages in light of the alternative frame of reference introduced in this chapter.

"standards, traditions, images and purposes" involved in any musical practice. Elliott writes:

> Aristotle used *praxis* to mean informed and deliberative "doing-action" in which doers (as ethical practitioners) are not merely concerned with completing tasks correctly (*techne),* but with "right action": enlightened, critical, and "situated" action. *Praxis* means action committed to achieving goals (*telos*) in relation to standards, traditions, images, and purposes (*eidos*) viewed as Ideals that are themselves open to renewal, reformulation, and improvement. Put another way, to act artistically as a music maker is to engage in music making and music listening (and MUSIC) as *praxis*. (Elliott, 1995, p. 69, author's emphasis)

Elliott's analysis is influenced by the historical fact that he is writing within the context of having to defend music education as a subject important to the education of all people. Within this particular context, praxis serves several important functions. First, Elliott uses it to redefine the nature of music and music education in contrast to definitions provided by writers within the "aesthetic" tradition such as Bennett Reimer and Susanne Langer (Elliott, 1995, p. 28)[102]. In Elliott's view, aesthetic theorists undermine the value of music education in people's lives by defining music "performance" as a skill or craft and music "listening" as a particular set of cognitive functions that serve to educate "human feeling."[103] By defining music as a form of praxis, Elliott supports his claim that music-making is neither a "skill" or "craft" nor the gateway to understanding human subjectivity; rather, it is a fully integrated form of "*knowledge*

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[102] Reimer, B. (1989). *A philosophy of music education, 2nd Edition.* Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall; Langer, Susanne K. (1976). *Philosophy in a new key: a study in the symbolism of reason, rite and art. 3rd Edition.* Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard University Press.

[103] The reader should note that these remarks are Elliott's representation of the work of Reimer, not this writer's.

that partakes of consciousness as a whole (attention, cognition, emotion, intention, and memory)" (Elliott, 1995, p. 69, author's emphasis).[104]

Second, defined as a unique form of knowledge, music as praxis fits the requirements of the liberal humanist tradition of education. Elliott's rationale for the inclusion of music as a form of knowledge is consistent both with the Aristotelian view of the value of the "excellences" and the view of liberal philosophers of education. One such author, R. S. Peters argues that developing a broad experience and understanding of different forms of intrinsic knowledge is vital to the development of educated citizens. As a unique form of "intrinsic knowledge," music represents a human capacity that must be developed in order to fulfill our human potential[105]. Elliott is drawing upon long-standing justifications for prioritizing "intrinsic" values, that is, intrinsic knowledge, over the lesser values of "instrumental" or "extrinsic" knowledge.

Finally, Elliott claims that immersing ourselves in different musics has the additional virtue of helping us to understand ourselves "in relation to self and others"

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[104] Thus Elliott distinguishes his position from his aesthetic predecessors and also justifies the "new" statement in his book's title, i.e., *Music Matters. A New Philosophy of Music Education.*

[105]

> There is, however, another interpretation of 'liberal' which is closer to the point I have just been making about cognitive perspective. This is the plea that education should not be confined to specialist training. The individual, it is argued, should be trained in more than one form of knowledge ...so that he can grasp the historical perspective, social significance, or stylistic merit of his work and of much else besides, 'liberal' education requires that he should also be trained, to some degree at least, in such other ways of thinking (Peters, 1965, p. 101)

N.B.: Note the similarity between Peters' argument and Saul's premises in *The Unconscious Civilization.* (Saul, 1995) See in particular pages 5, 164, 176.

(Elliott, 1994, p.14). For Elliott, knowledge of "others" leads to understanding and understanding leads to a "better world." In Elliott's model, immersion in different cultures through music (by definition: praxis), will contribute towards the goals of multiculturalism and a society based upon equality and mutual respect (Elliott, 1995, 207-208).

Thomas Regelski's use of the term "praxis" is also based upon an Aristotelian definition of the word. His purpose in using the term is to analyze and describe what music "does," to show how it contributes to "Being human" and, once again to justify the importance of maintaining music education programs.

> In a praxial view, all music is "functional" in some respect. Musical process-values may provide the primary occasion for a particular social or individual praxis but the pragmatic benefits of that praxis are never strictly musical. They are always partly existential in contributing to the actions of human beings Being human. (Regelski, 1997, p. 45)

Regelski advocates praxis as an analytical tool to understand the "value of music" in relation to "life and the specific conditions of its use" (Regelski, 1997, p. 44). Music and music education, he claims, are "primary avenues for Becoming more fully alive or enlivened by the fullness life has to offer beyond merely surviving" (Regelski, 1997, p. 44). Music offers enriching life experiences unavailable in any other medium and is, therefore, an important component in the education of all people. Here, it is possible to trace, again, Aristotle's view of the excellences contributing to happiness or the good life. Regelski also emphasizes an ethical component in his definition of praxis:

> Praxis is governed by the kind of 'doing' called *phronesis*—an ethical knowledge of and for achieving 'right results' judged in terms of actual benefits for one's self or for others. Thus, praxis is centrally concerned with the critical and rational knowledge of both means and ends needed to bring about 'right results' for

> *people*....Praxis...involves judgments concerning the 'goodness' of such goals and ends in the first place. (Regelski, 1998, p. 28)

In my view, one of the primary functions and accomplishments of Regelski's arguments is its contestation of the place of musical "virtuosity" as the primary way of assessing musical "goodness" or "value." His work provides an important challenge to the tendency of classical musicians to see virtuosity as the measure of a musician's or person's worth. Regelski's project is to justify and find ways to "get all students into action musically" (Regelski, 1997, p. 45). The responsibility of music educators is to facilitate this engagement, recognizing that musical goods come in a variety of forms.

The Marxist use of the term "praxis" is profoundly different from that of Elliott and Regelski. Music, as any other form of knowledge, is examined "critically" in light of its materiality, both in historic and contemporary contexts. Marx's use of the term[106] is the basis for a body of literature known as critical theory and critical pedagogy. This literature defines praxis as: "action and reflection upon the world in order to transform it" (Freire, 1990, p. 36). Education, which has the capacity equally to indoctrinate learners into particular value systems or to empower learners to participate in changing dominating relations to non-dominating ones, has a particularly important role in developing critiques of relations and the discourses that surround them. Inequality, according to critical theorists, has historical roots and is reinforced through structural, legal, social and economic means. Further, there are winners and losers in unequal relationships/systems and this inevitably means that there are vested interests in

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[106] Hegel's use of praxis pre-dates Marx. I begin my references with Marx however, as his work is the starting point for many of the ideas developed in the literature of critical theory.

maintaining particular views of the world and differently valued categories of human beings[107]. Correspondingly, the purpose of critical theory and critical pedagogy is not merely to observe or describe relationships but to participate in changing the material conditions that perpetuate relations of domination and oppression. Music, through a Marxist or historical materialist lens, then, would be examined critically in light of its materiality[108].

Praxis, as used by Marx and later critical theorists[109] refers to an epistemological relationship between theory and action that is linked, necessarily, to change in the material conditions of inequality. There is a gap between the Aristotelian view of praxis and critical thought and action. Aristotle connects ideas with action and situates them within specific contexts, but does not address their materiality. Likewise, experiencing other cultures and learning to tolerate and accept difference, without exploring and altering the dynamics of power, will not create equality. If greater equality through social

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[107] Marx's identification of the importance of these concrete manifestations of vested interest and inequality, and his analysis of the social relations that reproduce them, is the basis for labeling his form of critical analysis historical materialism.

[108] As I draw upon feminist, anti-racist and post-colonial accounts of historical materialist praxis in this chapter, I will use the more generic reference, to "historical materialism," rather than the term "Marxist praxis," through the remainder of the thesis.

[109] For example, Wallerstein, N. (1987). Problem-posing education: Freire's method for transformation. In I. Shor (Ed.), *Freire for the Classroom* (pp. 33-44). Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook Publishers; Ayers, W. C., & Miller Janet L. (Eds.) (1998). *A light in dark times.* New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University; Shor, I. (1980). *Critical Thinking and Everyday Life.* Montreal: Black Rose Books; hooks, b. (1994). *Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice of freedom.* New York: Routledge; Freire, P. (2003). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed.* New York, London: Continuum; Freire, P. (1994). *Pedagogy of hope.* New York: Continuum.

change is to be achieved, ideas must be integrated with action and both must be examined "in relation to," and from the vantage point of, historical material factors.

The notion that human beings can remake the world is central to the historical materialist concept of praxis. Praxis, in this context, refers to forms of knowledge as neither fixed nor absolute; rather, praxial knowledge is born of human relations, situated within historical context and relations of power.

> If we take knowledge to be generated within praxis in a world that is created by the historical presence of human beings, then it cannot be abstracted from human action and treated as a reified, fixed object that can be transferred from one being to another, given by one human to another or provided by one to be consumed by another. (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 22)

Allman and Wallis, here, are not suggesting that knowledge is a fiction, but that it is embedded within assumptions that can be difficult to recognize or analyze because we are living these practices and relations in the present—without the benefit of historical distance and critical analysis. For critical theorists, praxis entails questioning the bases of our knowledge. "Acknowledging the genesis of knowledge from historically located praxis enables us to recognize forms of understanding as potentially problematic, and this requires critical analysis to test their validity and to seek further or deeper insights" (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 21). With Aristotle, praxis is used to describe the nature or "virtue" (excellence) of a thing. In historical materialism, praxis refers to a process in which one works towards understanding one's present-day historical context in order to locate oneself within a myriad of social relations —including relations of power—and work towards creating new sets of relations. This 20th century use of praxis thus differs substantially from the Aristotelian version of the term. In Marx's words, "Philosophers

have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point, however, is to change it" (Marx as quoted in Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 15).

In the Aristotelian sense, praxis refers to the nature of the thing itself (i.e. music). To be "situated" as Elliott uses the term, is to be located within a series of more or less equal relationships between different cultural practices. Local musics, then, can be appreciated for their distinctive manifestations of musical excellences. Nonetheless, these disparate, culturally specific musical excellences are recognized as equal in philosophical terms, because each belongs to the "category" of music. Musical excellences are, categorically speaking, interchangeable.

To be "situated," according to critical theorists, on the other hand, means to locate different knowledges (musics) and knowers (musicers) [110] within historical, material, social and political contexts. In this sense, music, or any other subject area cannot be reduced only to an "essence" or category of being. Knowledge is the result of historical/social and political forces—of human action—and therefore cannot be "essentialized" or "objectified"— that is, seen as of a fixed nature (that is essentially good). Praxis, then, in the historical materialist sense, refers to a view in which premises

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[110] Some contemporary criticisms go so far as to contest the power relations effected by the processes by which we create ourselves as subjects. See especially Foucault, M. (1988). The political technology of individuals. In L. Martin, H. Gutman & P. Hutton (Eds.), *Technologies of the self. A seminar with Michel Foucault* (pp. 145-162). Boston: The University of Massachusetts Press. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore postmodern theory; however, postmodern criticism would undoubtedly contribute to developing critical consciousness. An example is the question of how we constitute our identities as "musicians." Exploring postmodernism in relation to the five categories of musical life is a project for a future date.

are constantly reevaluated in light of changing conditions and changing understandings of changing conditions[111].

Aristotle does not consider power relations, material relations or oppression in his discussion about the topics that should be included in the education of citizens. Similarly, neither Elliott nor Regelski consider such factors, although they both argue that music education can lead to better social relations. A best case view of this position is that it reflects a naiveté, based on the assumption that good intentions, as evidenced through an openness to experience other cultures, can resolve human conflict. A less charitable view is that limiting one's view to the "essential" qualities of music masks the political, preserves the status quo and allows those with privilege to maintain their privilege without guilt. While it is true that shared projects (as suggested by Elliott) can build community, a historical materialist analysis maintains that fundamental inequalities will not change without identifying and changing the structures that enforce/inscribe inequality.

Elliott and Regelski use the Aristotelian version of praxis to define the nature of music and music education and as a means to justify the importance of both in general education. I believe that part of the weakness of this viewpoint is that it reflects what I term "a view from the inside." This is a viewpoint located from within the field of music that is used to justify music education to an "outside" world that does not always accept music as an important subject area for general study. Because the focus is on the essential "goodness" of music in all its myriad forms, there is no necessity to consider who is included or excluded from different musical/social practices and what relevance

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[111] Unusual wording is used to emphasize epistemology.

this might have to the pursuit of social equality. In the Aristotelian context, "goodness" will come to someone's life as a result of engaging in the excellence that is "music."

Elliott and Regelski take this concept of "goodness" further by arguing that understanding and appreciating different cultural contexts and different musical goods will lead to better human relations. Elliott posits that his praxial approach to music education — that includes broadening one's experience to understand different musical cultures — will lead to social equality. Equality, in Elliott's frame of reference, is the result of tolerance, understanding and interaction with different cultural groups; however, this position ignores the realities of race and class struggles and the ways that music and culture are manifested in the lives and practices of people situated in vastly different *material* contexts. Elliott, himself, states that culture is not "neutral territory" (Elliott, 1995, p. 91); yet he does not consider his comment in light of material relations. Simply engaging in others' musics will not alter these material positions; in fact, the engagement may encourage an attitude of ownership and entitlement to other people's cultures that reinforces positions of dominance. Anti-racist activists[112] have long criticized the concept of multiculturalism as a government-initiated project of "containment" designed to make the state's role seem benign while obfuscating material realities. The neutrality of engagement with other cultures is also contested in contexts of cultural

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[112] Carty, L., & Brand, D. (1993). Visible Minority Women: A Creation of the Canadian State. In H. Bannerji (Ed.), *Returning the Gaze: Essays on Racism, Feminism and Politics* (pp. 169-181). Toronto: Sister Vision Press.

appropriation[113]— an issue of particular importance to students learning the music and traditions of different cultures.

Both Elliott and Regelski use the term *praxis* in order to talk about music as something that is understood as being "in relation to" various cultural practices and needs. The limitation that is present with the use of the Aristotelian version of praxis is that it limits the kind of relationships that are examined to ones that are musical. This "view from the inside" is based upon exploring the nature of music "as music," a nature, as already noted in Chapter Three, that is valued, in particular, because of its uniqueness in the human enterprise. Praxis, as used by Paulo Freire and other critical theorists, is based upon looking critically at what one does and attempting to see oneself "in relation to" one's historical, political, social, and cultural locations — with a comprehension of how society works (Freire, 1994, p. 133). I characterize this perspective as the "view from the outside." What interests me in particular about the Freirean use of praxis is its acknowledgement of the political in shaping both knowledge and relationships. Paulo Freire and other critical theorists begin from the assumption that no relationship is neutral. We are enmeshed in relations of power — whether or not we are conscious of our locations within such relations. Equality is only achievable by first "stepping back" and "disposing ourselves to know about" our lives and work, within a critical framework (Freire, 1994, p. 98). Critical theorists argue that locating oneself and others, politically,

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[113] Hatzis, C. (1999, January). *Footprints in new snow: Postmodernism or cultural appropriation* (Revised Transcript of Lecture Sound Symposium, St. John's, Newfoundland). Retrieved 27.07.04, from http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~chatzis/footpaper.htm.

is necessary to the development of any theory intended to bring about social equality. From this perspective it would not be sufficient to compare the artistic, musical or social characteristics of different cultures or even to immerse oneself into different cultures to bring about an equality-based multicultural society[114]. What would be required would be to look within and beyond any particular subject area or body of knowledge. One looks within to critically examine the discourse itself — and one looks without to see how the practice of that area of knowledge or culture is situated within a larger context, including historical and contemporary relations of power.

This second definition of praxis opens up questions about education in general, and music education in particular, that are not easily considered within the frame of reference established by Elliott and Regelski[115]. Based on historical materialism, the disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy offer a means to locate ourselves politically, broaden our viewpoint and make informed decisions about how we participate

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[114] Arguably, in Canada we live in a multicultural, pluralist society; however, this in itself, tells us nothing about the political/economic relations between different groups of people. I add "equality-based" above to identify a kind of multiculturalism that is attentive to material and political relations. For example, First Nations peoples do not have social, economic or legal equality with most Canadians. Housemaids brought in from Caribbean countries have limited rights and limited access to legal support in cases of abuse. Sources: Calliste, Agnes (1991): Canada's immigration policy and domestics from the Caribbean: the second Domestic Scheme. In: Race, Class, Gender: Bonds and Barriers. 2nd ed. (Eds: Vorst, J et al.) Garamond Press, Toronto, 136-168, and, Hutchings, C. *Canada's First Nations: A Legacy of Institutional Racism*. Retrieved 30.07.04, from http://www.tolerance.cz/courses/papers/hutchin.htm.

[115] Reimer and Jorgensen—to different degrees—also leave us without sufficient connection to the questions raised by the Marxist view of praxis and our connectedness to material relations. I will come back to Reimer and Jorgensen in Chapter Five. I have approached the subject in this way—through the contrasting definitions of praxis—because this is the way I first identified the absence of questions about material relations in the works of philosophers of music education.

in the world. They offer a different strategy for looking at the world and looking at the potential of education. Critical theorists argue that adopting praxis, in the Marxian sense, is necessary, if we are to move beyond replicating culture "in the absence of critical choice" (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 14).

In Part Two of this chapter, I examine the disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy, the related concepts of conscientization, problematization, and dialogical method, amongst others, and explore how developing "critical consciousness" relates to education in general.

Part Two: A View from the Outside: Critical Theory, Critical Pedagogy[116] and Critical Consciousness.

> "Culture is a contested domain that provides no escape from the challenge to identify its "negativities" and "positivities" (Freire, 1994b, p. 107) in order to construct bulwarks of resistance to dehumanization as well as construct the grounds for self-determination." (Glass, 2001, p. 22)[117]

The literatures of critical theory and critical pedagogy offer a means to analyze relations of power in society. Associated with liberatory and social justice movements, the parallel disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy have their roots in the work of Karl Marx and Paulo Freire and are primarily concerned with exploring and acting upon relations of power with the goals of achieving greater democracy and

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[116]Critical pedagogy looks specifically at how one comes to acquire a critical perspective on one's political location and how pedagogical approaches contribute to or militate against developing the ability to be self-determining within the constraints of material reality. Critical theory analyses specific disciplines, for example, art, science, business, and considers how to apply the concepts of critical pedagogy within specific learning contexts.

[117] Glass, R.D. (2001, March). On Paulo Freire's philosophy of praxis and the foundations of liberation education. *Educational Researcher, 30* (2), 15-25.

replacing oppressive relations with non-dominating relations. To achieve these goals, critical theorists argue that we must become conscious of our capacity to effect social transformation by developing critical consciousness, joined by meaningful praxis.[118] Critical consciousness and praxis are conceived as a continual evolution and interaction of ideas, action and reflection.

Critical theory and critical pedagogy seek to facilitate a shift in how people conceive of themselves. This shift involves changing one's self-concept from being an "object" of history to being a "subject." This requires, first, a recognition of oneself as a *subject* — one who labours and who makes choices about the role one undertakes within history — and, second, as one who is *subject to* historical material conditions and relations.[119] With such a shift in consciousness we move from being passive spectators of contemporary relations (while nevertheless being "subject to" such relations) to becoming informed and active participants in changing those relations. "Men and women develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality but as a reality in the process of transformation" (Freire, 2003, p.12).

The goal of this critical praxis is not to make arbitrary shifts in social and economic relations that simply move power from one group to another; rather, the goal is to participate in a continual transformation of society into one that is more democratic

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[118] I am paraphrasing bell hooks here. hooks, b. (1994). *Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice of freedom.* New York: Routledge, p. 47.

[119] See also Foucault, M. (2000). The Subject and Power (R. Hurley, Trans.). In J. D. Faubion (Ed.), *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Vol. 3: Power* (pp. 326-348 [p. 331]). New York: The New Press (Original work published 1994).

and equitable. Critical theorists attempt to recognize where oppression takes place and to change the structures of society in order to reject relations of oppression and dominance. The guiding vision of critical theory as articulated by Paulo Freire is "to imagine a world that is less ugly, more beautiful, less discriminatory, more democratic, less dehumanizing, and more humane" (Freire, 2003, p. 25).

The literatures of critical theory and critical pedagogy develop a set of analytical tools based on principles of historical materialism that can be used to examine how our own activities, within different disciplines and aspects of our lives, reflect, reinforce or serve to alter our political locations. The literature of critical pedagogy looks specifically at teaching and learning practices and how pedagogical approaches contribute to or militate against developing not only a critical perspective on one's political location but the confidence and conviction to act upon this knowledge. Importantly, critical pedagogy does not bypass or water down the knowledge base of any discipline. On the contrary, tools, techniques and strategies, that is, the knowledge that students need to function successfully at a professional level within any discipline, are essential to critical pedagogy. Freire explains:

> It is unthinkable for a teacher to be in charge of a class without providing students with material relevant to the discipline. But if both a progressive and a reactionary are equal in their obligation to teach, if both agree that it is unthinkable to be a teacher without teaching, nevertheless they will differ with regard to their understanding of what teaching really is. They will differ in their practice, in the way they teach. Professional competence, command of a subject or discipline, is never understood by the progressive teacher as something neutral. There is no such thing as a category called "professional competence" all by itself. We must always ask ourselves: In favor of whom and of what do we use our technical competence? (Freire, 1987, p. 211)[120]

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[120] Shor, I., & Freire, P. (1987). *A Pedagogy for liberation.* South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey.

A fundamental difference between traditional approaches to knowledge and critical pedagogy is that critical pedagogy includes analysis on the part of teacher and student together, of the meanings embedded within discourses, practices, and taken-for-granted assumptions pertaining to any given field. Critical theory and critical pedagogy ask us to step back from the preoccupations of our disciplines and to gain a view from the "outside" to understand the context of the work that we do, to recognize our relations with the world and gain the means to participate in the larger project of humanizing[121] our social and political relations.

Recognizing our relatedness *is* a key element in the work of critical theory and critical pedagogy. The need to discover one's historical and political location in order to act upon this knowledge is, importantly, not based upon the classical liberal notion of individual autonomy and choice—the notion of the self-made person. On the contrary, critical theorists argue that in order to understand what possibilities lie before us we must first understand our *shared* circumstances in order to recognize the possibilities of constructing, together with others, a more democratic and equitable set of relations.

> Education as the practice of freedom — as opposed to education as the practice of domination — denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from people. Authentic reflection considers neither abstract man nor the world without people, but people in their relations with the world. (Freire, 2003, p. 81)

Premises of Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy

Several premises underpin the disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy:

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[121] "But while both humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives, only the first is the people's vocation. This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is affirmed by that very negation." (Freire, 2003, p.43)

1) Human relations are created by humans and can be changed by humans;

2) Knowledge is the result of dialectical forces;

3) Forms of knowledge are contestable and ideology functions to mask and justify political relations;

4) Education, as a site of culture, is not neutral.

I delineate each of these premises briefly below.

Human relations are created by humans and can be changed by humans

As human beings, we are continually in the process of creating our own history, our own culture. "Objective social reality exists not by chance, but as the product of human action" (Freire, 2003, p. 51). Freire elaborates on this concept below:

> It is as transforming and creative beings that humans, in their permanent relations with reality, produce not only material goods—tangible objects—but also social institutions, ideas, and concepts. Through their continuing praxis, men and women simultaneously create history and become historical-social beings. (Freire, 2003, pg. 101)

Freire's premise is that we can change our social relations if we recognize that they are human creations, open to critical analysis and change if we engage in praxis. Praxis in this context, as historical materialism, requires that we look beyond surface appearances to understand what material conditions have led to contemporary relationships. For example, if black people are not succeeding in North American society, the "fault" might be (and often is attributed to) a flaw in the character of blacks: they are lacking in "gumption." This is an explanation that might be allowed to stand based on a superficial analysis of a contemporary situation. A historical materialist analysis, on the other hand, would investigate past *material* conditions to understand how current conditions have come into being. Extreme wealth was generated for a white ruling-class

through black labour. The development of a white middle-class was, in part, a function of the slave economy[122]. These economic relationships, generated during a particular form of economic production, continue to influence and shape where people are positioned within contemporary material and social relationships. Those with wealth, for example, did not lose what had been accumulated after manumission,[123] and their position today is still one of economic and social advantage. The task of historical materialist analysis, is then, to determine what conditions have led to the particular shape of current relations and to identify more just and equitable outcomes. This sense of locating oneself in history and then thinking-doing—i.e., theorizing and inserting oneself into contemporary struggles to bring about positive change is what Freire means by the term "praxis."

Knowledge is the result of dialectical forces

Critical theorists argue that while some kinds of knowledge may appear to be immutable, our approach and understanding of various knowledges are shaped by dialectical tensions.

> [Marx] understood that the truth or the principal of change in our social world was based on the movement and development of dialectic contradictions. A dialectic contradiction, or relations, is a unity of two opposites which are internally related such that neither could exist as it presently does outside its relation to the other. (Allman &Wallis, 1990, p. 15)

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[122] Davis, A. (1981). *Women, race and class.* New York

[123] Manumission: "The act of manumitting, or of liberating a slave from bondage." (Definition of Manumission. Retrieved 17.08.04, from Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary: http://www.wordiq.com/dictionary/Manumission).

By first acknowledging that knowledge is shaped by dialectical forces, we can then focus our efforts on unveiling what forces might be at play in shaping our understanding. At the very least, we gain the capacity to question our assumptions.

> Acknowledging the genesis of knowledge from historically located praxis enables us to recognize forms of understanding as potentially problematic, and this requires critical analysis to test their validity and to seek further or deeper insights. (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 21)

According to critical theorists, when we do not consider the possibility that knowledge and social relations are shaped by conflicting material interests and the dialectical tensions they produce, we "tend to reproduce them [these relations] even when we engage in resistance" (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 21). Thus, both pressures for and against certain relations (class or gender relations for instance) actually preserve the status quo. Locked in an established opposition, we are blinded from seeing other possibilities. The concept of "dialectical tension" suggests that we must find ways to challenge our most fundamental premises—those that seem on the surface to be "given."

The term "dialectical tensions" refers to contradictions that are the result of material conditions. For example, in the 1980's, the women's movement in North America was largely defined by the "Pro-choice" issue—framed as the right to free and legal abortions. Resistance came from members of society who did not agree with this premise; however, the most significant challenge to the agenda of the women's movement came from activist women of colour and First Nations women. For women of colour (particularly in the United States) and First Nations women, reproductive "choice" was about the right *not* to be forcibly sterilized. As marginalized women fought to bring this issue to the foreground, it became apparent that the issue of "Choice," as it had been

framed by the mainstream women's movement, served the interests primarily of white middle-class women. The movement that claimed to represent all women only represented the interests of a particular, historically-located, group of women. This group, because of social and economic privilege—again the consequences of historical material conditions—had greater access to resources and "voice" than other less privileged groups of women. As people came to recognize these contradictions, activists of all backgrounds were forced to reconsider their goals and their actions in light of these material realities.

> If we are located within dehumanizing social relations, engaged in reproductive rather than critical praxis and without a thorough grasp of the dialectical nature of our reality, it is likely that our understanding may at best be partial and fragmented. (Freire in Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 21)

Thus, acknowledging dialectical tensions leads to new directions, to new formulations and to change. As we recognize the existence of dialectical tensions, it becomes an on-going challenge to imagine possibilities that don't yet exist, even as we engage in developing critiques of our current situations.

Forms of knowledge are contestable and ideology functions to mask and justify political relations

In addition to the concept of dialectical tension, critique as an approach to investigation assumes that we live within and are surrounded by ideologies that need to be analyzed in order, first, to discern their relationships to people's lived experiences, and second, to recognize the interests that they serve. According to theorist Antonio Gramsci, our "common sense" beliefs tend to reflect the interests of those with the most power in society. Named as "hegemony," "common sense," in this case refers to a dominant ideological framework that so permeates a culture it is perceived as a "given".

> Hegemony in this sense might be defined as an 'organising principle' that is diffused by the process of socialisation into every area of daily life. To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalised by the population it becomes part of what is generally called 'common sense' so that the philosophy, culture and morality of the ruling elite comes to appear as the natural order of things. (Smith, 1999)[124]

Critical theory is devoted to unraveling different social narratives in an attempt to understand the elements that influence social, economic and political relations; to recognize competing ideologies and their relationships to lived experience and to recognize who benefits and who doesn't according to the terms of different narratives.[125] Recognizing the existence of hegemonic discourses challenges us to contest where our definitions come from. It challenges us to ask who is included and who is excluded from any particular discourse and to recognize that dominant discourses tend to support and justify existing power structures, making these structures appear to be part of a natural order. The concept of hegemony also shows us that our positions are not innocent. Whether or not we are conscious of our political locations, our positions reflect and reinforce value systems and thus reinforce our places within those systems.

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[124] Mark K. Smith. (1999, February). Antonio Gramsci. In (Prepared by Barry Burke, Ed.) *The encyclopedia of informal education.* Retrieved 7/9/03, from infed.org: http://www.infed.org/thinkers/et-gram.htm. (Re: Ideological Hegemony)

[125] "Often the term "ideology" is seen as referring simply to a system of ideas and beliefs. However, it is closely tied to the concept of power....Anthony Giddens...defines ideology as "shared ideas or beliefs which serve to justify the interests of dominant groups" [Giddens 1997 p583] Its relationship to power is that it legitimizes the differential power that groups hold and as such it distorts the real situation that people find themselves in." (Mark K. Smith. (1999, February). Antonio Gramsci. In (Prepared by Barry Burke, Ed.) *The encyclopedia of informal education.* Retrieved 7/9/03, from infed.org: http://www.infed.org/thinkers/et-gram.htm.)

Education, as a site of culture, is not neutral.

Curricula and pedagogical practices are related. In critical pedagogy, "education is conceived of as being intimately tied to the power structures in society." The "broader politics of social transformation" and the "power dynamics involved in the teaching-learning process itself" (Mayo, 1994, p. 24)[126] are central concerns of critical pedagogy.

Education is not neutral territory where objective facts are transferred from teachers to students. On the contrary, all education represents particular values and belief systems. These values are reflected in what is considered appropriate and what is considered "irrelevant" in terms of content, in the kind of relationships established by teachers within learning settings, and, in pedagogical strategies. According to Freire,

> There is no such thing as a *neutral* education process. Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, *or* it becomes "the practice of freedom," the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world. (Shaull, in Introduction to Freire, 2003, p. 34)

Education can be domesticating; it can be radical, it can fall somewhere in between these polarities, but all education reflects certain kinds of relations. Pedagogical practices *per se* also function to create culture thus serving to challenge or reinforce certain kinds of values and relationships. The music education philosophers discussed earlier in this thesis argue for the importance of recognizing teaching as a site of cultural creation. The defining characteristic of the disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy, however, is that pedagogical practices are clearly identified as having "political" implications.

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[126] Mayo, P. (1994, November). A comparative analysis of the ideas of Gramsci and Freire from an adult education perspective. *Canadian Journal for the Study of Adult Education, 8*(2), 1 - 28.

Education, as a form of culture, is not something we experience apart from political, economic and social considerations. The political is a part of our experience of culture and is as far-reaching as any other component of our education.

> [Educational practices] all have a form and a context that relate to power in society, that construct one kind of society or another, and they all have social relations in the classroom that confirm or challenge domination. (Ira Shor in Shor & Freire, 1987, p. 12)

Teachers and educational institutions often argue that what they are presenting is a neutral education; however, critical theory suggests that neutrality is a potentially dangerous fiction. Neutrality, seen in light of Gramsci's critique of hegemony, indicates an unquestioned acceptance of whatever values currently prevail. Freire discusses this notion below:

> Neutrality is just following the crowd. Neutrality is just being what the system asks us to be.
> Neutrality is the best way for one to hide his or her choice, you see. If you are not interested in proclaiming your choices, then you have to say that you are neutral. (Horton and Freire in Collins, 2001, p. 98)[127]

Thus neutrality represents an acceptance and tacit promotion of the status quo. Critical pedagogy challenges us to consider our pedagogical practices in light of their political impact and their roles in creating culture and creating the values and terms by which we live.

Tools of Critical Pedagogy

In the preceding section, I described the premises that underlie both critical theory and critical pedagogy. In the following section, I look specifically at one of the principal

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[127] Collins, C. (2001). Developing critical consciousness: A personal reflection. *Canadian Journal for the Study of Adult Education, 15*(1), 88-103.

goals of critical pedagogy; that is, developing critical consciousness. I follow this with an explanation of two approaches or tools, "problematization" and "dialogical method" which Freire recommends to develop critical consciousness and to lay the groundwork for praxis seen as a continual evolution and interaction of ideas, action and reflection.

Critical Consciousness

Critical consciousness refers to an engaged awareness of oneself as politically located. As bell hooks describes it, critical consciousness is "that historical moment when one begins to think critically about the self and identity in relation to one's political circumstance" (hooks, 1994, p. 47)[128]. Critical consciousness refers to developing an awareness of a number of different aspects of our political location. Thomas Heaney describes critical consciousness as follows:

> This is a level of consciousness characterized by depth in the interpretation of problems, through testing one's own findings with openness to revision, attempting to avoid distortion when perceiving problems and preconceived notions when analyzing them, receptivity to the new without rejecting the old because it is old. In striving toward critical consciousness, the individual rejects passivity, practicing dialogue rather than polemics, and using permeable, interrogative, restless, and dialogical forms of life. Critical consciousness is brought about not through an individual or intellectual effort, but through collective struggle and praxis. (Heaney, 1995 p. 3)[129]

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[128] hooks: 47: "And so Freire's work, in its global understanding of liberation struggles, always emphasizes that this is the important initial stage of transformation—that historical moment when one begins to think critically about the self and identity in relation to one's political circumstance."

[129] Heaney, T. (1995, June). Issues in Freirean Pedagogy. In *Thresholds in Education.* Retrieved September 11, 2002, from National-Louis University: www.edu/ace/Resources/Documents/FreireIssues.html.

In the process of discovering that we are "politically located," we recognize our relatedness to others as human beings within webs of political relations. For example, women in Canada belong to a class of people who were not persons, legally, until 1929. White women in urban centres, unlike young black men, can go about their business without being stopped and questioned by police[130]. In the 1970's there were no women's shelters. Family violence was considered an individual problem brought on by the behaviour of the victims. Since that time, men's violence towards women and children has been acknowledged as a *systemic* problem. Women, as a group, are vulnerable to this form of abuse. Financial vulnerability is also attached to women in abusive family settings. Each of the situations described above identifies a political location with identifiable material realities. We experience the effects of these locations in a personal way but they are consequences of our historical material relations.

In the process of discovering our political locations, we begin to develop critical literacy. In the process of developing critical literacy (in study and activism) we discover our political locations. Recognizing oneself as a member of a collectivity, we also recognize that we can act—as subjects—conscious of our political locations and conscious of the ways that political decisions affect material reality. Anti-racist movements, post-colonial critiques and equal rights movements are examples of critical consciousness in action. These movements embody the principle of praxis. Individuals recognize their political locations and take action, as part of a collectivity, to change material relations.

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[130] Of course other marginalizing factors can alter this safety for women, including indigency, mental illness, or disability.

Freire contrasts "naïve" thinking with critical thinking.

> Naïve thinking ...sees historical time as a weight, a stratification of the acquisitions and experiences of the past, from which the present should emerge normalized and "well-behaved." For the naïve thinker, the important thing is accommodation to this normalized "today." For the critic, the important thing is the continuing transformation of reality. (Freire 1973 in McLaren, 2000, p. 8)[131]

Critical consciousness is thus the overarching concept that connects praxis to historical materialism. The critically conscious thinker examines past and present material conditions to understand what particular conditions have led to current realities.

Problematization

Problematization is an important tool for developing critical consciousness. Learners and instructors examine the assumptions, histories and relationships of the various discourses in which they are engaged—looking for, and at, value systems, power relations, inclusions and exclusions in order to see how human relations are reflected in the meanings established in various discourses. Through problematization, one looks at discourses to see what labour and what changes in thinking and practice might bring about more equal relations of power.

> The objective is not to generate a solution but to explore the complexity and inter-relatedness of individual, organizational, and social issues, to learn about a problem and its context, and to identify ways in which learners can take collective action that constructively responds to the problem with which they have been engaged. (Boyce, 1996, p.8)[132]

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[131] McLaren, P. (2000). Paulo Freire's pedagogy of possibility. In S. Steiner, H. M. Krank, P. McLaren & R. Bahruth (Eds.), *Freirean pedagogy, praxis, and possibilities: Projects for the new millennium.* London: Falmer Press.

[132] Boyce, M. E. (1996, Summer). *Teaching critically as an act of praxis and resistance*. Retrieved June 2003, from http://newton.uor.edu/FacultyFolder/MBoyce/1CRITPED.HTM.

As stated earlier, critical pedagogues argue for the importance of rigorous intellectual work, learning various disciplines but also learning how these disciplines and knowledges contribute to or militate against social equality within a democratic context.

> Problem-posing does not suggest that students have nothing to learn from established knowledge or that fundamental knowledge must be reconstructed by each group of learners. Rather that instructors and students concern themselves with how texts and syllabi are organized, with the underlying assumptions of a course or discipline, and questioning the sources and perspectives included and/or excluded from the domain of the course. Problem-posing contextualizes knowledge and is based on instructor - and learner-posed questions as catalysts for learning. (Boyce, 1996, p. 7)

Problematization serves the function of connecting our interests with "a comprehension of "how society works". An education without problematization produces conformity in overt and covert ways. It reflects the power of the status quo by blocking access to critical questions. Learners without access to critical questions are effectively making decisions without knowing they are being made.

> The capacity to enforce nondecisions by keeping an issue from ever being raised is a profound, if largely invisible, form of power. In this regard, the role of educators in maintaining and stabilizing dominant forms of power is best described in terms of what is not contained in the curriculum, namely, critical questions excluded frequently in the name of maintaining a neutral posture. Nonknowledge and limited access to critical questions are a prior condition of nondecisions. The control and manipulation of knowledge, as well as the resulting mobilization of bias, represents a more economical and far-reaching exercise of power than reliance on overt force or the direct imposition of will. (Heaney, 1995, p.103)[133]

Problematization includes examining the role of education *per se,* the roles of various pedagogical practices and looking at power dynamics as reflected in teaching practices

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[133] Heaney, T. (1995, June). Issues in Freirean Pedagogy. In *Thresholds in Education.* Retrieved September 11, 2002, from National-Louis University: www.edu/ace/Resources/Documents/FreireIssues.html.

and teacher/students relationships. If part of the goal of teaching is to empower students to develop critical consciousness, teaching practices need also to embody these principles.

Dialogical Method

In critical pedagogy, students and teachers engage in dialogues about their disciplines. Critical pedagogues refer to this approach as "dialogical." It is described below by Thomas Heaney:

> The dialogical approach to learning is characterized by co-operation and acceptance of interchangeability and mutuality in the roles of teacher and learner, demanding an atmosphere of mutual acceptance and trust. In this method, all teach and all learn. This contrasts with an anti-dialogical approach which emphasizes the teacher's side of the learning relationship and frequently results in one-way communiques perpetuating domination and oppression. Without dialogue, there is no communication, and without communication, there can be no liberatory education. (Heaney, 1995)

The teacher moves out of an authoritarian role in order to embark, together with students, on an exploration of the social, historical, political, and material contexts of their disciplines. The teacher, nevertheless, retains the responsibility of facilitating the learning process. In the passage below, Nita Freire, the widow of Paulo Freire discusses his thinking on this issue.

> His thinking is radical and postcolonial; his approach to education is one which stresses the politics of knowledge throughout. Despite his constant advocacy of democratic social relations of education, he always affirmed the directive nature of socially transformative education, centering around the notion of praxis, in which the educator has authority which, nevertheless, should not degenerate into authoritarianism. (Interview with Nita Freire in Mayo & Borg, 1976)[134]

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[134] Mayo, P., & Borg, C. (Eds.) (1976, Spring'00). Reflections from a "third age" marriage: Paulo Freire's pedagogy of reason, hope and passion. *McGill Journal of Education, 35*(2), 105-120.

Thus the task of the educator is to balance the need to impart subject matter while creating a space to explore critically the tenets and context of the subject. Dialogical thinking requires engaging with differently situated people in order to learn about material and social realities. Freire gives as an example, the education work he did with peasants in the Brazilian countryside[135]. It was not adequate to take a critical analysis of their situation **to** this group of people because Freire's understandings could only be incomplete without integrating their own knowledge and experience of their material circumstances. It was through this experience that Freire recognized the need to approach teaching dialogically—together with learners. Mary Boyce describes this process below:

> To achieve this education, Freire proposes a dialogical approach in which everyone—teacher/student, administrator/teacher, health educator/community member—participates as colearners. The goal of dialogue is critical thinking (or "conscientization" from the Portuguese) and action. Critical thinking starts from perceiving the root causes of one's place in society—the socioeconomic, political, cultural, and historical context of our personal lives. But critical thinking continues beyond perception—toward the actions and decisions people make to shape and gain control over their lives. True knowledge evolves from the interaction of reflection and action (or praxis) and occurs "when human beings participate in a transforming act" (Freire [1985, p. 106] in Wallerstein, 1987, p. 34)[136]

Concluding comments on praxis, critical theory and critical pedagogy

There is much literature on the subject of how to put the principles of critical pedagogy into practice. Bell hooks writes extensively about her experiences in the

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[135] Freire, 2003, (Chapter Three, particularly p. 108). Also, Freire, 1994, p. 85.

[136] Wallerstein, N. (1987). Problem-posing education: Freire's method for transformation. In I. Shor (Ed.), *Freire for the Classroom* (pp. 33-44). Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook Publishers.

classroom, as do Elizabeth Ellsworth, Ira Shor, Paul Mocombe and others[137]. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate these critiques; however, I am encouraged by the amount of literature available to support and challenge educators as they attempt to integrate the principles of critical pedagogy into their practices. As I noted in an earlier footnote, postmodernist critiques also have a great deal to offer to the process of developing a critical viewpoint. I would argue that the growth of literature on critical thinking is a manifestation of the version of praxis (based on historical materialism) described by Paulo Freire. Thus, although there are many ways that more recent literature might inform future work in this area, my provisional goal, set within the limits of this thesis, is to argue for adopting a historical materialist view of praxis along with the principles of critical theory as a starting point in developing critical consciousness.

In this chapter I have compared two usages of the term *praxis* and have explored briefly the premises of critical theory and some methods of critical pedagogy. In my view, the historical materialist view of praxis allows us to see our work from both the "inside" and the "outside." While we learn the skills necessary to any particular area of interest, we learn also to question our assumptions, to look at ideology and its effects, to question our relationship to knowledge, to look at the power dynamics in teacher/student relationships, and, to consider how our work impacts on the creation of culture and

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[137] hooks, b. (1994). *Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice of freedom.* New York: Routledge; Ellsworth, E. (1994). Why doesn't this feel empowering? Working through the repressive myths of critical pedagogy. In L. Stone (Ed.), *Education feminism reader : Developments in a field of study* (pp. 300-327). London: Routledge; Mocombe, P. (After 2002). *Where did Freire go wrong? Pedagogy in Globalization: The Grenadian Context.* Retrieved 5.5.04, from http://www.chl.chalmers.se/main/inst_fack/dlc/Mocombe.pdf; Shor, I. (1980). *Critical Thinking and Everyday Life.* Montreal: Black Rose Books.

material relations for differently situated people. Exploring different cultures, in the terms suggested by Elliott, has always offered benefits for some. In terms of creating real change in social relations, however, the question for me remains: How do we support the notion of equality when we are unwilling to recognize its material manifestations? Stated another way: How do we become "friends" without first addressing the material conditions that have led us to being "not" friends?"

Part Three: Critical Consciousness in a Canadian Context

In this final section of Chapter Four, I look briefly at reasons why people might resist developing critical consciousness. I then offer three formulations of arguments in favour of developing critical consciousness.

Points of resistance to developing critical consciousness

Freire's first book, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* is written in the context of a strikingly polarized society of landowners and peasants. In this setting, the categories of oppressor and oppressed may be acknowledged more easily along with the rationale for developing critical consciousness. In the North American context, however, university students may find the concepts of "oppressor and oppressed" foreign and unrelated to their experience—this is particularly true for middle-class students. The tendency to dismiss radical-sounding discourses notwithstanding, a great deal of academic and grass roots work contradicts this impression of irrelevance. Racism, classism, sexism and other forms of oppression are well rooted in North American society. Writings by women of colour and First Nations peoples, for example, provide particularly strong analyses of

systemic inequality in Canada, and, indeed, powerful critiques exist of all aspects of our fundamental economic and social institutions.

From within the field of critical theory, there are also critiques of the dichotomous formulation of power expressed through the oppressor/oppressed designation. Peter Mayo[138] quotes Weiler as arguing that "the dichotomy between oppressor and oppressed is a false one." Mayo explains, citing Holub:

> [The false dichotomy] is a situation which invites parallels with Foucault's dictum that, in resisting power, one is not external to it. We are all implicated in relations of power. In fact, one of the major contributions of Gramsci's Hegemony theory is that it places emphasis on the way power is ubiquitous and manifests itself even in the most intimate social relations (Holub in Mayo, 1994, p. 23)

This critique is important to how one presents and conceptualizes relations of power in a contemporary context. It challenges us to look beyond possible dichotomies to more deeply integrated and complex manifestations of power relations and to take into account the possibility of being multiply situated[139] in relation to power dynamics. That the task is more complex than identifying "oppressors" and the "oppressed," however, does not change the relevance to our lives of understanding material relations and the impact of relations of power.

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[138] Mayo, P. (1994, November). A comparative analysis of the ideas of Gramsci and Freire from an adult education perspective. *Canadian Journal for the Study of Adult Education, 8*(2), 1-28.

[139] See earlier references to postmodernist critiques. See also Pratt, M. B., Burkin, E., & Martin, B. (1984). *Yours in struggle: Three feminist perspectives on anti-Semitism and racism.* Ithaca NY: Firebrand Books and Pratt, M. B. (1991). *Rebellion: Essays 1980-1991.* Ithaca, NY: Firebrand Books.

Resistance to developing critical consciousness may have other bases as well. Randall Allsup writes specifically about resistance to critical thinking from music students. He asks, "How do we problematize an art form that is not meant to be problematized? How do we examine a world that does not wish to be examined? How, specifically, do we engage our students in a pursuit of freedom if there is nothing from which they wish to be free?" (Allsup, 2001, p. 8)[140].

Students generally do not come to university expecting their view of the world to be deeply challenged. Many will accept that the role of the university is to broaden their experience and understanding beyond known territory but will not necessarily be willing to explore territory that makes them uncomfortable. Mary Boyce discusses this resistance in the following passage:

> The approach and practices presented in this paper are not uniformly welcomed by learners (Shor & Freire, 1987; Shor, 1992). Passivity in learners has been fostered in the education industry for a long time. A receptive and compliant or at least information gathering and organizing approach to learning is familiar to students. Some learners resist practices that require engagement, listening to classmates, developing a reasoned critique of knowledge and of external experts, and identifying meaningful action. To use a metaphor of waking and sleeping, developing critical consciousness involves waking up in fundamental ways. Remaining asleep is comfortable. The work of waking up and becoming actively engaged in one's life and learning in meaningful ways is in no small way, work. (Boyce, 1996, p. 8)[141]

In her 2001 paper, "Developing critical consciousness: a personal reflection," Carole Collins examines the sources for her own resistance to developing critical

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[140] Allsup, R. E. (2001). Music education as liberatory practice: Exploring the ideas of Milan Kundera. *Philosophy of Music Education Review, 9*(2), 3-10.

[141] Boyce, M. E. (1996, Summer). Teaching critically as an act of praxis and resistance. *Electronic Journal of Radical Organisation Theory, II, No. 2*(September 1996). Retrieved June, 20, 2003, from http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/depts/sml/journal/vol_3/mary.htm.

consciousness. One of several factors she cites is the fear of committing to engage in a process of change. "Finally, I resisted because critical consciousness requires a commitment to work for social change as well as personal change and I was not sure whether I wanted to make such a commitment" (Collins, 2001, 97). Collins points out that it was the passage on neutrality in Horton and Freire cited earlier in this chapter that forced her to recognize that the "neutral" position she was claiming actually represented values she was reluctant to identify (Collins, 1990, 98).

The forms of resistance cited here represent a small sample of reasons students and teachers may not wish to integrate the development of critical consciousness into their studies. Many may simply argue that they already have too much material to cover and don't have the time or mandate to go beyond teaching or learning traditionally accepted skills. To those who see talk of oppression as irrelevant to their lives there are, nevertheless, compelling justifications for engaging with critical consciousness. In the remainder of this chapter, I formulate three arguments requiring differing levels of "proof," in favour of integrating the development of critical consciousness into university studies. In Chapter Five I offer justifications specific to the field of music and suggest ways that critical consciousness can be integrated into professional music studies to the benefit of students in all branches of the field. For the moment, however, I limit my discussion to the importance of critical consciousness, generally, for students at advanced levels of education.

Weak, moderate and strong formulations of arguments for developing critical consciousness

The weak formulation:

A "weak" formulation designates a philosophical argument that requires a lesser degree of proof to be compelling. In this case, I argue that developing critical consciousness is in our self-interest as individuals engaged in the pursuit of intellectual, professional, social, economic and life skills. This argument is based solely on our need for material survival and does not infer obligations to other people or the acceptance of any particular personal philosophy.

Developing critical consciousness offers an opportunity to understand the competing discourses of the disciplines in which we engage, to make informed decisions about the context of our personal work, and to question our own assumptions about values and purposes. When these questions are not explored, we lose the opportunity to make conscious choices about how we want to live in the world; we find ourselves obedient to ideals we have never examined and find ourselves driven by forces we may resent but can't identify or address effectively. Critical consciousness is a powerful antidote to absolutist attitudes. With critical consciousness, we can avoid the dangers of idealism disconnected from reality. Likewise, although cynicism is a common first reaction to critical studies, this reaction is eventually mitigated by recognizing the potential for change through our own engagements[142]. We gain the tools to question

[142] With these comments I do not mean to understate the challenge of integrating critical consciousness into one's way of interacting with the world. One of the tasks of the educator is to help students recognize places where changes in consciousness have led to positive social change. A powerful example is the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa—a change that could not have taken place until the ideology of apartheid (and the

notions of success and self-worth and to recognize our relatedness to other people. With the benefit of historical material analysis, we have a means to distinguish circumstances and factors attributable to individuals, from circumstances and factors that reflect shared material, social, economic realities. Carole Collins expresses her recognition of this relatedness in the following passage: "I now more fully understand my obligation to put everything I will teach into a social context and continually to do so, as Mills (1959) advocates, [to]"translate personal troubles into public issues, and public issues into the terms of their human meaning for a variety of individuals" (Collins, 2001, p. 98). There are positive benefits to developing critical consciousness but there are also negative consequences when we fail to do so. John Ralston Saul demonstrates the risks of limiting one's knowledge and concerns to a specialist field in the following example. Here Saul refers to fishermen who can no longer earn a living because fish stocks have been so severely depleted.

> No one thought about the long- or even medium-term maintenance of stocks; not the fishermen, not the boat builders, not the fish wholesalers who found new uses for their product, including fertilizer and chicken feed; not the financiers. It wasn't their job. Their job was to worry about their own interests. (Saul, 1995, p.135)

Saul's example makes a strong case for developing critical consciousness on the basis of material survival. With only small picture views of the world, we remain, by default, "subject to" forces we don't recognize or understand and deprive ourselves of the possibility of taking informed action on our own behalf. Other current examples that

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material relations it was used to justify) had been exposed and challenged. I speak here of the ideology of white supremacy that was used to justify taking over arable land and moving black people onto reservations — a practice modeled on the Canadian Indian Reservation system.

support the need for developing critical consciousness are the multilateral trade agreements that appear in different formats every few years. These agreements have given corporations the right to sue national governments for potential profits lost, for example, due to environmental regulations. The trade agreements, therefore, alter Canadian political sovereignty by exposing government decisions to contestation by international corporate interests [143].

In my view, when we do not consider the "why" and the context of what we do, we function at a level of perpetual adolescence -- only semi-conscious of the larger historical influences "to which we are subject" and the means by which we might act as "subjects" in remaking the world. Thus the crux of my "weak" formulation, that is, the formulation needing the least amount of proof, is that in order to function well in the world—to survive in a rapidly changing world—we need access to critical questions. Without critical consciousness we lack sufficient information and insight to act upon areas vital to our individual, material survival.

The moderate formulation

The moderate argument is that, as citizens in a democracy, we need the awareness and ability to act brought by developing critical consciousness in order to have

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[143] Final Report of Citizen's Inquiry Into the MAI. Retrieved 17.08.04, from Council of Canadians: http://www.canadians.org/display_document.htm?COC_token=23@@8c47435bbef1545d03ee073ebf264b46&id=350&isdoc=1&catid=88 and The Citizens' Guide to Trade, Environment and Sustainability: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Retrieved 17.08.04, from Friends of the Earth: http://www.foei.org/trade/activistguide/mai.htm.

democracy function well. In a democracy we have choices and one of these choices is not to participate in the democratic process. Nevertheless, the argument that democracy can only be maintained with the informed participation of citizens is compelling. Rather than attempting a proof that developing critical consciousness is *necessary* to democracy, I argue that it is in our collective interest to do so if we wish to maintain or advance the level of democracy we currently enjoy.

In 1937 John Dewey argued that

> the very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy, must be continually explored afresh; it has to be constantly rediscovered, remade and re-organized, while the political and economic and social institutions in which it is embodied have to be remade and re-organized to meet the changes that are going on in the development of new needs on the part of human beings and new resources for satisfying those needs. (Dewey in Osborne, p. 54)[144]

The ongoing need to make and re-make democracy cannot be fulfilled by individual involvement alone. Institutional supports must be in place to develop the tools needed on a broad scale to facilitate informed and active participation. A surface reading of relations will not reveal power dynamics, hence, the need will always exist to develop critical understandings of social and economic institutions. Henry Giroux writes:

> One of the most important functions of a vibrant democratic culture is to provide the institutional and symbolic resources necessary for young people and adults to develop their capacity to think critically, to participate in power relations and policy decisions that affect their lives, and to transform those racial, social, and economic inequities that impede democratic social relations. (Giroux in Portelli & Solomon, 2001, p.17)[145]

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[144] Osborne, K. (2001). Democracy, democratic citizenship, and education. In J. P. Portelli & R. P. Solomon (Eds.), *The erosion of democracy in education: From critique to possibilities* (pp. 29-61). Calgary, Ab: Detselig.

[145] Portelli, J., & Solomon, P. R. (Eds.) (2001). *The erosion of democracy in education.* Calgary, Alberta: Detselig Enterprises Ltd.

In our current liberal democratic configuration in Canada, public funding of education and various services is "up for debate." These are not academic questions or questions to be decided by "experts" only. How these issues are decided will have profound effects on the material reality of differently situated people. As citizens and people who will be affected by any legal changes made, we need to know the why and how of such public issues. Again, if we know only how a government decision might affect our particular sector and have no means to distinguish between different arguments—some of which represent extremely well-financed interests—then we leave ourselves open to manipulation by public relations firms—with the cleverest manipulators winning the most support.

As we become senior practitioners in our respective fields, we may have opportunities to sit on development or review teams charged with creating new policy and/or determining how public funding should be distributed. On what basis do we make these decisions if our world view and life experience is limited to a narrow discipline and we have no strategy or tools to understand the impact of such decisions on people situated differently than ourselves? Citizenship in a democratic society comes with benefits but, as Freire notes below, it also comes with responsibilities.

> The second aspect I would like to focus on here is the responsibility of citizenship. We will only come to terms with this problem through a critical awareness of our social and political responsibility as a civil society, a responsibility not to take over the state's role, letting it sleep undisturbed, but to learn to mobilize and organize so that we can better supervise the state as it fulfills or fails to fulfill its

> constitutional duty. Only in this way will we be able to move toward a broad dialogue, at the centre of society. Freire, 1998, p. 10)[146]

Thus, my moderate argument is that we can only benefit and grow as a society if we develop the means to look critically at the historical, material factors that shape our contemporary relationships. For example, the system of apartheid was based on a belief in the inherent superiority of whites and inherent deficiencies of blacks. Today the contradictions of these ideologies may seem obvious, but they were well entrenched in belief systems of an earlier era. The means to change such relations of inequality came, at least in part, through recognizing the relationship between ideology, power and material reality.

In Canada, we are fortunate to live in a modern democracy. We are not and never will be immune, however, to ideology and its function of masking relations of power. There are marginalized under-classes in Canadian society and severe imbalances in access to resources[147]. We have been told that trickle-down economics and "less government" would benefit everyone. This is a belief system that has benefited a few at the top with obvious contradictions in lived experience for the growing numbers of people at the bottom. The fact that two corporations[148] own most of the newspapers and

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[146] Freire, P. (1998). *Teachers as cultural workers. Letters to those who dare teach.* (D. Macedo, D. Koike, & A. Oliviera, Trans.). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press (Original work published 1993).

[147] Single mothers on social assistance, people with jobs who can't find affordable housing ("the working poor"), and in this white dominant society, many First Nations people are obvious examples.

[148] These newspaper empires are sometimes identified by their individual owners, sometimes as corporate entities. I am referring here to Hollinger (Conrad Black) and CanWest Global Communications (Izzy Asper).

many radio and television outlets in the country should be warning enough of the limits imposed on our access to competing viewpoints[149]. To gain a critical perspective on events happening to and around us, we need to look much further for analyses of ideology and material relations. When we do not engage in questions beyond surface appearances, we cannot be confident that we are looking after our own interests as citizens. In Saul's words:

> Human society is a human construct, even if outside forces oblige, propel and limit us. Humanist society – that is, in our terms, the individual as citizen in a democratic society – is not only a human construct. It continues to exist only through the daily efforts of its citizenry. (Saul, 1995, p.154)

We can't afford to live in a vacuum, regardless of our field, if we hope to live within a democracy. This moderate argument is not dependent upon a shared notion of what constitutes a "good life." It does suggest strongly, however, that we are risking our personal security, insofar as we believe it is protected by democratic institutions, by remaining ignorant and outside of any form of collective engagement. We need, actively, to put ourselves in a position to deepen our understanding and enlarge our possibilities for engagement. Remaining a bystander is not a position of neutrality; rather, it indicates our agreement with relations as they are. This lack of informed engagement allows power relations to evolve uncontested. Democracy depends upon on-going challenges in order to function.

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[149] An example of "praxis" in response to corporate control of the media has been the development, internationally, of independently run, not-for-profit media centres open to the public and available on-line. The movement began during the "Battle of Seattle"—the 1999 protests against the World Trade Organisation in Seattle Washington. See http://journal.planetwork.net/article.php?lab=coleman0704 for a history of the movement.

The strong formulation

In philosophical terms, a strong formulation is one that requires a high level of proof, usually defined in terms of a necessary truth. An argument based on necessity holds for those people who agree on a particular view of the "good life." Therefore, I posit my third formulation as *one of a number of possible* ethical approaches to knowledge, education and engagement with the world. In this case, my strong argument is premised on the belief that engagement with critical consciousness is a *necessary* part of fulfilling ourselves as human beings. In the following discussion, then, I present ethical and psychological arguments articulated by critical theorists that support the contention that developing critical consciousness is an essential part of what it means to be human.

Educational philosopher Maxine Greene writes about the importance of developing a philosophy: that is, understanding the why of what one chooses to do.

> The philosophical "act" requires one "to take the risk of thinking about what he is doing...to become progressively more self-conscious about the choices he makes and the commitments he defines...and to examine critically the principles underlying what he thinks and what he says. (Greene, in Kohli 1998, p. 16)[150]

Greene's position is not unlike that taken by Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen in relation to the need for "philosophy;" however, she takes this notion further by arguing that "problematizing" our relatedness is essential to a genuine freedom.

> Freedom that is detached from the relatedness of others is a form of bad faith. ... There may be no sense of identification with people sitting on park benches, with children hanging around the street corners after dark. There may be no ability to

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[150] Kohli, W. (1998). Philosopher of/for freedom. In W. C. Ayers & Miller Janet L. (Eds.), *A light in dark times.* New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University.

> take it seriously, to take it personally. Visible or invisible, the world may not be problematized; no one aches to break through a horizon, aches in the presence of the question itself. So there are no tensions, no desires to reach beyond. (Greene, in Allsup, 2001, p.5)

According to Greene, the lack of forums within education for grappling with existential questions about the meaning of life translates into a moral failure.

Nel Noddings also argues that ethical behaviour requires an understanding and response to "others." "Ethical behavior or "caring" is central to education and community. Feelings of caring cannot operate "routinely, according to some fixed rule." To care requires an understanding of an "other" (Noddings in Allsup, 2001, p. 5). Understanding the "other" cannot come about through empathy alone. Understanding the "other" can only come about through an engagement with the material reality of those whom we wish to understand. We often cannot see the concerns of others until we engage in resistance with them. Through this resistance it becomes possible to see manifestations of power[151]. This is what critical theorists and Paulo Freire, in particular, mean by "engaging in praxis."

Marx conceived of the project of developing critical consciousness, leading to praxis, as part of the project to "humanize the world."

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[151] See Ford, M., & Pepper-Smith, K. (1998). Dividing the difference: Intelligibility as an element of moral education under oppression. *Journal of Moral Education, 27*(4), 275-293 for an illuminating discussion on moral intelligibility. In this case, Katherine Pepper-Smith was unable to understand her colleagues' practice of continually coming "out" as a lesbian. It seemed an overblown worry. Pepper-Smith perceived the safety and innocuousness of her own position, as a married heterosexual, to be generalizable, and, thus, neutral, when in fact this apparent neutrality masked a position of privilege she had not recognized prior to her engagement in writing this paper.

> At the heart of Marx's project was the question of what it means to be fully human and his belief in our potential to humanize the world." (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 18)

Allman and Wallis describe Marx's position in greater depth below:

> And because we have not critically chosen these social relations, they, on the whole, tend to be relations of domination and subordination or outright oppression. Although this often implies material impoverishment of one of the opposites, it need not. Marx often referred to impoverishment in that sense, but more often he used it to refer to our impoverishment as human beings. (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 16)

Freire also argued that our vocation as human beings is to humanize our relations, that is, by working to end relations of dominance and oppression.

> But while both humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives, only the first is the people's vocation. This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is affirmed by that very negation. (Freire, 2003, p.43)

In Freire's *Pedagogy of Hope*[152] he expands on this notion of humanization as the vocation of human beings:

> It is important to emphasize that, in speaking of "being more," or of humanization as ontological vocation of the human being, I am not falling into any fundamentalist position—which, incidentally, is always conservative. Hence, my equally heavy emphasis on the fact that this "vocation," this calling, rather than being anything a priori in history, on the contrary is something constituted in history. (Freire, 1994, p. 98)

In the arguments of Marx and Freire, a failure to develop critical consciousness represents more than a moral failure. It represents a failure to achieve our human potential.

In her book *Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice of freedom,* bell hooks writes of engaged pedagogy as a way for teachers as well as students to achieve personal wholeness.

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[152] Written after the passage quoted above.

> Freire's work affirmed that education can only be liberatory when everyone claims knowledge as a field in which we all labor. That notion of mutual labor was affirmed by Thich Nhat Hanh's philosophy of engaged Buddhism, the focus on practice in conjunction with contemplation. His philosophy was similar to Freire's emphasis on "praxis"—action and reflection upon the world in order to change it....Thich Nhat Hanh offered a way of thinking about pedagogy which emphasized wholeness, a union of mind, body, and sprit. (hooks, 1994, p.14)

Hooks points out that critical pedagogy, or "engaged pedagogy", has the well-being of teachers as well as students at its centre.

> Progressive, holistic education, "engaged pedagogy" is more demanding than conventional critical or feminist pedagogy. For, unlike these two teaching practices, it emphasizes well-being. That means that teachers must be actively committed to a process of self-actualization that promotes their own well-being if they are to teach in a manner that empowers students. (hooks, 1994, p. 15)

This articulation of the importance of well-being through engagement is important. Critical studies can be very unsettling for students. Common sense views of the world (hegemony) are so deeply engrained inside each of us it can be deeply disturbing to find critiques that challenge our views. Engagement and the development of critical consciousness, however, also lead us to discover our own place in history as we recognize our capacity to act as "subjects" and, according to hooks, this is ultimately empowering and fulfilling.

Finally, I turn to comments by David Karp, who writes about critical consciousness as a means of attaining mental health in the midst of social relations that seem fractured and isolating.

> The cultural pull away from others is often too powerful to resist. A culture that prizes individual self-realization above all else becomes a world held together by only the barest and most tenuous social connections. More and more Americans, identifying individual achievement as the primary medium for personal fulfillment, join the "lonely crowd" identified years ago by David Riesman. To

> be part of the lonely crowd means being connected to many in general and few in particular. (Karp, 1996, p. 184)[153]

Karp uses the following passage by C. Wright Mills to connect the need for historical materialist critiques with personal mental health.

> Nowadays men often feel that their lives are a series of traps. They sense that within their everyday worlds, they cannot overcome their troubles, and in this feeling, they are often correct ... Yet men do not usually define the troubles they endure in terms of historical change and institutional contradiction... They do not ... grasp the interplay of man and society, of biography and history, of self and world. ... What they need ... is a quality of mind that will help them to ... achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within themselves. ...This quality [of mind] ... may be called the sociological imagination. (C. Wright Mills in Karp, 1996, p.165)

Karp, like the critical theorists cited above, argues that the ability to recognize our relatedness is essential to both our individual and social well-being:

> [This is] what I now see as a shared sociological and spiritual message. It is that our individual emotional health and the health of society are inseparable. If we do not nourish society by realizing our individual responsibilities to it, we pay the price in terms of individual illness. In this way, those millions pained by affective disorders are part of a dialectical process in which the extent of collective suffering eventually creates an urge to change the social structures that have made so many of us ill. (Karp, 1996, p.195)

In summary, my strong argument posits that the development of critical consciousness is a *necessary* feature of what it means to be fully human. As individuals, conscious of our relatedness to others, we gain the knowledge that we are not alone in our struggles to understand the conflicts between our material realities and accepted ideologies (hegemony)—conflicts that, for many, result in a constant sense of cognitive dissonance. Critical consciousness gives us the capacity to engage, with others, in "making the world." Greene's "freedom", hooks's "engaged pedagogy," Freire's and

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[153] Karp, D. S. (1996). *Speaking of Sadness.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Marx's projects of humanizing the world and Karp's argument for critical engagement all suggest that, as human beings, it is our vocation to engage in the process of creating a better world.

Conclusion to Chapter Four

In conclusion, I submit that there are compelling reasons to include the development of critical consciousness as part of educational practices. The Aristotelian definition of praxis limits our view to the virtue of specific disciplines—a view of those disciplines from the "inside." The historical materialist view of praxis, with its focus on relatedness, provides us with a much richer account. This alternate view of praxis, as articulated in the discussion of critical theory and critical pedagogy opens many new questions and provides us with an approach to learning and to pedagogy that allows us to consider the methods, goals and potential outcomes of our education. Critical consciousness creates a space to examine our work, our beliefs, and our discourses in relation to material relations. Such a consciousness does not come at the expense of the joys and rewards of studying different disciplines; rather, we become newly able to look at the world as a place we can re-make—with an awareness of the realities that shape our subjectivity.

In Chapter Five I re-examine the five roles of professional musicianship: wage earners, artists, members of communities, teachers and cultural producers in light of critical consciousness. I argue that developing critical consciousness and understanding praxis will enhance the capacity of musicians to act as the "critical and creative producers of our conditions of existence" (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 17).

CHAPTER FIVE: TEACHING MUSIC AS IF THE WORLD MATTERED[154]

> [For Greene] acting, choosing, and deciding are what make a person free: "The person choosing breaks the chain of causes and effects, of probabilities, in which he normally feels himself to be entangled. He breaks it apart by asking 'Why?' by perceiving the habitual itself to be an obstacle to his growing, his pursuit of meaning, his interpreting and naming his world."...Freedom, Greene says, "is the freedom to decide what sort of person you ought to be" (Greene, 1973, p. 284, in Kohli, 1998, p. 18)

Throughout the preceding chapters, I have explored the philosophical analyses of four major writers in the field of Philosophy of Music Education. I share many values and concerns with these writers, including the belief that music is a unique mode of experience that ought to be a part of school curricula. Nonetheless, my focus in this thesis has been on a gap between the issues that can be examined within their frames of reference and my own concerns. I have examined their views on music education in light of questions about the intersection of music and politics that have come out of my own experiences as a music student and professional musician. It is my hypothesis that the kinds of analysis, insights and tools found in the literatures of critical theory and critical pedagogy address this gap and provide a way to address important issues in music education that are not adequately visible within the limits of current philosophy of music

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[154] I would like to thank Peggy Tripp for contributing the title of my last chapter. We had a wonderful conversation in which we exchanged ideas about the need for educational practices to engage students, through their fields of inquiry, with the problems of the world. At the time, she was co-editing a collection of essays on science and education, with the working title of "Teaching Science as if the World Mattered." The work has since been completed and published as Tripp, P., & Muzzin, L. (Eds.) (2004). *Teaching as activism: equity meets environmentalism.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

education thinking. Specifically, my hypothesis is that developing critical consciousness is important to the education of professional musicians.

Praxis as a point of entry

The moment of illumination for me comes with the recognition of two very different uses of the term praxis. The exploration of approaches to praxis set up a watershed recognition of two contrasting orientations, first toward musical praxis viewed "from the inside," as a unique form of thinking-doing excellence and, second, toward musical praxis viewed "from the outside," as a form of thinking-doing oriented to critique and engaged reflections on how music is lived in contexts of historical socio-political relations. I then draw upon the literatures of critical pedagogy and critical theory to generate an account of the forms of critical consciousness that will address the problematic intersection of music and politics. The key elements of this critical consciousness, I argue, enable people to take into account the workings of materiality, ideology, and power.

My discussion in Chapter Four highlights a historical materialist analysis of "the political," yet I think it is important to underscore that the weak, moderate, and strong arguments in favour of including critical consciousness in the education of professional musicians do not depend necessarily on a historical materialist rendering of the political issues facing musicians. Alternative forms of political analysis, such as might be based on the work of pragmatists like John Dewey, for instance, might also be used to generate an account of critical consciousness that would satisfy the need I have identified. To qualify under my analysis, such alternative accounts would need to address the three key political elements: materiality, ideology, and power. I do not attempt to discuss all of

these alternatives here; rather, it is sufficient for my purposes to show that critical consciousness, in this case, generated through the discourse of historical materialism, addresses the gaps between current philosophy of music education thinking and my questions.

Philosophers of Music Education

Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen do not agree precisely on the nature of music although they do agree that understanding its nature is important to how we approach music education. My sense is that the gulf identified between Elliott and Reimer is not as substantive as Elliott has argued. In common with the other writers, both Elliott and Reimer see the mental processes of perceiving music as representing a particular kind of cognition, whether it is called "perceptual structuring" or the "thinking-doing" that Elliott calls "praxial thinking." All four writers begin with a love of music and a concern that those studying music think about what they are doing in light of the value of music to the larger social fabric.

Elliott and Regelski open up the range of consideration to challenge Reimer's notion that music should be understood as an expressive form, detached from social, political and historical meaning. They argue that social and political meanings are embedded in musical practices and contribute to aspects of the "nature" of music; however, they limit their view to cultural expressions of music without noticing the effects of materiality, that is, the historical location of different musics — effects that have significant implications for music education. Thus, although Elliott and Regelski use the words 'social' and 'political' to refer to aspects of the nature of music, the limits

of their analyses of praxis effectively mask political relations in a way likely to perpetuate relations of dominance and privilege.

Jorgensen broadens the range of consideration further by analyzing different pedagogical practices highlighting the respective limits and accomplishments of each. She develops a process that she calls a dialectical dialogic approach, the point of which is to embrace the tensions and conflicts between competing needs, discourses and interests. Rather than set up mutually exclusive justifications that polarize the debates between competing discourses, she advocates treating these tensions as a challenge to be enjoyed as one looks forward to creating music education opportunities appropriate to different constituencies. Jorgensen identifies a Freirean goal of freedom as a guide to her dialogic practice; however, she does not articulate the need for a critical analysis of materiality and historical location — a crucial step if the conditions necessary for achieving the goal of freedom are to be created.

The limitation of the analyses of these authors, made particularly apparent through the different uses of the term "praxis," is that, in the main, they do not identify the influences of (historical) materiality, ideology, and power. As a result, their frames of reference tend to be situated within the world of music and music education, looking outward, missing the beneficial perspectives to be gained by looking from the outside in. We need a means to recognize the ideologies, the social structures, and the past conditions that have led to our present historical location in order to act *as subjects*, conscious of the conditions to which, and by which, *we have been "subjected."*[155]

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[155] The awkward syntax here has been chosen to emphasize the distinction between being a 'subject' and being 'subject to' external factors.

Tools of critical consciousness

The concept of praxis serves as an entry point to an analysis of critical consciousness represented as a means to step back from the world – paradoxically, by becoming more actively engaged with differently situated people — in order to re-enter it, remaking the world according to values consciously held and consciously striven for. Tools for developing critical consciousness that are suggested by critical theory and critical pedagogy include problematization and a dialogical method. Problematization helps us to look at the assumptions that underpin the social relationships and common sense beliefs that shape our historical, geographical, and social present. Problematization allows us look within – to contest ideologies that we might, otherwise, fail to recognize because they have been accepted as part of the natural order: for example, the assumptions that competition is essential to achieving high standards and that having winners and losers is necessary. Problematization allows us to look without at the political/material conditions that are shaping our relationships with one another.

A Freirean dialogical approach to pedagogy suggests that we need to come to knowledge as a place in which we all labour. Bell hooks writes about the importance of acknowledging that the power dynamic between teachers and students is unequal; however, her conviction is that it is crucial for teachers and students alike to see themselves as active participants (rather than passive consumers of fixed bodies of knowledge) in the shared project of developing critical consciousness (hooks, 1994, p.14). In this sense, though teachers and students are situated differently with respect to their material locations, they both enter the dialogic process as co-participants. They engage with the learning and with each other, and they share the goal of striving for critical

consciousness, wholeness and for transformation (hooks, 1994, p.138, 157). In hooks's understanding of a dialogical approach, "students and professors regard each other as 'whole' human beings, striving not just for knowledge in books, but knowledge about how to live in the world" (hooks, 1994, pp.14).

In the context of music education, teachers and students might explore the values and beliefs that each brings to the professional music enterprise. These beliefs are looked at as "assumptions" worthy of critical analysis within a learning project to understand the relationships between our assumptions and manifestations of materiality, ideology and power. The work of contesting entrenched hierarchies is difficult. We are almost always personally invested in our systems of belief. Challenging these beliefs can be threatening. Employing the concept of "praxis;" we need to consider what work can be done in an effort to mediate the difference and difficulties amongst differently situated people. We might consider attending anti-racist workshops for example, or caucusing or engaging in common actions. There is risk-taking on all sides in such pedagogical enterprises; however, the rewards come through learning to distance ourselves from habitual ways of thinking, gaining, in the process, a clearer understanding of how we might choose to live in the world.

In the context of this thesis I have limited my exploration of the concept of dialogical method to pedagogical contexts. In *Teaching to Transgress,* bell hooks writes about teaching/learning situations that take place in public forums and movement-building situations where engagement is rife with the tensions arising from the efforts of differently situated people trying to unveil ideologies and material manifestations of power within the coalitions they are trying to build. Although such formal and informal

'learning' situations are challenging, the level of engagement inherent in such situations is what defines a dialogical approach to teaching and learning. For the person in the role of educator, this means an anti-dogmatic approach to knowledge[156]. Facilitating equal participation means creating room for people to start from where they are and to respect and integrate the knowledge and experience that is brought by participants[157]. For hooks, the goal of education is to create critical thinkers. Thus, education as the practice of freedom is about liberating knowledge ***and*** liberatory practice in the classroom. The challenge is to go beyond traditional teaching practices and create pedagogical practices that subvert hierarchical values and create the ground where critical thinking can be developed.

Critical consciousness and the intersection of music and politics

I turn now to the questions that have driven this project from the beginning: what does critical consciousness bring to the study of music at the professional level? I address this question in light of four categories: materiality, ideology, power and insider/outsider relations. These categories are not intended to represent all possible applications of critical consciousness; rather, they represent a range of possibilities and potential areas of inquiry that can be associated with that umbrella term.

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[156] Recall Freire's concept of knowledge as contestable and as the result of dialectical tensions.

[157] See Freire's example of working together with peasants on learning projects. Reference is in Chapter Four.

Materiality

With respect to 'materiality,' critical consciousness allows us to examine our historical location as musicians working in particular economic and geographic zones which, in turn, are affected by a global economy dominated by capitalism. Such an analysis would allow us to see what factors contribute to the amount and quality of work available for musicians and the financial sources that support that work[158]. It would also allow us to resist personalization by helping us to separate our images of self-worth from the realities of our historical location.

Examining materiality would also let us explore the questions surrounding our locations as cultural producers. We might ask what groups of people are represented in professional music schools[159], amongst our professional colleagues, amongst our audiences and, perhaps more interestingly, which are not. A material analysis would allow us to consider the lived consequences of such representations and to consider how different forms of cultural expression serve the interests of various communities. I am thinking, here, in particular, of those occasions when we are called upon to consider how arts council funding is to be distributed. A materialist analysis of such decisions enables us to notice the differing patterns of benefits and burdens associated with the awarding of grants to members of dominant and non-dominant groups. We are encouraged by such

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[158] In my experience, the principal sources of funding are government and corporate grants with wealthy individuals occasionally purchasing services and, far less often, modest-income individuals purchasing musical services for special occasions such as weddings and funerals.

[159] Since there are a variety of professional music schools available including colleges that sometimes specialize in jazz or commercial music, it would be interesting, also, to compare different types of institutions and observe who is there and who is not.

analyses to pay attention to the work we must do to put ourselves in a position to encounter varied traditions, to recognize the need for caucusing when we are at risk of marginalization, or to recognize the need to educate ourselves if we are at risk of cultural appropriation or assimilation. Such analyses show us that simply entering an unfamiliar culture as a 'tourist" is not sufficient if we wish to interact respectfully and meaningfully. Critical music theorist Susan McClary (McClary, 1991, p. 26) suggests a materialist approach that unearths taken-for-granted practices and ideologies by envisioning one's own art form as visitors (performers, audiences, anthropologists, or ethnomusicologists) from another time and place.

Materialist analyses include examinations of large-scale historical forces that shape not only our working lives but our lives as members of communities. The changes in local economic conditions that occur as a function of the processes of globalization, for instance, determine who can afford to attend cultural events, and what kinds of resources (government and corporate) are available for funding cultural activities. Globalization processes affect us at another level as well. As money and jobs move out of the country, economic control is moved out of the hands of government and further out of the range of democratic processes.

Our relationships are shaped by the structural forces at play. Unlike some versions of liberal pluralism, analyses of materiality reveal (rather than obscure) the difficulty of working together when people occupy different social locations. An example of such structural forces shaping relationships is evident in work I have been doing as an artist/educator at a First Nations High School in Thunder Bay. The students at this school come from remote communities. In this situation I am necessarily a

member of the white colonizing class. I receive the possibility that the students will gain by interacting with me with a great deal of skepticism. Regardless of whatever good intentions I bring to this situation, there is a need to understand how our different material locations shape our relationships. Such a materialist analysis will not necessarily offer immediate solutions. In fact, solutions may require changes to social conditions that are not yet apparent; however, these analyses can show us where the struggles are. Learning how to work in this environment has required a process of trying out strategies and recognizing failures based on long discussions with First Nations elders, the students' classroom teacher (First Nations, but from a different background than the students), a First Nations colleague teaching at Lakehead University's Faculty of Education, and non-native friends and colleagues who have worked as 'outsiders' with young people in native communities.

In the midst of this question-asking, I discovered that I first had to learn how to approach an elder. I was not automatically entitled, by virtue of my good intentions, to seek out and receive information on terms with which I was familiar. I was told stories and sent away to consider how these stories might inform my work in the school. In the classroom, I found that I would try strategies that had been successful in mainstream high schools only to discover that I had crossed over into cultural meanings that caused offense and alienated the students. Working in this setting continues to be an on-going process of discovering what the students bring, what kinds of musical experience might be useful to them and how I can adapt the knowledge and experience that I bring to address their needs. Their classroom teacher and I continue to tread carefully as we attempt, together, to construct a program that lets us find ways of offering a rewarding

program for the students, in spite of but also through our different social and material locations.

Another situation that has made me aware of our situatedness is the different ways that publicity might affect our lives and our relationships with each other. CBC Radio has a program called "Out Front" that, on the surface, seems like a potentially useful vehicle for talking about this work in a public setting. We could construct the show ourselves and it would be broadcast all over the country telling, in our own words, how we are learning to work together. For me, as a free-lance musician and artist/educator, the benefits of producing such a show are obvious: my profile would be enhanced along with my credibility and I might get new work as a result of people hearing the broadcast. For the students and their classroom teacher, however, the benefits are not so obvious or tangible. Because of our different social locations, it would be next to impossible to portray our work together as something that is evolving amongst equals[160]. My fear, and the reason this idea is not acceptable under current material and social realities, is that, no matter how we were to construct such a radio piece, I would appear in the role of the "white expert" bringing music to this group of "at-risk"[161] students. We *might* be able to turn these conditions to our own purposes if we worked together with a producer to portray everyone's roles in a nuanced way, but the reality is that the only person who would really stand to gain from such a program is me.

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[160] Portraying it as an equal partnership in no way would guarantee its reception by listeners as such.

[161] "At risk" seems to be the term of choice for describing young people who have experienced a great deal of hardship due to their social locations. Here again, the term serves to mask a relationship of oppression by describing the problem in terms of the individual and their family.

At this time, under current conditions, such a program risks exposing the students and their lives to a scrutiny that would be more exploitative than beneficial, thus potentially breaking whatever trust we might have built between us. The social conditions are not yet such that we could successfully portray our work as a project amongst social equals. The situation I have described is an example of how critical consciousness, through developing an analysis of materiality, has made it possible for me to participate in a project that has change and growth as a goal, conscious of the way that our relationship will continue to be defined by our current social locations.

Ideology

I move now to examining the possibilities of a critical analysis of ideology: How could such an analysis serve us as musicians? When discussing the role of musicians as artists, I introduced the tension between conventional, individualist, representations of musicians' success or failure as artists and larger-frame accounts of economic forces such as labour market dynamics and competition for scarce resources. I would argue that challenging the ideology of meritocracy (that assumes every talented musician who dedicates herself to her art will succeed) might make it possible for more of us to resist the tendency to personalize consequences that have systemic origins.

In Chapter Four, I drew connections between the study of ideology and the phenomenon of hegemony. Dominant groups reinforce their dominance by representing, as universal, values that actually pertain to their own vested interests. Within societies such as ours, dominated by capitalism, the virtues of competition are almost unassailable. Although some people have qualms about the value of competition in education, or where

they advocate a wider range of more inclusive values, the association of excellence with competitive success and mediocrity with competitive failure largely remains intact.

When I read literature aimed at school music educators, for example, I see a strong commitment to focusing on the joys and rewards of music-making for what it provides to us in spiritual, social, personal, physiological and intellectual nourishment. Teaching practices are designed to bring out the best in students, regardless of what skills, talents or experiences they bring to the classroom. These practices are based on an understanding of the nature of music, the nature of music education and the value of both to our quality of life. These life-affirming priorities are articulated clearly by each of the four authors considered in this thesis.

Nonetheless, in professional music schools, arguably the pinnacle of music education, competition trumps these broader virtues. Those who are not good competitors (sometimes despite being very fine musicians) soon discover that they have little value as musicians and their chances of surviving as a professional are portrayed as negligible[162]. Teachers encourage their students to succeed in a very particular marketplace; however, the teachers appear to be as unaware as the students about the connection between the ideology of competition and the terms set by economic conditions. What we don't see is the way we have allowed a scarcity model to determine

[162] Teachers are not unsympathetic to the problem of stage fright. Seminars with advice and strategies for coping with stage fright are common and more than one supportive teacher has recommended the use of Beta Blockers as a coping strategy. What is not common, however, is questioning a system that limits the view of professional music making to high stakes competitive enterprises.

how we perceive music and its value to society. The value of music *per se* comes to be identified with the particular values embodied in successful competitors[163].

I draw particular attention to these expressions of ideology because I believe they are the source of enormous psychic pain amongst musicians — students, performers, and teachers alike. In music circles, the assumption is that competition is central to producing quality. This assumption, and the general economic conditions that we somehow see as not applying to us individually, pit us against one another. We are forced to compete again and again for scarce jobs. The stakes are not just symbolic; they are quite tangible. They represent life and death issues, including, for example, whether a musician will be able to work at all or whether they will be able to work in the same city as their spouse. At stake in an audition can be whether a player will have access to a modicum of job security or will remain in the free-lance market subject to the constant vulnerability of losing one's place in the pecking order (for health or other reasons often outside of one's control). This economic reality is hard on musicians in part because they identify their 'sense of self' so strongly with their ability to continue being a musician. "Quitting" music to take up another form of work that might be more stable and lucrative[164] has far more significance to a musician than finding a new job or even changing careers.

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[163] Regelski's concept of *phronesis* challenges the notion that perfection in performance constitutes some kind of "absolute" value in music. In other words, perfection is appropriate to some kinds of musical practices, but perfection, in itself, is not an absolute standard that determines value in music; rather, value is considered in terms of the "right results" achieved in particular settings. "The practiced perfection of productive techniques are necessary to any musical praxis, but they are not sufficient to understanding, realizing or accounting for its "goods" (Regelski, 1997, p. 44).

[164] Alternative kinds of work are not always so easy to find since musicians, as bright and entrepreneurial as many of us are, don't have a skill set that immediately qualifies us for other kinds of work.

"Quitting" almost always represents the belief that we will lose who we are — we will lose access to the place where our body, mind and souls are one[165]. Consequently, for musicians, analyses of ideology have the potential to give us perspective that is important to our psyches as well as to our material survival.

Power

Power represents an area of analysis that is not far removed from the function of ideology. Power is what we discover when we act in accordance with what we believe to be the best interests of ourselves and our communities only to discover that we are subject to outside interests (control) that we didn't know existed. In a footnote in Chapter Two, I related a story about the members of an orchestra who were reprimanded publicly – at the insistence of a corporate sponsor – for taking a stand for peace[166]. Until the musicians stepped out of their approved roles as instrumentalists, they were unaware of the conflict between their self-understanding as conscientious and engaged members of their communities and the meanings, values *and* material resources (of the corporate sector) that made their orchestral careers possible. The public face of corporate sponsorship, good corporate citizens supporting good people (the artists) doing good things (playing great music), obscures the material reality represented by the corporation's power to control the operation not only of an arts organization, but, also, the lives and citizenship of the members of that organization. Here is an example where

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[165] Rather than belabour these points here, I return to the question of the harsh material conditions faced by far too many musicians (and other artists) as they relate to ideology, materiality, power and authority and self-image in a Post-Script that follows the body of this thesis.

[166] I don't remember which particular act of aggression was being protested at the time.

the workings of power are revealed through an act of resistance, resulting in the unveiling of some of the structural elements of society to which we are subject. Power was expressed through the threat of the withdrawal of funds. Power was exercised through the public vilification of the peace protesters.

How does power play out specifically in the lives of musicians? One way is through our belief that people who are better players or have higher status jobs are assumed to be entitled to a respect that carries over to their worth as human beings[167]. Problematizing the notions of stardom and "star struck, for example" would make a worthwhile study on the intersection commerce, meaning-making and notions of self[168].

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[167] A senior conductor who was in residence at the National Youth Orchestra of Canada told the assembled students during a lecture that we were "slugs on the earth compared to the likes of Beethoven." I wondered then why it was not possible to respect a person's work without denigrating ourselves in the process, but I also had so much respect for this conductor, his accomplishments and his wisdom that I gave his comments a great deal of credibility.

[168] In fact, these connections do not come to me out of the blue. In *Understanding Toscanini,* author Joseph Horowitz (1987) examines how the public image of Toscanini was imbued with particular qualities that served the commercial interests of the time. Horowitz also looks at the social history of the period and the creation of the body of work now thoroughly commodified as "The Great Musical Masterpieces." These masterpieces represent the mainstay of the classical repertoire today and are part of the reason that audiences have come to expect they will hear pieces by composers who are long since dead. The commercial forces that worked to create a market for classical music were also supported by musical 'evangelists' who wanted to bring culture to the "masses"— as part of an effort to 'civilize' the population of the New World. Hence, Horowitz provides a window on a time period in which ideologies were created which, today, are taken for granted by many musicians and non-musicians alike. Another connection worthy of notice is how much this process of 'civilizing' a population sounds like the process of colonization. In the latter context, missionaries are sent to "new" lands to plant the seeds of a new ideology (thus saving the souls of the 'spiritually impoverished' natives) while preparing the ground for propertied interests to assume ownership of lands with a minimum of resistance. Colonization has been such a powerful historical influence. It is not surprising that it is manifested, not only in the long-held belief in the superiority of all things Western, but in the way our own choices as musicians are circumscribed by its ideological and material force.

As I described in Chapter Three, relationships between students and teachers are fraught with power dynamics that do not always serve the best interests of the students. Every musician has stories about emotional abuse that has been inflicted on students by their teachers. Sometimes the emotional abuse extends into sexual relationships in which the student becomes completely vulnerable to the opinions and wants of their teacher[169]. The dangers of power relations are compounded by the presence of the systemic effects of ideology and materiality. Routinely, students perceived to be performing below whatever has been deemed to be the standard, are ridiculed by their teachers and told that they have no business pursuing music as a career[170]. The difficulty of calling them to account has a great deal to do with the confluence of power, materiality, and ideology. Frequently situated in positions of material marginality (class, apprenticeship, educational legitimacy), the only way that students can challenge the power exercised by abusive teachers is to prove them wrong. Yet, given teachers' institutional responsibility for assigning students to ensembles, their role as adjudicators and their influence on job opportunities, students who would challenge their abusive instructors' belittling assertions face an uphill battle. Resistance thus plays directly into the influence of ideologies that equate personal value with competitive success. Looking at power dynamics from a critical framework would allow teachers and students to examine these dynamics in ways that depersonalize the issues.

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[169] Not every teacher-student relationship that becomes sexual is abusive or exploitative, but many are. It is difficult for anyone in a position of authority to cross over into an intimate relationship with a student, even an adult student, without confusing the boundaries between power and intimacy.

[170] Conducting classes with "Master Conductors" are notorious sites for demagoguery coupled with the derision of those deemed unfit to lead.

Critical consciousness in such instances allows all parties to step back and consider the purpose and goals of being part of an institution intended to nurture musical development. I believe that there are alternatives to the assumptions and material pressures that encourage the development of relationships shaped by power and vulnerability. In order to develop such alternatives, however, it is necessary first to unpack the interweaving influences of ideology, power, and materiality.

Inside/Outside Viewpoints

The development of critical consciousness offers us the capacity to see our work from both the inside and the outside. By problematizing our different roles as artists we are able to consider the paradigms expressed through our musical practices, our public presentations and the meanings embedded in musical discourses. We gain the capacity to step back from our work and our world and inquire about how we might be related to others in society. Likewise, we gain the capacity to consider how others might see *us*. A repercussion of limiting ourselves to narrow frames of reference is that we see ourselves as separate from issues that don't appear to affect us directly; in fact, we may simply not "notice" that factors outside our own immediate concerns are shaping our possibilities. In its worst form, a viewpoint focused on the inside can spawn the normalization of hierarchical categories: winners and losers, special people versus ordinary people, people we simply don't notice or even people we can totally discount. Mostly, though, what we gain by developing critical consciousness is to recognize our relatedness, our historical and social locatedness, and, thereby, to gain the capacity to work together with others on the conditions that shape our material realities.

Summary of moderate and strong arguments in favor of including critical consciousness in professional music studies

In Chapter Four I presented weak, moderate and strong arguments in favor of developing critical consciousness as part of an advanced level of education. A weak argument is one that requires the least amount of proof. In this case, my argument is based purely on self-interest in terms of one's basic capacity to survive. This argument does not need any further elaboration here — the same conditions apply whether one is a musician, home worker or engineer. A moderate argument requires a greater level of proof. In this case, I have based my argument on the assertion that we live in a democracy and, arguably, ought to be invested in maintaining and furthering this form of political organization. A strong argument requires a proof involving 'necessity.' Proving 'necessity' in philosophical terms is extremely difficult as it requires an agreement on what constitutes value in life. Therefore, my general argument in Chapter Four and the argument I make here directed towards musicians, will hold for those people who agree with my version of what constitutes a "good life."

Moderate Argument

We live in a country that considers democracy to be a defining characteristic. Democracy is not an objective state that will exist into perpetuity. Democracy, as articulated by such divergent writers as John Dewey, Paulo Freire and bell hooks, requires the constant efforts of its citizenry. Such efforts are also articulated as necessary by music education philosophers Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen, each of whom acknowledges the responsibility of music educators to further the goals of this system of political organization through their approaches to music education. Musicians are

positioned at an interesting site within our current democratic system. At this time in history we are particularly vulnerable to the effects of large economic forces and changing notions of what kinds of "services" should be paid for with public funds. At the same time, the availability of corporate funding is also being influenced by global forces. No particular group of working people in Canada is likely to have the capacity to strongly influence these structural conditions; however, in recognizing the conditions we share with others, that is, in recognizing our relatedness, we gain the capacity to work together with others to respond to these conditions and to work towards creating new conditions.

As cultural producers, we have the unique opportunity to generate meaning through our public activities. While this role suggests a responsibility to understand the meanings that we might be generating through our presentations, more than that, it suggests powerful opportunities to engage in public spaces as creators of public meaning. To me, this is a vision of our roles as 'artists,' and 'cultural producers' that inspires an unearthing of taken-for-granted meanings — an unearthing that could lead to broadening the scope of our artistic, cultural and personal engagements. Developing critical consciousness not only allows us to consider how our social and material locations intersect with ideological constructions, it gives us the opportunity to consider how we might generate cultural meanings that we have consciously chosen.

As potential arts council jury members, developing critical consciousness allows us to gain the capacity to consider what might be at stake in decisions around the distribution of funds — decisions that, in themselves, create and continue to create public meaning through the works produced by those who receive funding.

As teachers, we gain the capacity to look beyond the goals and expectations that seem to belong to our roles within music education institutions, and consider what projects we might share with our students. Further, we can consider, within a broad context of social, personal, and economic factors, how to work together with students in a way that acknowledges external forces while honouring what each person, teacher or student, brings to the learning process. Critical consciousness can allow us to step back from the pressures to achieve or maintain one's status as a performer, composer, conductor, music educator or musicologist and consider our work in light of the economic conditions that have such a bearing on how we experience ourselves in these roles.

Strong Argument

It is my conviction that understanding how we are situated empowers us to act as subjects, aware of what factors we are "subject to" but also empowered to choose what kinds of people we want to be. Musicians are tremendously committed to living their lives through music. I believe that we are attracted to this profession out of a desire to keep the passion, challenge, focus and enormous satisfaction that we experience as musicians, at the centre of our lives. I believe also that for many, choosing music as a career is a form of resistance to accepting a life in which the fruits of one's labour are used to serve purposes other than our own. Being a musician, at least before one discovers the perils of surviving on a musician's income, offers the opportunity to "own" in a physical, intellectual and spiritual sense, the musical energy we generate — an energy that represents a union of our minds, bodies and spirits. We have trouble conceiving of ourselves as 'workers' because, on good days, we get tremendous

enjoyment out of what we do and this enjoyment is not an assumed part of "working for a living.".

The passion that we bring to being musicians, however, is also part of our particular vulnerability in a world that doesn't reward our passion with material structures to support wage-earning opportunities. Through the journey I have taken while writing this thesis, I have learned that, while I am still passionate about playing music, I am even more passionate about the possibilities of collaborating with others to create structures that support our material and spiritual survival as human beings. Developing critical consciousness has allowed me to step back from the particulars of my own struggle to survive as a musician and to recognize the systemic factors that shape and will continue to shape that experience. From this new vantage point, I am able to consider what I bring to life and consider how I might bring my skills, energy and passion to a world I can contribute to making.

In the following passage I believe the term 'philosophy' is interchangeable with the term 'critical consciousness:'

> Maxine Greene invites us to "do philosophy," to struggle with ideas, with the arts, with the events of the world, with the daily newspapers and our idiosyncratic chance encounters--all in order to become more aware of ourselves and our world, more aware of our inter-subjective predicaments, and then, importantly, to act on our awarenesses. To act on what we find; to act, even with partial consciousness; to act, even with contingent understanding; to act, to be a participant in the world. (Ayers, 1998, p.ix)[171]

How this awareness has changed my conception of myself as a musician has allowed me to explore other means of musical expression not dependent on the performance

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[171]Ayers, W. C., & Miller Janet L. (. (1998). *A light in dark times.* New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University.

standards of a professional symphony orchestra. This includes working with children and young people to put together creative music projects in which musical skills are built, but the artistic products we strive for are based on contributions from everyone involved with the project. Much like Regelski's notion of *phronesis* and consonant with Jorgensen's dialectical and dialogical approach, we create the value amongst ourselves through learning to focus our energies towards shared musical and personal goals. This work is not something I do to 'fill in time' between my more 'important' work as a member of a professional ensemble; it is an alternative expression of my musical and personal goals of significant meaning and value[172].

Paul Freire, bell hooks, David Karp and Maxine Greene argue that there is a necessity to develop critical consciousness in order to fulfill ourselves as human beings and to achieve mental health in a world that assaults and assails us with seemingly irresolvable problems. For these writers, as for me, developing critical consciousness addresses our fundamental human need to be fully engaged, conscious of our material locations, conscious of our relatedness to others and conscious of our capacities to act and thus able to participate, fully, in making the world.

Looking to the Future

The approach I am suggesting for the educational of professional musicians does not exist at this time — at least not to my knowledge. Nevertheless, there are resources available that we can use to develop such an educational framework. The field of

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[172] I would like to note here the enormous amount I learned about working with nonprofessionals on musical projects through my work with members of the Performance and Communication Skills program at the Guildhall School of Music and Drama in London, England.

philosophy of music education provides us with an excellent starting place to explore the nature and meaning of music. Each of the writers, though with different sets of priorities, poses challenges to our assumptions about music and what roles it can have in our lives. Bennett Reimer's (2003) substantially revised book addresses many of the insights and critiques of a younger generation of writers and integrates many new ideas into his approach to music education.

There are also numerous works from within critical music theory that illuminate aspects of materiality, ideology and power as manifested in the field of music. For example, the work of Susan McClary (1991), Lucy Green (1997; 1998), Philip Brett (1994) and others explore music as discourse from the point of view of gender representations in music. Charlene Morton writes on the "Feminization of Music Education" (Morton, 1994 & 1996) and how this affects the status of the field and argues elsewhere for the importance of looking beyond the field of music for understanding our educational priorities (Morton, 2004). Morton, O'Dea (1993) and Bogdan write from a feminist perspective on the politics of music education and informed engagement. Christopher Small (1998) examines internal musical structures as they are reflected in external social expressions and provides a biting analysis of ideologies that continue to shape the world of the orchestral musician. Paul Woodford explores the relationship between democracy and music education in his forthcoming book (Indiana University Press). Ajay Heble (2000; 2003) and Daniel Fischlin (2003) of Guelph University have published an edited collection of papers that study music as a form of resistance and political expression. Gillian Siddall and Ajay Heble (2000) have written on issues surrounding the presence of women in jazz and the way that producers of music festivals

also create culture and generate meanings through their choices of programming and performers. Roberta Lamb at Queens University offers a course on Women, Gender and Music. John Shepherd (1991; 1997) and Peter Wicke (1997) write extensively about the sociology of music. Included in the work of these writers are critical analyses of discourses and practices within popular, jazz and classical music genres. In addition, there is a growing body of literature that explores meaning-making in the world of Hip Hop and the music of youth cultures.

Each of these writers approaches their areas of interest with a concept of critical engagement similar to the concept of critical consciousness I have portrayed in this thesis. Thus, while the model of a program that challenges all professional music students to examine the influences of materiality, ideology and power as they are reflected in musical practices and the ways our lives as musicians are shaped does not yet exist, the resources are available to structure such a program. There is also a vast body of literature in fields outside of music: for example, cultural criticism, literature, art, women's studies, race and gender studies and sociology, where critical approaches to knowledge have been present for some time.

Following the principles of praxis as articulated within the framework of historical materialism, a music program based on developing critical consciousness would include the various kinds of musical skill-building with which we are already familiar, framed within opportunities to study the ways that ideology, materiality and power are reflected in musical practices. For example, instead of studying music history as a progression of significant composers and the development of different musical styles, we might look carefully at the material conditions in which certain works were created

and explore how these conditions are reflected within these works. Here the insights of Susan McClary, Lucy Green and Christopher Small could provide a starting place for critical analysis. We might also study who is represented and who is not represented in such cultural expressions and how this lack of representation continues to shape the content and expression of these cultural forms. When studying form and analysis, along with learning to understand the various ways composers have constructed their pieces, we might explore how these structures reflect the belief systems of the times in which they were produced. To some extent this is done now; however, from a critical perspective, it would be important to connect such belief systems with those we take for granted today, challenging those beliefs rather than simply accepting them as "normal."

Ethnomusicology has a great deal to offer all music students. Here, we might explore the way music functions within unfamiliar cultures at the same time as applying the investigative strategies of this field to the ways musical culture is manifested in our own culture. Proceeding in this way might also break the pattern of seeing all cultures different from our own as "exotic" or "other" rather than seeing them as living expressions of culture every bit as valid as our own.

In music theory we might move beyond attempting to reproduce theoretical constructs belonging to previous generations of composers to seeing ourselves as potential creators of music, learning theoretical systems in order to develop the capacity to create music ourselves. Changing the focus of music theory from reproduction to creation would, in itself, challenge the notion that only composers, musicians purported to have inordinate musical capacities, had the right and the capacity to be musical creators. Perhaps composers, musicologists, conductors and music educators might also

be accorded the assumption that they too, might have the means to contribute meaningfully in other capacities as musicians[173]. Such an approach would immediately challenge the hierarchy of values ascribed to different branches of the profession[174]. Another possibility would be to develop an additional course that looks critically at various kinds of contemporary cultural expression, looking at the material locations, stated purposes and the larger social forces that shape how these expressions move through the world. All performers and educators could explore the different ways that musicians can function within communities and work together with musical learners with different skill levels[175]. Students could also be encouraged to pursue their own cultural explorations outside of their course work, for example, by organizing improvisation sessions for students from different musical genres (not just jazz players) or encouraging students to pursue their own re-mix or turntabling interests.

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[173] There are, of course, numerous examples of musicians who have moved beyond the fields in which they received their principal musical education. What I am challenging are the structures and ideologies that tend to limit our thinking and development during the educational process itself.

[174] Conductors are better than soloists who are better than instrumentalists who are better than music educators who are better than amateurs – though not by much. Musicologists and theoreticians are smarter than everyone but they can't play so they don't count; composers are now seen as *possibly* human, but they are still suspect because they sometimes write things that can't be played (so they're not as smart as they think they are), and, standing above us all, are great composers. None of us will ever be able to achieve the worth of these composers because they are already deemed to be great, and, because they are already dead, so their ascendancy is a given.

[175] Such a program, modeled in part on the Performance and Communication skills program of the Guildhall School, was developed and in use for a time at the Royal Conservatory of Music. The program was run by Ezra Schabas, a former Dean at the Faculty of Music at the University of Toronto.

Through modifying existing music programs, we could start a process of unearthing the meanings that currently shape the priorities of professional music institutions and begin a process of freeing ourselves from the assumptions that determine the priorities of professional music education. Entering into such a process would enable, not only the few rebels who challenge the system on their own, but all of us to engage in a continual process of engagement and reflection as we move beyond replicating values to creating culture on terms we have considered and have chosen.

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